A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS IN SCHOOL SCIENCE by Watts, D Michael
A STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS IN SCHOOL SCIENCE 
D. Michael Watts 
In partial fUlfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy, 
University of Surrey, 1983 
SUMMARY 
This study makes use of a constructivist epistemological 
stance (in particular that of George Kelly) to explore the 
. 
many conceptions young people develop for four concepts in 
school science - energy, force, heat and light. The work is 
placed within a growing area of research into students' alter-
native conceptual frameworks and by adopting a broad, action-
able, notion of a concept it is possible to explore the 
beliefs and contingencies that pervade these youngsters' 
personal theories. The central methodology involved is an 
individual interview approach framed around a set of line 
drawings depicting various situations which the students are 
asked to discuss in terms of their own conceptions. The 
interview sessions are conducted in schoo~and are audio-
recorded. The four concepts are treated separately across 
three age bands and the resulting four-by-three, twelve cell, 
matrix lays the pattern for the analysis and d~scussion of 
data. Three levels of analysis are discussed which are 
conceptions, categories of response and frameworks, and these 
are used as a means of examining the transcript data for some 
134 interviews. The relatic1nships betwaen the frameworks are 
considered and some emphasis is given to the degree of overlap 
that occurs in the students' use of the four main concepts. 
The responses of four particular students are explored across 
all four concepts and the resulting four-by-four, sixteen 
cell, matrix allows a study of their personalised approach 
to these ideas in further detail. The methodological checks 
employed are evaluated and, finally, summaries of the outcomes 
i 
of the study are made, implications for current practices in 
science education are drawn and future trends for research 
are indicated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nothing is more characteristic of everyday school life 
than the innum~rabie ordinary answers that students give 
as they record impressions, give reasons and provide explan-
ations of their world at large. Within a context of school 
science the answers may be so innumerable and ordinary as 
to be overlooked. This study represents a closer view. 
Its central claim is that, whilst commonplace, youngsters' 
explanations are far from being ordinary in the sense of 
drab or repetetive: they are genuinely creative attempts 
to explain their own experiences. Many answers to questions 
are not entirely for a questioner's benefit; youngsters 
have a real and material stake in securing for themselves 
viable answers as to how things work in the world. The 
search for answers stands both at the very centre of cog-
nition and the heart of science. It provides the impetus 
from which knowledge of the world is arrived: at. 
The purpose of this work is to explore students' res-
ponses concerned with particular concepts and situations in 
science. In doing so, it attempts to describe the patterns 
of belief, both naive and sophisticated~ that students 
bring to bear on their explanations of common phenomena. 
Behind it lies the premiaethat it is important to the 
venture of science education that school students find 
science both meaningful and relevant. To describe students' 
perspectives is to grant teachers the insights to allow 
them to facilitate that meaning and relevance. A second 
premise is that people, in general, do not settle for any 
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answer as explanatory. They seek viable and tenable answers 
that are compatible with their experiences and are amplia-
tive. That is, they enhance understanding - if only in 
a small way. Quick, intuitive ascriptions and deliberate, 
sophisticated explanations are parts of a single system of 
practice and belief within each individual. 
In recent years, there has been an important change 
of direction in research in science education. The respon-
ses students provide in the course of learning science have 
enjoyed two extremes of treatment. In the psychological 
arena they have commonly been treated as problems; treated 
in broad terms and have often been subsumed within general 
developmental theories of cognition. This approach may be 
attributed to the fact that research in all areas of child-
rens' cognitive development has been greatly influenced by 
the work of Jean Piaget. 
In contrast, within the area of science instruction, 
the 'deviant' is often dispatched rapidly anq-has little 
or no status. Mistakes are commonly associated with indiv-
iduals, not groups, and are categorically rejected as 
'wrong' with respect to tsupposedly) correct science. 
For researchers, the prospect has been between assuming 
a cornmon pool of experience and then seeking universal, 
developmental changes of conceptual structures on the one 
hand - or valuing individual idiosyncratic conceptions 
on the other. The latter is to recognise the wide diver-
sities of conceptual development (dependant upon the context 
and content of specific experiences), and is a choice to 
explore localised changes related to particular areas of 
knowledge. 
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This study follows the second path. The eventual argu-
ment is that it may be untenable to look for universal, 
invariant cognitive structures across broad age-related 
groups. Thus, it is part of a small, but now expanding, 
body of idiographic research into children's understandings 
of parts of science. Some previous attempts have focused 
on conceptual development as though this was in some way 
separate from language. However, it seems likely that a 
major aspect of the problem is the way in which everyday 
terms are used in a specialised context. Many concept labels 
in science are typically multi-meaning (polysemic) and 
exist at varying levels of explicitness. Explicit concepts 
are defined eventually by implicit ones whether they are 
the precise concepts of a public knowledge domain like 
physics, or the imprecise personal conceptions of a young 
physicist. The interactions between implicit and explicit; 
personal and public are a continuing theme throughout. 
A number of decisions and judgements formative in shap-
ing this work have been made on pragmatic educational 
grounds. Foremost of these has been the selection of the 
four concepts under consideration: force, energy, heat and 
light. They were selected not as concepts basic to modern 
physics - although arguably they fit that description too -
but for their prevalence within school science curricula 
as made manifest by syllabi and text books. 
Whilst this work is not bound by a single theory and 
is informed by several distinct principles, it must be said 
that it leans heavily upon the writings of George Kelly and 
his theory of personal constnucts. In part, this is taken to mean 
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that learning, as a general process of change within child-
hood, adoleaence and thereafter, continues remorselessly. 
It is not restricted to classrooms, to what a teacher intends 
should take place, or even to what she thinks is taking 
place. It recognises that a person achieves a large part 
of his education 'in the world' and that people are active 
meaning-bestowing agents. 
Making this assumption places considerable stress upon 
each individual's past experience and prior knowledge 
when a person bestows meaning they do so in a way that 
relates to a meaning structure they already have. Here 
recorded interviews are used to explore individual meanings 
and to establish common belief patterns. The language youn-
gsters use is scrutinised for evidence of such common 
rconceptual frameworks'. This process in turn allows for 
an exploration of the complex issues concerning the status 
and interrelatedness of distinctive frameworks and both the 
functional and logical boundaries that may exist between 
them. 
This study is reflexive in that it is itself an example 
of what it hopes to discuss. The construction of world views 
as a part of their imaginative efforts to explain phenomena 
is not solely a feature of young people. Rather than follow 
the customary practice of engaging in a general review of 
pertinent literature, each of the major sections is intro-
duced with regard to its own origins and perspectives. 
Thus at two levels the emphasis is upon drawing together 
some of the distinctive strands of argument in order to 
explore their continuity and coherence. 
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After some theoretical and methodological discussions, 
answers to the following main questions will be sought: 
(a) What are the major alternative (conceptual) frameworks 
commonly held for each of the four concepts of energy, force, 
heat and light? 
(b) How do these conceptual frameworks vary in samples of 
secondary school students of different ages? 
(c) What is the relationship between individual conceptions 
of phenomena and the commonly held frameworks? 
(d) In what ways are the frameworks related and what dist-
inctions mark the limits to each one? 
(e) To what exte~t are the conceptions and common frameworks 
context bound? 
(f) What are some of the consequences for both student and 
teacher of each idea? 
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CHAPTER 1 
Section 1.0: Introduction 
Section 1.1: A discussion of concepts 
The process-product dimension 
The formal-informal dimension 
The hypothesis-testing-abstraction dimension 
The semantic-logico-mathematical dimension 
Section 1.2: Misconceptions and alternative frameworks 
(i) Studies of misconceptions 
(ii) Some factors influencing a change to 
alternative frameworks 
(iii) A review of some 'newer investigations' 
Section 1.3: Developing a conceptual framework 
1.0: Introduction 
This thesis is about the responses made by young people 
to questions concerning some specific concepts in school 
science. They are asked to respond in terms of their under-
standings of these concepts as they apply them to a range 
of common situations. What results is an interweaving of 
many meanings. A single youngster as (s)he talks uses the 
concepts in such ways as to signal a variety of meanings 
which can shade into one another, and which, in turn, inter-
connect with the meanings given by other youngsters. The 
task of the thesis is to impose some order on this web of 
interrelations. 
There are four major themes that run through all of 
the chapters to follow. First, any imposition of order on 
these varied discussions is not to subvert the ideas and 
opinions profferred by the youngsters involved. Instead, 
the intention is to highlight the texture, the .richness and 
quality of the 'weft and warp' of their pronouncements. 
That is, their discussions are treated seriously as indica-
ting their own personal theories for parts of science. 
A second theme is that of constructivism: the view 
that these youngsters - as the leading actors in this activity 
- construct their own knowledge through interactions with 
the world around them. They come to know things about their 
environs only in so far as they can make interpretations of 
it, and approach a greater awareness of events by construct-
ing successive approximations and hypotheses. 
Third, an allied theme is the tension between partial 
or piecemeal views of the world and a notion of underlying 
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integration. There is a sense in which the many systems 
of ideas operated by an individual person are always held 
in unity by that individual. The constructive integrating 
ability of each person enables explanations to retain a 
unity - which leads, in this study, to exploring the inter-
related interpretations of the world that youngsters use as 
they bring coherence to it. 
Fourthly, a major strand is the interplay between 
individual and collective accounts of the same, or similar 
events. It revolves around the attempts to make comparisons 
between individuals in their constructions of experience. 
In the context of this study, some youngsters can be seen 
to provide very similar accounts which lead them to draw 
very different conclusions. Conversely, they can use very 
different explanations which converge to an almost identical 
result. The problem is a methodological one: how to cons-
truct interpretations of similarities in meaning and yet 
express essential differences. 
In the field of science education research, the central 
thrust of this thesis can be neatly pinpointed by reference 
to a figure used by Driver (1982). It is shown below in 
figure 1: 
Development 
of logical 
operations 
Figure 1 
Development of causal frameworks 
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In that paper, sandwiched as it is amongst critiques 
of Jean Piaget's work, Driver surveys the implications of 
Piaget's writings for science education. Her conclusion is 
that his theories are a useful but only partially apt desc-
ription of young people's development in science. Separate 
from, and of equal importance to, their development of 
logical operations (as described by Piaget) is the develop-
ment of their causal frameworks. 
It is not that Piaget's work is the only one to have 
a bearing on science education. In that same volume, for 
example, Novak (1982) discusses a number of theoretical 
approaches to describing student conceptualising in science. 
However, as Driver points out, Piaget's ideas have been 
highly influencial in this curriculum area. He can be 
credited in his early work (Piaget 1929, 1930, for example) 
with initiating exploration of children's causal frameworks 
only to ignore this aspect of conceptual development and 
emphasis in his later work, the structure of .. ·logical oper-
ations. In comparison to the large amount of research 
conducted in that field, conceptual frameworks have been 
barely touched. The purpose of this study is to assist in 
a small way in some redress of this situation. 
Bringing Piaget's name to the fore in this introduction 
is not to place this study in opposition to the direction 
of his work - rather to use it as a reference point and 
(as Driver (1982) suggests might be the case) to augment 
it. It shares a number of the metaphysical assumptions with 
his work - namely in terms of his views on the participants 
in the research, the methodologies appropriate to that 
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activity and an underlying epistemological stance. Piaget's 
constructivism (Piattelli-Palmari~ 1980; Furth, 1980) main-
tains that the development of 'knowing' is something each 
one must construct for themself. It is not that Piaget 
ignores social influences, it is that knowing is an active 
process~ knowledge is not passively received. 
However, to move along the 'causal framework' axis of 
Driver's figure is to depart from the mainstream of Piagetian 
enquiry. In doing so it moves away from considerations of 
strict logic and towards a more diffuse area of language and 
meaning, of personalised constructions of events as elabor-
ated in linguistic terms. As Elliot and Donaldson (1982) 
point out, this is an issue which Piaget does not widely 
address - the active use of language to explore issues, to 
give answers and justifications, and to find things out. 
In this case other reference points are sought where similar 
metaphysical assumptions, are in force. Foremost of these 
is the work of George Kelly (1955) which ofters a number 
of insights into the personalised constructions of individ-
uals. Others have drawn parallels between Piaget and Kelly 
(for example, Bannister and Fransella, 1980) which are not 
pursued in detail here. Rather, it is their general under-
lying notions of the constructive development of knowledge 
that is of interest. 
This study, then, centres on the responses that school 
students provide as they discuss some fairly common situat-
ions, and the meanings that they have for some common words 
in school science. Many linguists (for example, Smith, 
1982) make a distinction between two aspects of language, 
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its surface structure and deep structure. The former can 
be regarded as its physical properties - the sounds of 
speech, the written marks on a page. The latter, on the 
other hand, is meaning. Meaning, as Smith pOints out, defies 
measurement. It: 
'exists in our minds - in the nonverbal, inaccessible 
theory of the world in our head - underlying the language 
we produce and making sense of the language we understand. I 
Surface structure and deep structure are not reflections of 
each other, there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
spoken (or written) words and meanings that are singly, or 
cOllectively held. That is, meanings can be expressed by 
more than one set of expressions and anyone expression 
can have more than one meaning. 
Smith's notion of 'worlds in our head
' 
epitomises 
those important strands throughout all of the chapters to 
follow. Constructivism, as seen by Kelly, is an active 
construction of meaning that is not independent of the 
person doing the construing. As Novak (1981).~ .suggests: 
'ignoring or negating the internal world of people 
misses the essence of their personhood, flattens human 
reality and leads to educational practices which are 
mechanistic and lacking in respect for the basic integrity 
of the person. I 
In this study, a serious attempt is made to explore 
with students the ways in which they use words like force, 
energy, heat, light (and so on) in order to explain phenomena. 
It is a central tenet that it is important to come to an 
understanding of the view of the world held by youngsters 
as they attempt to make sense of, and personally reconstruct, 
the science they meet at school. In this way it is part of 
a growing shift in focus of educational research towards the 
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study of individual and collective views around particular 
issues (Pope, watts and Gilbert, 1983). 
The expression 'causal framework' is itself an 
example of the gulf between surface and deep structure in 
that it has a multiplicity of meanings. The notion of 
causation is itself not unproblematic and, as is discussed 
in chapter 4, the use of the word framework varies even 
within a small research area. Elsewhere Driver (in Driver 
and Easley, 1978) refers to alternative frameworks and des-
cribes them by saying: 
'In learning about the physical world, alternative 
interpretations seem to be the products of pupils' imagin-
ative efforts to explain events and abstract commonalities 
they see between them.' 
In similar lines of research they are known as 'misconcept-
ions' (Helm, 1980), 'preconceptions' (Novak, 1977) and 
'children's science' (Gilbert, Osborne and Fensham, 1982). 
This study concentrates upon pupils' responses to questions 
on specific science concepts and, as such, makes use of the 
expression in the form alternative conceptual-frameworks. 
In mapping the field of relevant research, in order 
to locate this study within a broader research tradition 
it is useful to talk in terms of a movement. In general 
this is a movement away from the notion of misconceptions 
towards one of alternative conceptual frameworks. This 
is illustrated in figure 2. 
MISCONCEPTIONS--------------------------~, ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORKS 
Figure 2 
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This representation gives some substance to what Gilbert 
and Swift (1981) and Sutton (198~ refer to as the 'alter-
native frameworks movement', in that it indicates what the 
movement might be moving away from, and the direction it 
is moving in. It would be misleading to suggest that all 
of the work to be considered here has a common basis by 
which to plot its progress along such an arrow as is shown 
in figure 2. However, a general trend is detectable in 
some senses - often as a change of emphasis within programmes 
of work, or in the citing of kinds of literature by which 
to contextualise a single study. In a survey of recent 
alternative frameworks research, Driver and Erickson (1982) 
suggest that there are three widely held assumptions: 
i) Some form of 'cognitive structure' in people is pre-
supposed. It is perhaps a structure of content-independent 
processing skills, but for most of the more recent studies, 
(they suggest) it is a structure of con~ent-dependent 
elements such as particular concepts or proPQ~itions; 
ii) A constructivist epistemology is assumed; 
ii) It is taken on tru~t that understanding pupils' ideas 
is important for the classroom. 
These are useful pointers to the 'state of the art' as it 
is at present. There is a need, however, to characterise 
the origins of the movement up to this pOint and to project 
forward from it. Whereas this study can be seen to fit 
comfortably within the three assumptions above, it is also 
an attempt to make progress forward along the line of research. 
One way to map the research movement is to examine 
the notion of a concept which has arisen in the course of 
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the various studies. There is often an assumption that 
everyone knows, in a general sort of way at least, what a 
concept is and how it is used. In actuality this assump-
tion is far from being as innocent as might appear at first 
sight, and it cloaks an essential ambiguity in the use of 
the word. To plot the shift in meanings of this term is 
to give some indication to the trend of development towards 
the 'newer investigations' (as Driver and Erickson call 
them) of students' alternative frameworks. In this way 
'concept' is used as a shibboleth for marking studies along 
this line of research. 
The remainder of this chapter is split into three 
main sections. The first details this discussion of concepts 
as a way of shedding light on the field of work already 
completed. The second section continues by exploring the 
movement depicted in figure 2~ and the third develops from 
this a rationale for a more explicit view of conceptualis-
ation to shape the empirical work in fOllowing chapters. 
1.1: A Discussion of Concepts 
The tide of curriculum innovation in science education, 
began some twenty years ago and well described by Bruner 
(1977) and Novak (1977), was motivated largely by scientists' 
dissatisfaction with the backwardness of the teaching mater-
ial of the time. The response from curriculum designers 
was to adopt the policy of first isolating the 'main' con-
cepts of the discipline. These concepts were then dissected 
into portions of 'digestible' size, ordered into a logical 
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sequence and delivered to an awaiting student (see Gagne 
1970; Gowin, 1970; for examples) • 
Optimism concerning the efficiency of such a process 
has now waned, with the realisation that the interactions 
between the roles of learner, teacher and course material 
are of vital importance (Laurillard, 1979; Marton and 
S~ljo, 1976; Saljo, 1982). Nevertheless, concepts are 
increasingly to be seen as integral parts of curriculum 
statements of many kinds - syllabi, school texts, teacher 
training material and a variety of articles on how and 
what to teach. As a mark of their importance Stones (1979) 
for example, argues that: 
'the skill of teaching for concept learning is prob-
ably one of the most important skills a teacher should 
acquire.' 
In only a few references to concepts is there any acknow-
ledgement that the term itself may be ambiguous, or have 
many referents. Nearly two decades ago, Wallace (1965) 
rued the lack of a generally accepted defini~ion of 'concept' 
or 'conceptual activity' by which he might arrange the wide 
variety of concept studies he reviewed. Freyberg (1980) 
notes the current diversity of meanings the term has for 
many educationalists. Claxton (1980) makes the same pOint 
for psychologists when he says: 
'The most glaring example of ••• isolationism is seen 
at the very heart of cognitive psychology, in the study of 
conceptualisation: what are concepts? How are they repre-
sented? How are they formed and used? We have the Cell-
Assemblians (headed by D.O. Hebb), the stored-Contingencies 
of-Reinforcements (led by Skinner), the Cambridge Logo-
Geneticists (under Ch1ef John Morton), the Semantic Networkers 
(like Collins and Quillan), the extinct but revered Old 
Schematicians (Piaget), New Schematicians (Neisser) and a 
thousand others - all grappling with the same central problems.' 
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From the multitude of distinctions that can be made 
between the major schools of thought, this section concent-
rates on four. The intention is not to undergo an exhaust-
ive review of all concept studies, so much has been accom-
plished by others like Bourne, Dominowski and Loftus (1979) 
or Bolton (1977). Nor are all studies pertinent. Rather 
by choosing the four dimensions enumerated below it is 
possible to explore some of the antecedents of this work: 
i) Process Product 
~ Informal Formal 
iii) Hypothesis testing Abstraction 
iv) Semantic Logico-mathematical 
Such a treatment of concepts is, of necessity, selective. 
The aim is not so much a 'compleat' treatment of concepts, 
more a critical appreciation of the term in use as a guide 
to pinpointing its limitations. 
These four dimensions emphasise the inherent ambiguity 
of the word concept. It can apply with equal authority to 
describe both the individual personal knowledge structures 
of the human mind and to the general categories of public 
disciplines. It is the way in which the interaction of 
these two meanings is discussed that indicates the orient-
ation of a particular study. Largely, the bulk of research 
work into concepts and concept development sees the concept 
itself as fairly imnlutable and focuses instead upon how 
people perform as they fail (or manage) to 'acquire' it. 
In Marton's (1981) terms, this is a first-order perspective. 
This study, however, adopts a second-order perspective (a 
pOint discussed more fully in chapter 2) and considers the 
interaction between personal conceptions and public concepts 
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as far as possible through the eyes of the actors involved. 
(i) The process product dimension 
A process/product dichotomy is an oft used separation, 
and here it is brought to bear on the nature of concepts. 
There are those who regard a- concept as a verb, a guiding 
action, a dynamic process of organising occurrences in the 
light of one's past experiences (for example, Markova, 1982); 
and those for whom a concept is a noun, a product of concep-
tualisati6n or, as Wallace (1965) parodies it, 'a piece of 
mental furniture'. Russell (1960), for example, talks of 
concepts as 'one type of the material of thought as distinct 
from the processes.' In contrast, Vinacke (1952) describes 
them as 'cognitive organisation systems which bring past 
experience to bear on a present object or situation.' 
It is a dimension which highlights two distinctive 
approaches. Firstly, treating concepts as products tends 
to the view that they are fixed, referential, independent 
components of cognition. Secondly, it provides for the 
notion that, once attained, they are relatively static. 
White (1979), for example, considers concepts to be units 
of cognition in a cognitive structure that is 'more static 
than fluid'. This tendency to nominalise concepts has been 
criticised by many for example, Putnam (1979) suggests that 
it is a fallacy to ascribe to the mind what is only an 
abstract property of its operations. Lenneberg (1967) also 
argues that: 
'Concepts / •.•• / are not so much the product of man's 
cognition, but conceptualisation is the cognitive process 
itself' • (emphasis in the original). 
loll 
(ii) The Informal Formal dimension 
A second distinction is between informal and formal 
concepts. Essentially, this is a distinction between con-
cepts that are seemingly found ready-made in the world 
outside the person, and concepts generated by the person 
himself. Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) make a similar 
separation: 
'Conceptual classification, like many other cognitive 
functions, seems to exist at two distinct levels: one level 
consists of the intuitive, implicit categories of daily life, 
many of which are reflected in ordinary language, and the 
other consists of the more self-conscious and cold-blooded 
categories of an explicit classification system such as one 
finds in a science.' 
The implication here is not that there are two, or more, 
different kinds of concepts so much as the two levels repre-
sent opposite ends of a continuum. By an 'informal' concept 
is meant a tacit, perhaps partially explicit conceptualis-
ation in contrast to a fully explicit, societally accepted 
form which Ziman (1979) calls: 
'A concept within an academic subject.'; 
There is a second aspect to the informal-formal dist-
inction which might have been better served by being treated 
as a separate dimension. Instead it is included here 
because at least one of the two parts remains the same. 
A very large number of concept studies have been conducted 
using 'experimental' concepts rather than 'everyday ones. 
In this case they are not the formal rigorously precise 
concepts of, say, physics but are what Dodd and White 
(1980) call 'logical concepts'. They are formal in the 
sense that they are defined by a strict rule and a set of 
pre-determined attributes, or are defined by single arbit-
rary artificial value. This 'common element' - or monothetic 
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approach relies on sorting or matching tasks of geometric 
designs or nonsense syllables. It is typified by the work 
of Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956). On the other hand, 
Rosch (1977) has argued that everyday, natural (informal) 
concepts are not logically bound entities. They are seldom 
unified by a single common property - are polythetic - and 
are, in Rosch's view, 'fuzzy'. 
The 'formal' view of concepts - as it is used here -
is one Markova (1982) relegates to a Cartesian tradition. 
One consequence of this is that studies of conceptual devel-
opment are often concerned with straight forward 'object' 
concepts (like 'ball') which have direct referable meanings, 
and so (by extrapolation to all concepts) that the acquis-
ition of knowledge is a 'yes-no affair'. It is a trend in 
psychological studies that treats people as containing 
special compartments dealing with reasoning, one with 
emotions, one with beliefs, one with language and so on 
(Salmon, 1980). 
(iii) Hypothesis-testing Abstraction dimension 
This third distinction has a long history: it is a 
long-standing discussion between schoOls of concept form-
ation, the abstractionists being what Bolton (1977) calls 
the 'traditional' school. He describes them this way: 
"The traditional theory, known as the theory of abst-
raction, or as the 'copy-theory', is that concepts are 
formed by the subject abstracting (ie., 'drawing away') 
certain resemblances among otherwise dissimilar stimuli. 
On this view, a concept is a representation of the general-
ities we have observed to occur among our many particular 
perceptions. The opposing point of view is that a concept 
is formed not by the subject merely attending to such 
general features but by having a particular hypothesis about 
certain features of his environment." 
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The abstractionists have been roundly ctiticised (see 
Nelson, 1974; Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977; Markova, 1982, 
for example), primarily for the model of human learning 
that underlies this stance. Essentially it implies that 
individuals are passive recipients of sensations, merely 
attending to general features amongst stimuli. It belies 
the notion that consciousness is intentional. Piaget (1979) 
for example, has long been an adversary of such abstract-
ionism and has maintained a constructivist and interactionist 
approach. His work has prompted Kessen and Nelson (1978) 
to say: 
'Of course, it would be a moment of memorial grandeur 
to assert that Piaget's critique had at last and forever 
chased abstraction theory - in its classical and in its 
modern modes - off the psychological field, but the dragon 
still limps around, still breathing out obfuscating smoke.' 
One aspect of the 'modern mode' of abstractionism 
alluded to here concerns the primacy and sequencing of oper-
ations during concept formation. Clark (1973) for example 
ar~ues that when young children categorise o~jects, it is 
perceptual similarity that is of fundamental importance. 
Nelson (1974), however, contradicts this by saying that it 
is the functionality of the object that is paramount. She 
presents a strong argument that any theory visualising 
children as simply attending to perceptual 'features' again 
overlooks the child's own independent organisation of exp-
erience. 
(iv) Semantic Logico-mathematical dimension 
The last distinction is between those who study sem-
antic conepts, and those who have explored logico-mathernatical 
ones. Studies within linguistics and cognition are often 
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seen as separate and distinct, to the point that a recent 
debate between leading exponents in each field (Chomsky 
and Piaget) was heralded by the organisers as 'historically 
important' (Piattelli-Palmarini, 1980). Many studies of 
logico-mathematical concepts are associated with Piaget's 
work. In essence, the crux of his theory of mental devel-
opment is that a child's intellectual growth is not due to 
sensory perception or anything else passively impressed on 
her from outside, but by her own actions. These actions 
are internalised through the child's acquisition of language 
and her growing use of imagination and representation. 
These in turn are organised into mental operations governed 
by rules of mobile equilibrium, basically rules of logic 
and mathematics. 
On the other side, some of Piaget's critics oppose 
his relegation of language to the periphery of cognitive 
processes (Brown and Desforges, 1979; Donaldson, 1978). 
Moreover he seeks cognitive 'universals' (unIJ,:ke Chomsky's 
linguistic ones) and concentrates upon logical 'schema' 
rather than natural language concepts. Both Moore (1973) 
and Nelson (1977) see Piaget's theory as being more easily 
reconciled with semantic development at early stages of 
infancy. It loses its applicability as the child ages. 
As Sinclair-deZwart (1973) says: 
'Piaget sees the construction of cognitive operations 
as following structurally defined stages and as a universal 
phenomenon ••• No such necessary and universal character is 
attached to the morpho-syntactical rules of specific lang-
uages and therefore we cannot expect either universality or 
clearly defined stages: in fact we expect them less and 
less as language learning proceeds.' 
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Semantic development is possibly the least understood 
aspect of language development. Much of the oldest lines 
of research have concerned vocabulary counts, used as indi-
cations of vocabulary growth. Some latterday examples of 
this approach are Evans (1974) and Cassels and Johnstone 
~979). A decline in interest has come with the realisation 
that the presence of a word in a person's vocabulary does 
not by itself tell an observer much about the meaning of 
that word to the person. Moreover vocabulary counts ignore 
important relations amongst word meanings - relations that 
make vocabulary more than just a list of words. 
A distinctive approach has been that of the 'semantic 
networkers'; Collins and Quillan (1972); Smith, Shoben and 
Rips (1974) and Rumell~rt, Lindsay and Norman (1972). 
Semantic networks are very complex and have been criticised 
as being difficult to test empirically (Claxton, 1980). 
Moreover, they favour validation by computer simulation 
(Baddeley, 1976) rather than personal meaning_.systems in 
natural situations. 
In general terms the semantic system of a language is 
the knowledge a language speaker must have to understand 
groups of words and relate them to his knowledge of the 
world. Unlike phonetics or syntatical grammar, the semantic 
development of a person is the aspect of language develop-
ment most directly linked to his broader cognitive develop-
mente As Dale (1976) says: 
'The question of how do children express their ideas? 
cannot be neatly separated from the question what kinds of 
ideas do children have to express? Therefore understanding 
of semantic development requires a deeper understanding 
of cognitive development.' 
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To summarise this discussion of concepts a number of 
points can be made. The ends of the dimensions that have 
been used characterise two different paradigms of inquiry. 
Gilbert and Watts (1983) refer to these as paradigms 1 and 
2. The first embodies an 'erklaren' tradition. Here, 
explanation is the goal, it is strongly realist in outlook, 
it shows allegiance to an empirical - inductivist view of 
knowledge, has a firm belief in the value of a reductionist 
approach to phenomena and the use of replicable experimental 
methods in the search for causal mechanisms. It is what 
Markova (1982) calls the Cartesian tradition. Paradigm 2, 
shares a 'verstehen' tradition. This is more relativist in 
outlook, shares the influence of post-inductivist views of 
knowledge, holds a belief in the value of an holistic approach 
to phenomena, seeks to perce~ve understanding as shown by 
individual actors in human situations without - necessarily -
the open pursuit of generalisation. For Markova (1982) 
this is the Hegelian tradition. 
Transferred to the area of science education research, 
these two sets of assumptions characterise the two parts of 
the movement depicted in figure 2. Needless to say, it is 
often difficult to establish quite what the philosophical 
assumptions are that underlie a single study. Moreover, 
few of the studies viewed in the next section can be slotted 
simply at either end of what is a continuum. As Gilbert 
and Watts (1983) suggest, when research is in a Kuhnian 
pre-paradigmatic state (Kuhn, 1970) it might be expected 
that underlying assumptions and modes of research conduct 
are not always specified explicitly or completely. Many 
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research reports will not fit simply onto a single dimension. 
1.2: Misconceptions and Alternative Frameworks 
In their seminal paper delineating the field and coin-
ing the phrase alternative frameworks, Driver and Easley 
(1978) review a range of research reports. They divide 
these into studies of misconceptions and 'naturalistic 
studies of alternative frameworks' • They dismiss the 
former as 'lacking interpretive power'. From what has been 
said, such a straight division of research is perhaps 
unwarranted - it is more the case that any discernible move-
ment from paradigm 1 to paradigm 2 will show only with 
time. Since Driver and Easley's paper many more studies have 
been completed which indicate both these end poles and 
various pOints in between. Moreover, some researchers, and 
groups of co-workers, have migrated from studies of miscon-
ceptions to alternative frameworks. 
This section looks first at some studies of miscon-
ceptions, then considers some factors that favour a change 
of emphasis. Finally, current work within the 'frameworks' 
movement (and the topics they investigate) are discussed. 
i) Studies of Misconceptions 
Having considered concepts along four dimensions, the 
general picture to emerge is that concepts and conceptual 
development are not clear cut issues, but are unsystematic 
and messy. To talk of misconceptions is to attempt to min-
imise this lack of order. Essentially it is a gross over-
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simpl ification, treating concepts :as having a binary mode. 
Either one 'has' or one does not 'have' a concept. For 
example, it is often where concepts are seen as 'products' 
that it becomes possible to talk of 'having' concepts. 
It is what Pines and Leith (1981) call the 'all-or-none' 
view of concepts. In contrast, they describe alternative 
frameworks as: 
'a complex network within a child's cognitive structure'. 
Another example is Gagne's (1970) theory, where any 
'piece' of knowledge can be acquired only if the learner 
p~esses pre-requisite pieces of knowledge in fUll. These 
in turn are founded upon other pre-requisite knowledge 
items. In this sense misconceptions are attributed to the 
'absence' of a required concept. Little or no credit is 
given for partial, unorthodox or variant understandings -
concepts are seen as integral units. This approach is an 
example of what Kelly (1963) rejects as 'accumulative frag-
mentalism. ' 
Similar attitudes are adopted by others who begin 
from another point of view. Shayer (1978), for example, 
concludes that certain elements of school science cannot 
be mastered by the majority of youngsters who are asked 
to tackle them. He links non-mastery to failure in Piaget's 
formal-thinking tasks: large proportions of the student 
population fail to master basic concepts. He says: 
'A series of excursions half-way up the cliffs surr-
ounding what would be interesting territory, if it were 
ever reached, is no use to anyone.' 
Anything less than a whole (or proper) concept is denigrated 
as useless. 
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In some cases 'misconceptions' are seen as the causes 
of students failing to think 'formally'. Aiello-Nicosia 
and Sperandeo-Mineo (1980), for example, say: 
'The familiarity with la problem'sl content can indeed 
play an important role to pull-out these formal strategies 
••• but it can also have a negative effect if preconceptions 
or misconceptions are present.' 
The normative implications of this statement (of formal 
operational 'norms' with deviant fluctuations) raises an 
allied point. Cawthron and Rowell (1978) argue that much 
of current science education is governed by an 'empiricist-
inductivist', or 'positivist' view of science. Consequently, 
in many studies a students' failure to conceptualise the 
'objectively' true concepts of science is to be misconceived. 
Failure to be correct is to labour under a misconception, 
or to have developed a 'wrong' concept. 
In this vein, Za'rour (1975) talks of students' 'erron-
eous notions about some scientific facts and concepts ••• 
referred to as misconceptions.' Ferbar (1980) equates mis-
conceptions with mistakes in mechanics. Helm-'s work (1978, 
1980), which at the time attracted popular attention 
(Maddox, 1978), sho .... 's that not only do students 'fail' 
conceptual physics questions, but so do their teachers. 
That they are seen to be as bad (or worse) than their students 
gave rise to Maddox's title, 'The blind leading the blind 
up a blind alley.' 
Other studies to follow a similar outlook have been 
Linke and Ventz (1979) and Harris (197R). Goldsmith's (1978) 
survey was to measure the continued popularity of some old 
misconceptions. 
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ii) Some Factors Influencing a Change to Alternative 
Frameworks 
The shift from paradigm 1 towards paradigm 2 can be 
summarised by reference to a changing climate of research 
in terms of psychological orientation, methodological inno-
vation and philosophical assumptions. Though hinted at 
in Gilbert and Watts (1983), these factors are described 
more fully in Pope, Watts and Gilbert (1983). Here it is 
argued that paradigm 1 traditions have resulted in a tend-
ency to undervalue human learning in order to discover 
fundamental general principles. In this sense much of 
educational research conducted in this mode has been of 
little direct help to practitioners who have to deal with 
awkward and complex learning issues in natural settings. 
Paradigm 2, or New Paradigm research (Rowan and Reason, 
1981) shows regard for the dignity and autonomy of research 
subjects and focuses on an holistic examination of indiv-
idual behaviour - and the personal reasons fq~ actions and 
decisions. 
For example, Salmon (1980) advocates the acknowledge-
ment of the 'particular reality of the learner' and thus of 
a more phenomenological perspective to be adopted. This is 
a disruption of the usual 'scientist-subject' distinction 
of traditional psychological research. This, like Kelly's 
(1955) work, is within the traditions of the verstehen 
approach. Important, too, are research methodologies that 
are compatible with, and serve to enhance, such understand-
ings (Swift, Watts and Pope, 1983) - a point to be developed 
in chapter 2. In that paper the authors argue that any 
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methodology must be compatible with the philosophical assum-
ptions that are part of the research design. As new and 
different methodologies become available so the shift to a 
new paradigm of research becomes visible. 
Changes in philosophy, too, have bourne on the con-
duct of research. The rapid developments in the philosophies 
of science due to Popper (1963), Kuhn (1970), Lakatos (1970) 
and Feyerabend (1979) have emphasised a continuous recons-
truction of scientific explanation. This has, in turn, had 
a profound effect upon the human sciences so that what Abell 
(1982) calls the Kuhn-Barnes thesis can be seen to be 
having an increasing effect. Central to this is Barnes' 
(1982) Kuhnian view of concepts. He suggests that people 
map their environment conceptually through a subtle mixture 
of ostensive definitions and 'conceptual fabrics'. Barnes 
calls this 'finitism', and one major consequence is that 
concepts are always open. He contrasts this with what he 
calls 'extensional semantics' where a concept is defined once 
and for all so that it is seen as covering a decided and 
agreed content. There is a strong similarity here with the 
poles of the four dimensions already discussed. In this 
case Barnes (via Kuhn) blurs any distinctions between per-
sonal and public concepts. He blurs, too, distinctions 
between 'natural' and 'social' science so that there is no 
way of drawing any other than a conventional boundary 
between science and non-science. Whatever is the case, 
progress is not made through closed concepts; every concept 
has a moving history and meaning is never fixed. Concept 
formation is selective, not absolute. Some explorations of 
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the influences of philosophy upon science education have 
recently been undertaken, for example by Swift et. al., 
(1982), Watts and Pope (1982) and Zylbersztajn (1983). 
Intermediate between the poles of paradigm 1 and 2, 
between the Cartesian and constructivist traditions, lie 
a range of concept studies. These can be seen as transitional 
between the two. Markle and Tieman (1970) for example, 
question a behaviouristic approach yet settle for a typical 
syllogistic definition of a concept. Herron, Cantu, Ward 
and Scrivenssen (1977), similarly, attempt a taxonomy of 
school science concepts. Here they question the perceptib-
ility of the instance of the concepts. Osborne and Gilbert 
(1979) fOllow Klausmeir's (1974) model of a concept which, 
whilst being developmental takes an abstractionist view-
point. In each of these cases the nature of concepts is 
being queried and reformulated. However, concepts are 
analysed primarily as 'concepts in an academic subject' 
(Ziman, 1979) and scant attention is given tQthe individual's 
perspective: the disposition to construct conceptions on 
a wide range of bases. 
Albert (1978) rejects the 'subject' approach, as do 
Freyberg and Osborne (1981). For them, a concept is dis-
played by a person's response to instances, rather than her 
ability to recite a definition or a list of criterial 
attributes. As Kelly (1963) pithily pOints out, people are 
inventive. Consequently, there will not be unique solutions 
but alternative ways of representing events and experiences. 
Pines (1980), too, has sought to challenge traditional 
aspects of concepts, particularly in the failure to represent 
everyday, natural conceptions. He pOints (Pines, 1982) to 
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his own work on a 'conic model' of a concept. Whilst, he 
suggests, it is elegant, has appeal and would provide a large 
number of research questions, it fails to represent human 
concept development. He sees a schism between precise theor-
etical (formal) models of concepts and the outcomes of class-
room practice: the former are too removed from everyday 
experience to be of value. 
An important adjunct position to the constructivism 
in paradigm 2 are studies which place an emphasis on cog-
nitive structure and prior knowledge. Whereas concepts are 
not isolated discrete entities but are ways of organising 
experience on the basis of what is already known, they 
are often discussed as bei~ 'transmitted to' students rather 
than constructed by them. Novak's (1977, 1982) popularis-
ation of Ausubel's (1968) work has prompted much revision 
in work on concepts. Some, for example, are reported by 
Kempa (1982). A number of difficulties and criticisms have 
been levelled at Novak-Ausubel studies (for instance, West 
and Fensham, 1974, Barnes· and Clawson, 1975; Mayer, 1979, 
Driver, 1982). In the context of this discussion, it is 
the 'transmission model' of concept acquisition that marks 
the divide between these studies and those in paradigm 2. 
Novak's (1982) approach is strongly nomothetic, so that 
when he describes concepts as 'regularities in events or 
objects', he then classifies student responses as miscon-
ceptions or incomplete conceptions. The conflict here 
revolves around what an 'incomplete' regularity might be. 
Clearly, for Novak, it is not the student's regularities 
that are important, only their irregularities when compared 
to 'correct' concepts. 
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iii) A Review of 'Newer Investigations' 
The majority of the studies considered here are what 
Driver and Erickson (1982) would call 'newer investigations'. 
In Erickson's (1979) terms they attend to the substance of 
actual beliefs and concepts held rather than to reasoning 
and logical skills. In considering a very disparate range 
of studies, it seems convenient to group them roughly in 
two ways: by approach and by topic. In a short review of 
papers, West (1982) chose four headings - 'intentions', 
'methods', 'types of representation' and 'theories of learn-
ing'. The two latter issues are dealt with in other sections, 
here, intentions and methods are considered briefly together 
under 'approach'. 
It is possible to identify a small number of important 
pieces of work that have fostered and generated many more 
replications and modifications. They have been influential 
as the starting point for a wide range of studies. Driver 
and Easley's (1978) review has already been mentioned, with 
it can be considered Viennot's (1979) work on force, 
Nussbaum's (1979) questions on gravity, and Osborne and 
Gilbert's(1979) methodology in looking at work and electric 
current. 
In that brief review by Driver and Erickson (1982) 
the authors fastened upon a unity of approach that contained 
elements of cognitive structure, constructivism and class-
room importance. It is that type of similarity in approach 
that is noticeable even in a wider spread of studies. The 
'context' of such work - and the outcomes reported, are 
dealt with more fully in the sections relating to particular 
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concepts, that follows. Nor are all studies reviewed here 
- the approach used by different groups can best be exemp-
lified rather than enumerated. The majority of the work 
has been accomplished within physics, particularly in pre-
relativistic mechanics, although some inroads have been made 
into the 'chemical' and 'biological' sciences. 
By far the most wide ranging series of studies has been 
those within the Laarning in Science Project, Waikato, New 
Zealand. Based upon the IAI approach (Osborne and Gilbert, 
1979; Gilbert, Watts and Osborne, 1981, - and described fully 
in the next chapter), the topics have embraced much of 
mechanics and related issues. For example, stead, K; and 
Osborne (1980 a ) have looked at gravity and friction (1980 
b ); Stead, B. and Osborne (1980) at light; Stead (1980 
a ) has explored living and (1980 b) energy. Osborne has 
reported on children's ideas of force and electric current 
(Osborne, 1980, 1981). Their work has commonly encompassed 
the secondary school age range and has used both interview 
and paper-and-pencil methods. The results are generally 
described in terms of students' 'views', answers to quest-
ions are combined to be presented as percentages for certain 
categories of response. 
Other studies have been less cohesive, tackling a more 
restricted set of topics with a more diverse range of methods. 
Duit's (1981) study, for example, centres upon a word-assoc-
iation questionnaire with a request for students' own def-
initions and examples for energy, force, work and power. 
It also includes multiple-choice elements and, concentrating 
primarily upon energy, considers gymnasien students' notions 
of energy before and after course instruction. Part of the 
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same study compares variations in notions between students 
in Germany, Switzerland and ~hilippines. 
Driver (1981), Engel (1982) and Engel and Driver(1981) 
have looked at youngsters' alternative frameworks of weight, 
heat, pressure and evolution. Their methods have used both 
written test questions and interviews, sometimes in combin-
ation. In a similar vein Erickson has looked at children's 
'conceptual inventories' of heat and temperature (1979), 
heat (1980) and vectors (1982). He has used an interview 
approach, followed by a survey of popular answers, with 
children of 6-13 years in Canadian schools. 
Force and gravity ha.~,been the two most widely researched 
concepts. The seminal work by Viennot (1979) looks at the 
persistence of reasoning patterns by Belgium physics under-
graduates concerning forces in springs. Osborne (1980), 
Gilbert and Osborne (1980) and Watts (1983~ report the use 
of the IAI approach with force with secondary pupils' 
across a range of common situations. A pape~~ and-pencil 
variation on this method (Watts and Zylbersztajn, 1981) asks 
for an explanation along with a particular choice of response. 
Used by others too, (Wright, 1982; Thomaz, 1983) it shows 
that students' frameworks are clearly. at variance with orthodox 
scientific viewpoints. Sjoberg and Lie (1981) in Norway 
have reached similar results; as have McCloskey, Carmazza 
and Green (1980) and Minstrell (1982) in America. The out-
comes of these studies will be considered more fully when 
discussing the concept of force. 
Gravity, too, has received special attention. As 
Sneider and Pulos (1981) suggest, students are generally 
required to recognise the part-to-whole relationship between 
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visible ground and the whole earth. They must accept such 
apparently absurd ideas as the existence of people who 
live under our feet on the other side of the earth. That 
they are reluctant to do so is reported by Nussbaum (1979) ~ 
Vincentini-Missioni (1981) argues that this is true of 
adults too. In Australia, Gunstone and White (1981) employ 
a set of questions first used by Champagne and Klopfer (1980) 
to look at the views of first year undergraduate students. 
They also comment on the diversity and tenacity of students' 
views, along with their reluctance to accept disconfirming 
evidence. 
A growing emphasis has been upon the overlap between 
concepts; in particular, force and energy. Duit (1981) 
points to a considerable overlap between youngsters concept-
ions for both concepts, both before and after school inst-
ruction. The interchangeability of the two terms has been 
noted by Clement (1978),Viennot (1979),Jung (1981a) and 
Watts and Gilbert (1983). An interesting aspect of Duit's 
work is the even greater overlap between energy and elec-
tricity - noted too by von Rhoneck (1981). 
Outside of mechanics and thermodynamics Guesne (1980), 
Stead and Osborne (1980), Jung (1981b) and Andersson and 
Karrquist (1982) have chosen to look at light. This is a 
remarkably small number considering the major role that light 
plays within the study of physics. Fewer still have ventured 
into the traditional areas of chemistry. A notable except-
ion is Pfundt (1981) with a study of children's conceptions 
of 'substance' and chemical and physical change. 
Many of these studies are considered in detail in 
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chapter 3 - in relation to the specific concepts in this 
study: energy, force, heat and light. Before moving on to 
the next section it is useful to recap for a moment the 
arguments suggested so far. 
Firstly, this thesis deals with the complexities of 
youngsters' discussions around four concepts in science. Seen 
against the backdrop of previous research it is primarily 
concerned with understanding students' own conceptions, the 
substance of their ideas, rather than grading their concept 
'acquisition' in terms of correctness, completeness, form-
ality, syllogistic logicality and 50 on. 
Secondly, such an approach to students' own ideas is 
distinctive and can be seen as part of a verstehen tradition. 
This is at variance with an erklaren tradition, and both 
approaches have been labelled paradigm 1 (erklaren) and 
paradigm 2 (verstehen). In this sense it is possible to see 
similar studies of students' alternative frameworks as 
falling in paradigm 2. 
Thirdly, previous research has been described as a 
movement away from 'misconceptions' towards 'alternative 
frameworks' and some reasons for this movement have been 
outlined. Research studies have been characterised as fall-
ing on the continuum between these two poles. Research at 
each end has been discussed along with some that has been 
disignated to intermediate or transitional points. 
What remains to be done is for a more detailed picture 
to be developed, both for the notion of concept and concept-
ualisation being used here, and for the ensuing research 
design. These issues are taken up in the next section. 
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1.3: Developing a Conceptual Framework 
The studies of 'misconceptions' already discussed can 
be seen as researchers' attempts to reduce the highly 
complex aspects of concept development towards clear and 
distinguishable issues. The unfolding oversimplification 
results in an inappropriate model - when applied to the 
intricate subtleties of human actions during the generation 
and exploration of explanations. In this study, the th~or­
etical assumptions are that the students are taking an active 
role and are learning whenever they experience something, 
which includes the interview - the data gathering method 
itself. This reflects, then, upon the very task at hand, 
how the task should be presented to the student, what kind 
of instructions are to be given, what kind of analysis to be 
used and what kind of methodological checks to employ. 
That is, the very notion of the students' conceptualising of 
situations (both the exemplar focus situations within the 
interview and the interview itself) determines the shape and 
design of the study. 
So far, much that has been said about concepts (and 
concept development) has been negative. Natural (everyday) 
conceptualisations are not necessarily logically bound, 
are not simply abstracted regularities, are not distinct 
entities clinically derived and unaffected by other human 
considerations. The purpose of this section is to detail 
the proposed view of conceptualisation and the intended 
course of exploration. These are discussed as six distinct-
ive but related points. 
First, although this study has been identified within 
science education research via Driver's (1982) summary 
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diagram on page 1.6, it is necessary to relate it, too, 
to its broader realms of interest. Here use is made of 
another figure, by Harre (1982), who calls it 'two-dimens-
ional space of anti-Cartesian psychology'. This is shown 
below in figure 3. The first quadrant (I) is intended to 
represent the domain of social meanings of which science is 
a highly specific example. Items in science have signif-
icance because they are both located within networks of 
relations in a semantic system and they are public: they 
are conventionally bound (within the conventions of science) 
entities. The second quadrant (II) represents the personal 
interpretation of the social domain - privatised versions 
of the public. The third quadrant (III) represents items 
of personal thought that have no meaning in the public-
collective domain at all. These might be daydreams, private 
fantasies or inner (inexplicable) doubts or fears (for 
example). The final quadrant can be seen as part of the 
individual meanings of a person that can be, _and are, dis-
played in public - by means of their behaviour and speech 
in a public arena. This study fits into no one quadrant 
but use can be made of the axes described in this way. 
Figure 3 
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It can be said that the meanings of individual students 
that fall within quadrant III are inaccessible. If they 
are displayed in public then, unless they have some recog-
niseable counterpart in the social domain, they will be 
unintelligible. If a personal meaning is truly private and 
individual then the items concerned cannot interact directly 
with the public network of meanings, to other people or the 
social mileau. However, a second-order exploration of 
conceptual frameworks ~ be made by examining the inter-
face between the other three quadrants, as depicted in 
figure 4. 
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Figure 4 
The interface between quadrants I and II Harr~ calls 
appropriation'. Personalised ideas of the social domain 
are those meanings that are privati sed versions of the 
public ones. Harre quotes Vygotsky (196~) as describing 
learning as appropriating for personal use practices which 
are essentially public. It is a description of meaning that 
hOlds that it is not inherent in things, but within people 
who are actively engaged in interpreting the events (words, 
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acts, speeches, situations) confronting them. It is an active 
imposition of meanings or interpretations upon public features. 
In the context of school science it is the active imposit-
ion of meanings by students on the words, drawings, appar-
atus, experiments, charts, etcetera that comprise the realm 
of science as they encounter it in school. 
The interface between quadrants IV and I Harr~ calls 
'catachresis'. This is the making public of an individuals' 
personally derived meanings, their own language in action. 
Rather than, as in the other interface, being a personali-
sation of the concepts of science this is the expression of 
words as they are used by students, their own language in 
action as they are coordinating their accounts, and forging 
explanations. Put crudely, these two interfaces might be 
sensed in two questions: how would you (the student) describe 
this situation (using, for example, the word 'force')? 
This is a very different question from what do you (person-
ally) mean by the word force in science? An4. yet, in order 
to explore youngster's meanings-in-use, their conceptual 
envelope for the word, both questions are necessary. They 
are complementary facets of personal meanings for parts 
of science. 
The second major issue in this section is a develop-
ment of the first. In identifying this study as a (science 
orientated) subset of the interaction between the individual, 
personal and the public domains of meaning, it needs to be 
noted quite which metaphysical assumptions are being made. 
Clearly, if persons are actively engaged in interpreting 
the events confronting them, they can be seen to impose 
different interpretations on these events and so disagree 
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about their 'true' nature. This is a relativistic stance 
akin to the philosophies of Kuhn (1970)1 Lakatos (1970) and 
Feyerabend (1975) already mentioned. In particular it is 
within the spirit of Kelly's (1963) philosophy of construct-
ive alternativism which states that 'all of our present 
interpretations of the universe are subject to revision and 
replacement.' This underlies Kelly's whole theory, his 
model of the person and of psychological change. In 
these terms people (to a large extent) base present actions 
on past constructions of similar events. In this way 
predictions are made and hypotheses decided which can 
then be tested. Rather than adopt the analogies current 
at the time of his writing, of 'man-the-machine' or 'man-
as-impulse-driven', Kelly opted instead fer t~e metaphor 
'man-the-scientist'. He invites exploration of the metaphor: 
to see the way that persons go about making sense of their 
world as if they are scientists. This way, he says (1969) 
the: 
'ultimate explanation of human behaviour lies in 
examining man's undertakings, the questions he asks. the 
lines of inquiry he initiates, the strategies he employs 
rather than analysing the logical pattern and impact of 
the event with which he collides.' 
The overall consequence of this for what follows is that, 
as is argued in Swift, Watts and Pope (1983), a pupits 
expressed view which is at variance with the curricular 
'orthodoxy' of school science can not be construed as a 
'mistake' in any simple or discre"et sense. 
'School science' is itself a broad framework (as 
Zylbersztajn (1983) suggests) of conventional text-book 
and teacher meanings to be found in school curricula and 
classrooms. Here it is used as a reference framework by 
1. 34 
which to consider the responses students make as they 
discuss the various situations and concepts. However, it 
is not intended as a normative basis by which to categorise 
the 'correctness' of student answers. Rather, as indicated 
earlier, this is a study of the interaction between the 
'public' and the 'personal', the oxymorons of science 
which are tethered by conjunction in the confection of 
school science. 
Before moving on to the next point, an additional 
comment is necessary here. The process of conceptual is-
at ion portrayed so far has been discussed in rather induc-
tive terms whereby new events are organised in relation 
to prior knowledge. This undoubtedly is the case - it is 
a procedure through which expectations of future events 
are dictated by the results of past experience. Critiques 
of induction - from 'Popper and after' (Stove, 1982) -
are levelled at logical induction, for the 'rules of 
induction' as a basis for the acceptance of scientific 
statements. As Piattelli-Palmarini (1980) says: 
'Hume's critique of induction did not impede the 
practice of induction which, logicians notwithstanding, 
goes successfully on today as it always has, but rather the 
rules of induction.' 
The practice of induction only becomes a problem when it 
is cited as both a process of conceptualisation that is 
psychologically guided and stimulated by antecedant know-
ledge, and the way in which scientific theories and hypoth-
eses are logically determined. In this case, induction can 
be seen to be sandwiched between methodological 'rules' 
of scientific acceptance and the psychology of hypothesis 
formation. 
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This is not intended as a neat and dichotomous 
separation between philosophy and psychology - there are 
few resolutions to the tensions between the two, and this 
study is not an attempt to provide one. Constructive alter-
nativism is a philosophy of pluralism (Swift, Watts, and 
Pope, 1983) so that no ~ explanation or interpretation 
of concept formation in either the public or individual 
sphere can be sufficient. 
The third major point to be made here is allied to 
this. Despite the general use of the term so far, not all 
forms of constructivism are identical. Commonly they differ 
in emphasis. Piaget's structural or 'systematic construct-
ivism' (Piaget, 1979) relies heavily upon his theory of 
genetic epistemology. Keil (1981), on the other hand, 
argues that Piaget's 'groupments' - structures with certain 
formal properties - can bere-interpreted in terms of his 
own 'constrained constructivism'. He suggests that humans 
come equipped with strong constraints upon their knowledge 
systems - cognitive constraints that operate differently in 
different cognitive domains, making cognition domain -
specific. This is an argument for cognitive subsystems, 
rather than widely generaliseable rules for cognitive 
development like Piaget's. Marton's (1981) constructivism 
is more phenowenologically based: descriptions of people's 
world views he calls 'phenomenographs'. Sigel (1978) 
and Sigel and Holmgren (1981) posit a 'constructivist 
dialetic' view, one that attempts to vie between a number 
of theorists to produce a fuller account of constructivism. 
They described constructivism as follows: 
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'Constructivism refers to that process of constructing 
in effect, creating, a concept which serves as a guideline 
against which objects or people can be gauged. During the 
course of interactions with objects, people, or events, the 
individual constructs a reality for them. The object, for 
example, is defined mentally. This mental construction 
then guides subsequent actions with the object or event.' 
(in Sigel, 1978). 
The notion of 'creating concepts' is an important 
one. From the discussion of concepts earlier, it can be 
seen that a constructivist perspective sees the individual 
as constructing the form and content of his own experience. 
'Constructive theory hOlds that the form and the 
contents of all experience are constructed •.• This propo-
sition represents a complete break with the theory of know-
ledge long dominant in psychology' (Cofer, 1977: in diSibio 
1982) . 
It has already been noted that constructive alternat-
ivism is a philosophy of pluralism. It supports the premise 
that an individual does not have ~ personal theory about 
the world - but has many. Each 'mini-theory' (Claxton, 1982) 
derives from the need to make sense of, and act effectively 
within, new types of situations. Kelly (1970) says: 
'Like other theories, the psychology of- personal con-
structs is the implementation of a philosophical assumption. 
In this case, the assumption is that whatever nature may be, 
or howsoever the quest for truth will turn out in the end, 
the events we face today are subject to as great a variety 
of constructions as our wits will enable us to contrive.' 
In Claxton's (1982) terms, the implementation of construct-
ive alternativism can be described as follows: people con-
struct theories around life events and once a successful 
way of construing is found then the same construction br 
conception in this case) can be applied to other novel but 
similar events. The event and its immediate context form 
the 'focus of convenience' of the theory which, if success-
ful with subsequent events, readjusts and alters its 'range 
of convenience' to include each new occurrence. In this way 
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a mini-theory gradually, through learning, broadens and 
refines its range. That is, the boundaries beyond which it 
fails to explain and predict events are open to exploration. 
The failure to explain gives rise to fresh, alternative, 
theories which are tested for their applicability. 
Each construction is defined and delineated by the 
domain of experience to which it is generated to apply. 
The success or failure of a theory (its viability) is not 
an instant measure;imm~ture or imperfectly located theories 
might be refined or replaced only over a period of time. 
It follows that there will be domains of experience for 
which some people will have no theories, others for which 
they will have many. 
Kelly's own theory is not without its critics (for 
example, Shotter, 1975; Holland, 1970) and it needs to be 
said that his own focus of convenience was psychotherapy 
rather than the general educational process. That said, 
Kelly saw his theory as reflexive; capable it~elf of having 
its range of convenience altered and refined, and the result-
ing constructions explored for their viability. In this 
way, the theory can provije a constructive and supportive 
context in which to explore the world views and conceptual 
frameworks of youngsters in school. 
Thisdi~cussion of constructivism bears directly on 
the fourth point to be made: some notion of 'concept' that 
is compatible with the description of personal meanings and 
constructive alternativism that has taken place so far. 
What Kelly's work can add to a view of a concept is both 
specific and general. At the time of his writing, Kelly 
(1963) rejected 'concepts' for reasons similar to the 
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arguments used here against the traditional use of the term: 
because they are part of the context of 'mentalistic psy-
chology or of formal logic.' He sees constructs as includ-
ing the notion of precepts, so that it carries with it the 
sense of being a personal act. However, the use of the word 
concept where it embraces this same personalised set of 
conditions is also acceptable: 
'Some logicians take the view that a concept is a way 
in which certain things are naturally alike and that all 
other things are really different. For them the concept is 
a feature of the nature of the things with which it is 
connected and not an interpretative act of someone. We 
would agree that a concept is real, but its reality exists 
in its actual employment by its user and not in the things 
which it is supposed to explain.' 
Within the compass of this study the term concept 
will be reserved for use in describing the public-collective 
meanings in science- particularly of energy, force, heat 
and light, and the associated concepts in the network of 
physics. The term conception will be used to denote indiv-
idual, personal meanings as displayed to a listening audience, 
in much the way that Kelly refers to 'concept"s' above. 
In this sense, conceptions will be seen as similar to Claxton's 
'mini-theories' and will be described in terms of their range 
of convenience and their focus of convenience. It is a 
use of conception that approaches Bolton's (1977) description 
of a person's concepts as 'constructive hypothesis testing', 
and as: 
'a stable organisation in the experience of reality 
/ •..•. / to which can be given a name.' 
Given the 'warmth' of personal intention to this view of 
concept (ions) there is little difference between it and 
Kelly's notion of a construct. He (1963) puts it this way: 
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'Forming constructs may be considered as binding tog-
ether sets of events into convenient bundles which are 
handy for the person who has to lug them. Events, when so 
bound, tend to become predictable, manageable and controlled.' 
It needs to be noted, however, that for Kelly constructs 
are essentially bi-polar and dichotomous. This is not so 
of conceptions, which can be seen as polythetic nodes in the 
meaning networks of individuals. 
The fifth major point is as follows. The view of 
concepts, conceptions and the philosophical assumptions of 
constructive alternativism lend to a particular model of 
people and their construction of knowledge. These can be 
shaped for the purposes of this study as follows: 
a) People are active constructors of meaning. Kelly 
invited the use of the metaphor person-the-scientist. That 
is, people in their science-like behaviour hypothesise and 
test their personal conceptions of reality; 
b) Peoples' conceptions help them ch~ between alter-
natives, by allowing them to test their expectations and 
elaborations of the conception; 
c) Conceptions are contingent on past experience so that 
ones which do not work are eventually discarded; 
d) The range of convenience and focus of convenience of 
the conceptions grows by restructuring from within and not 
by simple addition from outside; 
e} Conceptions are contingent upon the intentions, pur-
poses and anticipations of the individual. 
As already suggested, it is a relativistic philosophy. 
Pope (1982) suggests that Kelly sawall theories - including 
his own - as created in order to fit known facts and ideas 
at any particular time. When found wanting, they are modified 
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or eventually replaced by a better one. Watts and Pope 
(1982) explore the similarities between constructive alter-
nativism and Lakatos' (1970) philosophy of science. 
Lakatos advocates a 'revolutionary activist' approach to 
knowledge which he describes as follows: 
II 'Passivists' hold that true knowledge is nature's 
imprint on a perfectly inert mind: mental activity can only 
result in bias and distortion ••• 'Activists' hold that we 
cannot read the book of Nature without mental activity, 
without interpreting it in the light of our expectations or 
theories. Now conservative 'activists' hold that we are 
born with our basic expectations, with them we turn the world 
into 'our world' but must then live forever in the prison 
of our world ••• But revolutionary activists believe that 
conceptual frameworks can be developed and also replaced 
by new, better ones: it is we who create our 'prisons' and 
we can also, critically, demolish them." 
The important pOint is that there are no objective 
markers or shibboleths to guarantee the truth or 'correct-
ness' of any group of competing theories. The metaphor 
of person-the-scientist allows this description to be 
observed for individuals as they theorise, interpret and 
conceptualise situations in a variety of different ways. 
Needless to say, the same can be said of the-fruits of 
analysis of this study. There is no attempt in later chap-
ters to argue that the interpretations made of the responses 
students provide are the only ones that can be derived from 
the data. Interpretations ~ made and are evidenced as 
fully as possible from the data-base, in oIder to describe 
both individual conceptions and alternative frameworks. 
Finally, the sixth point to be made concerns the means 
by which access can be gained to meanings. A number of 
methods are possible for accessing personal conceptions 
(Swift, Watts and Pope, 1983) and some of these are discussed 
in the next chapter. In this study, access is by means of 
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dyadic discourse. Following the tenets already described, 
of ascribing kudos and status to the responses made by the 
students in order to examine their personal conceptions from 
their own accounts, a fairly informal discussion is called 
for. Unlike other forms of discourse (speeches, texts, 
narratives etcetera) informal conversation lacks finish, is 
exploratory and tentative. It is the prototype out of which 
finish may eventually be produced - at this stage, however, 
it is progressive, mutual, alternating and sometimes incom-
plete. This being the case, in order to study such explor-
atory discourse, it is necessary to 'freeze' it in trans-
cript form so that it can be inspected. 
This kind of informal discourse is an attempt to 
identify with another's personal meanings in science - and 
it is well to recall that personal meaning is dynamic, a 
process not a thing. The semi-focused interviews described 
in following chapters are, in principle, social encounters 
which are improvisations around a concept th~me. They are 
imprecise, and are ones in which participants interact using, 
and constructing creatively, the conventions of science 
and language. How well the documented analysis captures 
this process is a point of debate in the final chapter. 
It is an approach which Whitehurst (1979) neatly observes: 
'is like catching rain in a bucket for later display. 
What you end up with is water, which is only a little like 
rain.' 
Whilst similar to Piaget's clinical interviews they 
differ in that they focus on a set of drawings, rather 
than laboratory equipment. Although there are disadvantages 
to this, as discussed in the next chapter, it has a strength 
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over and above Piagetian methods in the possibility of 
escaping from the constraints of a concrete, demonstrable 
task. It has the ability to explore a wider range of incid-
ents and to transcend them and so lessening the fear of 
contextual influences on inferences made from school science. 
The interviews can be seen as a method developed to 
take account of conceptions in action as they are brought 
to bear upon the stylised situations depicted in the pic-
tures. The interview as a whole can be understood as a 
time-line through a range of personal conceptions as held 
by an individual in relation to the topic under discussion. 
Harre's appropriation and catachresis are parallel processes 
in the explication of the meanings involved. 
The interviews produce data for each individual stud-
ent so that the discourse can be studied as a single case 
study in looking at the responses for the focal items and how 
they relate to the individual. However, a second purpose 
of this study is exploring similarities and differences in 
meanings within groups of students. It is an examination of 
the overlap of meanings as students both appropriate the 
language of science for their own purposes, and generate 
their own uses for familiar words in their vocabulary. 
Such overlaps can take place at various levels. Here, as 
Osborne and Gilbert (1979) suggest, it is the relationship 
between their use of words that is important. The point 
here is that, having come to consider similar and different 
sets of exemplar circumstances and having worked out their 
ideas about what the circumstances are all about, students 
come to account for their ideas in terms of the many poly-
sernic words of science like force, pressure, power, stress, 
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strain and so on. For some, power (for example) will be 
synonymous with energy, or force, or pressure. For others, 
it\will have some vague but unspecified connection, or 
perhaps a strong and developed relationship. Yet others 
will consider all of the words entirely separate and dis-
tinct within their own range of conceptions. 
In short then, the following chapters are considerations 
of personal conceptions and discernible common conceptual 
frameworks that are alternative to - and yet related to -
the system of public scientific meanings. Each level of 
meaning consists of a network of relations in which (mainly 
four) focal entities are embodied. Above all, the inter-
pretations presented of the individual and his/her personal 
meanings are necessarily a reflection of the researcher's 
own philosophical assumptions and meaning matrix. 
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CHAPTER 2 
METHODS OF ENQUIRY 
2.0 An Introduction to the Chapter 
2.1 First and Second Orders of Perspective 
2.2 The I.A.I. Approach 
(i) The exploration and curriculum analysis of 
target concepts 
(ii) The generation and design of a deck of instance 
cards 
(iii) The conduct of interviews in two phases 
(iv) The transcription and editing of the audio-tapes 
(v) The analysis of interview transcrifts 
(vi) The evaluation of the technique at various points 
2.3 The Research Design 
2.4 Methodological checks 
2.5 Summary 
2.0. Introduction 
Traditionally, the first chapter in a thesis reflects 
the current state of the art and presents the opening argu-
ments in favour of an adopted approach. Here, for instance, 
the trend towards research in alternative frameworks has 
been noted, along with a description of the pressures that 
have helped to shape it. Some arguements have been put 
forward for a constructive alternativist interpretation 
of individual explanatory dispositions. None of this is 
intended as a castigation of all previous enquiries or of 
other theoretical ~sitions. Rather, a case is being made 
for a re-focus of emphasis upon students' responses to the 
questions they are asked. Their answers are to be used as 
evidence for the explanatory frameworks they adopt - and 
as indications of the level of commitment they hold for the 
arguments they put forward. 
This second chapter is orientated towards matters 
methodological. Its agenda provides for a description of 
the specific methodology of this study, after a review of 
some of the methods used in similar studies. A third section 
describes the research design, and a final section ent~rs 
into the much controverted problem of the justification of 
research. 
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2.1. First and Second Orders of ~erspective 
The phenomenon of imposing meaning on the outside 
world can be described from at least two perspectives: as 
it appears to an external observer and as it appears to 
the actor herself. Marton (1981) calls this a distinction 
between a 'first order' and a 'second order' perspective. 
As SaljO (1982) suggests, questions and problems belonging 
to the first order perspective have a matter-of-fact quality, 
and concern such issues as the performance of students, or 
the evaluation of one curriculum programme or another. 
An example of a first-order enquiry is that by the 
Assessment of Performance Unit (D.E.S., 1981, 1982). This 
• is an attempt to make an assessment of students performances 
on a range of science questions. The performance on quest-
ions is then matched aqainst a number of personal and 
school characteristics, like geographical location or class 
size. An example of a second-order enquiry is Pfundt's 
(1981) explorations of youngsters' (aged 8 to 13 years) 
conce~tions of 'substance', and its transformations. She 
uses a loosely structured interview as she undertakes four 
demonstration experiments (for example, burning some alcohol). 
She records not only the students' accounts, but also notes 
her own reactions to their comments. This focuses, then, 
not on the performance side of learning, but on the exper-
iential aspects as they appear to the participants •. 
The discussion of concepts in the first chapter can 
be seen in this light. Much of the traditional studies 
, 
have emphasised a first-order perspective of concept 
2.2 
acquisition studies. Perhaps this has been a result of 
psychOlogists' distrust of the 'objectivity' of mental 
processes, as Shanks and Abelson (1977) suggest. The move 
away from purely behavioural indicators towards a regard 
for the introspective evidence of constructivism allows 
use of ~ orders description. Pope and Keen (1981) 
suggest that any methodology that allows a person to elab-
orate on his own personal meaning of events is opposite 
to large scale nomothetic studies. In contrast, Marton 
argues that the two orders are complementar~, giving 
different kinds of information. 
A point to make here is one that Marton hints at 
but does not make: the two perspectives may require differ-
ing methodologies. Novak (1980) has pOinted out the need 
for research methods to be compatible with the underlying 
assumptions of the research approach. Pope and Keen's 
(1981) argument is similar: for a 'coherence' between 
theory and methodology. The central feature of this study 
is a second-order enquiry into students' own statements 
concerning common physical situations. At first sight, a 
pluralist epistemological position, like constructive 
alternativism might seem a recip.e for eclecticism. swift. 
Watts and Pope (1983) have argued that advocates of personal 
construct psychology have not been nearly wide ranging 
enough and have placed over reliance on a single methodology 
- the repetory grid technique. Plurality of methods is 
acceptable where this is based upon a compatible philosophy. 
These issues shape the discussion in the sections 
to follow. The growth of research into students' alternative 
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frameworks can be seen as an attempt to 'compensate for the 
traditional emphasis on behavioural data by building a body 
of experiential data' (Colaizzi, 1971). The suggestion 
here is that such an attempt is constrained by two main 
factors. There is no single appropriate methodology; in 
fact there is a need for a range of methods because 'there 
are no guaranteed techniques which would work with all 
students' (Novak, 1980). Secondly, the methods need to be 
compatible with a second-order perspective or, in Novak's 
words, do not entail 'ignoring or negating the internal 
world of people'. 
The first section surveys some of the methods employed 
in other alternative frameworks research. This is followed 
by a description of the details of the rnterview-about-
Instances approach and then by some of the methodological 
checks employed in justifying the research outcemes. 
2.2. A Review of Methods 
Kuhn (1970) suggests that when a research worker 
adopts a paradigm, he acceots not only theoretical commit-
ments but also methodological commitments to that paradigm. 
The primary methods within the alternative framework move-
ment have been based upon students' accounts in visual, 
verbal, or written form. By visual is meant observation, 
by a researcher in situ, or by remote camera videotaping. 
The most common verbal approa~h is through interviewing, 
although there have been a variety of interview methods 
used. By 'written form I is intended paper-and-pencil tests, 
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surveys, and graphical responses. Seldom is the division 
between methods a clear-cut one, many are used in combin-
ation even in a single study. 
Observation on its own allows only a restricted 
opportunity to explore second-order perspectives. It has 
most commonly been used in combination with other methods. 
Zylbersztajn and Gilbert (1981), for example, use class-
room observation coupl~d with an analysis of documents, 
in their case, the class worksheets that students were 
using. They also tape-recorded groups of students as they 
worked. A similar combination is used by Tasker (1980) 
and Tasker and Osborne (1980) to produce 'lesson portrayals'. 
In all these reports, observation techniques allow insight 
into the sUbstance of the interactions between students' 
frameworks and teachers' requirements. 
In contrast are the more commonly used classroom 
observation schedules like the Science Teaching Observation 
Schedule , (S.T.O~S.) . (Egglestone et. al., 1975). The latter 
allows for types of questions and interactions within a 
classroom to be charted at th~ee minute intervals, but 
cannot cope with the con~ent of the interactions. S.T.O.S. 
has been criticised on this and other bases (Dunkerton and 
Guy, 1982). 
By combining observation with· other methods, the 
emphasis is moved from a first-order to a second-order 
perspective. Driver (1981) gives a good example of this. 
She reports observations and (presumably) recordings of 
teachers and pupils as they interact around classroom exper-
iments in the laboratory. The emphasis here is not just on 
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the quality of the discussion taking place, but is primarily 
on the types of explanations being used in terms of the 
pupils' alternative frameworks of heat and force. In another 
form of observation, Gilbert and Pope (1982) use remote 
video-cameras to record discussions between small groups 
of students. The talk·takes place around a set of Interview-
about-Instances cards of 'energy'. The analysis of the video 
tapes explores both the interactions that take place between 
students and the content of their discussion in terms of 
their alternative frameworks of energy. The observation 
is combined with 'de-briefing' interviews and requests for 
students' own drawings of examples of energy. In this way 
Gilbert and Pope are able to comment about the actions of 
the participants in debate and to make inferences about 
their 'internal worlds'. 
The majority of research into students' frameworks 
has used interviews in some form or another. These range 
from one-to-one 'case studies' over time, to group discuss-
ions with part or whole classes. Crookes (1982), for 
example, describes the changes in explanatory framework used 
by a single student in discussing heat transfer. The 
talks occur over a number of sessions using tape-recorded 
infOrmal interViews, the pupils' own written accounts and 
recorded deliberations as both student and researcher conduct 
experiments to explore various explanations. Similarly, 
Clement (1978) uses protracted discussions with a single 
student, involving pieces of laboratory equipment, as they 
discuss force and energy. Nussbaum and Novick (19a,), on 
the other hand, describe whole group debates and ex~lanations 
for the nature of gases. Individuals within the class 
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articulate specific models, which are then used as the 
focus for a general debate. This, too, is an excercise 
that extends over several sessions, as laboratory equip-
ment is introduced in order to crystalise some of the issues. 
Solomon (1980) also uses classroom debate to elicit students' 
perspectives on energy. Such methods are not unproblematic. 
Recording group-talk raises many difficulties in transcrip-
tion and analysis. Rarely is it possible to identify 
individual speakers and therefore to attribute a particular 
line of argument to one person. As individuals talk over 
each other, finish sentences for one another, leap-frog 
comments and side-track each other, it is seldom possible 
to evidence coherent explanatory frameworks. Rather, as 
in Gilbert and Popes' (1982) work, it becomes more meaning-
ful to talk of 'sequences' or trends in the movement of 
explanations. The facility to 'freeze' an argument at one 
point, in order to explore its implications in detail, 
depends upon the willingness, or ability, of the researcher 
to intervene in the group debate as it progresses. This 
is, of course, the difference between observing a qrouD, 
and attempting to interview it. 
Many studies rely on solitary one-to-one interviews 
around some focus. Much of the Interview-about-Instances 
work is of this nature (Osborne and Gilbert, 1979; Watts, 
1982; Watts, 1983) as is described fully in the next 
sections. It is a variation of the 'clinical interview' -
a name derived from the 'clinical' methods adopted by 
Piaget (1929). The focus of such interviews can differ 
between sample materials or laboratory demonstrations to 
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pictures or written questions. Osborne (1980) for example, 
describes interviews with students concerning events that 
were taking place at the time. Called the Interview-about-
~vents approach, the focus of the interviews are such 
occurrences as water boiling, steam condensing on a cool 
surface, or ice standing in a beaker. Pupils are tape-
recorded as they give explanations of the events and Osborne 
takes particular interest in the students' use of the word 
'particle' to describe evaporation or condensation. Brumby 
(1981) uses photographs and samples to elicit responses 
in terms of evolution - as it might have occured in birds 
or moths. Pfundt's (1981) interviews use short experiments 
like burning alcohol, adding water to anhydrous copper 
sulphate and heating lead oxide on charcoal to produce 
lead. Her goal is to generate discussion on the transform-
ations of sUbstance. 
A number of interviews are used in conjunction with 
paoer-and-pencil tests or other written responses. Engel 
(1982) uses questions in interviews based on items pupils 
had already completed in a written test. Questions on 
pressure, for instance, ask respondents to explain what 
happens when a person drinks orange juice through a straw, 
or why someone sinks into snow when wearing boots (but not 
when wearing skis Y. Interviewees are re-presented with 
the test questions and asked supplementary probe questions. 
The format also allows for new questions and practical 
tasks (like actually drinking orange juice through a straw) 
to be introduced during the discussion. Posner and Hoagland 
(1981) use a bank of written items concerning statements 
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about science and scientific beliefs. Its use is primarily 
as a survey questionaire with American college students, 
however it is also used as the basis for a series of inter-
views. They comment that students are 'unfailingly creative' 
in what they respond to an item during interviews, and 
this leads them to place items in contrast with each other 
and then require students to make a choice. In another 
study, Von Rhoneck (1981) describes the use of questions 
and diagrams as the basis for interviews on electric cir-
cuits. The interviewees are asked to predict values for 
the current in the circuit, and for the 'vol~age' across 
parts of it. A demonstration is then conducted to produce 
measured values and the students are asked to explain dis-
crepancies between their predictions and the circuit measure-
ments. 
These kinds of methods lead easily into various .. 
written approaches - where no attempt is made to interview 
respondents, but to collect larger samples of written 
answers. An example of this is Watts and zylberztajn's 
(1981) survey -about-instances approach where some 150 
responses were generated from a multiple-choice-with-explan-
ation format. The questions .are adapted from other studies, 
like that of Viennot (1979), and require a choice to be made 
concerning the forces present in particular situations. 
Each choice is accompanied by a request for an explanation 
for the choice made. Viennot's work· is similar, allbeit 
with different situations, and in her case, aimed at under-
graduates. Zylberztajn and Watts (1982) have used a varia-
tion of this, where explanations are sought to questions 
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about the operation of optical filters. Students are asked 
to write explanations after seeing a classroom demonstration 
of a torch shone through a red filter. Gunstone and White 
(1981) use parallel methods to explore undergraduate frame-
works of gravity. Again, whole class demonstrations are 
conducted - this time with falling objects of different 
mass - requirinq written answers from large groups. 
Still with notions of gravity, Sneider and Pulos 
(1981) use a questionnaire with young children to explore 
gravity in relation to the earth's shape and size. The 
questions ask for both multiple-choice responses, as well 
as the completion of diagrams - by showing the trajectory of 
a stone dropped into a tunnel cut along a di.ameter through 
the earth. 
Duit (1981), too, uses written responses. His work 
is conducted using word-association tests to explore students' 
meanings for terms like force and energy. The associations 
are supplemented with other test questions and with requests 
for free definitions for these and related concepts. 
This last study raises some further points to round 
off this section. Firstly, no methodology is unproblematic. 
Word-association tests, for example, have been roundly 
criticised. Gilbert (1982) argues that they give no basis 
for inferring the relationships that students make between 
words. In this sense they are similar to vocabulary counts, 
or simple word lists, in that they cannot permit a high 
level of inference concerning the 'internal world' of the 
learner. This is a telling argument - essentially word 
association tests are indicators of performance in a first-
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order perspective and, on their own, perhaps cannot be 
transferred to explore second-order ones. Certainly Duit's 
work is much enhanced by the additional tests and questions 
he uses, as he himself notes. 
This is a criticism that could be aimed at other 
methodologies too. Observation alone, as in the S.T.O.S. 
schedule already mentioned, could fall into a similar trap. 
To explore second-order perspectives relies on the production 
of some account by the respondent - an account that must 
go beyond a simple 'tick response', a direct calculation, 
or a single-word answer. The request for an explanation, 
for examples, or for extended descriptions must play an 
integral part in the task for it to form a basis from which 
second-order inferences can be made. 
Other methods run into different problems. Sutton 
(1980) argues that clinical interviews, word association 
tests and repetory grids are all problematic as research 
tools because of their doubtful reliability and validity, 
or through being time consuming, or both. Posner and Gertzog 
(1982) make similar comments about some specific studies 
using clinical interviews. Both critiques are aimed rather 
more at the outcomes of the interviews after analysis. 
However l as the outcomes bear directly upon the conduct of 
the interviews, the questions and the questioner's actions, 
then they also reflect upon the interview as a whole. Engel 
(1982) also argues that interview results have problems 
in terms of reliability and validity. In this thesis it 
is argued, that these criticisms are essentially misplaced. 
To use a Kuhnian expression, these two terms are the product 
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of another paradigm (in this case, paradigms) and are, in 
many senses, incommensureable when used in a different 
research movement. Care and attention does need to be 
placed on the authentication of research outcomes, however 
this issue is removed from traditional 'psychometric' 
definitions of validity and reliability as described in 
standard psychology texts (for example, Hilgard, Atkinson 
and Atkinson, 1979). The point to be made is that different 
research perspectives look to different methodological 
checks, and not to a re-dressing of the old ones. Such 
issues, already argued elsewhere (Watts, Harrison and 
Gilbert, 1982), are taken UP again in the last sections of 
this chapter. First, the methodology and design of this 
study are to be described in detail. 
2.2 The Interview-about-Instances (I.A.I.) Approach 
The IAI approach is a development of Osborne and 
Gilbert's (1979) seminal work. Their own use of the method 
has been described in a number of reports (Osborne and 
Gilbert, 1980; Gilbert and Osborne, 1980; Gilbert, Watts, 
and Osborne, 1981). 
In outline, the IAI method consists of tape-recorded 
dyadic discussions with individual pupils. using a series 
of pictures as a focus. These are drawings concerned with 
the central characteristics of a major concept, as seen 
by physicists. Each picture card depicts a line drawing 
of a situation which may, or may not, represent an example 
of a concept. The method elidts a wide range of responses 
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and, whatever the response, further probe questions are used 
to explore the response using, where possible, the language 
of the student. 
The situations, or instances, as taken from syllabuses, 
texts and teachers, and some would lie on the borderline 
of a physicist's concept, being unusual or unorthodox. A 
number of the pictures contain a 'dynamic element' that 
requires the interviewee to make some predictions as to 
the possible outcomes. 
The IAI approach can be subdivided into six distinc-
tive stages, each of which is discussed separately. They 
are: 
i) the 'exploration' and curriculum analysis of the 
target concept 
ii) the generation and design of a deck of 'instance' 
cards. 
iii) the conduct of the interviews in two phases 
iv) the transcription and 'editing' of the audio-tape 
recordinqs 
v) the analysis of the interview protocol 
vi) the evaluation of the technique at various strategiC 
pOints. 
Before the discussion of each stage, there are several 
general points to be made. Firstly, there are two major 
intentions that underly the approach. It was a primary 
requirement of the methodology, from its first inception, 
that it should be readily useable and therefore open to use 
with a broad sample of interviewees. In reporting the method, 
Gilbert and Osborne (1980) suggest that it is applicable over 
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a wide range and is non-threatening to the interviewees involved. 
Another intention is that it should be sensitive to indiv-
idual, idiosyncratic perspectives. What Posner and Hoagland 
(1981) see as a drawback to interviews - students 'unfailing 
creativity' - is here considered a virtue of the approach. 
This second intention is part of a broader issue. 
From the outline sketch above, and from the arguments put 
forward before, it can be seen that the method complies with 
the requirements that might be made of any attempt to monitor 
second-order perspectives. That is, it allows for, and 
encourages, the participants to expand on their accounts 
of the focal situations. Although there are general probe 
questions available, the interviews have commonly followed 
lines directed by the lines of argument pursued by the inter-
viewee. The questions are shaped as supplemental, non-
evaluative and reflective although clearly the interviewee 
will construe the questions in personal, individual, ways 
and develop corresponding answer strategies throughout the 
session. The interviewer is not (nor is seen to be) a 
neutral eavesdropper to a dispassionate monologue. The 
conversation is probed and extended in ways which reflect 
the interviewer's interests as well as those of the inter-
viewee. 
In this sense, the interview operates broadly at 
two levels; in exploring youngster's hypotheses and concept-
ions of certain situations, the interviewer is of course, 
extending and developing his own hypothesis concerning 
the alternative conceptions the interviewee is adopting. 
The characteristics 6f a person's conception are inferred 
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from what is said, in this way, shapinq the ap~roach to 
subsequent questions and probes. So much is to accept 
Piaget's (1929) dictum that: 
"at every moment he (the interviewer) must have some 
working hypothesis, some theory, true or false, which he is 
seeking to check'. 
Thus, the methodology can be seen to be coherent with 
the underlying philosophical assumptions. Pope (1981) 
describes lAl as being within the 'spirit' of Kelly's theo-
retical framework; as an approach compatible with the expl-
ication of personal constructions of knowledge. 
i) The analysis of target concepts 
The purpose behind the analysis of target concepts 
is to provide a rational basis for the design of the inter-
view cards. At the early stages of the research, this took 
on an 'essentialist' view: that it was possible to complete 
an attributional analvsis of scientific concepts in order 
to qenerate con~~tive or disjunctive sets of attributes. 
These sets could then be used as the ingredients of situat-
ions in the instance oictures. The sugqestion was (Watts, 
1980) that the conjunction of criterial (essential) attributes 
would form examples ~f the concept and that non-examples 
could be generated by omitting or negating one nr more such 
attributes. This approach trades on the view of scientific 
concepts as idealised logical entities, and relates to the 
formal-informal dimension discussed in chapter one. Logical 
conce~ts are definitional in that they are defined by the 
presence of logical rules. The simplest logical concept is 
defined by the oresence or absence of a single attribute: 
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a vertebrate is defined bv its havinq a backbone, an inver-
tebrate bv not having one. By applying a similar analvsis 
(albeit, more elaborated) to the concepts force, energy, 
heat and light, the intention was to produce similar classes 
of examples. 
This approach has been;rejected on three counts. 
Firstlv, the purpose of the cards, and therefore the concept 
analysis, is to exnlore the interaction between the informal 
conceptions of youngsters and the formal concepts of phYsics. 
To view that interaction requires a model of concepts that 
can be applied to both, even at the opposite poles of a 
continuum. Whereas an 'essentialist' view of category 
formation is applicable to the (somewhat ideal) principles 
of a scientific (and formal) lanquaae; it is not a satis-
fying model for the co~municative requirements of everyday 
language (Shweder, 1977). The analysis of the youngsters' 
transcripts in this study does not rely upon a conjunctive 
or disjunctive list of elements for their concepts, (in 
a similar way to Bruner, et. al., 1956) and so an essent-
ialist view of scientific concepts would not nrovide a 
compatible theoretical base. 
Secondly, whereas an attributional analysis is 
applicable to straightforward concepts like vertebrate/ 
invertebrate, it is not clear that it applies with equal 
facility to more formal concepts like force. The orocess 
of negating or omitting sinale attributes becomes more 
cumbersome as concepts become more complex and less 'percep-
tible', as Herron et. al., (1980) suggest. The concept of 
force, for example, is both formal and logically bound in 
2.16 
a complex set of relationships with other concepts in physics. 
Its attributes lie in formal propositional statements, like 
those of Newton's first two laws of motion: attributes which 
are themselves complex concepts like mass, acceleration, 
inertia, vectors and so on. This opens a door to a morass 
of circular arguments that, in physics, is resolved by post-
ulating 'fundamental' quantities. The~e are axiomatic 
entities, so that the logical structure of physics, in some 
areas particularly, is based upon a distinct hierarchy and 
the order for producing definitions becomes important. 
There is a sense in which it is meaningless to attempt to 
produce non-examples of force, for example, by 'negating' 
or omitting inertia. A full description of force would 
include a description of mass, and therefore inertia, but 
it is the relationships between the concepts that is the 
important issue here, not artificial, non-combinations of 
imperceptible attributes. 
Thirdly, at a pragmatic level, the production of 
the instance cards is geared to an exploration of what 
Gilbert Osborne and Fensharn (1981) call 'curriculum science', 
and not 'scientists science'. They suggest that 'scientists 
science' embodies the public concepts of orthodox consensus 
science. Whether or not such a consensus exists is a moot 
paint. O'Sullivan (1979), for example, paints to four 
distinct conceptualiRations of force currently in use. 
Kuhn's (1970) central thesis allows for the incommensur-
ability (non-consensus) of terms between competing paradiqms. 
~ Harre (1972) argues that concept of force is 'inessential' 
to the science of mechanics, which could be reformulated 
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without it. None of this forbids an attributional analysis 
of a description of force at this level. It would be, 
however, removed from the purposes and the debate. Here, 
it i~ the characteristic features of the concents as they 
are described and organised in common texts and syllabi 
that is at issue. 
The task of concent analYsis, then, can be seen as 
the compilation of a list of descriptors of the concept. 
Many texts include only the explicit definitions of concepts 
along with contrived (often numerical) examples, without 
a seneral discussion of their manv relationshiFs and impli-
cations. Here, a descriptor analysis of the concept attempts 
to make explicit the assumptions that are often tacit, and 
to recognise the intrinsic limitations placed upon it by 
its relationship with other concepts in a specified domain. 
It is by operating outside of these limitations that it 
is oossible to generate non-examples of the concept. 
The descriptors are expressed at two levels: a small 
number are higher level descriptors at a general, more 
encompassinq level of sI?ecificit~. C)n the other hand, low-
lev~descriptors are more descriptive. particular and 
dptailen, and often describe relationships between other 
descriptoTs. The low-level ones are more easily exemplified 
concretely. and are therefore more easily expressed in 
pictures AS instances of situations. This is similar. but 
not identical, to Reif and Heller's (lQa1) use of the term 
'descriptor. ' 
It is an exercise that Lewis (197a) describes as 
the 'unpackina' of a curriculum area and,in doing so, of 
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delineating both the implicit and explicit characteristics 
of cpntral concepts. Kilmister (19Rl) and Warren (1979) 
for example, both qive useful discussions of the 'concealed 
implications' of the concept of force. In terms of producing 
illustrable situations for the inst~nce cards it has been 
necessary to generate a list of some thirty descriotors of 
a concept. The difficulty in practical terms has not been 
in p~0ducing that number, but of limiting it. 
In their original work, Osborne and Gilbert (1979) 
sl1ggest thar. a key problem for rhe method is how to select 
a necessary and sufficient set of instances which will 
clearly explore the~ 
~theoretical structure of the concept, the attributes 
of the concept, the relationship between the concept and 
other concepts ••• For each component attribute of a concept 
at least one instance and one non-instance need to be inclu-
ded to specifically investigate student aPFreciation of 
that particular attribute.' 
By relinquishing an attributional view, the problem 
becomes, instead, one of clearly exploring the dimensions 
and boundaries of the concept. A top limit of thirty cards 
is arrived at, purely from pragmatic considerations. Exoer-
ience has shown that forty minutes is a convenient length 
of time for an interview. both in terms of the comfort of 
the participants and the expediency of class teachers. In 
that time, students vary in the number of cards thev will 
discuss. Some may linger on no more than six, others will 
swiftly respond to all provided. This olaces an importance 
on the orderinq of the cards - an issue that is discussen 
later. 
The eiaht-step process listed below (a-h) is a summary 
of working practices (Watts, 1980; 1981): 
a) The analysis begins with a derivation and determination 
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of a number (commonly, three) of different definitions of 
the concept. For examole, force can be defined as 'a push 
or a pull'; as 'anythinq which can cause a body to start 
moving when it is at rest, or stop it when it is moving. 
or deflect it once it is moving' (Harrison, 1968). It is 
also 'proportional to rate of change of momentum' (Wenham, 
et. al., 1972), and so on. The differences between the 
definitinns are considered in detail - a process similar 
to that adopted by Sefton (1980) when examining 'formal' 
and 'operational' definitions of force. 
b) Each of the terms of the definition is examined for 
notions that 'pervade' them. Seldom, for example, do def-
initions make explicit statements about inertia when discuss-
ing forces. These are suoplemented by related concents 
from texts and syllabi, in this sense, items that are 
generally acceoted by curriculum planners as forming the 
basis of courses in physics. For example, force is inter-
related with such concepts as distance, speed, velocity, 
average velncity, mass, etcetera. In practice, these have 
been schematised in the form of linked diagrams, in the 
manner described in Dow (1976). 
c) Each of the terms and expressions are examined for 
their ambiguity and opacity. Often, for instance, no dist-
inction is made between force and resultant force, so leav-
ing the term with a duplicity of meaning. An allied concept 
to force is weight, again, an ambiguous term (Stead and 
Osborne, 1980). Opacity implies a vagueness of reference: 
forces are often discussed in terms of 'systems' without 
that term ever being clearly delineated. 
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d) Applications of the concept are now listed, how (and 
if) it can be experienced; detected; measured; in what units; 
in what usual and unusual situations. 
e) The concept is explored in terms of the models and 
analogies b~ which it is seen. Sch011 (1963) for instance, 
describes the use of forces (of attraction and repulsion) 
as metaphors to describe interpersonal relationships in 
psychological theories. Harre (1972) argues that force in 
physics is itself an analogy. The concept force carries 
with it the implication of human effort which is trans-
ferred to inanimate objects as, in Harr~'s words, 'an aid 
to understanding, a device by which intuition is engaged 
in the business of understanding motion'. The authors of 
Nuffield Advanced Science (1971) draw an analogy between 
the tensional forces in a spring with the potential diff-
erences in a reSistance-capacitor circuit. 
f) The descriptors are framed in the light of other 
studies in alternative frameworks of that particular concept. 
To continue with the example of force; a number of studies 
have pointed to a range of alternative frameworks, work by 
Osborne (1980), Viennot (1979); Clement (1978) and Sjoberg 
and Lie (1981) for instance. 
Because the concepts are all linked together; it 
becomes inevitable that some of the descriptors would be 
common to the lists of all the concepts. In this way, the 
descriptors of the relationships between force and energy 
would appear on the list for both concepts, for exampte. 
g) The list is elaborated in terms of the applications 
of the concept in common textbook examples; in everyday 
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contexts and in unusual situations. Antonyms, synonyms 
arid everyday usage are all examined to delineate and 
specify the boundaries of the concept. 
h) The final part of the process is to order and limit 
the number of descriptors. The list eventually suggests 
an order from the higher level descriptors to the low 
level, often operational ones. As far as possible, the 
list reflects the emphasis on various aspects of the con-
cept that occurs in syllabi and texts. The results have, 
produced a coherent, unified set of propositional descriptors 
in terms of higher level generalised relational character-
istics and low-level functional ancilliary characteristics. 
ii) The generation and design of a deck of instance cards 
There is a long history of using pictures in cog-
nitive psychology studies. In this study, they playa 
central role: they embody some element or elements of the 
descriptors listed for each concept, and they are the focus 
of discussion for the respondent in terms of her own explan-
atory frameworks. In SIess' (1981) words, the cards have 
the dual functions of focusing the 'author/message' and the 
'audience/message'. Both messages, he says, operate within 
a 'framework of assumptions and expectations.' Moreover, 
he argues that there is no logical basis for presuming that 
there is necessarily a nexus between the two, 
tlThey represent two worlds in which the only uncond-
itional similarities are the physical form of the message 
and the humanity of the participants.' 
There will be ample examples from the interviews to fOllow) 
to show that any link between the author's message ('curriculum 
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science') and the students' framework is tenuous indeed. 
This is an important point. If this study had been cond-
ucted within an 'associationist' philosophical perspective, 
the 'associations' produced by interviewees would carry 
implications stemming from the assumptions and expectations 
of that stance: in some cases stimulus-response contin-
gencies might be investigated, or whatever. 
To adopt a constructive alternativist position is 
to emphasise the interpretation of events, where 'events' 
in this case mean the presentation of line drawings during 
an interview about physics concepts. It is this process 
of interpretation and reinterpretation - as a person tries 
to encompass his inner and outer worlds - that is of import-
ance (Swift, Watts and Pope, 1983). 
Bannister and Mair (1968) make the point that the 
essential reason for developing personal constructions in 
this way is anticipation: for 'the better understanding 
of future events.' 
The design of interview cards, then, takes on a third 
role. Not only do they focus author and audience messages, 
they also allow for the expression of anticipation within 
a person's constructions. 
From a 'repetory grid' pOint of view, the cards 
might be seen as 'provided elements' in order to gather 
information about an individuals views on a particular topic 
and to make comparisons between a number of people's view-
pOints. Incidentally, here their grid-like qualities end -
a point that is taken bp at the end of this section. When 
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pope and Keen (1981) discuss the use of provided elements 
for these two purposes, they make the pOint that the elements 
should represent a range of events which can be construed 
by such people. 
In practice, and by its very nature, the design of 
the cards is a mixture of art and science. The examples 
are based upon the descriptors and use is made of contemp-
ory studies, as suggested, as a source of possibly challen-
ging situations and borderline cases. 
Osborne and Gilbert's (1979) suggestion of producing 
at least one instance and one non-instance for each desc-
riptor is almost impossible to accomplish. As an illust-
ration, it is not possible in principle to have 'negative' 
energy and there are only some very specialised instances 
where there might possibly be zero energy. Therefore, in 
using instances that fall within the reference of the 
students to be interviewed, design is immediately limited 
to positive examples. In developing non-instances in this 
case, it has been more meaningful to extend the intrinsic 
limitations placed upon a concept by its relationship with 
other concepts. That is, to seek instances outside the 
orthodox curriculum science range-of-convenience for the 
concept. Some examples of the instance cards for force 
are shown in figure 2.~the full range of cards is shown in 
appendix I. 
The style of the drawings retains that initiated 
by Osborne and Gilbert's (1979) original study. 'Stick-
People' are represented in various situations and objects 
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A golfer hilling a golf boll 
Are Ihere any forces here? 
./ 
/ 
/ 
./ 
/" 
./ 
/" 
./ 
./ 
/' 
/' 
/' 
Two simi tor torches. Has one more force 
octing on it thon the other? 
A book lying on 0 toble. 
Are there ony forces here? 
Walking along wIth a balloon . 
Are there any forces here? 
The ostronaut hos tripped over 0 croter on the moon. 
Are there ony forces here? 
Oiving into 0 pool. 
Are there any forces here? 
Figure 2.1: Some Examples of the Force Cards 
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are drawn in outline. Some small amounts of shading and 
highlighting are used to add perspective, to show substance 
and suggest motion. The choice of line drawings over, say, 
photographs or sample laboratory equipment has been a 
matter of pragmatism. Line drawings allow considerable 
control of content as in the representation of concepts for 
which there are no perceptible instances (Herron eta al., 
1979), or in the presentation of a conceptual model (like 
a model of an atom). Further, they allow for the omission 
of any extraneous detail and context present in photographs 
and are both portable and less susceptible to the frailty 
of laboratory equipment. Spaulding (1956) and Paivio and 
Csapo, 1973) both suggest that illustrations that are 
intended to convey specific ideas appear to be more effect-
ive if they are simple: not making too large a demand on 
the interviewee's handling of information. Paivio and 
Csapo suggest that the number of specific features in a 
fixture are inversely related to the level of abstractness 
of responses. 
A further consideration in the design of the cards 
has been the logistical ease of application. In contrast, 
a range and variety of practical laboratory equipment would 
require a high degree of involvement and investment of 
resources at school level - involvement that may have not 
been so readily available as the release of an individual 
student for a single-period interview. 
Finally, the type of line drawings described here 
are seen to fit well within a broader educational setting. 
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Whether in books or on blackboards, pictures are used to 
inform, instruct, exemplify, motivate and stimulate.) 
Students are taught to draw and to recognise drawings as 
aids to comprehension (Lindstrom, 1980) and in order to be 
more skilled at expressing their ideas (Tough, 1976). 
iii) The conduct of interviews in two phases 
The interviews are commonly 35-40 minutes in duration, 
each conducted with a student taken from a science or physics 
lesson, in a nearby laboratory or preparation room. They 
are private and anonymous to the extent that no one in the 
school is present at the time, or hears the tape. Discuss-
ion with teachers about students is kept to a superficial 
minimum, and comments like 'she seemed very interested,' 
'he was very pleasant and chatty' are the norm. The task 
is introduced conversationally as a request to 'find out 
how people use a particular word', along with the emphasis 
upon there being 'no right or wrong answers'. Permission 
is sought to record the discussion and some indication given 
of how the recording would be used. At the end of the 
session the interviewees are invited to ask quest~ons about 
either the subject matter of the discussion or the conduct 
of the exercise. Some have taken the opportunity to listen 
to parts of the tape and add their own comments. 
From this description, it can be seen that this type 
of interview lies somewhere between a 'rapport' and a 'depth' 
interview as suggested by Massarik (1981). There is an 
attempt to engage the students interest in an informal 
discussion where the focus of the interview can be altered 
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and rescheduled by the interviewee. This is not always 
successfUl because, whereas the interviewee is a vOlunteer, 
the constrained context and social mileau do not permit a 
fully informal debate on equal terms. On the other hand, 
it bears little resemblence to the highly structured 
survey interview of the type described by Brenner (198~). 
Some virtues and disadvantages of the IAI interview have 
been discussed by Bell and Osborne (1981) and Watts, Harrison 
and Gilbert (1982). As Powney (1982) points out, partially 
structured interviews offer the interviewer considerable 
flexibility so that the direction of the interview may be 
determined by the interviewee's responses. 
In this study, the interviews are used in two stages. 
The first stage is the pilot stage for a particular deck 
of cards. It is at this point that feedback is used to make 
adjustments to the drawings, the selection and the order of 
the instance cards. This permits the use of youngsters' 
own examples and non-examples (where appropriate). More 
importantly, it allows for a selection of cards that 'work' 
- that is, promote lengthy and varied discussion. In their 
own use of a deck of IAI energy cards, Pope and Gilbert 
(1982) assess them in terms of the 'fruitfulness' and the 
'level of interaction', the cards produce. The cards that 
produced extended discussions between youngesters (in the 
absence of an interviewer) tended to be multi-faceted: they 
had a number of aspects in them to be tackled. These were 
not always the cards that produced the greatest number of 
interactions (interpretations, challenges or argumentative 
strategies) during the same sessions. 
In this study, the initial drawings were produced on 
A6 card. During trials. work, it was suggested that some 
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students might like to amend or expand upon the theme of 
the drawings. This implied a 'consumeable' set of draw-
ings, so that the final format has been on AS paper. 
Some students have taken advantage of this, and have, for 
example, placed arrows on the drawings to indicate the 
forces present. An example is shown in figure 2.2. 
A second purpose of the pilot phase has been to 
establish an order for~the cards. Given thbt some inter-
views would make use of only a few cards, the first cards 
in the deck are required to be productive in terms of 
protracted and varied talk. 
A contrasting requirement has followed a general 
criticism from co-researchers who suggested that many of 
the cards might not explore some of the more abstract bound-
aries of the target concept. Such discussions have led to 
a three stage ordering, as follows: 
Card No. 
1,2 Obvious, stereotypical examples S 
3 an obvious non-example T 
4,5 obvious examples A 
6 a non-example G 
7,8 two examples E 
9 non-example 1 
At the end of this stage, which for some might be 
the end of the interview, students are asked for their 
meaning of the word-label for the target concept: - force, 
energy, or whatever. Then: Cards 10 - 17 feature novel 
instances and borderline cases. Interviewees are also asked 
for their own examples of the concept. This is the second 
2.29 
... 
I 
J 
figure 2.2 
Drag.tog a huge stone. Are there any force~ heTP? 
--- ------_. __ .. _------------------.-._-_._-- -------.. _. 
In this example, the arrows were added during the interview by an 18 year 
old 'A' level student. 
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stage. The third stage, cards 18 - 24 are comprised of 
'difficult' examples and non-examples suited to exploring 
the more abstract boundaries, as suggested. When confronted 
with these cards, the younger pupils in Pope and Gilberts' 
(1982) study found them problematic, both because they 
were unsure of the meaning of the drawings and of the written 
description. These instance cards clearly fell outside of 
the range of elements that the respondents were able to 
construe. 
In designing cards it is sometimes possible to 
duplicate cards on the same descriptor, or for some cards, 
to be seen as duplicates from the respondents point of view. 
The initial phase of interviews allows for a selection process 
to take account of this. Examples of duplicated cards in 
the first draft are shown in figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
The second phase of interviews has been less res-
ponsive than the first. A settled deck of cards becomes 
more common and changes less frequent. These interviews 
constitute the bUlk of those conducted and follow the exper-
imental procedures described in the next section. 
iv) The transcription and editing of the audio-tapes 
Methods of transcription are not uniform. Different 
research areas require varying degrees of completeness in 
the transcribing of taped interviews. In this case, it has 
been considered important to be as accurate as possible 
as far as the content of the speech is concerned. A repre-
sentation of intonation or pitch has been relatively unimp-
ortant unlike, say, in the work of Wells (1981). The role 
of the transcriber has been to provide a faithful account 
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Figures 2.3 and 2.4. 
Examples of cards in the early stages of the Pilot Study. 
These two cards were seen as duplicating similar ideas. 
Figure 2.3 
-
\-\A~ Mo~'" fot.U: ~" • .u., 0"'- 'T 
Figure 2.4 
"- ' .. 
~ ,"TC-t\-. I> ON 
W"""1c.~ '"tO~M \t'6 ~E. MClSi 
fo~c: JifC; "T ,~ 4, O~ ,t' "? 
" \ \ \' I' ;; 
'\. \ '/ 
\ \ ;' 
I 
-_.,_. - ------''---- ----.--------... -~---------'----
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of the interviewee's speech and stress, in a manner that 
allows for subsequent annotation and addition of detail. 
In circumstances where talk is barely audible, or comes 
together and accuracy is difficult, a system of symbols 
are used to indicate partial words, 'best guesses' and 
transcriber's doubt (Watts, 1980). 
The majority of tapes used in this study have been 
transcribed by someone other than the interviewer, but have 
then been 'edited' and annotated by the interviewer/analyst 
at a later stage. This two phase approach has been described 
elsewhere (Watts, Harrison and Gilbert, 1982). During 
the editing stage, the interviewer/analyst makes use of 
other material (interview notes, interviewee's drawings, 
supplementary comments) to annotate the transcript. 
The transcripts are not punctuated in any normal 
way, and the speech not divided into sentences. The type-
script occupies the centre of the page, leaving large margins 
for notes. Each separate utterance is numbered, and 
occasionally, numbers are included off the tape-recorder 
to allow swift reference back to the tape. An example 
interview transcript is included in appendix IU. 
Both the transcribing and editing of tapes is clearly 
an interpretational activity: it is virtually impossible 
to write down or annotate everything that is transmitted 
by speakers. What is written is inevitably selective. 
v) The analysis of interview transcripts 
Following on from above, the inevitable subjectivity 
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in transcription leads directly to the inevitable subject-
ivity of analysis. As constructive alternativism would 
suggest, the interpretation of data is open to a range of 
hypotheses and constructions. Clearly, when allied to a 
reflexive attitude, this approach implies that the very 
processes at issue - the use of explanatory frameworks by 
young people - applies equally well to the researcher as to 
the researched. The basis of this work assumes that the 
youngsters interviewed are guided and constrained by their 
own conceptions. In a similar way, the analysts own con-
ceptual frameworks playa similar role whilst preparing and 
interpreting"the resulting data. 
Seldom are the details of analysis made explicit in 
journal reports, often for editorial reasons. A review of 
methods of analysis might founder for that reason. Inter-
esting exceptions are Konold and Well (1981) and Posner and 
Gertzog (1982). Both report broadly similar methods, of 
condensing reported talk to manageable units on a case-by-
case basis. Posner and Gertzog report work by Pines (1977), 
who calls his system of analysis 'conceptual propositional 
analysis'. This essentially involves transforming all of 
an interviewee's responses into propositional statements 
that are independant of the questions that produced them. 
These are then analysed against a range of criteria like 
relevant/irrelevant, surface/deep and so on. 
Two serious limitations to this propositional approach 
concern, firstly, the assertive nature of propositions and 
secondly, their supposed independence from questions. Freq-
uently, the responses made by interviewees are made tentatively, 
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or are offered as hypotheses. This represents a lower 
level of communication in their statements than that produced 
by a 'disembodied' propositional statement drawn directly 
from the transcript and then attributed to the interviewee. 
In some cases, the interviewer will summarise a discussion 
and offer the summary for comment: 'I understand you as 
saying ••• was I right?' Again, agreement with the inter-
viewer's summary cannot properly be made into a propositional 
statement attributed to the interviewee. 
An important pOint Pines (1977) does make is that 
'almost any child interviewed will exhibit responses char-
acteristic of many categories irrespective of the category 
system used.' Here, such diversity of response is taken as 
being entirely consistent with a constructive alternativist 
view. 
Elements of this analysis are based on Giorgi's (1975) 
protocol analysis (Watts, 1980). The goal is to develop 
descriptions of students' conceptual frameworks powerful 
enough to encapsulate individual differences and yet not so 
specific as to have as many models as there are students. 
The first step begins with the 'editing' of the 
tape - a careful reading of the raw typescript. It is at 
this point that some decisions are taken as to what the 
interviewee is trying to say about the concept or the instance 
in question. Discussion of one instance, or of a particular 
idea might extend from one utterance to long protracted 
'episodes' (Pines, 1977). An episode can thus be seen as 
dialogue that relates to some specific topic. The interview 
can be separated into a number of such episodes, commonly 
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where the discussions centre on, or returns to, a particular 
card. Possibly, within a single episode, a respondent might 
adopt or display a range of alternative frameworks. 
The frameworks are first established as tentative, 
temporary statements: hypotheses concerning the perspectives 
of an individual. Taking a first transcript the hypotheses 
are posed as questions, which are then tested on the next 
transcript. Here, some will be confirmed, some are left 
open and yet more are formulated from the second transcript. 
This complex of hypotheses is now visited upon a third trans-
cript with the same effect. The models that are being 
developed are now taken back to the first two transcripts 
and the procedure repeated - a process of redressing and 
reshaping that is a continuous cycle as more and more tran-
scripts are drawn into the pool. This is similar to the 
procedure reported by Konold and Well (1981), and Piaget's 
(1929) concern for hypothesis testing. He also says that the 
researcher 
'must in fact make up for the uncertainties of the 
method of interrogation by sharpening the subtleties of 
interpretation.' 
The more tentative frameworks of early interviews grow or 
shrink in status as progressively more and more interviews 
are analysed. 
Two further pOints need to be made. Firstly, it is 
necessary to treat each response in the transcript seriously, 
unless flippancy or humorous intent is signalled by either 
participant. Secondly, all responses have to be accounted 
for in some way. Some seem illogical or inconsistent when 
juxtaposed with other statements by the same person. However, 
as Sinclair and coulthard (1975) suggest, it is unacceptable 
-to ignore or discount some statements amply if they prove 
awkward and fail to fit categories. These pOints are taken 
up later in the discussions of individuals' use of frame-
works. 
The suggestion here is that the most confusing or 
inconsistent responses may be the very ones to temper 
initially clear cut models. Moreover, the conjunctives used 
by the interviewee, their pauses and anacolutha1can be used 
alongside explicit statements to mark changes in the frame-
works being adopted. In practice, the problem has not been 
in generating hypotheses, or more stable frameworks, but in 
limiting the number. This process is an attempt to draw a 
balance between generalising frameworks beyond the individ-
ual yet retaining specificity. 
The analysis has been conducted with these main 
features in view. Firstly, of establishing frameworks 
pertinent to particular concepts across all of the inter-
views with a single set of IAI cards. That is, of develop-
ing a limited number of frameworks for each of the four 
main concepts. Secondly, patterns of frameworks are sought 
at each of the three age bands described in the next section. 
Thirdly, the coherence of frameworks is considered by using 
a small number of transcripts as case studies. These case 
studies are conducted using transcripts chosen from the 
main body of interviews, though primarily using transcripts 
from students who have been interviewed on more than one, 
or in some cases all four, of the major concepts. In this 
way some of the answers to the central research questions 
may be reached. 
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iv) The evaluation of the technique at certain points 
During the course of the stages described so far, 
a series of checks are made on the procedures as they are 
being undertaken. Commonly these have been with co-resear-
chers and colleagues, sometimes with teachers in schools, 
sometimes with students during interviews. 
The eventual list of descriptors produced as part 
of the concept analysis has been assessed and criticised in 
this way. All four lists have been considered at some pOint 
by co-researchers, particularly ur. Arden Zylbersztajn, 
whilst the energy and force descriptors have been commented 
upon by Dr. Ian Sefton (Department of Physics, Sydney 
University, Australia) and heat and light by ~ofessor Will 
Graben (Department of Physics, Clemson University, U.S.A.). 
Some attempt, also, has been made to adopt a list of descr-
iptors consistent with the 'list of concept areas' produced 
by the Assessment of Performance Unit (D.E.S., 1911). 
Individual cards used during pilot interviews are 
evaluated along criteria similar to those adopted by 
Gilbert and Pope (1982). As has been suggested, these are 
based upon the fruitfulness of the card to produce varied and 
protracted discussion, as opposed to a cursory or summary 
dissmissal. The order of difficulty of both the examples 
and non-examples was also decided at this stage. Again, 
colleagues were asked to comment about cards as the pilot 
stage ensued. 
During the course of developing the methodology 
questions have been raised concerning the role, and effect, 
of the interviewer. Gilbert and Pope (1982) study has been 
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very illuminating in approaching these issues. In their 
, 
study, groups of younger students (12 year olds) discussed 
rAI energy cards, some with and some without an interviewer 
present. They observed that in all of the groups there was 
an increase in the number of 'dialogue interactions' which 
occur when the interviewer is present. They suggest that 
this is due to the interviewer's use of direct questions} 
using non-directive, reflective techniques; the use of 
summary statements similar to the example in the analysis 
section above; and of directing the discussion towards 
individual students. The greater incidence of 'dialogue 
interactions', however, did not necessarily result in a 
greater number of explanatory frameworks being displayed. 
Two more points need to be made in this section. 
Firstly, the evaluation of the analysis and the research 
outcomes is discussed in the final section in this chapter, 
and is not covered here. Secondly, the methodology as 
described is clearly unlike the 'repatory-grid' techniques 
commonly associated with constructive alternativism. The 
increased use of grids over recent years has not been 
unproblematic. As Pope (1981) suggests, some researchers 
have been unconcerned by the detachment of the technique 
from its theoretical base. Using Marton's (1981) terms, 
this could be seen as using a second-order method to gather 
first-order data. This lack of compatibility between theory 
and method, (for example, the use of grids as a 'definitive' 
measure of people) has perhaps marred their use (Watts and 
Pope, 1982). Whatever their misuse by others, however, 
bears only slightly on the decision not to use them in this 
2.39 
study. Primarily, this stems from the primacy of Osborne 
and Gilberts' (1979) methodology in the initial design of 
the study, and of the inappropriateness of a bipolar, 
dichotomous rating system for use on ~olythetically desig-
nated concepts. The disparity between concepts and cons-
tructs already discussed has pressed for a broader methodology. 
2.3. The Research Design 
In this study, twelve main groups of students have 
been interviewed. Each of the four IAI decks has been used 
with three major age-bands: 13-14 years: 15-16 years and 
17-18 year students. These ages cluster around three secon-
dary school year groups: third year, fourth year, and lower 
sixth. Each group has been labelled as shown in the table 
in figure 2.4. 
concept 
Year group Energy Force Heat Light 
3rd. yr. band 3E 3F 3H 3L 
4th, yr. band 4E 4F 4H 4L 
6th. yr. band 6E 6F 6H 6L 
Figure 2.4 
A small number of students have been interviewed on all 
four target concepts; some on two or three of them. The 
majority in each group have been interviewed only once with 
jUst one deck of IAI cards. The age range in each group is 
not exact. A strict record of age, in years and months, has 
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not been considered important: rather, it is the 'year' 
of schooling that has dictated groups. The conduct of 
the interviews has spanned a three year period and so, in 
following up some students for further interviews, they 
were to be found in different year groups. Those inter-
viewed in the early part of the fifth year, for example, 
have been included in the fourth year band. Those in the 
early throes of fourth year work have been included in the 
th1rd year band. 
Such a school-year grouping is fairly arbitlary in 
many ways: obviously the age difference in anyone year can 
span twelve months. Nor have all students followed ident-
ical syllabi to allow the suggestion that a year's school-
ing is somehow uniform or standard. Students have been 
interviewed from general science classes at third-year and 
physics classes at fourth year and sixth year. In many 
schools no formal distinction is made at fourth year level 
regarding the proposed examination entry of students. 
Students due for entry to both O-level and eSE-level exam-
inat~ons follow an identical course, and are entered for 
separate examinations after tests, some four months before 
the examination date. That is, over mid-way through the 
fifth year. This means that there is a Wide variance in 
the levels of achievement of the students in both the 
third year and the fourth year band. The sixth year band 
is considerably more homogeneous in that all students are 
prospective A-level candidates. 
The sample can best be described as an 'opportunity' 
sample based upon availability and ease of ~ess within 
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the secondary school system. Commonly, schools and teachers 
are reluctant to release examination year students, even 
for short periods of time, and so the groups chosen represent 
those seen as most available for interview. During the 
early stages of research some interviews were conducted 
with younger pupils at the end of primary schooling and in 
the first two years of secondary. In,many ways the groups 
reported here are more interesting. During the third year 
of secondary school, students are required to opt for subject 
choices to follow in the fourth and fifth years. That is, 
they are in the process of moving from physics as a compul-
sory subject to it as a selective one. Many will not opt 
to do physics, some will choose to do no science at all. 
Arguably, the conceptions they hold to at this age will 
form the basis for those they will carry forward into adult 
life, with little or no influence from formal science' 
teaching. 
At fourth year, they are meeting formal instruction 
in physics concepts and are in the process of weighing newly 
introduced physics concepts against their own previous ones: 
of, possibly, giving up (or ammending) one conception for 
another. At sixth form level, they are seen as having been 
successful students, for whom this is their second time 
of choosing to study physics. That is, they might be more 
willing to identify with matters scientific, and may be 
aware of incumpatibilities between their own frameworks and 
those of orthodox science as Posner and Gertzog (1982) 
suggest. 
In all, some 210 interviews have been conducted. 
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Not all of those are reported h~re in detail, some were more 
to enhance the interviewing skills of the interviewer, 
others were part of the phase I of interviews. Here, only 
phase 2 interviews are discussed - those that have taken 
place with a settled deck of IAI cards. The division in 
each group is largely equal between males and females, to 
within one or two interviews in each case. This is not so 
at the sixth form level where the number of girls studying 
physics A-level is considerably less than the number of 
boys. Here, the ratio is roughly two-thirds male to one-
third female. The numbers in each group ar~ shown in 
figure 2.5. 
concept 
Year group 
Year 3 
Year 4 
Year 6 
TOTALS 
Figure 2.5 
Energy 
10 
14 
10 
34 
Force 
15 
14 
14 
43 
Heat 
9 
11 
9 
29 
Light 
9 
11 
8 
28 
Total 
43 
50 
41 
134 
The total number of interviews to be reported here 
is 134. Of these, four students have been interviewed with 
all four IAI card decks, three students using three of the 
decks and ten students on two decks. Initially, the intent-
ion was to interview more than four students with each deck, 
however, some of those interviewed on three decks were ear-
marked for four but were later unavailable for interview. 
This was either because they had subsequently moved from 
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the school, or were unavailable within the school due to 
exam work and so on. The spread of 'multiple' interviews 
of this sort are shown in the table in figure 2.6. 
The large majority of interviews have been conducted 
in comprehensive schools in the Greater London area. A 
full list 6f schools is shown in appendixIV Schools have 
been chosen for their willingness to cooperate with the 
venLure, to release students for interviews, to provide a 
quiet space for recording and generaliy, to tolerate inter-
ruption to their working life. Some schools have been 
extremely generous in their time and, clearly, each of the 
'multiple' interviews using several card decks have been 
conducted in a school where return visits are welcomed. 
Interviews using: 
4 decks of cards E.F.H.L. 4 
3 decks of cards 2 E.H.L. ) 3 
1 F.H.L. ) 
2 decks of cards 4 E.L. ) 
3 E.H. ) 
.L. E.F • ) 10 
1 F.H. ) 
1 F.L. ) 
Figure ~. 6 
2.4. Methodological Checks 
Simons (1981) suggests that research reports commonly 
fail to discuss interview practices on the grounds that 
interviewing is seen as an idiosyncratic, interpersonal 
process that is not susc~ptible to systematic analysis. She 
makes the point that 
'We must begin to discuss the problems we experience 
in practice, however self evident, situation specific or 
limit~d when restricted to the written word they may seem.' 
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The type of interviews, and interviewees, described 
here present their own kind of problems. The interviews 
have been individual, informal, almost conversational and 
without a fixed question schedule. They have been structured 
by the expectations of the school environment, the perceived 
status of the participants, a list of guideline questions 
and the control exercised by the interviewer over the 
occasion. The majority of interviews represent a first time 
meeting between participants. None of the 'multiple' inter-
view students expressed any reluctance to repeat the oper-
ation, or to be audio-taped. All of those who have partic-
ipated in three or four interviews did so willingly, were 
eager volunteers. 
As interviews progress, informal frameworks produced 
and derived from earlier interviews feature later as the 
interviewer~ hypotheses. Konold and Well (1981) make the 
point that: 
'It is this ability to revise and test hypotheses 
during the process of data collection which constitutes 
the greatest strength of the in-depth interview. However 
this fluid, ongoing exchange between hypotheses and data 
is the very characteristic of the in-depth interview which 
can make it difficult to evaluate the validity of the 
research.' 
Traditionally, questions of validity and reliability have 
been concerned with the extent to which a test actually 
measures the entity which it was designed to measure, and the 
extent to which a test gives the same result when applied 
by different people or on different occasions. 
Reason and Rowan (1981) argue that there are many 
different sorts of validity, that it is a relative measure 
and that: 
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'any notion of validity must concern itself with 
the knower and what is to be known: valid knowledge is a 
matter of relationship'. 
Between these two positions, the traditional approach and 
Reason and Rowan's 'new paradigm', it is possible to find 
a variety of stances and opinions on the issue. Ste~house 
(1978), for example, argues that validity is to be found in 
the relationship between interpretation and evidence, and 
the justification of research outcomes is characterised by 
appeals to the reasonableness of interpretation based upon 
publicly accessible forms of evidence. Kushner and Norris 
(1981) argue for a process of negotiation between the 
participants in the research, a position similar to that 
put forward by Terhart (1981). 
For the purposes of this research, the essential 
aspects of the arguments would appear to be as follows: 
An appeal to the reason of evidence (as in Stenhouse's 
case) is clearly unsatisfactory given a constructive alter-
nativist theoretical basis. Any data is open to a wide 
variety of interpretations, each of which is arguably as 
reasonable as the other, dependent upon the viewpoint of the 
interpretor. Nor is it simply sufficient to make public 
the interpretations alongside the 'evidence'. Whilst this 
is a necessary step, it fails to take into account the 
presence of audiences. The question of 'for whom is the 
research valid' needs to be addressed. Elliott (1980) has 
argued that such research can only be validated by the 
participants involved in the study. He maintains that it 
is necessary for the researchers and participants to reach 
agreement by a 'free and open dialogue' as to what a truth-
ful description of the researched would be. 
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This seems to miss an essential pOint. Research 
results offered to a wide audience can expect to be eval-
uated against a wide variety of diverse criteria. In any 
ensuing debate, particular audiences ought to be able to 
base opinions on a reading of the methodologies, the circum-
stances, conclusions and implications. As Powney (1982) 
suggests, there should be no areas in which it is uncertain 
what was done. In this way, the possibility is open for 
interested people to generate alternative explanations of 
the data, with an exchange of views and the possibility of 
a richer understanding. This is not an argument for a 
consensus agreement between all involved. Rather, the point 
is that participants in the study, th~ users of the inform-
ation and an audience of informed critics can relate to 
the description and analysis - a point that Patton (1980) 
makes. 
In this context, these three audiences can be seen 
to be the students who have been interviewed, science teachers 
in schools, and research colleagues. The particular methods, 
and their evaluation, are discussed in chapter 7. In out-
line, their purpose is twofold. The first is to explore 
the popularity of, and generalisability of, some of the 
frameworks with different groups in different contexts. 
Secondly, to present thumb-nail sketches of the frameworks 
alongside sample quotations and example instance cards, 
for the critical scrutiny of each of the three audiences 
mentioned. 
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2.5. Summary 
To summarise this chapter is to make the following 
points. The discussion has dwelt upon many methodological 
issues and has argued that the methods of this study are 
exploring a second-order perspective; one that explores the 
internal world of a person. Such a methodology, for gener-
ating and examining interview discourse, must be sensitive 
to individual, personal constructions of events and to a 
theory of conceptual-change processes in people. 
The Interview-about-rnstances approach has been 
detailed along with some 'ongoing' and 'final form' method-
ological checks. The preparation and presentation of a 
research report has audiences in mind for whom the outcome 
should be credible in the circumstances; sensible, in that 
they can be interpreted in a meaningful way, and functional 
in some sense, if only as a basis for debate. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, PERSONAL SCIENCE 
Section 3.0: Introduction 
Section 3.1: Classical concepts 
Section 3.2: The four concepts 
a) The energy concept 
b) The force concept 
c) The heat concept 
d) The light concept 
Section 3.3: Organisation and fragmentation of constructions 
3.0: Introduction 
This chapter enlarges on some of the issues raised in 
chapter 1. In that chapter, a traditional (paradigm 1) 
view of concepts was rejected in favour of a continuum that 
stretches between personal conceptions and public concepts. 
Moreover, the rigid 'logical' nature of concepts was rejected 
in favour of a looser definition in terms of a 'stable 
organisation'. The point of this chapter is to introduce 
in some detail the four public concepts of interest: energy, 
force, heat and light. They are important concepts in phy-
sics and between them encompass a web of interrelated ideas. 
They have been chosen because they are interrelated and/in 
the context of this study, the relationships bear scrutiny 
alongside the concepts themselves. As has already been 
argued, concepts are not to be seen as singular entities 
but take their meaning from their relationship with other 
concepts. School students meet physics concepts in a 
reified form - as being both incorrigible and incontravert-
able. It is (largely) in this form that they are presented 
here - as the 'public' concepts of physics. The point of 
interest is the intersection of the public and the personal: 
between the seemingly impervious physics concepts in a 
public knowledge system and the personally constructed 
conceptions of young people. It is a juxtaposition of 
agreements about 'what is the case' with a plural world 
of ' beliefs about what is the case. 1 
Clearly, when students conceptualise energy and force 
in individually different ways then they will conceptualise 
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the link between the two in different ways as well. It is 
entirely possible that a student will see no necessary 
overlap between the ranges of conventence for their concept-
ions of force and energy. Nor any overlap between heat and 
light, light and energy, force and light and so on. 
It is an underlying theme of logical and psychological 
coherence that is discussed in this chapter. Having left 
the description in terms of conceptions and mini-theories 
in chapter 1, it is now useful to consider how these might" 
be related. It has been argued that conceptions embody 
expectations and are therefore predictive. There are three 
pOints at issue, which are: 
a) In what sense are 'conception' and 'theory' synonymous? 
b) In what sorts of ways might personal conceptions be 
organised? 
c) How are both of these issues to be se~n from within 
the spirit of Kelly's (1955) work? 
The first section discusses the four main concepts 
in general terms and the criteria for choosing these part-
icular concepts. The second section deals with the four 
concepts separately and a selection of the most recent 
literature on students' conceptions is reviewed for each 
one. The final section takes up the issues just mentioned: 
about the order and structure of personal theories within 
a Kellyan perspective. 
3.2 
3.1: Classical Concepts 
It has already been suggested that the four concepts 
energy, force, heat and light have been chosen because 
they are interrelated. Energy and force are most commonly 
related through the concept of work, heat is defined in 
thermodynamics as the energy that moves from one point to 
another because of a temperature difference; whilst li~t 
and energy are related through Planck's constant and, of 
course, the famous E = mc 2 expression. 
These four concepts are 'classical' concepts in three 
separate ways. They are concepts at the very heart of the 
history of physics and so are classical in terms of their 
acknowledged importance and value. They are classical, too, 
in the sense that they are discussed here in their pre-
relativity formi primarily as classical mechanics and optics. 
The reason for this emphasis is that this is the way they 
are presented in curriculum materials, with the exception 
of some (later) sections of some A-level courses. 
They can possibly be seen as classical in a third 
sense, too. They are commonly placed at the 'formal', 
'abstracted', logical ends of the dimensions described in 
chapter one and so would be, in Smith and Medin's (1981) 
terms, part of the classical view of concepts. This classical 
view suggests that every concept has a set of necessary 
and sufficient features. Warren (1982), for example, says 
of energy that it is a very 'abstract' idea, a very 'advanced' 
concept which.can only be understood if the student has 
first mastered several difficult basic ideas (particularly 
force, work and conservation) and has extensive knowledge of 
elementary physics. He gees 6n to say that the only way 
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to overcome difficulties in learning the concept is to teach 
it 'logically' to students who have been properly prepared. 
Leaving aside matters of instruction for a moment, and 
Warren's own view of matters, the classical view illustrated 
by this example is closely aligned with the positivistic 
philosophy of science (Newton-Smith, 1981). In this pers-
pective, the theories and concepts of science are conceived 
of as being organised only according to the canons of ded-
uctive logic, the logic of mathematics and taxonomy. As 
Harre (1972) maintains, the most important consequence of 
the positivistic view is that concepts which appear only 
in theory are construed as having meaning only by virtue 
of their position in the theory - as logical devices. 
Moreover, these are separate and distinct from the obser-
vational entities commonly experienced. 'Classical' in this 
sense, then, is part of the paradigm 1 tradition. 
The influence of the philosophy of science upon 
science education is tenuous: in schools a single paradigm 
(in a Kuhnian sense) is commonly accepted as being the case 
(Cawthron and Rowell, 1978; Gilbert and Swift, 1981). Not 
that this need be the situation, as has been argued by others 
(Pope and Keen, 1981; Watts and Pope, 1982). A philosophy 
of constructive alternativism underpins a relativistic 
stance as has already been argued. However, the 'curriculum 
science' (Zylbersztajn, 1983) described in the next section, 
and taken from current curriculum materials, is of the 
'old school'. As Schofield (1982) remarks, school-science 
is: 
'seen to have the answers ••• plurality is thought of 
as being untidy, unrewarding and epistemologically disreputable.' 
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Before moving on to discussing and reviewing the 
concepts themselves two further points can be made. Because 
of the ·dalience of positivistic thinking in curriculum 
materials ~'Sullivan, 1980) differences in interpretation 
of theories and concepts, or disputes about conceptual co-
herence or theoretical emphasis, are seldom raised. Very 
often text book readers are not informed that alternative 
viewpoints are possible. That there are differences of 
opinion and emphasis is worth a passing note. O'Sullivan 
for example, notes that, upon a closer inspection of text-
books, it can be seen that the conceptual structure within 
which Newton's laws are interpreted varies considerably. 
He presents four different 'pictures' of Newton's laws which 
he concludes are equally valid in that no one picture can 
be a more 'correct' viewpoint than another. Kilmister 
(1981) also makes the strong point that the 'hidden' 
implicit assumptions underlying the concept of force are 
seldom made explicit in school texts. Within the science 
education journals, it can be seen that protracted debates 
have taken place around a number of terms, for example, 
weight, (McClelland, 1975; lona, 1975; Brown, 1976, etcetera) 
and energy (Warren, 1982; Richmond, 1982) and so on. These 
serve to illustrate that the seeming consensus surrounding 
such curricular concepts is sometimes frayed. 
The second pOint concerns the choice of concepts: 
around the concept of. energy. There are two reasons for 
the choice as follows. Firstly, it is important for the 
concepts to have some formal relationship between each other 
rather than, say, be logically unrelated. Engel (1982), 
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for example, considered the rather disparate concepts of 
evolution, heat and pressure. Whilst these are both 
profitable and interesting areas to explore, the added poss-
ibility of the concepts being interrelated by students is 
worth developing. For this to happen, though, as Pope and 
Keen (1981) indicate, the topics and the situations under 
discussion must span the range which might be reasonably 
discussed by the participants concerned. There is no logical 
necessity that students will link the concepts together in 
discussion, but because of their curriculum 'proximity', 
the possibility is open. 
This possibility is enhanced by using similar cards 
in different interview decks and by the interviewer using 
the opportunity to probe distinctions between terms. The 
decks of cards that have cards in common are of particular 
interest where a student is interviewed on more than one 
concept. Comparisons are made on their responses to the 
same card from different frameworks. 
Secondly, the concepts are linked to energy because 
of its uniquely central position as a unifying concept in 
major areas of physics. Giancoli (1974) says of energy 
that: 
'It is a unifying principle and helps to bring order 
to the natural world. Today many physicists feel that 
conservation laws are the most basic laws in nature. There-
fore it may be that the law of conservation of energy is 
more basic than Newton's laws themselves.' 
This echoes Freeman (1968) who says of the conservation of 
energy, that it is: 
'without question the most significant and far reaching 
generalisation in all classical science.' 
This significance is not lost on curriCUlum planners 
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and a brief survey of a selection of ten examining board 
syllabuses (Watts, 1982) showsit to be a major topic on each 
one. Energy features, too, in current curriculum proposals 
at national level as embodied in Department of Education 
and Science advice (D.E.S., 1982) and common 16+ examination 
criteria (Joint Examining Boards Committee for 16+ criteria, 
1982) • 
For these reasons, then, of prominence within physics 
and prominence within curriculum material, energy is taken 
as a thematic b~sis for choosing concepts. The following 
sections describe the concepts and relevant research studies. 
3.2: The Four Concepts 
The four concepts are discussed separately in the 
order energy, force, heat and light. 
a) The energy concept 
The term energy derives from the Greek 'energia' 
meaning activity, and is noted as coming into general scien-
tific use in the late nineteenth century. Elkana (1974) 
credits Helmholtz with formulating the essential features 
of energy conservation somewhat earlier, in the middle of 
that century. Earlier, conservation laws of sorts were in 
operation based upon the work of the mathematical physicists 
or upon metaphysical commitments. Leibiz in 1686, for 
example, proposed a finite quantity of 'force' in the 
universe. This took the form of 'vis visa' in moving 
objects, or 'vis mortua' in stationary ones. The latter 
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was possessed by objects with the property of position or 
deformation that allowed it to produce vis visa. 
In school-science, energy is described as the capacity 
to do work. At the year three level it is often shown in 
terms of 'energy chains' whereby the different forms of 
energy are connected (sometimes by arrows) to show their 
successive changes (for exawple, in Lewis, 1977). The 
examples often cited include 'light energy' to 'heat energy; 
'chemical energy' to 'electrical energy'; 'mechanical energy' 
to 'sound energy' and so on. In years four and five this 
approach is continued with the added use of symbols and 
calculative manipulation (at O-level and sometimes at CSE 
level). This is the case in Nelkon, 1971; Johnston, 1980 
for example. At A-level, the concept is commonly approached 
at a more formal level in terms of conservation; work; 
energy interchanges; power and the laws of thermodynamics 
(for example, in Wenham, 1972; Whelan and Hodgson, 1978). 
In the early years, the terms work and power are 
seldom made explicit. Lewis (1977), for instance, talks 
of 'jobs of work' (hereby retaining the common everyday 
use) and of power stations and 'electric power'. Even at 
years four and five it is not always the case that work and 
energy are fully distinguished - energy as a quantitative 
measure of the condition of a system, and work as a process. 
Lehrman (1973) argues strongly against the common practice 
of providing pithy one-sentence definitions of energy in 
school science (like 'energy is the capacity to do work') 
because they fail to do justice to the complexity of the 
concept. In his words: 
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if it is not possible to write a satisfactory 
definition in a few words we will have to learn to get along 
without any such neat package.' 
There is considerable debate about the teaching of energy 
in schools and the level at which it might be taught. 
Warren (1982), for example, argues that teachers should 
eliminate the word entirely from early science teaching, 
that it should appear only in advanced work and then be 
based upon a rigorous definition of work. He argues against 
a background of recent research that has explored both 
curriculum approaches to energy, and student~ interpret-
ations of it. There are a number of studies in which 
students' conceptions have been explored. Mentioned in 
chapter 1, they are considered here more fully. The 
closest in spirit to this study is that of Stead (1980) 
who used the IAI technique to explore perceptions of energy 
with younger students in New Zealand. She notes a strong 
tendency to anthropomorphism, in that youngsters relate the 
word energy to living things by way of being 'energetic'. 
She says, too, that it is often treated as a 'waste 
product' - energy is something expended, and lost, during 
some activity. Unfortunately, much of her interpretation 
of results remains as a simple categorisation of responses 
rather than any further elaboration of their implications. 
In this sense she fails to capitalise on some valuable 
data. 
An earlier work by Clement (1978) considered explan-
ations by American college students. He concludes by comm-
enting on the lack of differentiation between related con-
cepts shown by the respondents: 
3.9 
notions of force, force of resistance, elastic 
force and energy are not clearly distinguished by the 
students as they are in physics.' 
Viennot (1979) makes a similar pOint of Belgium physics 
undergraduates, that the concept of energy is 'inextricably 
mixed with the concept of force in a single undifferentiated 
explanatory complex.' 
In Clement's study, be makes an interesting note of 
a particular conception he calls a 'source of force' model. 
From this perspective youngsters see some objects as having 
'stores' of energy inside them that are then used to perform 
certain tasks. In Warren's (1982) terms this is a 'mater-
ialist' view that sees energy as a concrete entity, a sub-
stance that has objective existence. It is in sharp con-
trast to the 'conceptualist' view of energy as an abstract 
quantitative descriptor. 
Solomon (1980, 1982) reports work with classes of 
students and discusses the responses they make in the course 
of everyday school activities. Two specific aspects of note 
are students' explanat~ons of how bodies can be 'recharged' 
with energy (human bodies in particular), and the notion 
of 'useless' energy. When humans rest or sleep they are 
seen as giving the body the opportunity to restore energy 
'lost' during the course of activity. The greater the 
activity, the more energy lost, the greater the need to 
'recuperate' energy. 'Useless' energy is not similar to 
the 'expended' energy in Stead's study, rather it is seen 
as energy unavailable for tasks like the operation of mach-
inery. Solomon argues that it provides a useful means of 
gaining entry to the complex notion of entropy , even with 
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younger students. 
In none of these studies do students see energy as 
being conserved, a point amply made by Duit (1981) in his 
report. A particular model he discusses is the teleolog-
ical nature of student responses. Energy is seen as an 
entity designed for human consumption, especially in tech-
nical devices. His study also comments on students' con-
ceptions of 'work' which, like Osborne and Gilbert's (1979) 
study, simply underlines the richness and variety of 
students' own explanatory disquisitions. Pines and Leith 
(1981) also note the complexity, value and importance of 
students' propositional knowledge drawn from interviews 
about energy. 
b) The force concept 
In physics, force is related to energy through the 
notion of work. Like energy it is a concept remote from 
everyday experience and is no less complex. Unlike energy 
it is a vector quantity, with all of the associated impli-
cations. There is a need to distinguish between force, as 
one of the interactions of nature, and resultant force. 
The latter is concerned solely with the acceleration of 
bodies. Strictly 'body' should apply to particles: the 
extension of Newton's first two laws to cover extended 
bodies by applying them to the notion of the centre of mass 
requires the consideration of internal interactions within 
the body. 
The interesting aspect of force is that it is central 
to Newtonian physics, as crystallised by his three laws. 
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In essence, his first law delineates a system of mechanics. 
The law suggests that unless a 'resultant external force 
acts upon a body, it will move with constant velocity. 
The decision as to whether or not a body moves with con-
stant velocity requires a framework to define speed and 
direction. This aspect of course, raises the complex issues 
of frames of reference. 
Warren (1979) is highly critical ~f the presentation 
of force in school texts to the extent that he says: 
'young people studying mechanics are far too often 
exposed to a bewildering mixture of rigidity and chaos.' 
Nor are such criticisms to be reserved for British texts. 
Sjoberg and Lie (1981) make similar comments about Norwegian 
texts and courses~ Jung (198b) of German ones and so on. 
As has been suggested, studies of student understand-
ings of force have been the most numerous of all such single 
concept studies. Piaget's famous (1929) work with young 
children, reporting their animalistic responses, was con-
cerned with force amongst many other ideas. As one of his 
earliest works, it forms one of the bases upon which he 
organised his theory of developmental stages. In more recent 
times, Fleshner's (1963) investigation of childrens' con-
cepts of force andwaght are apposite. She says of weight, 
that her students (between 11 and 13 years old): 
'attributed weight only to those bodies they have 
. weighed, it is for them the numerical result of the action 
of weighing.' 
They did not necessarily relate weight with force 
except where a person had to use force in order to lift a 
heavy object onto a scale to weigh it. Force, for Fleshner's 
students, is limited to muscular effort, taking place mainly 
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in the actions of men or animals on any other body. These 
results presage a number of more contemporary studies (Watts, 
1980; Watts, 1981; and Osborne, 1980). Before discussing 
these and other studies it is worth commenting on a further 
pOint that Fleshner raises. She argues that students 
succeed in applying newly acquired knowledge where this is 
close in situation to old everyday, knowledge. However, 
one group which she describes as being in the process of 
'actualising' two knowledge systems (the old and the new) 
are brought to a stop and refuse to answer in the interviews. 
She suggests that there is no 'interlacing' of the two 
systems so that the students are aware of the deficiencies 
of the old without the consolidation of the new: 'I don't 
remember and I don't want to talk nonsense', she quotes one 
as saying. Chapter 5 and 6 of this study discuss similar 
features in the interviews with students. In the terms 
used here, students may have reached the limit of their 
range of convenience for their conception in a particular 
domain and may be attempting to construct a new range of 
convenience. 
Some of the early studies include one by Leboutet-
Barrell (1976), who indicates that high school and college 
students in America have misconceptions about force and 
motion (which are described as 'pre-Galilean') and which 
persist despite physics instruction. Helm's (1978) work 
on force has already been described as one of the central 
'misconceptions' papers. He considers South African stud-
ents' (and teacher~) responses to pencil-and-paper questions 
and therefore again suggests that the misconceptions continue 
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during (if not 'despite') formal physics teaching. 
A number of papers cluster round the IAI methodology. 
Watts (1980, 1981) for example describes animistic and 
anthropocentric responses using the method, and Watts (1983) 
presents an early version of some of the ideas presented 
here in chapter 4. As with the energy studies, the work 
closest to this in spirit and methodology is that by Osborne 
(1980) and Osborne and Gilbert (1980). He comments largely 
upon the anthropomorphism of many students' responses and 
calls them examples of 'everyday views'. Osborne tentatively 
suggests using anthropomorphic explanations in the course 
of instruction as a means of trading on this tendency. 
The work was conducted with New Zealand children of 9 to 
14 years old using the IAI technique. 
The allied methodology of IAI, discussed in the last 
chapter, has now generated a number of short studies on 
force. The original by Watts and Zylbersztajn (1981) 
surveyed about 125, 13 year olds in London schools and argues 
for a number of frameworks for force, motion and gravity. 
Of force and motion, the authors say that one of the major 
frameworks can be paraphrased as 'If a body is moving there 
is a net force acting upon it in the direction of movement. 
If a body is not moving there is no force acting on it.' 
Two other studies using IAI have since been reported, 
first by Thomaz (19ro) with Portuguese university students 
und school students, and secondly by Wright (1982) with 
Kenyan physics undergraduates. They both report very similar 
results showing that both undergraduates and student teachers 
in both countries have conceptions simil~r to those expressed 
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by the younger school students. 
Sjoberg and Lie's (1981) work makes this same point 
a little more strongly. They also use paper-and-pencil 
tests with school students of between 16 and 19 years old, 
using some questions adopted and adapted from other studies. 
They highlight the strongly Aristotelian - or more approp-
riately, Impetus Theory - responses of their respondents. 
The Impetus Theory (commonly associated with Buridan in 
the pre-Newtonian era) conflicts with Newton's first law 
in a way that is similar to the framework outlined above. 
For Aristotle, the force that maintained a projectile in 
its trajectory derived from the air around the object. 
For Buridan the force was an internal impetus within the 
stone, recp.ived when it was thrvwn. This maintained the 
object in forward motion until a 'natural motion' (the 
vertical movement) gradually took over as the impetus was 
used up. Sjoberg and Lie conclude that a reasonable explan-
at ion of their data is that no learning of Newtonian physics 
takes place as students progress in their 'physics career'. 
Rather, more advanced students are better equipped to verbal-
ise their Impetus theories than less advanced students. 
They say: 
'The only "development" which seems to occur is that 
some of the mistakes are more clearly expressed by the more 
mature students. One may argue that they then have the 
"tools" to express views already developed earlier ••• ' 
A number of studies have considered the overlap between 
force and other concepts, in much the way that Fleshner's 
interviews were designed to do. For example, Duit's (1981) 
study considers force along with work, power and energy, 
although concentrating on energy. The German students 
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responding are between thirteen and fifteen and associate 
force and energy through the german word 'kraft', meaning 
power. In Germany, a powerplant is called a kraftwerke -
a direct translation might be a 'force' plant. Duit notes 
that many associations for force are linked to human affairs 
and that force is more related to qualities than is the word 
energy. He notes, too, tnat: 
'Most students still prefer, after four years of physics 
instruction, conceptions stemming from everyday experiences. 
The conceptions which are to be seen among the students of 
grade 10 are more or less the same as those described for 
students in grade 7.' 
Also in Germany, von Rhoneck's (1981) work explores the over-
lap between force and electrical voltage. About half of his 
sample of fourteen year old respondents describe electrical 
voltage as the 'strength', the 'force' or the amount of 
current, whilst current itself is understood as being energy. 
Watts and Gilbert (1983) consider three levels of overlap 
between force and energy. The two can be seen to be synon-
ymous, separate but related, or distinct and unconnected. 
They pOint, too, to results similar to those of Viennot 
(1979) and Clement (1978) mentioned within the studies on 
energy. 
These two last studies are primarily with undergraduates 
and in a recent paper, Clement (1982) makes the important 
point that: 
'In conclusion, the data support the hypothesis that for 
the majority of these students, the 'motion implies a force' 
preconception was highly resistant to change. This conclusion 
applies to the extent that the students could not solve basic 
problems of this kind where the direction of motion does not 
coincide with the direction of net force.' 
To emphasise the point that 'preconceptions' exist even at 
more exhaulted levels, Peters (1982), in a paper entitled 
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'Even honours students have conceptual difficulties with 
physics,' notes that only 5% of a class of physics honours 
graduates iuentified the expected forces in the common example 
of a person pulling a heavy stone. Some, he suggests, 
indicate a 'lack of progression from a more primitive view 
of how the world works' and visualise force as a substance 
which is 'passed back and forth like a hot potato.' Similar 
points are made by McCloskey, Carmazza and Green (1980) for 
situations that involve curvi~inear motion. In their study, 
college physics students argue that objects projected from 
a curved tube will continue to follow a curved path. 
One further group of studies require some comment, ones 
that are typified by Champagne, Klopfer and Gunstore's (1981) 
paper. Champagne's work, and that of similar studies, is 
concerned with mapping and representing both 'novice' and 
'expert' knowledge, often in computer programme form. 
They are directed towards enhancing novice knowledge struc-
tures in problem sOlving techniques (for example, Chi, 
Feltovich and Glaser, 1980). As such, they study student 
performance which is often limited to the solution of 
characteristic textbook physics problems, solutions which 
are then compared with the well-defined correct solution 
provided by the expert. 
Similarly, DiSessa (1982) employs aspects from artificial 
intelligence and information processing to elaborate a 
theoretical model for students' Aristotelian responses to 
Dynaturtle, a computerised, graphical, problem solving 
situation. Using a single case study he cha~ts the 'robust' 
and 'surprising structure of discrete and definite theories' 
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that the student employs. Moreover, he suggests that concep-
tual development need not be governed by a general path in 
the transition from novice to expert: 
'More profoundly, one can never rule out the possibility 
of radically different routes of development based perhaps 
on entirely different pools of naive knowledge.' 
In contrast to Champagne's et. al., work, Disessa's is 
more akin to the majority of the papers reported here in. being 
(in the main) more idiographic than normative. 
c) The heat concept 
Unlike the large number of studies completed on force and 
energy, comparatively little has been written about heat, 
In physics, the concept of heat conflicts with the common 
usage of the word in some important ways. Heat is energy 
being transferred solely as a result of a temperature differ-
ence - a body does not contain heat. When this process 
called heat (or heat transfer) takes place, work is done 
on a molecular scale but not macroscopically. Heat, like 
work, is a process. Work is energy being transferred as 
the result of mechanical processes (so that a body does 
not contain work either). These processes do not have to 
be purely mechanical, for example work can be done by dis-
placing an electric charge. 
In this way, heat is made distinct from a body's internal 
energy, which is assumed to be an aggregate of the kinetic 
and potential energies of its constituent particles. As 
Warren (1982) pOints out, heat is often made synonymous 
with internal energy. He adds that: 
'To make matters worse, the term 'heat energy' is now 
often used, sometimes for heat and sometimes for internal 
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energy. As heat and energy are so essentially distinct, 
this is a meaningless term.' 
Warren~(1972) too, is one of the earliest studies to 
consider students' definitions of both heat and internal 
energy. One hundred and forty eight university students 
were asked for their definitions, and to state the relat-
ions hip between them. Warren reports that not one gave a 
'meaningful definition' nor did anyone provide a statement 
of the first law of thermodynamics, which formalises the 
relationship. The most popular response was 'heat is a 
form of energy', along with a collection of 'diverse' and 
'vague' ideas. In commenting upon the results, Warren 
censures teachers and textbooks for incorrect presentation 
of these two concepts. Of the students, he suggests that 
their patterns of thought have been 'inculcated' and are 
quite lacking in logical structure. It thus becomes 
'extremely difficult to remedy these errors by later teach-
ing. ' 
In contrast, Tiberghien's (1978) work is more idiographic 
in that her stated aim is a particular interest in 'some 
of the representations or types of interpretations which 
children give concerning heat.' She uses a range of methods 
with eight students between 12 and 13 years old: individual 
interviews, a logical reasoning test, filming of one pair 
of students working and the tape recording of others. She 
notes a number of conceptions I that heat is a fluid which 
moves over the surface of objects~ that the 'transfer of 
heat' to the interior of solid objects is sometimes described 
by postulating holes for it to travel through~ and that 
'hot things heat; cold things cool'. This last conception 
sees heat as the property of the material of objects. 
Albert's (1978) study is with younger students over 
a range of 4 to 9 years old. Some forty interviews are 
reported, conducted to a Piagetian model. She analyses the 
data first into the 'thought patterns' (which are seen to 
underlie the responses made) and then secondly, into conven-
ient categories. In all, she argues for six categories which 
she sees as being arranged developmentally, according to 
chronological age. The last category, for example, is a 
conceptualisation of heat as being produced by mechanical 
energy. This conceptual ising is expressed at eight or 
nine years old, but not before. The six categories follow 
in sequence from heat seen as 'hot bodies' (4 years); to 
it being 'labile' and a process (6 years); an independent 
entity, sometimes as a single dimension (8 years); and then 
en~rgy as a source of heat, with some conceptualisation 
of temperature at 9 years old. 
Erickson's work (1979, 1980) takes two looks at 
students' conceptions of heat. The initial study is inter-
view based, first with 6 to 13 year oids and then a phase 
of ten in-depth, videotaped interviews with 12 year olds. 
The in-depth interviews are based upon experimental tasks 
and situations. Erickson presents his outcomes in terms 
of conceptual inventories and one particular conception 
is prominent: the existence of cold as an opposite to heat. 
Like heat, cold is endowed with a material property as it 
is transferred from object to object. In addition, temp-
erature is sometimes described as the measure of the mixture 
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of hot and cold inside an object - a mixture that all objects 
have. Other examples describe heat as a substance rather 
like air or steam. Erickson's second study (1980) reports 
a subsequent survey of 276 students in three age groups; 
8, 11 and 14 year olds. Whole classes are asked to observe 
a demonstration and then to rate a range of explanations 
on an eleven point bipolar scale. An example of one scale 
asks the students to rate the explanation as 'very much 
agree' to 'very much disagree' with their own explanation 
of what takes place. The explanations provided for the 
students to rate are taken from three viewpoints, charac-
terised as 'children's viewpoints' (based on the interview 
phase data); a 'caloric viewpoint' (derived from an inter-
pretation of the historical view of heat); and a 'kinetic 
viewpoint' (a modified curriculum model) • 
The results suggested that the 'caloric viewpoint' 
is well subscribed and remains constant over the three age 
bands. Changes occur in the other two viewpoints, which 
Erickson construes as a shift from a more perceptual bound, 
common sense explanation of heat phenomena to a more abs-
tract perspective. There is no overall clear developmental 
pattern shown, in that although there is a movement away 
from an intuitive set of explanations, some of the individ-
ual statements gain in popularity and strength of belief 
with age. 
Stavy and Berkovitz's (1980) work concerns qualitative 
and quantitative judgements of temperature and amounts of 
water. For example, if cold water is added to more cold 
water, a youngster replies that the result is cold water of 
the same degree. However if water at looe is added 
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to more 100c water, the result is expected to be water at 
o 20 c. Stavy and Berkovitz refer to these as questions of 
'intensitivity' and are interested in the apparent con-
flict between two 'representational systems' related to 
temperature - a verbal one and a quantitative-numerical 
one. The youngsters (200 students between 4 and 13 years 
old) are presented with demonstration activities with hot 
and cold water, are asked to produce a judgement on temp-
erature (before and after mixing) and for a justification 
of their answer. The authors argue that, by comparing the 
classroom instruction for groups, those students for whom 
a conflict is induced between their 'representational systems' 
improve their understanding. That is, by confronting youn-
gsters with their contradictory answers, this awakens the 
'need to resolve the conflict that has arisen'. 
Andereon's (1979) questions are also about temperature, 
but more specifically about bOiling points. He presents 
paper and pencil multiple-choice questions to over four 
hundred students in four age groups between 12 and 15 years. 
The questions concern the continued boiling of water over 
a five minute period and any possible change in temperature 
as a result. The responses of students iri all age groups 
suggest that the longer the water is on an electrical hot 
plate, the hotter it will get, beyond 100oc: whilst a second 
popular answer is that the switch setting on the hot plate 
determines the temperature of the boiling water. Andersson 
maintains that there is a general progression, with age, 
towards the correct answer of boiling being the cause of 
temperature invarience. He points out that answers over 
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two questions (where the switch setting is first constant 
and then changed) are consistent for most of the students 
in the groups, in that over 70% give compatible answers on 
both questions. 
Two further studies are worth noting; the first by 
Crookes (1982), a case study of a 14 year old boy, and the 
second by Engel (1982), an extensive survey and interview 
approach. Crookes' study follows a single student through 
a series of discussions and practical sessions. Crookes 
charts the student's changing explanations in the face of 
discussion and discomfitting experience. In early sessions 
he explains heat in terms of rays, but then moves to versions 
of a kinetic model. The move resolves a number of problems 
his early explanations raise but in turn generates more 
problems, particularly concerning the expansion of solids. 
The realisation that his previously 'solid' world alters 
merely as a result of temperature changes seemed challeng-
ing. Crookes paraphrases the student's worry as: 
'If everything does expand and contract, how can you 
survive in this suddenly flexible world.' 
Engel (1982) considers two age bands (12 to 14 years 
and 14 to 16 years). In many cases these are the same 
students who are questioned two years later. The questions 
are paper-and-pencil ones fOllowed up by selected inter-
views. Heat is just one of three topics investigated and 
the questions range across a variety of situations, from 
boiling kettles, bath water, bOiling potatoes, ice, breathing 
'clouds' on a cold day and so on. Engel analyses her data 
into frameworks on two scales, ordinal and alternative 
(parallel). She says of the heat frameworks that there is 
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no clear age trends and,for questions on the conduction of 
heat, there are no age differences. Students consistently 
give similar, or the same, alternative responses across a 
number of question contexts. Engel suggests that perhaps 
students find it easier to identify common scientific prob-
lems embedded in similar question contexts, which explains 
the relatively higher stability of alternative frameworks , 
over other sets of questions. 
This collection of studies, although few in number, 
raises a number of interesting points and here the stress 
has been upon noting the outcomes from the research quest-
ions. Interestingly some report a progression of ideas with 
age, or with specific instruction, whilst others are equi-
vocal, reporting rapid changes in some contexts but not 
in others. These points are raised again later. 
d) The light concept 
If there are only a few studies reported on students' 
conceptualisations of heat, then there are even fewer for 
light. In physics, the wave-particle duality in the nature 
of light is fundamental to the core of the discipline. 
The nature of light in these forms has become a topic for 
school physics curricula with the inception of the Nuffield 
Advanced Physics courses (Nuffield, 1971a, 1971b). At 
lower age levels, students are commonly introduced to waves 
and to light although not usually in combination. Often 
waves are treated with respect to sound; light with respect 
to ray optics and, most commonly, the human eye. 
The human eye is a complex system, and many of its 
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limitations are not discussed except, perhaps, in some A-
level courses (Nuffield, 1971a). Some defects, such as 
the lack of proper curvature of the retina, are used to 
explain some of its lack of resolution. Since the retina 
has a finite number of light receptors, it is possible that 
the brain enables one to 'see' detail not clearly present 
on one retinal image by storing information from successive 
images and compairing different sets of information. At 
such points vision is indistinguishable from perception. 
It is no coincidence (as Schon, 1963 points out) that theories 
of light and vision have been transferred to theories of 
thought and reason. It is usual to discuss comprehension, 
understanding, and a host of other mental activities as 
'enlightenment'; 'seeing' a pOint, 'envisaging' some action: 
gaining 'insight': 'seeing through' an argument: an idea 
'dawning' and so on. The resulting ambiguity in terms 
like 'see', 'observe', and 'indicate', for example, is a 
systematic ambiguity in that the metaphor is both extensive 
and pervasive. 
The common sense view of light, and colour, is that 
these are seen as something an object possesses as a real 
quality rather than a set of wavelengths reflected by the 
object. In this sense an object can be said to be red even 
when in the darkest corner of a remote cupboard. It is a 
distinction, as Jung (19815) suggests, between potential and 
actual colour. Light itself is often conceptualised as 
brightness, the condition for actually perceiving colours 
through a transparent medium, given off by some body of 
a special kind. 
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This is, Jung claims, an Aristotelian account of 
seeing. In this sense, he says, light itself is not seen. 
What is seen is a streaming (an emission) of colours or 
brightness. This is one way in which the physics concept 
of radiation is seen to enter into the 'common sense' frame-
work of ideas. 
A long line in theories of light has been documented 
(for example, in Bray, 1938), some of the earliest being by 
the Egyptians as reported by Thales (640 BC). Until the 
time of Newton, light was normally considered to be pure, 
elemental, and white (Zylbersztajn, 1983). Newton's contr-
ibution is well known: he was led to the view that white 
light is a mixture of rays of many varieties and colour. 
He opted for a corpuscular theory, compatible with his 
work in mechanics, and away from Huygens' wave theory of 
light. As Andrade, Silva and Lochak (1969) remark: 
'It was of course, difficult for (Newton) to be 
totally unbiased when there was such an obvious analogy 
between the 'particles of light' in the corpuscular idea 
and the 'particles of matter' in his own mechanics.' 
It is said that Newton was impressed by the sharpness of 
light shadows and this seemed to him to be inexplicable if 
light consisted of waves. 
Cantor (1981) uses the historical arguments between 
'waves' and 'corpuscles' as a useful example for generating 
theorising and debate at sixth form level. The particle 
theory leads to the view that light has a higher speed when 
passing into a second medium whereas the wave theory predicts 
a lower speed. Cantor suggests that by rehearsing and 
reconstructing the arguments, and conflicting predictions, 
it is possible to stimulate students to consider their own 
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ideas before embarking on the more recent explanations of 
light. Zylbersztajn and watts (1982) note that few school 
texts consider students' own ideas about light. One excep-
tion is a Nuffield text (Nuffield, 1976), where the authors 
suggest that colour filters might be seen by students as 
adding colour to an otherwise pure white beam of light. 
Zylbersztajn and Watts asked 150 thirteen year olds to 
describe and explain (in writing) why red light is seen 
to come from a red projector slide. Only some 2% of the 
sample give what might be considered to be a textbook answer 
in terms of the transmission of some frequencies of light, 
and the absorption of others. About half of them suggest 
that the light is transformed or changed in some way, two 
thirds of whom are non-specific whilst one third specify 
a 'dyang' mechanism for light. Interestingly, some 13% of 
the sample indicate a model whereby the white light is not 
so much coloured by the filter but 'projects' the colour 
forward from the filters - a kind of 'knock-on' effect. 
Three other studies on students' conceptions of light 
are worth noting, The first, by GUesne (1978) uses two 
interview formats (directed and non-directed) in parallel. 
They are described as separate but complementary-exercises, 
probing the conceptions of 13-14 year old French students 
in Paris. The first asks questions concerning experimental 
situations - the student is asked to make a prediction of 
(or interpret) the outcome of some set of phenomena. The 
non-directed interviews pose questions such as 'What does 
light mean to yOU?' 'What does light do?' and so on. The 
research outcomes from the directed interviews suggest that 
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the students talk in terms of reflection for a mirror but 
not for an illuminated white sheet of paper. Lenses are 
seen as making light bigger, and candles visible at a dist-
ance are not considered to be sending light as far as the observer 
but are only capable of 'being seen'. In the non-directed 
interviews light tends to be associated with large, obvious 
sources like lamps or the sun. Responses are given in 
terms of affect (of 'warm' light), and of personal experiences 
of light and dark. 
The problem of distances is taken up in a study by 
Stead and Osborne (1980). In Guesne's study, students 
thought that light would not travel far from a candle and 
yet it could be seen from a distance. Stead and Osborne 
query the relative distances travelled by light at day and 
at night. They use the IAI technique with thirty-six New 
Zealand students between 9 and 16 years old, and follow 
this with a survey of 144 9 year olds. For many interviewees, 
the distance travelled by the light depended on the size 
of the source. For example, fourteen of them answered that 
the light from the sun (obviously a large source) travels 
to the earth, whilst only five said the light from the candle 
would travel any distance. The results of the survey (a 
multiple-choice test) showed that most 9 year olds did not 
consider light to travel more than a metre from a source 
during the day, and only slightly more further at night. 
Similar results are obtained when Stead and Osborne tested 
other students, and those a year older, although both groups 
had recently completed a section of work on light. 
The final study, reported by Jung (198~) is with 12 
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to 15 year old students in Germany. The study concerns the 
conceptualisation of optical phenomena such as emission, 
absorption, scattering, reflection and image formation. 
In one part of the study students are asked to look through 
a double-slit at a distant light source and to explain what 
they see. Although explanations in terms of interference 
were not expected, some response in terms of image format-
ion were. In the eventuality, students responded within 
Jung's 'common sense frame' in terms of the source radiating 
sideways. In describing mirrors and reflection, 90% of the 
sample of 12 year olds argued that their image was upon 
the mirror and not 'behind' it - a conclusion reached by 
the majority of older students too. An allied question is 
as follows: 
'You are standing in a completely darkened room against 
one wall. A small bundle of light is directed against the 
wall in front of you. All the walls are black. Somebody 
tells you there is a mirror on the wall in front of you -
could you decide if they are right or wrong?' 
A typical response was that a small bright spot can 
be seen upon the mirror. Jung argues that this exemplifies 
a de-coupling between seeing the mirror, or the light lying 
on the mirror, and receiving light from the mirror, into the 
eye. 
Although few in number, these studies in light and 
optics are valuable and illustrative of several major points, 
and Jung's term 'de-coupling' is a useful term. Put another 
way, in physics the concepts of ~ight', 'reflection', 'absor-
ption' and 'refraction' are all interrelated. Their relat-
ionship 1s one of unification and not disjunction: they 
exhibit logical coherence, are 'coupled'. This coupling 
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is not something that students are necessarily aware of, 
or would formulate in a response to questions. In this 
example, seeing is a natural activity that means one can 
watch the goings-on in an outside world: the events that are 
taking place around them. The activities of light, and the 
occurrence of images, are just some of those events and it 
is not always necessary to conceptualise the observation 
of those events as being contingent upon the events them-
selves. 
A person's conceptions of 'sight', 'seeing', 'being 
seen', 'watching', 'looking', 'looking at', 'noticing', 
'catching sight of', 'glimpsing', 'staring at' and so on 
may well form a cluster of conceptions. This cluster may 
well be complemented by a range of operational descriptors 
that help to describe how this takes place. And such a 
complex of ideas may have only partial overlap with the 
advent of reflections, images and so on. 
The next section takes up the issues began in chapter 
1, and discusses groups of personal theories from under the 
mantle of Kelly's theory. In doing so, it considers the 
array of results that have just been described and attempts 
to set the scene for the empirical data to follow in chapter 
4. 
3.3: The Organisation and Fraqmentation of Constructions 
The arguments about concepts that have been presented 
so far have rejected a simple logical (either-or) view in 
favour of a polythetic view, seeing concepts as being found 
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on a number of continua. These arguments have been made 
on the basis that if one is to study students' conceptions 
of scientific concepts then this is best achieved by pict-
uring concepts as differing in degree and not in kind. In 
order to view a person's natural concepts one has to allow 
that concepts can be natural. The suggestion here is that 
the process the person goes through in developing physics 
concepts is one of progressive integration and different-
iation of their own natural concepts (conceptions) rather 
than the 'acquisition' of logical concepts that are of a 
different kind. Taking Bolton's (1977) description of a 
concept as a 'stable organisation' begs the question of 
what sort of organisation, and that is the topic of this 
section. 
Conceptions have been described as mini-theories that 
have a range of applicability, or convenience, and with a 
central focus of convenience. In one sense, the word theory 
denotes a testable proposition, or group of propositions, 
that have withstood the process of testing. In another 
sense it is commonly used to refer to almost any set of 
ideas, whether speculative or principled. It is this latter 
(non-FOpperian.) sense which is used here. Whereas some of 
the elements of a person's theories are testable (and tested) 
not all are, or even could be. A person's mini-theory 
(conception) on any topic can be described as the set of 
beliefs, expectations and implications which (s)he is 
prepared to avow about it (Pe~t, 1978). In Markova's 
(1982) words, a person: 
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is not an idle observer of the world around him, 
recording his experiences and then devising concepts and 
theories to fit them. On the contrary, he is always activ-
ely conceptualising and theorising, and his experience is 
laden from the begirring with concepts and theories which 
determine the form it takes.' 
This is a similar point to those made earlier for 
concepts and fits well with Kelly's constructive alternativism. 
Mini-theories, then, are not fixed. Some, clearly, 
are more stable over time than others, as Engel (1982) 
pOinted out for ideas about heat; Jung (198lli) for light; 
Sjoberg and Lie (1981) for force and so on. Therefore some 
conceptions are less fluid and more ephemeral than others. 
They, too, span a continuum of stability, from durable 
(slowly revised) to permeable (quickly revised). 
These are arguments against a simple dichotomised view 
of concepts as simple-logic sets, or ones that fall separ-
ately either side of a concrete-abstract division. In a 
way that is positivistic in outlook, Gagne (1970) for 
example, makes a distinction in kind between 'point-at-able' 
concepts and 'defined' (theoretical) ones. Here, following 
Newton-Smith's (1981) arguments, concepts can be seen as 
theory-lad~n even at the minimal, most concrete level-
although some will be more theory-laden than others. 
The proposal here is that conceptions are gathered 
together in clusters concerning particular topics, or within 
certain contexts. These clusters form distinctive, semi-
independent subsystems, that are subsumed at some point by 
a unifying thread, some superordinate conception. This is 
a description developed from Kelly's (1955) theory -
although here it is addressed in terms of conceptions, or 
construction~ rather than bi-polar constructs. The contention 
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is that this description is sufficiently flexible that it 
survives and profits from this amendment. There are two 
main features of Kelly's theory that are pertinent here: 
the Fragmentation and Organisation corollaries: 
The fragmentation corollary states that: 
'a person may su~ssively employ a variety of constr-
uction subsystems which are inferentially incompatible with 
each other.' 
This is a picture of a flexible system, of situation-
specific, differentiated domains. The way a person responds 
to a particular situation on one day cannot necessarily 
be inferred from their responses yesterday or the day before. 
Nor will they necessarily respond in a similar manner in 
the future. To the observer - or in this case, the inter-
viewer - it may seem that one response could not be antici-
pated from the previous one and that grossly inconsistent 
responses and constructions are being offered by the indivi-
dual. However, just because different constructions do not 
seem consistent with each other and one cannot be inferred 
from the other directly, it does not mean that no consistency 
exists for the person involved (or some other observer of 
the scene). One of the implications of the fragmentation 
corollary is that 'superordinate' constructions can be used 
to resolve apparent inconsistencies at lower levels (Adams-
Webber, 1979). 
The fragmentation corollary is, in essence, making 
two pOints. Firstly, it complements Kelly's 'organisation' 
corollary which says that 'each person characteristically 
evolves, for his convenience in an,ticipating events, a 
cOnstruction system embracing ordinal relationships between 
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constructs'. This is generally taken to mean the construct 
system as a 'whole'; that is, there is a degree of organis-
ation concerning a person's entire repetoire of constructs. 
The fragmentation corollary then allows for the whole system 
to be subdivided into relatively independent subsystems, 
which can be brought together under some superordinate 
constructs. This is tantamount to saying that, although one 
may have task-specific or domain-specific constructions which 
are separate from one another (fragmented) there is some 
level at which a person can bring together and co-join the 
subsystems. This is the trademark of rationality and lies 
behind the commonsense view commonly credited to 'normal' 
people in everyday encounters: that they are rational (Pet~it, 
1978). As Ryle (1975) contends, the fragmentation corollary 
is necessary to account for the generally observable fact 
that people can hold beliefs or make judgements which seem 
incompatible with each other and yet remain consistent and 
coherent to themselves. 
There is an inherent circularity in this argument -
where being rational is by virtue of having a degree of 
unity in one's argument, and where that unity is also used 
as a reason for describing someone as rational (as opposed 
to irrational). It is a circularity that Pettit (1978) 
recognises in his 'rational-man theory' and yet, fragmen-
tation is not often used in this context of the coherence 
, 
and unity of peoples naturalistic personal meanings. Too 
often it is reserved for the extremes of thought-disorder 
rather than as a description of everyday construal. And 
yet the notion that, despite apparent conflicts and illog-
icalities, people are consistent at a superordinate level 
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is a feature of rationality as argued by, for example, 
Foster (1983) in terms of self-evaluation. 
This study is not a development of grid methodologies. 
It is more in the spirit of recent developments (for example, 
Pope and Keen, 1981) in terms of gaining access to const-
ructions and discursive feedback and in terms of the red.uction 
and reconstruction of personal meanings as aids to awareness 
and negotiation. In this way the term fragmentation is 
taken in its (and arguably Kelly's own) commonsense applic-
ation as an expression of the 'topography' of an individ-
ual's clusters of meanings. As Adams-Webber (1979) pOints 
out, Kelly assumed that the systemisation of sets of inter-
related constructs (that is, of separately functioning sub-
systems) increases the deployability and scope of the entire 
construct system as an operational whole. Such local domains, 
or contexts, can be developed and themselves integrated into 
a related network without (too much) due concern for incon-
sistencies or 'peripheral' counter-examples. 
This picture of alternative constructions-within-an-
operational-whole is reminiscent of Piaget's (1969): of 
'the role played by a substructure (or functioning sector) 
in relation to the functioning of the total structure.' 
However, there is no suggestion here that one can seek 
universal similarities between people or age groups. More-
over, the problems to be tackled do not so much consider the 
'operational whole' as chart the force of the fragments, 
substructures,or personal constructions as they relate to 
these four concepts in physics. Attention is squarely upon 
capturing young people's descriptions of physical concepts 
as they see them and use them in explanations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
4.0 An Introduction to the chapter 
4.1 A discussion of alternative frameworks 
4.2 Some proposed outlines for frameworks 
a) Individual perspectives 
b) Categories of response 
c) Alternative frameworks 
4.3 Frameworks for the main concepts 
E: Frameworks for energy 
F: Frameworks for force 
H: Frameworks for heat 
L: Frameworks for light 
4.0: Introduction 
It is a consequence of using open-ended questions, 
particularly in a loosely structured format, that the result-
ing data is very rich in varied, detailed and complex 
information. Each one of the 134 interviews in this study 
is discernibly different to its neighbours even where the 
same cards, the same age student and where similar inter-
viewing conditions have prevailed (as far as this could be 
discerned). However, in only a few of the interviews have 
exactly the same pattern and order of IAI cards been used. 
students have been happy to take the initiative and have 
been instrumental in shaping the interviews as they talk. 
In many cases the overriding impression is that such an 
arrangement (it would be inappropriate to call it a tactic) 
allowed the students a greater feeling of directing the 
pace of events and therefore the flow of their own responses. 
This was not always the case, of course, and on a number of 
occasions the interviewee adopted a passive role and control 
was vested with the interviewer. It was pOinted out in 
chapter 2 that some seventeen students were used for more 
than one interview. The choice of student for revisiting 
with different decks of IAI cards was based upon their 
eagerness to participate and their willingness to be open 
and frank about their thoughts as they worked their way 
throuqh the pictures. The upshot of this is that the scope 
and breadth of the responses in the interviews is very wide 
and therefore mitiqates against any simple system of analysis. 
It is not the purpose of this study to provide a 
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normative evaluation of students correct or incorrect res-
ponses. It is not an analysis of errors, or of categories 
of appropriate or inappropriate responses. Instead it is 
an attempt to pick out the threads of the many arguments 
and accounts put forward as explanations for the situations 
depicted in the cards. The analysis, then, is couched in 
terms of frameworks of ideas, a structure placed on the 
variety of responses by the interviewer. This is made much 
the easier by the shaping that students have undertaken 
themselves as they order their own thinking in the course 
of the discussions. 
Three themes are intertwined in this chapter - the 
three meanings by which frameworks have come to be used. 
Firstly, 'framework' has been used as a description of a 
particular perspective adopted by an individual interviewee. 
Secondly, it has been used to signify a unit of data analysis 
at protocol level and thirdly, (and more usually) to repre-
sent a research outcome. Whilst it is necessary to discuss 
each theme separately for conceptual clarity (rather than 
irreparably shred their interaction) an inevitable shaping 
for relevance - as opposed to comprehensiveness - will 
reflect this entwining. 
Despite the advent of the rapidly growing fund of 
research reported in chapter 1, little has been written 
on the nature of frameworks to lead this discussion. The 
purpose of this chapter, then, is to extract and examine 
those small indications that ~ been made by others and 
to propose a clear use for frameworks. What follows is a 
description of those frameworks c,ulled from the interviews 
in each concept area. They are illustrated by numerous 
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extracts from the transcripts in each of the three age groups. 
There is no suggestion that the frameworks are free standing 
- the intra- and inter-relationships between the frameworks 
in each concept area is the topic of chapter 5. Rather, 
each framework is a generalised, typifying case that spans 
a number of responses and situations. 
4.1: A Discussion of Alternative Frameworks 
The metaphoric use of architectural terms in academic 
disciplines is commonplace. Hence disciplines have 'found-
ations', one seeks 'support' for arguments, some of which 
may have been 'built on shaky grounds' and so on. Toulmin 
(1976) calls this pervasive metaphor the 'city of truth'. 
He says: 
'Individual items of secure belief, or knowledge, 
resemble particular rooms or buildings - in spectacular 
cases, individual skyscrapers. Well organised theories resemble 
complexes of buildings whose different rooms or structures 
lend each other support, so that we can move with ease from 
one to another.' 
He invokes this metaphoric imagery to make a description 
of the term framework. He argues that human rationality is 
the capacity to arrive at secure, strong, well founded 
knowledge. Experience provides the background and the 
plethora of events upon which the knowledge is 'constructed' 
whilst logic checks the design of the skeleton - or frame-
work - from which the knowledge gains its security. The 
specific reasons that one gives in defense of particular 
beliefs demonstrate that a person is conversant with parts 
of that knowledge; that is, one shows that a particular 
belief is 'well founded' - one proves it - by pointing out 
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just where in the entire construction it is located and how 
it obtains the necessary firm support. 
A framework, then, can be seen as a scheme - an ordered 
organisation - whereby elements can' be linked together to 
provide substantive support for each other. 
Within the literature previously cited, the term 
alternative framework is used broadly with varying degrees 
of specificity and sophistication. It is commonly a non-
specific designation for responses to questions. Freyberg 
and Osborne (1981), for example, equate framework with view-
point and make a distinction between an everyday mental 
framework and a technical mental framework. They suggest 
that the two frameworks are distinct and separate, being 
in 'sharp contrast' to each other, and are discernible in 
the responses that both teacher and student make, in 
particular in transcript data. They say: 
lIn our interview work a careful analysis of trans-
cripts has often subsequently revealed to us that we, too, 
as interviewers have sometimes missed cues which would have 
told us that the children we were talking to have been 
responding from a much more everyday, or non-technical, 
mental framework than from the technical viewpoint we 
intended.' 
The three senses in which the term can be used are inter-
mixed in this passage. However, it is possible to derive 
a number of guidelines towards detailing frameworks from 
what has been described in other reports. Freyberg and 
Osborne, for instance, are suggesting that two frameworks 
can be d~crete, that is, separate and distinct, whilst at 
the same time making reference to the same phenomena. 
Although the focus of conversation is common to the part-
icipants, there need be no overlap between their 'mental 
frameworks. I 
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In another paper, Osborne, Bell and Gilbert (1981) 
make lengthy reference to 'children's science'. This, they 
say, refers to the views of the world and meanings for words 
that children tend to acquire before they are formally 
taught science. They suggest that the term children's 
science now supercedes 'alternative frameworks', their 
implications being that the research community now: 
'increasingly realise how sensible and understandable 
children's views are in terms of their experience.' 
As with other examples of Osborne's work (for example, 
Stead and Osborne, 1980), children's science is consist-
ently made synonymous with 'viewpoint'. In Osborne, Bell 
and Gilbert (1983), however, the authors characterise 
children's science in three important ways: 
1. It is typically non-abstract reasoning and is usually 
ego or anthropo-centric, as children: 
'consider only those entities and constructs that 
follow directly from everyday life'; 
2. Children's science is 'not concerned' with a need for 
coherence and non-contradictory explanations across a wide 
range of phenomena; 
3. The language base for children's own descriptions of 
phenomena is imprecise, ambiguous and non-technical. 
These three criteria beg a number of questions - and 
are considered in more detail a little later. At this 
point, it is suffice to note that there is little in their 
description of children'S science to encourage researchers 
to the view that it represents a more coherent or compre-
hensive entity than that more commonly termed framework. 
More preferable, because it lacks demeaning connotations, 
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is the term 'students' science' (Watts and Gilbert 1983 ), 
which is used as a collective noun for a range of possible 
frameworks. 
In their original paper, Driver and Easley (1978) 
describe youngsters as having 'autonomous' frameworks for 
conceptualising their experience of the physical world. 
They emphasise this self-regulation in conceptualisation 
by describing frameworks as the product of pupils' 'imagin-
ative efforts' to explain events. They point, too, to 
frameworks that will be 'in keeping' with youngster's own 
experiences, although they may also be recognised as partial 
explanations of limited scope. They point up two further 
features: frameworks are resistant to counter examples (a 
conclusion based upon Driver's own doctoral thesis, Driver 
1973); and that there are features in common between child-
ren's alternative frameworks and some historically held 
scientific views. 
In a more contemporary paper Driver (1981) refers to 
alternative frameworks as 'implicit theories', derived from 
prior experience upon which people base their reasoning. 
She argues that frameworks can be persistently held despite 
instruction (rather than simply before it, in the case of 
'children's science') and that in some cases quite profound 
changes are required in students' frameworks before they 
can be 'emancipated' from one world view to another. She 
interprets Engel's (1982) study as showing that frameworks 
display a range of stability. In some cases, pupils' frame-
works tend to be problem specific and are influenced by 
seemingly superficial characteristics of a task. Other 
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more stable frameworks appear to be discernible across a 
range of different tasks or situations. 
In a jOint paper Engel alld OLiver (1982) go further and 
make some additional points about frameworks. A framework, 
they suggest, is a description of a perspective from which 
a prediction about events can be made, a perspective which, 
at the very minimum, should be demonstrated in more than 
one question context. By making this stipulation they intend 
frameworks to be a way of thinking which i~ not simply quest-
ion dep~nd~nt and which has some generality ~ithin the 
sample of children. Again, these are useful indicatvrs ~nd 
are taken up as a summary of points is made. 
Elsewhere (for example, Driver, 1983) she is less 
specific and more content to leave both the properties and 
referents of frameworks as more general notions. She exhibits 
~he tendency already mentioned - of intertwining the mean-
ing of framework between category of response, idiosyncratic 
commitment and research product. The term is used for both 
pupils' 'first time' answers, and for long held 'deep-seated' 
ideas. She suggests, too, that frameworks may be both use-
ful explanatory devices and yet hinder observation. They 
may facilitate focusing on 'irrelevant' (from the teacher's 
point of view) details whilst reflecting 'relevant' ones. 
A further consequence, she argues, is that instead of acting 
as a source of idea~well formulated and firmly held frame-
works would restrict hypotheses and experimentation. 
Ser~ (1982) suggests that pupils (who consider a number 
of experiments on pressure) would need some framework 'incor-
porating the concepts of mechanics' in order to interpret 
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the experiments. She implies that frameworks are elements 
within a person's interpretations and that they ( or their 
organisation) are often inadequate: she too, sees them as 
representing obstacles - to the pupils' understanding of the 
properties of gases. In this case, framework is used in 
a strictly normative way: they are related to Piagetian 
stages (with some noted discrepancies) and are seen as 
barriers to correct concept learning rather than (say) as 
'growth points.' 
In contrast, Nussbaum and Novick (1981) propose using 
student frameworks as a basis for cognitive conflict and any 
ensueing accommodation. In their 'preparation' for cognitive 
conflict, they encourage students to state their ideas as 
clearly and concisely as possible thereby making themselves 
aware of the elements of their own alternative frameworks. 
Note that, in contrast to Sere's description, it is frame-
works that have elements due for interpretation and not 
the other way round. 
As with others (Posner, 1981; Pines and Leith 1981; 
for example), however, Nussbaum and Novick equate frameworks 
with pre-conceptions. There are a number of objections to 
this particular equation of terms. It is worth exploring 
these objections because, at one pOint, they raise a number 
of issues which have been used in arguments against the whole 
notion of 'alternative frameworks'. These arguments them-
selves are worth developing since, when the opportunity 
ar isi·ng later to collate and propose some features for 
frameworks, it will be possible to suggest just what frame-
works are~. Preconception is a commonly used term in 
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Ausubel's (1968) theory of meaningful learning. It denotes 
a learner's prior knowledge and contrasts with concepts at 
the highest order of abstraction. It is these high order 
concepts that Ausubel suggests are the most stable and useful. 
In this sense, a pre-conception occurs before the subsumption 
of a correctly abstracted (usually scientific) concept. 
Leaving aside the draWbacks to 'correct' concepts and to 
abstraction already argued, the term suggests that the complex 
of knowledge and experience held by an individual prior to 
the subsumption of some abstracted 'organising' concept is 
not worthy of the name conception. McClelland (1982) goes 
further. In a critique of Driver's work he challenges one 
of her examples of a framework (in Driver, 1981 and 1983). 
It is a case where a young boy, who needs to weigh some 
marbles, is unsure whether the height of the scales relative 
to the floor is important. The youngster recalls from 
experience that an object dropped from a greater height 
makes a greater impact on landing. McClelland interprets 
this as indicating that, prior to the weighing activity, 
the boy had a rule for weighing and a vague idea about gravity 
and falling which had never needed to be considered in 
conjunction. He says: 
'Rather than having preconceptions which needed to be 
overthrown, he had no conception worthy of the name. The 
activity itself created conditions under which a clarification 
and ~erging of weight and gravity were needed for the first 
time.' 
Using this kind of argument, McClelland seems to be 
arguing that a person's 'ideas' precede even their concept-
ions, which in turn precede their pre-conceptions. Nor does 
he grant a 'conceptual status' to weight or gravity to show 
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how these interrelate and cO-join with both prior experience 
and the task at hand. Not to be too harsh on McClelland's 
cow.ments, the problem he raises is real enough; what terms 
might best be used to denote various types of responses that 
youngsters (and adults) provide - from deeply considered 
carefully weighed answers to tautologies, circumventious 
strategies, or 'instant' first thoughts? 
Sutton (1982), too, has been critical of the term 
framework as being too static a description of the fluidity 
of personal conceptions. He questions the 'stability' of 
frameworks over time - if they are transitory (passing phases 
on route to 'correct' science) then they deserve some other 
name than framework. A similar point is made in a more 
recent paper by Gilbert (1983). In this case, he returns 
once more to 'children's science' because it implies a more 
relativistic epistemological outlook. 
It has already been suggested, reinforced by this 
summary of papers, that there has been little consensus in 
current literature to help explicate a description of terms. 
Needs necessitate, therefore, for proposals to be put forward 
for the purposes of this study. 
4.2: Some Proposed Outlines for Frameworks 
To begin, it seems worth wrestling some distinctions 
from the three uses of framework mentioned earlier: 
a) Individual perspectives 
Much of the work reviewed as studies in alternative 
frameworks is interested in charting an individual person's 
scientific theorising. This case - study approach, using a 
case of one, interprets changing verbal responses as changing 
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mental constructions. A point of interest is that (as in 
this study) the evidence for the nature and extent of a 
person's theorising and construing is commonly anecdotal 
narrative and necessarily involves frequent compression of 
events and language when reported by anyone other than the 
individual student involved. Such reporting involves complex 
assumptions and interpretations (as outlined in chapter 2) 
concerning the purposes and intentions of both participants 
in the data gathering process. 
Here, the term conception has been reserved for the 
personalised constructions of an individual. It will be 
used to describe talk and accepted meanings which are either 
entirely idiosyncratic or generaliseable - in fact anything 
that is attributable to a single person. Some responses are 
very idiosyncratic where, for example, someone recounts a 
personal piece of experience or puts forward an opinion 
unrepeated in further interviews. 
The example provided below is meant to fulfill three 
purposes. It will first of all exemplify the personalised 
constructions at issue whilst at the same time introduce 
the reporting procedure to be used extensively in this and 
the next chapters. Thirdly, it will illustrate the level 
of response that is the strong feature of all of these inter-
views, the direct and open disclosure of personal ideas. 
The transcription process outlined in chapter 2 is 
modified in the reporting in only one or ~wo ways. In some 
cases additional notes are included in the middle of Lhe 
extract /in square brackets/. The talk is sequenced even 
where both participants have spoken over each other - a 
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feature not usually indicated in the reporting. The extent 
to which this happens might be gauged from the sample inter-
view transcript provided in appendixrII. The extract to 
follow is number one: all of the extracts to follow that are 
numbered sequentially throughout the study. Each extract 
is also identified by a suffix which indicates the inter-
viewee's initial and their concept-year group. Consequently 
the brackets (A,3L) mean interviewee A from the year three 
about light, (as tabulated in figure 7 in chapter 2). The 
year three interviews about light have in fact two interviewees 
with the initial G. They appear as (Gl,3L) and G2,3L), 
that being the order in which they were originally inter-
viewed. A full list of the interviewees and some biograph-
ical detail is shown in appendix II. A further ~art of appendix 
II shows the extract numbers against each interviewee. 
Each of the interview cards is numbered (as shown in appendix 
I) so that, for example, the card that features in this 
following extract shows a flower in a pot, card Lll (card 
eleven in the light deck). Later extracts will refer to 
cards by an abbreviated name and the number (for example, 
'Flower' Lll) although here in this first extract the card 
is shown as figure 10. 
Figure 10 
Extract 1 
I. a little flower in a pot 
A. umh ... it needs heat and light to survive otherwise 
the plant just dies off ••• on its own it doesn't give 
off anything, but with help /from other flowers/ it 
can brighten up a room ••• 
Underlining in an extract (for example 'give off' above) 
is to indicate the emphasis that A gives to those words: 
that is, that although the flower needs heat and light in 
order to survive, it does not emit light - it is not an 
obvious source of light. As it stands this extract is only 
remarkable because of the ambiguity of the word 'brighten'. 
The paradox it suggests is that, given that a flower is not 
a source of light, how is it possible for it to 'brighten' 
the locality at all? There is no evidence to suggest that it 
is an ambiguity A had previously considered. Earlier in 
the interview he had described both a candle and television 
set as 'brightening up' a room, and immediately after the 
last extract was asked to say what light 'is' by being asked: 
I. . •• another question is something like this ••• say 
somebody "had missed a lesson and came to you and said 
'you did light last week - what is it?' ••• how would 
you explain what light was to them •• ? 
A. •• umh ••• well I'd say light is a source of energy 
that ••• umh ••• brightens things up ••• er ••• so you can 
see them ••• umh ••• 
(A,3L) 
From the theoretical standpoint argued for in chapter 
1, there is necessarily a wide range of possible interpret-
ations of A's responses. Here the interpretation is made 
on the basis of A's responses within the context of the 
whole interview. Added to this is the close scrutiny of the 
audio-tape recording for emphasis and intonations, and the 
many field notes made. Not least, of course, are the 
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researcher's own hypotheses, being both interviewer and 
analyst, and therefore present at the time of the interview. 
To brighten up a room is an expression in everyday 
language that is infused with affection: it has emotional 
overtones. This is true of much of the way light-related 
terms are used, stemming quite probably from religious 
origins. In these interviews, light as 'warming' is a 
common response. In contrast, space is seen as both dark 
and cold (and therefore an inhospitable place to be). In 
A's case, the pOint of light (and of candles and flowers 
etcetera) is to brighten objects so they can be seen. It 
is a very anthropocentric conception of light that sees its 
purpose as being for the benefit of human beings. 
Before continuing with discussion of the overall 
analysis of the interviews it is useful to make two more 
pOints about conceptions. Firstly, in the interviews time 
is taken at the start and during the course of the interview 
to explain the nature of the taGk and its purposes. None 
of this is included in the extracts to follow. It is not 
that it is unimportant: the seating arrangements, the role 
expectancies, the immediate setting, perceptions of the 
task, the air of relaxation and so on must all contribute 
to shape the conceptions of each individual. However the 
purpose here is to focus on the substance of the person's 
responses~ the method, to talk to them individually as close 
as possible to their own classroom setting. In this sense 
then, the term conception can be taken as being the inter-
pretations made by the researcher of responses made by the 
interviewee only where they concern some aspect of the content 
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of the picture cards, some further development of that, or 
some feature or fact of the nature of the particular concept 
in question. 
The second point, though, is that not all talk can be 
seen as evidence for particular conceptions: they are not 
amorphous conglomerations of information. As Hewson (1980) 
contends, a conception is only useful to a person if it 
forms a whole which is somehow more than the sum of its parts. 
In turn, he quotes Anderson (1977) in a pertinent comment 
as saying: 
'The force of the /notion of a conception/ is to 
direct attention to the patterning of elements. What the 
elements are and how they interrelate cannot profitably be 
addressed as separate issues.' 
This picture of a conception, then, is of an organised 
structure of interrelated information, hypotheses, opinions, 
local theories and emotions. They are, empirically, commonly 
evidenced from at least two statements in a transcript, 
although occassionally a single, strong, statement is reveal-
ing. They carry with them sets of expectations and limits 
to their range of convenience - as in the case of A above. 
Such limits can be eVidenced from explicit statements and 
implied from strings of anacolutha, and from interpretat-
ions of non-verbal behaviour. 
b. Categories of Response 
In the context of this study, to categorise responses 
is to construct groupings of responses which are construed 
as having very similar intended meanings. Responses are 
extracted from a range of interviews and are used as exemplars 
of the category. Osborne (1980), for example, makes categories 
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of one line statements from interviews in this way. He 
categorises 'viewpoints', which he equates with children's 
science and gives each category a name, for example, a 
Human centred viewpoint. 
Needlesstosay, categories can be established on any 
one of a variety of bases. Most commonly they have been 
on the basis of responses that directly approach the resear-
cher's question. Engel (1982) limits categories to one 
response per question for each participant and admits that 
mixed protracted responses, with different parts of the 
answer fitting into different categories, were common. More 
importantly she admits that in operating a set of 'ground 
rules' to overcome this problem, she is aware of making 
certain assumptions about the coherence of students' ideas 
and the conviction with which they are held. 
A somewhat similar approach is adopted by Zylbersztajn 
and Watts (1982) who categorise students'written responses 
to questions about colour filters. 
In this sense, then, categories of response can be 
seen as simple classifications of (often) propositional 
data under some loose, but convenient, heading. They are 
not individualised and represent an interpretation of state-
ments at a general, but functional level. The example below 
is a categorisation of responses to one particular card in 
the heat deck. The card shows a block of ice melting. The 
interviewees are asked to discuss this in terms of heat. 
The students represent those in the oldest age range in the 
heat interviews - group 6H, a total number of nine. A copy 
of the card is shown below as Figure 11 (card H6) • 
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I 
Figure 11 
~ 
Melting ice 
The nine respondents are identified by their initial: where 
initials are the same they are designated a number for the 
order in which they have been interviewed. Thus the students 
are: 
P; C; N; Jl; M1; S; J2; M2; L. 
Category 1: 'Heat in the Surroundings'. 
All nine of the students respond in terms of heat 
being in the surroundings to the ice. In each case this is 
taken as meaning the air around the ice rather than, say, 
the surface it is on. Eight of these suggest that the heat 
in turn comes from the sun, radiators, gas, electricity, 
lights, bunsen burners and so on. Only one (Jl) says she 
does not know where it comes from. P is uncertain as to 
whether sunlight ~ (or contains) heat. She decides that 
sun-heat and sunlight are separate, but is not sure, because 
'light is quite warm, isn't it?' 
Two more (C,N) go further by discussing movements of 
heat in the surroundings. N says that heat spreads out 
in the air, is 'spilled' out through an entire room - unless 
there are draughts. She does not elucidate on what the 
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effects of draughts would be. C says that cold air falls. 
This 'goes to warm air' and then, as we move about a room, 
we move the heat around. That is, warm air is circulated 
by people moving around in an enclosed space. 
Category 2: 'Ice has Heat/has no Heat' 
Seven of the respondents argue that ice itself has 
no heat. Since the ice is at zero degrees centigrade, it 
is the air around it that has heat and is causing the ice 
to melt (as the picture shows). 
melt itself (P). Two, however, 
If ice had heat, it would 
(S,J2) maintain that the 
ice itself does have heat. S says it has heat because its 
temperature is slowlyr~ing and it is therefore melting. 
The temperature would continue to rise until the ice is all 
water. J2 thought that ice does have heat but"isn't sure~ 
She had seen something recently on television about ice 
having heat but couldn't remember what was said. 
Category 3: 'Molecules' 
Four of the students (MI, S, M2, L) discuss heat in 
terms of molecules. The elements of the discussions are 
similar in that 'warmer' molecules move about more and in 
moving appart change from a solid to a liquid. As they 
gain heat they move faster and farther appart to form a gas. 
For Ml, warmer molecules 'get active and spread out'. S 
suggests that water doesn't want to be heated or cooled, 
but if it is 'forced' to, then it will go through the changes 
outlined above. For M2, water molecules receive heat fronl 
the surroundings and in turn take energy from the heat. 
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This enables them to move and so to melt. S suggests that 
the heat expands the space between the molecules so that 
they spread out. Molecules are given energy by the heat 
and move about. This kind of response is dealt with in 
greater detail (as the'hot~molecul~ model) in chapter 6. 
Category 4: 'Energy' 
Only two (E2~) discuss melting ice in terms of energy 
and this has been mentioned above in the last category. 
Such categories, of course, do not catch all of the 
talk concerned with this card since it is only where the 
talk has some similarity with that in another interview that 
it can be brought together. As suggested, they are group-
ings of particular responses to specific questions. 
c. Alternative Frameworks 
The case to be made here is that alternative frameworks 
are also generalised, non individual descriptions. Their 
relationship to the transcript data, however, is one level 
further removed than the categories of response. Whereas 
the categories are simple groupings of responses, frame-
works are intended as short, summary descriptions that 
attempt to capture both the eXFlicit statements made and 
the implied intentions behind them. They are thematic 
ways of responding, stylised, characteristic, mild carrica-
ture of the talk made in interviews. A framework typifies 
a range of responses in the same way as one might typify the 
views ascribed to parts of the political public - the opin-
ions of a typical T~ry voter, member of the Labour left 
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and so on. Consequently, from this description, an alter-
native framework is more depersonalised than either a category 
of response or conception 
The important point is to see each framework as a 
'family' of responses, to borrow a term from Wittgenstein 
(195£). That is, they are a tool for grouping and organi-
sing in a manageable way the many types of individual 
responses which students have given. Such a grouping - of 
a small number of broad frameworks - serves to highlight 
the similarities and differences between students' dispos-
itions towards the various situations depicted in the cards. 
The frameworks therefore help to focus attention on a range 
of student approaches which may not have previously been 
apparent. They are not, however, an attempt to classify 
students. Rather, they offer a way of organising young 
people's responses to depict the threads of argument they 
use - and transfer - across a number~ settings. 
At least three immediate consequences arise from this 
description of a framework. First, the frameworks will 
not necessarily match tidily with the particular conceptions 
of an individual student .• Some conceptions (as illustrated 
in chapter 6) are sufficiently idiosyncratic as to either 
cross framework boundaries or escape them altogether. It 
follows from this that a particular response could be used 
as evidence for two different frameworks. Responses have 
to be taken in the context of the whole interview for the 
thread of argument to be discerned. Second, the frameworks 
can only organise the responses that exist in the transcripts 
and so mayor may not match well with findings in other 
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studies. As is indicated in the next chapter, in many ways 
frameworks are bound to the questions that precede the res-
ponses. Third, the frameworks do not attempt to be compre-
hensive in the way that a categorisation of responses could 
be. Thus the personalised discussion, the clarification of 
the task at hand, criticism of lessons, personal attitudes 
to physics and a host of other detail in the transcripts 
is not incorporated in the frameworks. 
There are some advantages and disadvantages to this 
view of frameworks - more to be considered in a moment. 
First it is necessary to outline the elements that might 
compose a framework. The construction of a framework is a 
third stage of analysis. From individual conceptions it is 
possible to generate categories: from an examination of 
categories it is possible to construct frameworks. 
As Engel and Driver (1982) suggest, a framework can 
be constructed from perceived commonalities between categories 
so that it is applicable beyond a single question context. 
As noted earlier, they contend that: 
'A framework is a description of a perspective from 
which a prediction of events.:can be made, a perspective 
which, at the very minimum, should be demonstrated in more 
than one question context.' 
The construction of a framework too, they argue, is influ-
enced by the reporting of similar outlooks in other research 
studies: that is, outside even of the immediate research 
context. The inclusion of a 'predictive' element in a 
framework is important. For the frameworks to be useful, 
they must facilitate the construction of consequences from 
a line of argument. For example, Nussbaum and Novick (1981) 
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use frameworks in a classroom situation. The first part 
involves a teacher elidting responses to a question about 
the evacuation of a glass flask by a hand pump. Students 
are asked to show on an outline drawing of the flask 'which 
part of the flask is left without air?' or 'where do you 
place the 'empty space'j'Vacuum' in your model?' The 
responses are not categorised in a formal way, the teacher 
moving around the class selects representatives of each type 
of drawing. In some way this can be seen as the enactment 
of implicit frameworks by the teacher selecting 'typical' 
drawings which are also going to allow her to raise points 
about it, what Nussbaum and Novick refer to as helping to 
'differentiate meanings'. In the second part the students 
are asked to predict and apply the frameworks to explain a 
second event and question (to operate in another question 
context). The process is one of classroom debate where 
students are encouraged to make open and explicit their 
reasoning, hypothesising arguments and counter-arguments. 
From this description, then, frameworks can be seen 
as 'arguing pOints', autonomous (in that they do not have 
to be personalised) and stable, across small, local, shifts 
of context. 
In making this conceptual distinction, between concep-
tions, categories and frameworks, there is no suggestion 
tha:t any' one is preferred to the others. Each has its own 
focus and limits, both in content and functionality. Concep-
tions focus on the personalised theorising and hypothesising 
of individuals. Each person's knowledge is unique (though 
not infinitely diverse) which greatly limits the generalis-
ability of the single case. categories of response focus on 
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multiple data. They represent plausible, functional sub-
divisions of bulk data according to some features ascribed 
by the researcher. The number, and type of categories 
depends upon the nature of the data (and the data gathering 
methods) and of the choices made by the analyst (as is 
argued in Bliss, Monk and Ogborn, 1983). What the frame-
works lose in failing to represent closely the responses 
of anyone individual, they gain in generaliseability across 
a narrow context. Frameworks focus upon a characterisation 
of responses and are more consistently stable because they 
(by design) bridge small local changes in context. They 
might, however, be seen as 'labels', in the manner of any 
stereotype, by which to classify individuals: Sutton (1982) 
hints at such a possible misuse of them. Such a use would 
indeed be a misrepresentation given that~ as defined above, frame 
works are to be seen as two levels removed from individual 
conceptions. 
Both categories and frameworks are illustrated further 
in the next sections - conceptions in the next chapter. 
To summarise this discussion use is made of a diagram in 
Engel and Driver (1982), in this case modified and ammended 
to highlight the points made here. 
Individualised 
Accounts 
Generalised 
Accounts 
Delicate~.~ ________________________________________ ~,Gross 
First level 
Conceptions 
Second level 
Categories 
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Third level 
Frameworks 
Figure 12 
The dimension on the vertical axis reflects the degree 
of individuality or generaliseability of the accounts in 
the data. The horizontal axis suggests a dimension between 
delicate and gross levels of accounts of the data, in a 
similar way to the terms used by Bliss, Monk, and Ogborn 
(1983) • 
Before moving to the next section a comment is nece-
ssary about the choice of extracts and about some of the ques-
tions they portray. The extracts are not always the most 
powerful examples of a particular framework. They have 
been chosen largely for five reasons: 
a. They are good examples of the framework 
b. They are fairly concise and short. 
c. They make explicit reference to detail in instance 
cards. 
d. They span more than one card. 
e. That, for anyone framework, there are examples from 
at least two of the three age bands. 
It is important that an extract should exemplify the 
framework and at the same time span more than one specific 
instance card, in order to give some indication of the 
generality of the framework. Some effort has been made to 
indicate the cards under discussion each time. It is not 
always possible to chose extracts that are concise enough, 
in that discussion may take place over several transcript 
pages and can be returned to, as a developing topic, over 
several sections of the interview. This commonly occurs 
at the end of discussion of each card as they are compared 
to others. This extended development of arguments is an 
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feature of the interviews since early tentative conceptions 
are strengthened and modified in the light of continued 
discussion. This makes the choice of pithy extracts diff-
icult since many of the references within a given section 
may be in previous (and in some cases future) discussion. 
Here, the terms exophoric, anaphoric and cataphoric, are 
borrowed from linguistics to describe referent predication 
Exophoric reference is where an item relies for its 
interpretation on the presence of information in the context 
of the situation (that is, outside the transcript text). 
In such cases an extract has not been used unless augmented 
by specific /bracketed/ field notes. Students may pOint to 
one of an array of cards (referring to them as 'those' 
'that' or 'it'), or to apparatus in the room, pictures on 
the wall and so on. Anaphoric reference (references back-
wards in time in the interview) to 'it', 'that' etcetera 
again need careful documentation. In the interviews it 
has often been simpler to make explicit what is being referred 
to. 'You mean the melting ice' is a typical interviewer 
interjection to make clear on the tape recording the subject 
of discussion, or of previous discussion. This is not 
always possible since over, say, a five minute period of 
discussion it is abundantly clear to both participants what 
the topic of discussion is, and repeated confirmation by 
the interviewer for tape recording purposes is a barrier 
to animated and cohesive talk. 
In a few cases, where students commandeer the pack 
of cards and make reference to cards yet to be discussed, 
their comments can be seen as forward referencing, or 
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cataphoric. Again, this makes the extract difficult to use 
unless carefully annotated. Some of the extracts concern 
only one card and in such cases an extract has been chosen 
where the discussion begins in the specific detail and 
context of the situation but then becomes more general and 
wide ranging. 
The vast majority of extracts are intended as serious 
discussion except where some humour is signalled and this 
is noted by a laugh. A laugh sometimes indicates embarr-
assment and this is noted separately. In the interviews 
humour is generally quite obvious. In the following extract 
for example, Y is teasing the interviewer for his picture 
in the light card 'a bright red painting'. The card is 
presented as a black and white line drawing and the work 
of art as an impressionistic doodle. Y finds it funny to 
consider a red painting in black and white and then suggests 
that it might be: 
Y. yes ••• its a fire engine in a red sunset on Mars ••• 
yes very good. 
(Y,4L) 
The extracts, too, illustrate the style and type of 
questions employed. On the whole, they intend to be facil-
iative ('what do you think ••• '); as classificatory ('what 
do you mean by ••• '); and as reflecting some part of the 
previous response to encourage further comment. Some quest-
ions are more probing (usually 'why' questions), and 'chall-
enging', in the sense that the interviewer contrasts two 
sets of response that might be seen as conflicting. Desire-
able as it is to portray an adept and untainted interviewing 
performance, a close scrutiny would undoubtedly reveal some 
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examples of leading or loaded questions. Such issues are 
discussed in a later chapter under 'methodological checks'. 
The following sections describe frameworks for the 
main concepts and ways in which they are seen to be related. 
4.3: Frameworks for the Main Concepts 
The frameworks for the four main concepts are discussed 
in the order energy, force, heat and light. Each set of 
frameworks is presented in a summary table and then eluci-
dated and illustrated with sample extracts from the trans-
cripts. The extracts are numbered sequentially and, as has 
already been indicated, are suffixed with a (bracketed) 
group number that relates them to one of the three age 
groups in the table in figure 7. In some cases the extracts 
have been tidied and de-personalised in minor ways; the 
utterance numbers used in the original transcripts (see 
appendix III have been erased, along with some of the ana-
colutha and redundant repetition of words. For example 
in some instances, as a person attempts to form a sentence 
to express a difficult argument, they may repeat a word 
like 'if': 
'if •• if •• if •• if •• if •• you really mean •••• ' 
This type of anacolutha is highly suggestive of deep 
consideration and deliberation but is omitted here for the 
sake of clarity and brevity. It is not all removed in some 
descriptions (often of individual conceptions) where it is 
used to evidence some changes in argumentative stance or 
base. The extract numbers and suffixes are cross referenced 
in the table in appendix II~ 
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E: The Energy Frameworks 
A case is made here for each of the frameworks in turn. 
They are summarised in figure 13 and are presented in 
alphabetical order according to the characterising name 
they have been given. Clearly there are many interrelat-
ions between the frameworks both within a particular concept 
area and between concepts. Here the frameworks are detailed and 
discussion of the relationships is left for the following 
chapters. 
A-E: Anthropo-morphic/-centric Framework 
This framework bridges two main categories of response 
and generally concerns 'human centred I responses. These 
two relate to human-like and human-caused action. The 
framework encapsulates responses where energy is seen as a 
vitalistic entity concerned with living creatures. Other 
active, but inanimate, objects are described analogously 
in humanistic terms. There is clear evidence in some res-
ponses that the descriptions are analogous, in others it is 
more difficult to separate analogy from a literal, animistic 
use of descriptors. The three following extracts illustrate 
the framework. 
Extract 2 
I. someone pushing a box up a hill ••• what about that 
one? 
C. • •• yes I think it would /be an example of energy/ 
because umh ••• (IO) ••• I think that's why we eat to 
umh ••• collect the energy to push things to ••• umh •• 
kind of walk .•• so I think I'd put it las an example/ 
because he is a source of energy ••• he pushes on the 
box up the hill. 
I. has the box any energy? 
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A-E 
D-E 
F-E 
I-E 
O-E 
P-E 
T-E 
Anthropomorphic 
Anthropocentric 
energy 
Depository 
energy 
Functional 
energy 
Ingredient 
energy 
Ostensive 
energy 
Produced 
energy 
Transfer 
energy 
Figure 13 
Energy is 'human centred'; certain 
objects are endowed with human attributes; 
it is internal to the object and lasts 
for an active 'life time'. 
Energy is seen as deposited in certain 
objects, is inherent to their composition. 
This results in different kinds of 
energy, each kind internal and consumable 
- of relatively short duration. 
Energy is deliberately contrived, often 
a commodity for technological convenience. 
It is manufactured, external to objects 
is in continuous supply on demand. 
Energy is not continuous but is a 
triggering of dormant ingredients. A 
combination of items and events produce 
discrete bursts. There are different 
kinds of energy depending on the various 
combinations. 
Energy is described in terms of overt 
occurrences during the performance of 
some activity. It is often signalled 
by participle phrasing. 
Energy is generated as a consequence 
of some mechanism - a continuous 
process of energy productl.on. There 
is one kind, internally produced, 
externally released, often as a 
'surplus' to needs. 
Energy is transferred from place to 
place, object to object. There is 
~ kind which 'metamorphoses' and 
appears in different guises. It is 
externally derived and in continuous 
supply. 
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C. . .. {4} •.• no ... because its just a box. 
(Cl,3E) 
Extract 3 
Icard: sledging down a hill, E9/ 
C2. • •• obviously the boy or the man has used energy to 
get the •• sledge up the hill ••. like the man pushing 
the box up the hill/referring to another card already 
discussed/ ••• and i~s exhilarating coming down the hill 
fast so he's enjoying it ••• so to him its worth pulling 
the sledge up the hill ••• to come down really fast at 
the end and sit down ••• umh •.. energy ••• I don't see 
any real energy there •••. apart from the man using 
his own physical energy to push the sledge up the hill ••• 
(C2,3E) 
Extract 4 
ICard, Ell/ 
I. an alarm clock ••• this is one of those on~s with a 
luminous dial and a bell on the top. 
S. . .. well ••• I WOUldn't have thought there's energy ••• 
/not/ the same sort of energy as the sledge because 
that's /the clock/ ••• doing something automatically 
••• its just doing it ••• it hasn't got much thought 
behind it. 
I. how do you mean? 
S. well you actually make the sledge go down the hill 
but that /the clock/ is just there ••• it doesn't do 
much. 
(S,4E) 
The clock is not regarded in the same way as the sledge 
because it is not seen as having a part in purposeful {human) 
action - it has no 'thought' behind it. Similarly, in the 
second extract the sledge itself is not seen as having 
energy, rather the focus of the discussion is the exhilar-
ation and fun of sledging that is entirely human centred. 
As in the first extract, energy is seen as being in fairly 
short 'lived' human physical exertion and not in inanimate 
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boxes or sledges. 
Stead's (1980~ work has already been discussed, the 
similarities in methodology and approach noted. She reports 
a category of response she calls 'everyday' uses of the 
word energy where it is used very anthropocentrically. The 
children interviewed used it to describe actions by way 
of being 'energetic'. 
Animistic or anthropomorphic comments are more commonly 
restricted to short phrases where an object, may 'want', or 
'not want', may 'try' or not be able to 'manage' to do some-
thing. A clearer example of an animistic response is extract 
5; : 
Extract 5 
/Reaction, E6/ 
J. . •• they /two reacting chemicals/ have energy in them ••• 
I mean they don't go around talking to things ••• but 
I mean they've got energy in them ••• so I suppose in 
their own sort of way they are living. 
(J,6E) 
D-E: Depository Energy 
This framework typifies two categories of response. 
The first categories, those responses where students regard 
energy as resident within certain objects, so that batteries, 
chemicals, water, coal and so on, all have their own internal 
source of energy. The second category collates responses 
where such energies are seen as being intrinsically distinct 
and having different names. In this way, the energy within 
chemicals is known as chemical energy and is treated as 
being in a separate taxonomic group from, say, electrical 
energy. 
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For many students, to name a type of energy as being 
involved in a situation is itself a reasonable response. 
That is, to name it is to describe it - which in turn goes 
some way to explaining it. When pressed, the energy is 
discussed as a causal agent distinctive of the material or 
objects under discussion - inherent to their composition. 
The energy in turn acts upon other objects to compel them 
into action. As the cause is removed, or the energy consumed 
('used up'), so the activity stops. 
Extract 6 
I. what would you say it /energy/ is? 
M. • •• something in lots of different forms ••• it can come 
from inside ourselves so we can produce energy ••• to 
do everyday things ••• and the sun will produce energy 
••• there's electrical energy and heat energy ••• all 
sorts of examples. 
(M,4E) 
Extract 7 
J. well energy's different sorts of things really ••• 
like energy in the body •.• and energy used up by 
things like /electrical/ power ••• and there's chemical 
energy. 
I. what do you mean by chemical energy? 
J. umh ••• energy's ••• I don't know ••• chemical energy is 
energy produced by chemicals 
(later) 
J. if something moves its got to have energy ••• its 
got to be there ••• its going to have energy inside it. 
I. do you think that everything has got energy inside it? 
J. no not really ••• I mean I don't know if a table's got 
energy in it ••• I suppose it has but I'm not really 
sure. 
I. you said something about moving ••• what if it Ian object/ 
moves ••• what then? 
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J. well if it's moving ..• yes .•. it'll have energy inside 
it. 
I. why do you say that? 
J. . ... because I think the energy .•. that if it /the 
object/ is still ••• the energy's going to be building 
up inside it ••• well potential energy ••• and then it 
moves. 
(J1,4E) 
This rather longer extract is intended to illustrate 
the framework, showing both the naming and categorising of 
different energies and their interiorisation within certain 
objects. Chemical energy is the energy in chemicals; poten-
tial energy is an inner - pent-up - motive energy. The 
framework is pithily summarised by Clement's (1982) express-
ion, a 'source of force'. Some objects are seen as having 
inner deposits of energy which are sometimes re-chargeable 
(as in humans, or electrical cells) and sometimes entirely 
consumable (oil, coal and so on). 
The notion of an internal, active agent has, according 
to Elkana (1974), a long history as an explanatory device; 
the 'power' within things enabling them to act has often 
been used in the same terms as these descriptions of energy. 
saying so much is a pOint of passing interest rather than 
an ontological premise. 
F-E: Functional Energy 
This framework incorporates a teleological component. 
Energy does not occur 'naturally' but is purposefully produced 
in order to do work - that is, some 'useful' activity. In 
this sense it is contrived as a matter of convenience. In 
extract number eight below, for example, J makes a distinction 
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between a.ctivities that are 'natural' and require no energy, 
and those which are purposeful and therefore require energy 
to be produced for them. 
Extract B 
ICard ElB/ 
I. 
J. 
I. 
J. 
I. 
J. 
I. 
listening to a radio and falls over a cliff ••• what 
do you think about that? 
well the radio's got energy ••• no I don't think he's 
got energy if he falls over with the radio /laug~ 
why do you think the radio has? 
well its ••• its like its got wires in it and all that. 
•. like transmitting energy •.• that's what I think 
anyway ..• its like a little power station ••• its got 
a transformer so its sort of like a power station ••• 
and •• yes ••• if its a power station its got a lot of 
energy hasn't it 
why do you say that? 
because that produces the energy ••• they have it for 
houses ••• and put the energy in ••• it goes in all the 
wires to go where ever its going 
how does it produce it? 
J. . .•••• chemicals I suppose ••••••• scientists make it 
I. 
J. 
I. 
J. 
I. 
J. 
flater, card E9/ 
somebody just sledging down a hill ••• 
• •• the person's got some energy to hold on ••• if he 
was weak he'd let go and falloff ••• but the sledge 
has no energy ••• it's the hill just slows it down 
naturally ••• anybody can ~ down 
I see 
the person's got energy to grip ••• to keep his balance 
but the sledge hasn't? 
no ••• well if you put anything on the edge /of the 
cliff, the brow of the hill/ it'll fall down because 
its not balanced properly ••• but no ••• like if you 
touch the sledge you wouldn't get an electric shock 
would you ••• you're not putting chemicals in that to 
make it work are you? 
(J2,3E) 
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J2 is making the pOint (quite forcibly with his final 
rhetorical questions) that falling over the cliff is not a 
deliberate act and so requires little or no energy, that 
energy is manufactured (by scientists) in power stations 
and that were the sledge to be ',energised' it would require 
either electricity or chemicals. Extracts 9 and 10 are 
much shorter but make similar points: 
Extract 9 
J. energy has ••• got to make something else ~ ••• like 
if it was electrical ••• you know, like that tape 
recorder ••• making that work ••• I think there's energy 
all around us /points to equipment on shelves and 
benches in the prep. room/ 
I. /indicating 'power station' card/ why do they call them 
power stations and not ••• say ••• energy stations? 
J. • ... because there's energy there ••• but it gives 
power to something else ••• gives something else the 
power to move or something else the power to work 
(J2,4E) 
Extract 10 
H. well we need energy to move things and that .•• 
and to •.• you need energy for electricity and that 
if you didn't have energy you wouldn't be able to 
have lights or anything 
I. uha 
H. well you need energy to work things don't you 
I. what are you thinking of? 
H. like the fridge or something like that ••• hair dryer 
••• or the washing machine 
(H,4E) 
Duit in his (1981) study, notes a similar tendency 
in students' responses and says that 'for a life without 
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technical aids it seems no energy would be needed'. This 
framework suggests an externalised, manufactured general 
purpose type 6f fuel that provides the motive 'power' for 
mechanical devices (for example 'power tools' or 'power 
packs'). Actions can occur without it, but, in such cases, 
the occurrences are 'natural' or are instigated by some 
other causal agent. It is in continuous supply as requir~d 
(or, as some suggest, whilst world stocks last). Like the 
other frameworks this goes beyond one particular situation 
card context or specific question. 
I-E: Ingredient EneEgy 
In this framework energy is not so much a causru agent, 
a catalyst to action, but is more a dormant ingredient 
awaiting some catalysing mechanism to release it. In differ-
ing situations the emphasis will shift between the ingred-
ients themselves and the triggering mechanism. For example, 
for some the presence of energy in food is less important 
than the process of eating it - it is this that produces 
the energy. As Solomon (1980) pOints out: 
'pupilS believe that energy is not stored in food, it 
only 'gives you energy when you eat it". 
For others, the mechanism occurs but is overshadowed by the 
necessary ingredients since, were they not present, no 
amount of triggering would produce energy. This framework 
pervades much of SiS transcript on energy, extract number 
eleven, of course, being 9nly part of it. 
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Extract 11 
/S is discussing energy in relation to food, E7/ 
S. . .. well its actually when you eat it ... you sort of 
..• its sort of all stored up and then its released 
into •.. wherever you want ••. the part-of your body 
its needed 
I. do you mean it is part of it? /food/ 
s. it is .•• but ••• you've got to do something to it before 
it can release the energy 
I. so when you digest it? 
S. yes •.• its sort of like coal .•• you've got to burn it 
before you can get the steam out of it to produce the 
energy 
/later/ 
S. there is energy ••. some sort of stored energy in the 
wires and in /a/ battery ••• but you have to join the 
whole circuit up •• before the energy can be let loose 
to go to the bulb and light it up 
I. what sort of form would it take in the battery when 
its stored? 
/s has introduced the notion of- 'forms' of energy in 
earlier parts of the transcript/ 
s. . ....... well I suppose it is just there •••• I mean 
its just waiting until its let loose. 
(S, 4E) 
Extract 12 
J. Things have energy stored in things .•• its there but 
needs another energy to ••• sort of ••• another form of 
energy to sort of make it come out .•• you know what 
I mean ••• like a seed needs ••• its got energy inside 
it to grow but it needs the sun ••. another form of 
energy 
I. I see ••• and here? /indicates the 'chemical reaction' 
card, E6/ 
J. umh ••• one chemical needs another chemical to react 
(J1,4E) 
Extract 13 
/M has been asked if the card depicting a battery and bulb 
(E2) seems to her to be similar to any of the other cards 
she has discussed/ 
M. • •.•••.• I'd say that one /a card depicting two people 
before, and as, they collide (E,12)/ •• of them 
I. why that one? 
M. because it /the battery/ isn't connected up ••. isn't 
producing any sort of energy .•• when its joined up 
it'll produce energy· 
I. and what of the people? lin the collision picture/ 
M. yes .•• they're not producing anything until they've 
sort of banged together or connected together like 
that lin the collision/ 
(M,4E) 
Extract 14 
/D is discussing the flower-in-a-pot card, E14/ 
D. yea ••• well the flower recei~es ••• light energy from 
the sun ••• heat ••. and that gives it the energy to grow 
I. the energy to grow 
D. yes ••• from the sun ••• from its food it ge.ts its food 
from the sun, from the soil •• water ••• that-gives it 
the energy to grow 
I. has water energy? 
D. . ••••••• no ••• umh •.• things all combine to make 
energy .•• then they all get together to produce energy 
to get it to grow 
(D,4E) 
Some see energy, then, as being present but requiring some 
other action to make it apparent whilst others see it oper-
ating in combination as ingredients come together. It is 
not continuously produced, is intermittent, and is of diff-
erent kinds depending upon the various combinations. As 
the extracts have been chosen to shOW, the framework spans 
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a range of situations and contexts. 
O-E: Ostensive Energy 
Responses across a range of cards suggest that energy 
is seen as obvious, manifest acLivity. Not only is activity 
in some form used as a means of identifying energy, the 
activities themselves are often called energy itself. The 
most common example is that of movement, and is commonly 
signalled within the descriptive discourse of the trans-
cripts by students equating energy with verbs. Hence energy 
is moving, dOing, running etcetera. 
Extract 15 
Icard E9/ 
I. sledging down a hill ••• what about energy in that one? 
G. it's in moving downhill •.• going fast ••. its the 
sledge 
I. the sledge ••• why that? 
G. its ••• creating energy by moving fast 
(G,E9) 
Extract 16 
I. what about something like clouds? 
/introduces the card on blouds' (EI6)/ 
s. . .. uh •.•• that hasn't got much energy 
I. no? •• is it similar to any of the others? 
/cards she has discussed/ 
s. . ..... I suppose the snow one but ••• the snow would 
have slightly more energy than that because ••• well 
the snow's actually dOing something but they're just 
sitting there 
I. you mean that /clouds/ is sort of snow up in the sky? 
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S. yes .... that snow is actually ... doing something ... 
its moving ... its got the energy there where it's 
let loose whereas that lin the clouds/ sort of stored 
I suppose 
(S,4E) 
Extract 17 
I. what would you say energy was? 
c. its movement •.• like anything moving ••• like umh some-
body going down a hill is energy 
(C,4E) 
Extract 18 
I. here they are running /'collision' card (E,12)/ 
J. yes that has /energy/ ••• the running's got the energy 
.•• the movement ... that's an energy but I don't know 
about this 
I. what ••• where they've clashed together? 
J. yea ••• well they stop and it /energy/ s~ops as well 
(J3,3E) 
Whilst these extracts have emphasised 'doing', 'going' 
'running' and 'moving', other verbs like frothing, boiling, 
ringing, shouting and so on have also been used as student~ 
own examples of energy. 
P-E: Produced Energy 
Much discussion of energy describes it as being 'produced'. 
It is produced 'by', 'when', 'as' things happen and seems 
to be in addition to some event. For example, if two chem-
icals react they produce energy rather than, say, requiring 
energy for the reaction, or being energy themselves. Some 
students describe at length the process of production (in 
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terms of, say, resistance to electrons within the filament 
of a light bulb), a mechanism which produces energy both 
for the needs in hand (to continue the electron movement) 
with a surplus amount (to appear as light in the bulb). 
Commonly there is only one kind of energy though many proc-
esses of production, it is produced internally within mechanisms 
yet released externally, is continuously produced which, 
since only certain amounts are used, results in the surplus. 
Stead (1980b1has also noted such resPQnses~ She describes 
them as treating energy rather as a waste product, as with 
smoke, sweat or exhaust fumes, is 'Produced' and 'given off'. 
Extract 19 
Icard E6/ 
I. a chemical reaction •.. 
J. umh ... when they react it gives off energy ••• and 
the energy produces something ••• 
I. what are you thinking of? 
J. umh ••• sometimes it produces colour lin the reaction/ 
••• sometimes sugar ••• things like that 
(J5,3E) 
Extract 20 
K. There's definitely energy involved lin a chemical 
reaction/ ••• it was originally caused by some mechanism 
in the atoms ••• the atoms of whatever have been reacted 
and it is now released as heat .•. into the surroundings 
(K, r E) 
Extract 21 
Icard E21 
J. • •• umh well there's ••• inthe bulb there's a little 
wire and it .is •.• umh... its like a re,sister t<?. the 
electrons flowing through and ••• and as the electrons 
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flow through it's just like a force ... like a pressure 
... and it sort of holds them up a bit as they come 
through the bUlb ... 
I. and what about energy? 
J. yes ... and as the electrons flow through the bulb ••• 
it becomes hot and it produces energy and it gives off 
light 
(J2,4E) 
Extract 22 
Icard E7/ 
I. eating a meal lintroduces a new card/ 
P. • ••••• there's energy in actually taking in the meal ••• 
I. how do you mean? 
P. well there's energy produced when the meal is eaten 
••• then the meal is actually giving you energy to do 
something else .•. it builds up in you 
I. I see 
P. if things are still Ido not move/ the energy sort of 
builds up and as they move .•• theysort of use the 
energy 
I. if they are staying still they're bui~ding up energy? 
P. yes ••• well if they're staying still they're using up 
a only a little bit of energy but not as much as if 
they were dOing something 
/later/ 
I think the energy's ••• well they're building up energy 
for the next day ••• but their body is also using up 
energy to ••• make sure everything's alright inside 
the body as well ••• using /it/ for a heartbeat ••• flow 
of blood round the body ••• I think there's energy in 
the muscles as well ••• building up for the next day 
(Pl,4E) 
Similar conversations surround discus~ions of power stations 
where energy is seen as produced in continuous manufacture 
somewhere in the innards of machinery, and is then released 
externally both as a necessary artefact and, sometimes, as 
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a waste product that is lost (by heat, disuse and so on) 
T-E: Transfer Energy 
This framework embodies what Warren (1982) calls a 
'metamorphosis' model of energy. He makes the point that 
it is both an implicit and sometimes explicit assumption 
behind the way in which the concept is commonly taught. 
In being transferred, energy is seen as being capable of 
flowing (fluid-like) from system to system, and from object 
to object. It is essentially the same kind of entity that 
appears in different guises or 'forms'. In this way it can 
be 'transferred' 'given to' and 'be seen as'. Energy is 
thus (sic) externally applied and in continuous but changing 
modes. 
Extract 23 
/K is discussing the 'battery and bulb' card, E2/ 
K. it /energy/ comes out of the negative end /0£ the 
battery/ ••• flows round the circuit ••• encountering 
the light bulb on the way •.. where it can transfer 
some of the energy ••• and goes back to the battery 
the electrons that is ••• 
I. and the energy? 
K. but the energy is on the electrons as they travel 
round ••• it is given up when they corne to the light 
bulb and the electrons are still there to travel back 
to the battery 
I. and would they have any left? 
K. I should think they must have some left yes •.• (S) •• 
I. what are you thinking of? 
K. I'm trying to think of how energy is stored on an 
electron ••• to be given up ••• I don't know exactly how 
an electron gets round to carrying some energy to a 
certain pOint in the lead where it can then give it 
up and then ••• you know ••• travel on its way ••• it 
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obviously is doing that because we've got energy at 
the light that wasn't there before 
(K,6E) 
Extract 24 
ICard E2/ 
M. I suppose there's energy all along the wires but you 
can't see it and ••• the only way you can see that 
there's energy is with that •.• when its in the bulb 
/points to bulbi 
(M,4E) 
Extract 25 
/L is discussing the card depicting a beaker of hot water, 
E,4/ 
L. well energy would go into the water ••• the glass of the 
beaker .•. the thermometer whatever •.• 
I. aha 
L. and the air above the water ••• and where it's /the 
beaker/ been on the bench ••• but if you say 'where is 
the energy' then its never going to sort of stay in 
one place at one time ••• its gOing to go anywhere 
••• sort of around ••• its slowly going somewhere like 
to the bench and so on 
(L,6E) 
Extract 26 
G. there's a number of ways you can do it /operate a 
power station/ •.• nuclear reactors ••• nuclear react~ons 
form heat energy ••• which through a process is trans-
formed into electricity and sent out /along cables/ 
••• you've got oil reactors ••• gas ••••• which is 
basically used to give heat to water till it boils ••• 
it gives steam ••• drives a turbine ••• to form elec-
tricity ••• there must be energy going into all that 
through the boiling water .or burning oil ••• you're 
putting energy into the water ••• which is then sort 
of driving the turbines so ••• to get energy out 
you've really got to put energy in 
(G2,6E) 
4.43 
Whilst some of these extracts concentrate on energy in con-
junction with electricity - either electricity being the 
energy that flows, or 'carrying' the energy along - these 
are not the only transfers. Energy is seen as going from 
rain, into soil and then through the roots into a plant for 
instance. 
The relationships between these frameworks, and those 
in other concept areas are discussed in the following 
chapters. The next section here deals with the framewo~ks 
for force. 
F: The Force Frameworks 
The force frameworks are presented here in a manner 
similar to those for energy. First the summary table (Fig. 14) is 
presented and then the frameworks are discussed separately, 
in alphabetical order. 
A-F: Affective Forces 
The term affect is chosen to imply 'desire, especially 
as leading to action'. It is an attempt to summarise the 
anthropomorphic and anthropocentric features of students' 
responses. Osborne (1980) comments on these features of 
children's talk and calls them children's 'everyday views'. 
In this sense to be 'forced' to do something, or 'forcing' 
oneself to act, is contrasted with it happening 'naturally', 
or accidentally. This is an anthropocentric view, where 
objects are forced to do something by someone, and anthro-
pomorphic where one object 'forces' another to act. More 
animistic terminology is included, too, where objects 'want' 
4.44 
A-F 
C-F 
D-F 
E-F 
I-F 
M-F 
O-F 
S-F 
Affective 
Framework 
Configurative 
Framework 
Designated 
Framework 
Encounter 
Framework 
Impact 
Forces 
Motive 
Framework 
Operative 
Framework 
Substantial 
Framework 
Fiqure 14 
Force is 'human centred', some objects 
are endowed with human attributes. It 
is internal to the object or person 
and is short lived. It is an obliga-
tion to act, or a resistance to such 
an obligation. 
Here, force is external to objects and 
is what keeps them stable, upright and 
in position. It acts continuously and 
ubiquitously and accounts for lack of 
movement. 
Force is seen to 'activate' objects, 
those that 'have' force are those most 
likely to create an occurrence. It is 
internal and continuous - it is an 
inherent feature of certain objects. 
It is applied externally. 
As an event takes place forces will 
appear at certain points: 'pressure 
points'. They do not always produce 
movement but can combine in different 
ways. They are temporary and are 
different kinds of forces and external 
to objects. 
An obvious situation where forces occur 
is in collisions, both before the 
collision and as an immediate consequence 
of it. Hence it is both internal and 
external, usually only for the duration 
of the event itself. 
Forces associated with movement are 
the most commonly reported, and often 
the only one commented on. They last 
only for the duration of the movement, 
are externally applied and of the same 
kind. 
In this framework the event or activity 
seen as taking place is the force and 
accounts both for single activities 
and for a chain of events, force is of 
one kind, consumable and signalled by 
verbs in discourse. It transfers inter-
nally through objects. 
Force is limited to large occurences, 
not to small ones; is of one kind and 
happens intermittently 
4.45 
to return to a position, or 'try' to remain in place. 
Extract 27 
/v is discussing a large stone being dragged along by two 
people, FI/ 
v. . .... they're being forced to do it ••• when they don't 
want to ••• 
I. I see 
v. maybe in this one lin this picture/ they might not want 
to pull this ••• they might have been told to drag a 
huge stone ••• with some force here .•. they might be a 
bit upset and don't really want to do it 
(V,3F) 
Extract 28 
/Y is considering similarities between a number of cards 
already d.ia:::ussed: 'dragging the stone' (FI); 'be ing told what 
to do' (F3); and the 'rocket at take-off' (F2) / 
Y. • •• well they're all moving something against it's will 
aren't they ••• I mean look he's getting him to do some-
thing against his will/person being tOld/ ••. they're 
trying to get the stone to move against its will and 
in this /rocket/ they're trying to get the rocket up 
against the will of ••• against the will of ••• you know 
••• the earth pulling it down 
I. ahmm 
Y. . •• the earth says 'stay on the ground' ••• you know •• 
but the rocket is saying I no I want to go up' •• so 
they're all trying to overcome that 
(Y,3F) 
Extract 29 
/02, is discussing someone diving off a diving board, F4/ 
02. . •• umh ••• well ••• the •• er ••• springboard's trying 
to force itself back upright because it was made straight 
and so it wants to remain straight. 
(02,3F) 
4.46 
Extract 30 
/D is considering a golfer hitting a golf ball (F8)! 
D. . .. umh as he /the golfer/ has swung around .•. he's 
hit the ball ... and the ball was stationary .• not going 
anywhere, just sitting on it's tee and ••• he's forced it 
to rise up in the air ••• against the will of gravity ••• 
the will of gravity was perfectly okay when it was sitting 
on the tee because it /the ball/ didn't want to do 
anything else ••• umh ••. except hold onto the tee ••• 
but as it is he's forced it to ••• to go away from 
gravity ••• he's forced it to rise up ••• 
(D,6F) 
Extract 31 
/D3 is discussing the 'balloon' card (F12)/ 
D. • •• it /the balloon/ has no force on it 
I. none? 
D. no force ••• /if released/ it just sort of travels 
along ••• like a spaceship that hasn't got any force 
/she refers to the 'rocket in space' card/ 
I. would it /the balloon/ ever come down again? 
D. • .•• only if the balloon burst ••• if it bursts open 
I. why would that bring it down? 
D. • •• 'cos you know the air in the balloon is gas ••• 
there is gas in the balloon which makes it float 
away ••• well all that will go in the air ••• and the 
balloon hasn't got that gas anymore, it opens up ••• so 
it goes back down again and the gravity is so happy 
that it can have the balloon back now ••• see its like 
that 
(D3,3F) 
Previously, D3 had been arguing that objects that rise are 
breaking 'gravity's rules', hence when they return to the 
ground they are presumably complying with those rules - to 
gravity's great relief. 
C-F; Configurative Forces 
A range of student responses can be interpreted as 
suggesting that objects have force by virtue of their posit-
ion within a particular system or situation. It suggests 
some 'bonding' between objects that maintains them in a 
stable relationship with each other. Moreover, the suggest-
ion is that without such forces objects would not stay in 
position, but would move apart. It is a framework that 
attempts to account both for the absence of movement and the 
restoration of objects to their 'normal', 'natural', 'usual' 
place or position. It is a force external to the object 
and is often referred to in non-specific terms as a 'force 
that holds it (sic) there' and so on. In many cases, this 
in reference to a gravitational effect, holding things in 
place, but sometimes the impression is created that it is 
a 'blanket', overlaying objects and keeping them immobile. 
Extract 32 
/S4 is talking about gravity in relation 
in particular to the 'golfer' card (F8). 
that gravity does not act on everything, 
golfball in flight/. 
to a number of cards, 
She is arguing 
but will on the 
S4. • •• and that's a force ••• gravity is forcing it /the 
ball/ to come down 
I. I see ••• you haven't mentioned gravity before 
S4. no ••••• there's no gravity here lin the other pictures/ 
.•• we're not liable to float up ••• are we? ••••• 
unless we're on the moon /S laughs/ ••• but here /the 
golfer card/ the gravity's not going to do anything 
to him ••• and here /people dragging a stone (Fl)/ I 
can't see any gravity because it /the stone/ is actually 
stuck to the ground ••• and the same here /the diving 
board (F4)/ its forced to be actually stuck to something 
••• its secured •• but this /the golfball/ is free to 
go and to have gravity ••• 
(S4,4F) 
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In this case, S reserves the term gravity tor objects that 
can be projected and brought back down again, whilst the 
other objects she refers to are stuck and forced to remain 
grounded. 
Extract 33 
/L2 is discussing her own example of forces on a motorcyclist 
turning a corner/ 
L. there's something keeping him up ••• so he doesn't fall 
on the ground 
I. how do you mean? 
L. it's a pressure or something like that but I'm not sure 
I. you think its got 
L. well its something that's keeping him up when he goes 
over ••• like that /she indicates the book-on-the-table 
card (Fll) which she had argued was 'being held down. 
held in place'/ ••• it keeps him in position as he rides •• 
(L2,3F) 
Extract 34 
/C2 considers the 'diving off the diving board' card, F4/ 
C. I think there's probably some force here 
I. what do you mean? 
C. on the board ••• potential force I think ••• its holding 
it /the board/ back and its going to spring up and 
he's going to jump off it ••• and also gravity force 
as well •.• not now las the diver is on the board/ but 
when he jumps up and falls into the pool ••• its pulling 
him down 
I. and what happens as the person comes off the board? 
C it rebounds and goes back to its normal ••• straight ••• 
positio~ 
I. why does it do that? 
C. well there's a force on all things keeping them in 
position and he /the diver/ uses a force to push the 
board down ••• and ••• well it gets pushed up again 
to /it's/ normal place 
(C2,4F) 
D-F: Designated Forces 
Many of the responses used as evidence for this frame-
work seem to focus on one particular object within the 
situation as 'having' force, or of forcing other objects. 
Force is seen to activate bodies and those that 'have' most 
force are those that are deemed most likely to create an 
occurrence. In many instances it is not a case of simply 
ignoring or disregarding other objects in the situation 
but of suggesting that they do not have force at all. The 
designated bodies are often those of people and so there 
is overlap between this framework and the affective frame-
work. In this sense then, it is humans, (gas-filled) balloons, 
golf balls; and astronauts' boots, and so on, that have 
force and not their surrounding environment. 
Extract 35 
Icard F13/ 
I. an astronaut in space ••• what about forces there? 
J2 (16) .•• /laughs/ 
I. • •••. what are you thinking of? 
J2. /laughs/ well yes and no because ••• umh ••• it can't 
be affected by gravity .•• and yet he's so he's using 
••• well he is the force ••. himself because •.. I mean 
well he is moving 
(J2,4F) --
Extract 36 
/L2 is discussing the 'wind blowing the tree' card (F5)/ 
L. yes /there is a force/ ••• yes where the wind's blowing 
the tree there ••• the wind is the force in that one 
I. and what would happen if the wind was to stop? 
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L. the tree would come back up ... 
I. why? why would it do that? 
L. because there's no force .•. and it would just go 
straight back up ..• 
I. does the tree have force? 
L. no •.. that is how it is normally .•• it's a bit like 
that /rocket at take off/ the force is in the rocket 
that pushes it off the ground ••• well the wind pushes 
the tree ••• the diver /diving off a diving board/ is 
pushing with his feet ••• they're pushing the diving 
board 
(L2,3F) 
Extract 37 
/T summarises her views over a number of cards, the 'golfer' 
(F8), 'rocket' (F2) and 'balloon' cards (F12)/ 
T. the force is contained within the guy /the golfer/ ••• 
and ••• the golf club ••• and here there's something 
inside /the rocket/ forcing it up 
I. and the balloon? 
T. well ••• I can't see it having any /external/ propulsion 
•••• its just in the nature of it •.• or in the nature 
of the gas inside it ••• I suppose it is a force inherent 
in the object. 
(T,4F) 
Extract 38 
/N is talking about the 'astronaut falling over on the moon' 
(F14)/ 
N. well he wouldn't fall backwards would he? 
I. why not? 
N. because they float about on the moon don't they 
I. I see ••• so having tripped like that what do you think 
will happen next? 
N. he might go like that lin an arc down towards the moon's 
surface/ but then he'd kind of just float around and 
of course ••• they wear those really heavy boots which 
brings them down nearer the ground .•• so they don't 
go flying off 
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I. how do the boots work? 
N. because they're heavy .•. which pulls them down .•. 
there's a force in them because it pulls them down 
(N,4F) 
Similar lines of argument were presented for the sledge 
moving down the hill (F9), the lit torch (FIs) and so on. 
Seemingly, where something is seen to be happening, or about 
to happen, then it requires some force to make it occur. 
E-F: Encounter Forces 
This framework suggests forces that are not ubiquitous 
or general in any way, rather, many responses suggest imrned-
iate forces that apply at specific points and then cease 
to operate. In accounting for forces in this way, students 
often name them and catalogue them as different varieties 
of force. In some cases, for example where pressure, velo-
city, acceleration and power are all classed as different 
kinds of force, they might be seen to operate in combinat-
ion to produce a particular effect. They are externally 
produced forces. The reason a golfball travels in an arc, 
for instance, might be because of a combination of (the 
'force' of its) velocity, speed and gravity. 
Extract 39 
/D is discussing the 'golfer' cards (F8, Fl) before includ-
ing an example of his own/ 
D. so this force /from the golf club/ will only last to 
"ripe" it /the goifball/ twenty feet and once it gets 
there its tired out ••• it~ finished and so gravity 
overcomes the force given to it and eventually pulls 
it down and ••• because it is going with such a velocity 
as it hits the ground it has elastic force inside ••• 
so it bounces and it bounces and it bounces and he 
gets an eagle or birdie or whatever /both laugh/ 
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I. the bounce is smaller in each case isn't it ... why 
does that happen? 
D. the bounce is enough to get rid of gravity for a 
while so it bounces up but it wasn't quite as much as 
the initial push ••• so gravity is pulling down again 
and as it~ pulling down it has accelerating force ••• 
so it punches the ground again ••• 
/a moment later/ 
D. well if you exert a force against a football ••• it has 
done some work force for you ••• so i~s finished ••• 
you've given that /the football/ some energy and it 
has shot off but ••• in shooting away its had to fight 
away other forces like friction on the ground and 
friction from air and gravity •.• rather force from 
gravity so its done work for you ••• 
(D,6F) 
This rather long extract gives some indication of the complex 
responses 'sometimes generated by the cards. Anthropomorphic 
aspects (like the golfball being 'tired out' and 'finished' 
its own forward force having to 'fight away' other forces) 
are intermixed with many other aspects like energy, gravity, 
elastic force, workforce (!), acceleration force and so on. 
Another extract indicates a similar argument: 
Extract 40 
/P2 considers the 'tree blown by the wind' card, (F5)/ 
P •••••• yes well there's a force of the wind because 
of its spaed ••. the speed of the wind ••• and there's 
a resistance here as the tree tries to push back ••• 
and its weight acting down •••••• when it /the tree/ 
moves ••• it has a sort of elastic force in a way it 
sort of springs about so its got a force which makes 
it spring back but the wind is much stronger so it 
blows it to one side ••• 
(P2,6F) 
In other studies, similar pOints have been made. Trowbridge 
and McDermott (1980) report how college students in an 
introductory physics course use the concept of velocity 
in a number of different ways whilst also being able to 
give the orthodox definition of it. Saltiel and Malgrange 
(1980) show that for French eleven year olds and fourth 
year university students 
'Forces and velocities are often intermixed even when 
all motion is uniform. Our results, together with our co-
workers, point to the fact that velocities and forces exist 
'per set, independently of reference frames, and are endowed 
with causal properties so that they are invoked to explain 
motion on a quite similar basis.' 
I-F: Impact Forces 
This framework and the following one are similar in 
that force is explicitly associated with motion. In this 
case, force is associated with the impact of collisions and 
the potential impact a moment before the collision. The 
force is in the movement: the act of moving means there is 
force present in the movement. This contrasts with the 
next framework where the force is given to an object to 
make it move, but is distinct from the movement itself. 
Both frameworks are common to those cards that indicate 
movement, particularly fast movement, like the rocket, 
golfball, sledge and so on. When, during the course of the 
interviews the students are asked to say what force is, 
some answer in the way of the first extract below: 
Extract 41 
I. what would you actually say a force is? 
N. • •• er ••• umh ••• a force is when something that's 
moving comes into contact with something that isn't 
••• or something that's moving slower ••• and then it 
moves it 
(N,4F) 
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Extract 42 
IV is discussing the 'rocket at take off' (F2) I 
V. hum ... the forces are the propulsion and you get a 
g-force from the speed 
I. and what is a g-force? 
V. when you're already taking off ... at the height of 
speed ••• you're pushing into the air lin the rocket/ 
.•• can really move ••••• 'cos you're travelling at 
such high speeds 
(V,3F) 
Extract 43 
ICard F8/ 
I. this one /card/ is a golfer ••• 
D. umh •••. the force of the ball travelling through the 
air ••• umh ••• yes ••• umh the movement ..• its moving 
through the air 
I. this one /the golf ball landing/ is the next part ••• 
are there any forces here? 
D. yes again there's movement force ••• the ball bouncing 
along ••• hitting the ground ••• its in the impact with 
the ground 
(D2,3F) 
'Movement force', then is a way of describing the movement 
of an object in terms of force. It has echoes of the physics 
concept of momentum, but in these cases it is clearly not 
conserved in any way. Responses of this sort contrast with 
the following framework where movement is given ~ a force 
instead of being the force. It will be argued in the follow-
ing chapters that such use of prepositions as 'under', 'on', 
'by' and 'with' etcetera are useful guides to distinguishing 
conceptions - particularly where these have been picked up 
on, queried and clarified during the course of the interview. 
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M-F: Motive Forces 
As in the case of the last framework, forces are 
commonly associated with movement - both as a means of 
identifying the presence of forces and of defining them. 
In this way, students will often declare an instance to be 
an example of force because 'there is some movement'. When 
asked for a description of force it is frequently 'some-
thing that produces movement'. One distinguishing feature 
between these two frameworks can be seen in answer to the 
question 'what happens when the golfball slows down?' For 
those who see the force as the movement (Framework I-mthen 
the focus of attention is on the speed of the ball. For 
example, they will say that the ball's force is reducing 
because the ball is slowing down. In contrast, those who 
see the force as external to (and the cause of) the move-
ment, will reply that the ball is slowing down because the 
force given to it (by the golfer, club etc.) is being used 
up, or wearing off. Two somewhat longer extracts serve to 
illustrate this framework: 
Extract 44 
/C2 is talking about the 'golfer' (F8) and green (F9) cards 
together/ 
C. there's force on the ball .•. /the golfer/ hitting the 
ball .•. making it move 
I. has the ball any forces on it at the moment? lin flight/ 
C. yes 
I. where do you mean? 
C. it's got forces of pushing there Ion the ball/ ••• 
they're pushing /he points in the direction of the ball's 
movement/ 
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I. here the ball has landed ••. it has bounced and gone 
into the hole ... what do you think is happening in 
that one? 
/1 indicates 'golfing green' card/ 
c. the force is •.• it /the ball/ is falling down .•• its 
loosing the force and then being forced back up and 
it bounces and then it just falls down the hole /he 
laughs/ 
I. each time the bounce gets smaller ••• why does that 
happen? 
C. because it looses more force and because it's lost 
the force it hasn't got enough force to push it back 
up ••• higher 
I. what do you mean when you say it looses the force? 
C. it's just going .•• with that /the golf club/ the 
force is strong ••• and then it'll get lower up here 
somewhere lin mid air/ ••• then it'll fall back down 
here ..• it'll bounce and each time it bounces it 
looses energy ••. like force •••••• in a car when it 
looses petrol ••. it sort of can sort of go up a hill 
with petrol and it can't make the same hill again 
with less petrol then when it hasn't got any petrol 
it won't bounce at all ••• like ••• or move 
I. I see ••• and what does energy have to do with force? 
C. energy is a force ••• because it is being made to do 
things in machines 
(C2,3F) 
Again, a long extract like this is indicative of a number 
of frameworks, particularly this final discussion about 
force and energy. This kind of overlap is discussed later. 
Here the extract is useful as an indication of the tendency 
to see forces as pushing the golf ball along in flight and 
being lost ('up there') and as it bounces. 
Extract 45 
ICI is again discussing the 'golfer' (Fa)/ 
I. what is happening here? 
C well the man's putting force from his arms into the 
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stick and hitting the ball and the ball's gOing where 
its told to go ... well not always ... if you're a good 
golfer it does 
I. I see 
C. and the ball's being forced up just like the rocket 
is .•• its got no choice ••• its being hit and it has 
to go up ••• so the golfer's g~ving force to the ball 
I. I see 
C. but if the ball hadn't any force it would just stay 
there 
I. and what about the ball now then? 
lin mid air/ 
C. well the force that the man put through the stick ••• 
through the club onto the ball has swiped it up into 
the air and eventually it will land and stop 
I. this is the next part /indicates the 'ball landing' 
card, (F9)/ 
c. . .. well that's where the power goes out •.• off the 
ball ..• I mean •• at first it had been right up in the 
air so it must loose power ••• and every time it bounces 
it looses power I suppose •• like a car will slow 
down if you take your foot off the accelerator 
I. and what has power to do with force? 
C. well ••• power is a force 
(Cl,4F) 
Although both of these extracts are set around the golfball 
cards, similar arguments are put forward for the sledge 
coming down a hill, and as an argument for why the book on 
a table has no force. There would not be force unless it 
were to be given a force to move it. 
O-F: Operative Forces 
A number of responses depict forces in operational 
terms. That is, forces are known by what they accomplish 
rather than where they are sited or for their involvement 
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in movement. Thus a force is that which bends, twists, turns, 
moves, acts, pushes and generally produces occurrences. 
Force is not restricted to movement alone and is used to 
account for both isolated occurrences, and for chains of 
events. In this latter case, there is a sense of force 
being transferred internally through objects rather than 
being applied to them. Objects need to be in contact with 
each other or are sometimes 'joined
' 
by air. 
Extract 46 
/P2 has been asked to describe what force is/ 
P. well the forces in these /pictures/ are ••• well they're 
tangible things that produce an effect ••• you can 
feel the effect •.• i~s a physical thing 
I. I see ••• what do you mean by tangible? 
P. well you see •.. yes you ~ the result of a force ••• 
in this /~raggir~a large stone/ it is the result of 
the tension in the strings ••• that will move it 
(P2,6F) 
Extract 47 
/T is considering the 'tree blown by the wind' (FS)/ 
T. yes ••• I think where the wind is actually moving the 
tree then there must be a force •••• I suppose the 
air is moving the force in •• into the tree and taking 
it with it ••••• actually going up the tree and push-
ing it and pulling it 
(T, 4F) 
Extract 48 
/S4 is talking about a person robbing a bank (FlO/ 
I. what would it have to be like for there to be a force? 
S. well the bank robber would have to be in contact 
with the cashier in some way ••• either actually touch-
ing the cashier or having some sort of medium between 
the two 
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I. what do you mean by medium? 
S. well it doesn't have to be a physical medium ... like 
wind. you can't see wind but you can see the effects 
of wind 
I. you mean in the tree one /card/? 
S. yes ••. that would be the actual air molecules I should 
think 
I. how do you mean? are the molecules the medium? 
S. they are a mixture of both /a force and a medium/ 
the force is actually in the air •• its provided by 
air currents but it uses itself as a medium •••••• 
but if there is a physical force between two people 
then the people would be using themselves as a medium 
••. pushing the force from one to the other .••• in 
the rocket picture they're using the thrust as a 
medium between the spaceship and the ground ••• 
(S4,6F) 
This line of argument is one that accounts for forces by 
their actions and not by name or external pressure. It 
contrasts with framework ~Ffor instance, where forces are 
recognised at source. If there is an obvious ~ of act-
ivity, then that is where the force is. Here, as in other 
cases, some event is taking place and students attempt to 
trace back from the event to a cause. And in doing so, 
they need to postulate an unbroken causal chain. 
S-F: Substantive Forces 
This framework is one that describes a size limit for 
forces. An action only qualifies for the name force if 
it is over some limit. That is, for some students, some 
situations fall outside of the range of convenience of their 
conceptions of force if they are associated with small events. 
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Extract 49 
IT begins with the 'people dragging the stone' card F1/ 
T. there's force there .•. 
I. why do you say that? 
T. it is heavy ••. it looks quite heavy it's like that one 
/the 'rocket at take-off', F2/ 
I. why's that? 
T. because the force comes down and makes it go up and 
its very strong and that's force ••• a very strong thing 
(T,3F) 
Extract 50 
/P is discussing the 'golfer' cards (Fa) she decides 
that the instance of the ball on its way ~ is an example of 
force, but on its way down it isn't/ 
P. because it's quite high up there lin flight/ and here 
it gets smaller .••• it doesn't go so high because that 
one /landing/ is not big like. that one 
I. what about here where it /the golfball/ lands? 
P. no ••• that's not a force ••••• as that one /hitting 
the ball/ is ••• its got to be big to force it 
(P,3F) 
Extract 51 
/01 has been asked to describe what force is/ 
o. . .. forced to do something ••. umh something hitting 
something .... like a hammer ••• yes something really big 
I. what are you thinking of? 
D. a car crash or something ••• colliding very fast •.• 
you wouldn't say force about something small like a 
feather 
(D1,3F) 
This kind of framework, where the magnitude of the 
causal agent is involved, is not apparent in the energy 
interviews. The youngsters it would seem, are willing to 
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countenance very small activities as being within the range 
of convenience of their term energy. For these students, 
however, it would seem that force is synonymous with being 
large, so that students would use it in the same sense as 
power or powerful. To have force, or to be forceful , in 
this sense is not seen to be the property of small things. 
In a similar way, there are three 'substantive' frame-
works in the next set: the frameworks for heat. Each one 
has a range of convenience that embraces heat only in certain 
ranges of scale. Along with the other frameworks these are 
described in detail in what follows. 
H: The Heat Frameworks 
As before, these heat frameworks are set out in a 
summary table (Figure 15) and are then established and 
exemplified separately. The three frameworks mentioned 
above are here called 'Conspicuous heat' 
heat' (N-H) and 'Standard heat' (S-H). 
(C-H) , 'Normal 
As with the other 
frameworks these are presented in alphabetical order in 
amongst the other ones, and the clear and obvious links 
to be made between them are left for the next chapters. 
C-H: Conspicuous Heat 
This framework summarises those responses where heat 
is seen as the property of obvious, prominent sources. 
Heat is associated with things that are very hot (as opposed 
to merely warm or cool) and is 'given off' to the surround-
ings. No mechanism is offered for the 'giving off'. Hot 
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C-H 
D-H 
M-H 
N-H 
P-H 
S-H 
R-H 
Conspicuous 
Framework 
Dynamic 
Framework 
Motile 
Framework 
Normal 
Framework 
Product 
Framework 
Standard 
Framework 
Regional 
Framework 
Figure 15 
Heat is very obvious hot sources; it 
is given off by hot objects. Other 
objects in the surroundings receive 
heat from such external sources. Heat 
is anything that is very hot. 
Heat is associated with movement. It 
both produces movement and is produced 
~ movement. It is commonly generated 
internally and expended externallY. 
Heat is transferred, by a range of 
mechanisms, from one location to another. 
It is not static but spreads out, or is 
'given off', into the immediate envir-
onment. 
Normal heat is body temperature, so 
that cold is seen as anything below 
normal and hot anything above. It is 
an anthropocentric framework that sees 
heat, and the norms for heat, as being 
concerned with humans. 
A distinction is made between 'manufac-
tured' and 'natural' heat. Natural 
heat is seen as a consequence of other 
activities, as a by-product of the 
central activity. 
Ice is used as an external standard so 
that cold is Been as being below freezing, 
to be above 0 is to have heat. As in 
other frameworks cold is the absence 
of heat, in this case the melting point 
is the mid pOint of the scale. 
Heat is static and pervades a particular 
location. In cooling it remains in 
certain locales and reduces. Some of 
the localities are the periphery of 
objects, others the central regions. 
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things are obvious, often need no further explanation, and 
are detected by sensory experience (touch, luminescence, 
colour, etcetera). Objects in the surroundings receive their 
heat from such external sources. Some of the terms used 
express heat as a verb so that things 'are heated'; heating 
is what heaters or hot things do. 
Extract 52 , 
/P is considering a flower in a pot (H7)/ 
P. no ••.• that's not hot ••• there's no heat there 
I. why do you say that? 
P. I just don't think there is .•• no 
I. how would you describe heat to somebody? •• what would 
you say it is? 
P. well .•• just heat is hot ••• they should know what 
heat is 
(P,3H) 
Extract 53 
I. how would you describe /heat/ it to ••• say a friend? 
J. oh I'd show her the fire and I'd show that's heat 
coming out ••. that is heat.central heating and things 
like that ----
I. anything else? 
J. umh •.• hot water •.. a cooker ..• the fire and central 
heating ••• lighter ••• matches ••• the sun ••• the sun, 
that's hot 
/a moment later she reconsiders the card showiJJg ice 
melting, H6/ 
and that's not hot ••• no heat there at all 
(J,3H) 
Extract 54 
/P is discussing the card showing a person throwing a stone 
off a cliff (Hll). She has decided that there is no heat 
present/. 
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P. . ..... there isn't any heat given off there as far as 
I can see .•• no .• I can't see any heat coming off 
there at all /laughs/ 
I. go on .•. why do you say that? 
P. because heat is something that is given off ... when 
something is hot •••• I know that's not a very good 
way of putting it •.• but for example, if you light a 
match and put your hand over it you get burnt •.• heat 
is hot and heat is given off in that way •.• something 
gives off heat •••• a flanes hot •.• 
(P,6H) 
Despite piS modesty about her description, this is a 
suitable summary of a common pOint of view. Objects are 
described as 'visibly' hot, 'noticeably' hot to the pOint 
that, when one student was asked to describe heat to a 
mythical friend he said 'he'd be pretty backward if he didh't 
know what it is'. 
D-H: Dynamic Heat 
Dynamic,here,is intended as active, energetic, or 
allied to (concerned with) motion. There are two main 
aspects to the framework: 
a. heat produces movement 
b. movement produces heat 
In some cases the framework can be evidenced froLl general 
statements students make about both movement and heat, in 
som~ cases, they are more specific and describe particular 
mechanisms. For example, some suggest that body heat is 
produced by 'internal friction' in the movement of limbs 
and examples of this are given below. In a number of instances 
both aspects of the framework are used without any perception 
of tautology, circularity of argument or sense of contradiction. 
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They are often seen as complementary aspects where both heat 
and motion are concerned. For instance, heat is seen as 
being required in a person's body (generally derived from 
food) in order to perform exercise (one needs to do 'warm-
ing up' eXercises and so on). This movement, or exertion, 
then in turn generates heat which is 'given off'. Extracts 
55 and 56 below, give some examples of this set of responses. 
Extract 55 
/C2 first discusses the 'flower in the pot' (H7) and then, 
a moment later, moves on to the card that shows two people 
having an argument (H13)/ 
C. it /the flower/ needs to be fairly warm otherwise it 
will die .••• it won't be able to make its food 
I. make its food? 
C. yes but not the way we do ••• we digest our food ..• 
we take our food in .•. as chemicals ••. it gets changed 
inside to produce heat and to move about and to do 
things 
/later/ 
yes .•. they /the people arguing/ are giving off heat 
because they're moving as they get worked up and 
bothered 
I. what does that mean? 
c. well if you move ••. generally you produce more heat •• 
sometimes if you're moving a lot •.• if you are in 
an argument or something you produce a lot of heat 
(C2,4H) 
Extract 56 
/N is discussing a class experiment where someone is hammer-
ing a piece of lead, and then she turns her attention to a 
range of the cards/. 
N. when you bang it •••• it probably releases heat 
I. why does that happen? 
N. because when you bang your hand all this heat comes 
out /laughs/ ••• because when you bang it you're giving 
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it energy and the molecules will move a bit and so 
heat is given off 
I. the molecules give off heat? 
N. when they move •.•• they're moving every time you bang 
it ••. its like when you shake a rattle all the beads 
inside move around don't they and give off heat 
I. the rattle gets hot? 
N. well not that hot but I think it gets hotter yes /a 
moment later N considers a person running (HIS)/ ••• 
yes /there's heat/ because he's fighting friction in 
his joints when he's moving and when you're fighting 
friction you get heat don't you ••• so you need heat 
to move and then you produce heat 
(N,4H) 
Molecular movement is a common theme and is used to explain 
increased blood flow during exercise because the blood 
molecules would circulate more quickly, and the operation 
of an electric kettle by the electricity galvanising the 
water molecules by shocking them into increased activity. 
This framework considers only the role of movement in the 
generation of heat and not the movement or transfer of heat 
itself. This is considered in the next framework. 
M-H: Motile Heat 
The term 'given off' is by far the most common desc-
ription for the transfer or, usually, the end-point for 
heat. The means by which it moves - and the reasons for 
it to move - are varied. One or two students use terms 
like radiate or conduct, though these terms themselves 
disguise a range of modes of travel. Some suggest express-
ions like heat 'beaming', or heat 'rays' without a descr-
iption of the mechanism. Motile means capable of motion 
and this framework summarises those responses over a range 
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of cards where heat was not viewed as a static entity. 
Extract 57 
/Cl is talking about a house standing in sunshine (H9)/ 
C. yes there's heat coming from the sum 
I. from the sun 
C. yes it's something to do with molecules 
I. what do they do? 
C. no ... its beta rays or something like that .•. umh 
minus electrons or something like that ..• and they give 
out rays 
I. and they're coming from the sun? 
C. they're being given off ..• well they ~ coming out of 
it yes ... and they just surround the whole atmosphere 
I suppose .•• wherever the sun is 
/C later describes photosynthesis in a flower, H7/ 
c. well its /the flower/ got like veins and that ••. that 
carries the food and keeps it alive 
I. you said something about sunshine and photons •.• what 
are they? 
C. I imagine they are probably the beta rays that come 
from the sun. 
(CI,4H) 
Extract 58 
/el describes an iron bar which has one end in a burner 
flame and the other under a flow of tap water, HS/ 
C. I think the water at the end would be getting warmer 
I. why do you think that? 
C. because its a conductor of heat ••• well slightly .•. 
the metal is anyway .•. it conducts the heat 
I. what do you mean by that? 
C. conductor? •• its when the molecules that have been 
heated move along isn't it? they vibrate along 
I. I see ..• and what happens to the molecules? 
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C well they just move about everywhere and ... we did 
diffusion yesterday in biology •.. and heat is when 
they sort of spread themselves out ... I think it~ 
with water and gas mainly but I suppose it would 
happen with the molecules in metal .•. they would 
spread themselves out. 
(Cl, 3H) 
For C1 (3H) heat is conducted by the molecules spreading out 
down the bar and this fitting with a model of molecules 
vibrating in a conductor. It also seems coherent with a 
diffusion model (taught the day before) for gasses and 
liquids. C1 (4H) 's model is also a 'particulate' transfer 
of heat, in that case, the particles being beta particles. 
As suggested, a mechanism for 'spread' or 'flow' is not 
always given but does suggest that students treat heat as 
capable of movement. 
N-H: Normal Heat 
The norm for normal heat in this framework is body 
temperature. The framework summarises responses which are 
very anthropocentric. That is, heat is seen as anything 
hotter than 'me', cold is anything colder than 'me'. The 
range is continuous from very cold to very hot with body 
temperature at the mid pOint. Again, this is a common 
type of response: in extract 59 below, 01 has argued con-
sistently that this is the case. He then goes on to desc-
ribe an experience at an outdoor swimming pool. 
Extract 59 
/01 talks first about a poster showing mountains by the 
sea - as part of the 'rain cycle' - that is on the wall/ 
o. yes that would be hot on there /the mountains/ because 
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if you go and stand next to a wall when the sun is 
kind of beaming on it ... it'd be hot ... it is for 
me anyway ..• the water /sea/ might be hot because 
when it rains the water is hotter 
I. oh? 
D. I've found that out ••• when we was at some open air 
pool and it poured down we went in ••. it seemed to get 
hot for some reason 
I. the water in the pool? 
D. yes •.• if it is raining then the water in the pOOl 
gets hot but if the sun was on it it won't get so hot 
I. that seems funny somehow doesn't it? 
D. yes I know ••• I don't know why .•• most probably because 
the umh •.• rain that's corning down is warmer 
I. and when you got back in 
D. yes it was hotter •.• as soon as it stopped raining 
we got in it felt much hotter 
(D1,3H) 
Extract 60 
J. that /some melting ice, (H6)/ is the total opposite 
to that /a hot pie (H3)/ for a person 
I. opposite? 
J. yes its lack of heat /ice/ to hot /the pie/ with umh 
a ••. human comfort pOint in the middle somewhere 
(J,4H) 
Extract 61 
/R1 is describing the 'iron bar' picture (H5)/ 
R. right •.• the iron bar is being heated up by the bunsen 
burner because of the flame ..• so this /end/ will be 
warming up ••• it should be getting quite hot .•• but 
if this is a cold water tap that's on there it will be 
cooling so that will be cold 
I. and what will happen in the middle 
R. in the middle ••• well there's no cold in the middle 
••• the molecules will be moving so there's no cold 
.•• it will"be normal 
(Rl,4H) 
Many more the the students referred only to human 
participants in the pictures; deciding whether they would 
be warm or cold as they threw stones, were running or expl-
oring space and so on. Some described 'normal' as a 'com-
fortable' heat and noted objects, like houses, as ceing 
'nice and comfortable' suggesting a pleasant human temper-
ature as a norm. 
P-H: Product Heat 
In describing heat, many students feel a need to make 
a distinction between heat generated deliberately for a 
purpose and heat that occurs incidentally. Many of the 
former responses would be examples of a 'conspicuous heat' 
framework since to generate heat deliberately (in an electric 
fire, for example) would be a clear and obvious illustration 
of making something hot in order 'to heat' something. In 
the second case, however, heat is seen as a consequence of 
some other activity and is then classed as 'natural' or a 
'by-product! In this case, it is described simply as being 
'produced' and then 'given off'. 
Extract 62 
/J is discussing the 'flower in a pot' (H7)/ 
J. no •••••••• not heat as in sort of •. being hot ••• I 
think more of heat being used lin this instance/ by 
the flower ••• rather than being radiated and given 
off 
I. what are you thinking of when you say ~ heat? 
J. well it's starch stuff •• you know ••• respiration and 
you know all food and that •••• yes heat is a by-prod-
uct isn't it? ••• well not actually a by-product but 
it's produced when you do all these other things ••• 
you need a certain amount of heat yes ••• but it is 
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produced when you use up energy 
(J,4H) 
Extract 63 
Icard H2/ 
P. when two substances combine and form another substance 
heat is usually given off 
I. why is that? 
P. well it depends •••• I'm not sure why it happens but 
it just does its umh an exothermic reaction ••• that's 
when heat's given off and that's what is happening 
here lin a chemical reaction/ 
I. are all reactions like that? 
P. no some are endothermic when heat's taken in I think 
••• it just depends what sort of reaction it is 
I. what sort are you thinking of? 
P. when some two chemicals would combine together and 
heat's given off ••• when umh ... salt and an alkali 
with an acid is combined ••. its an exothermic react-
ion and heat's produced and given off to its surround-
ings ••• we've done that in chemistry ••• and that could 
be happening here 
(P,6H) 
Extract 64 
/s is making a distinction between heat and temperature/ 
I. if you had to describe to somebody what heat was ••• 
what would you say? 
s. I suppose its a rise of temperature sort of 
I. and what is temperature? 
s. what is temperature? .. something that measures heat 
/laughs/ 
I. I see /laughs/ 
s. yes there's sort of ••• natural heat ••• body temperature 
••• the sun ••• and there's unnatural heat •• sort of 
electricity ••• fires and that 
I. and the electric mixer? /points to the 'mixer' instance 
card, H12/ 
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s. well there is some sort of heat ... any electrical 
appliance does get hot after a while ... but this is 
not actually meant to get hot its meant to do some-
thing else like mix cakes. 
(S,6H) 
These three extracts explore similar themes across differ-
ing instance cards. In each case, heat is both a sense of 
'genuine' heat and accidental heat. This framework is a 
~ummary of accounts of the latter - the incidental occurence 
of h&at. This next one is the third of the • substantive' 
frameworks. 
S-H: Standard Heat 
Here the norm at the focus of the range of convenience 
is neither hot objects or 'normal' heat but the zero temp-
erature: the melting point of ice. Although this is clearly 
intended a~ 00 celsius very few (perhaps one or two) mention 
the temperature scale, even as a centigrade scale. More 
commonly they speculate about temperatures simply as degrees. 
The responses that e~~~lify this framework, then, see cold 
as anything belOW freezing and would allow that melting ice 
would have some heat whereas frozen ice wuuld not. The 
scale extends in both directions, down beyond 'freezing 
cold' and up beyond 'boiling hot'. 
Extract 65 
/Rl is discussing both the 'ice melting' card and the 
, refrigerator' (H14) / 
R. • •• ice melting ••• well ice melts at above nought 
degrees so the atmosphere wi 11 have to be abo\re nought 
degrees for it to melt and there must obviously be . 
heat to melt it.if it was freezing it would still be 
frozen in a block of ice. 
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I. where would the heat be? 
R. the air around the refridgerator ... to melt it ... 
the air gives off heat to the ice 
I. and has the ice any heat? 
R. no /laughs/ ••• if it had any heat it would melt itself 
(Rl,4H) 
Extract 66 
/C2 is discussing changes of state in terms of molecular 
activity across a range of cards - the 'ice melting', H7, 
the refridgerator (H14), in particular/ 
C ice changes at different temperatures 
I. how does it do that? 
C. well .•• the mOlecules in the ice are frozen ones and 
it could actually stand ••• in the liquid though ..• 
because that's water ••• there's more heat •• they're 
/the molecules/ moving ••• and more heat turns it into 
a gas - steam •.•••• although if it cools down it'll 
condense back into water and then if yuu want it .•. 
back into a sOlid ••• you have to freeze it .•• take 
all the heat out of it 
(C2,4H) 
Extract 67 
/Ci is again focusing on the 'melting ice', H7 and then 
general ising to other cards/ 
C. well there's got to be ••• heat of some sort ••• well 
no not necessarily heat ••• it could just be nought 
degrees where its melting point .•• so it doesn't have 
to be really heat it just ••. if it is one degree then 
it'll start melting anyway. ---
I. why do you say that? why one degree? 
C. because the melting point is nought degree centigrade 
so anything above that and it will start melting 
I. and how do degrees relate to heat? 
C. • ••••• /laughs/. when you measure heat you use a 
thermometer and one degree is a certain amount of 
heat and here fat the ice/ there doesn't have to be 
much ••• it could be just slightly higher than the 
melting point of ice so there doesn't have to be a 
lot of heat. 
(Cl,4H) 
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The extracts to illustrate this framework are clustered 
around the 'melting ice' card for obvious reasons: it is ice 
that is being used as the distinction between heat and no-
heat. These types of arguments, however, are made general 
at different points, usually where there is discussion about 
change of state, or thermometers. 
R-H: Regional Heat 
This final one of the heat frameworks contrasts in 
some senses with the motile heat framework. Here heat is 
more static than mobile and is situated in regions. As 
students account for the distribution of heat they some-
times discuss it as flowing or spreading from area to area 
though - as in this framework - it is sometimes described 
as simply being somewhere. 
Extract 68 
IC describes the 'iron bar' instance, HS/ 
C. well when the cold water reaches the heated bar it 
cools it down 
I. and what happens to the heat? 
C. well the heat ••• I don't think it actually ••• I don't 
think the heat moves ••• it just moves the particles 
but then when water comes onto the particles it just 
cools them down ••• so it's /heat/ not a moving thing 
itself ••• 
fa moment later/ 
well I don't know really ••• I don't know fabout the 
heat/ •••• its not a moving thing ••• its sort of just 
saturated into the material 
(C,6H) 
Extract 69 
/R considers some sugar being stirred into a cup of tea, 
H16/ 
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I. what about heat in a picture like that? 
R. what .. you mean on the cup? 
I. what do you think? 
R. well there's some in the room and on the bottom /of 
the cup/ ••• perhaps round the sides ••• that's about 
all •• oh yes •••• on the tips of the handle /of the 
spoon/ ••• where they are rather hot 
(R,3H) 
Much of this Xind of discussion would not have heat 'spread-
ing out' or dispersing but being located in certain areas 
and the heat simply reducing as it cools. Hot pies taken 
from an oven, for example, do not 'give off' heat but cool 
down and 'get cooler'. Engel's (1982) work has pOinted to 
simi1ar tendencies - particularly where heat is seen to be 
present at the periphery of objects, rather as in the case 
of R(3H) and the cup of tea. Some responses to the picture 
of the iron bar suggested that the whole bar would be hot 
except for a small region of cold under the tap water. 
That is, that the 'mid' point where hot and cold meet would 
be on the far right of the bar in the picture. The heat 
is not seen as moving so much as the water cooling that end 
of the bar and reducing the heat of the bar. And since 
no heat is moving there would be no temperature difference 
between the water under and over the bar. 
The frameworks have failed to develop a number of 
interesting points, in particular the connections to be 
seen between heat and temperature, energy and light. As 
before, these relat±onships are the domain of the succeed-
ing chapters. 
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L: The Light Frameworks 
There are seven light frameworks which are again 
presented in alphabetical order and are summarised on the 
following table in figure 16. Some of the frameworks can 
be seen as contrasting with one another. For example, the 
normal daylight in a room is perhaps difficult to concept-
ualise in terms of rays and beams. Some students consider 
this 'natural' light and describe it more as a static 'pool' 
of light. In contrast, direct sunlight coming through a 
window is described in terms of a directed beam, can be 
re-directed, deflected and aimed to 'hit' something. As 
one youngster argued, it was not possible to 'dazzle' a 
friend using a mirror with ordinary daylight; one needed 
a thin beam of light. The argument was not that daylight 
is not 'strong' enough, simply that it is not going any-
whe~e ann so cannot be re-directed for a purpose. This 
'stagnant' light is described in the first framework. 
A-L: Ambient Light 
As suggested, a distinction is sometimes drawn between 
overt luminous objects and the daylight one might get even 
on an overcast day. The latter is frequently called natural 
light (as opposed to sunlight). In this sense, it forms 
the mia-range on a continuum that g~es between 'very light' 
through 'normal' (natural) light and 'dark'. It is not often 
connected to a source and is ~mply present, everyday light. 
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Figure 16 
Light is discussed as a general glow 
of one kind, as static and natural. 
It is contrasted with 'dark'. Only some 
ambient light is discussed in terms of 
sources, it is normally external to 
objects. 
Light is considered to be of composite 
nature - either a 'fibrous', striated 
collection of rays, or granular and 
being composed of 'bits'. The various 
parts can behave differently. 
Objects and events are observed from 
a vantage point that does not entail 
a direct link between the illumination 
of the situation and the retinal image. 
Light is separate from seeing. 
An anthropocentric framework that con-
siders light to be for h~man purposes -
of teleological intent: objects and 
events are lit in order to be seen. 
Rather than one kind of light, there 
are many kinds, or forms of it. They 
are commonly generated by different 
methods and mechanisms and have differ-
ing properties. 
Light is associated primarily with 
obvious prominent and conspicuous 
sources. It is a property of the 
sources. Light is very luminescent 
objects. 
Light is a directed beam that has 
palpable effect. It has tangible prop-
erties, moves at speed and can be stop-
ped by barriers. Terms like 'bounce' 
'throw' and 'hit' are used to evidence 
this framework. 
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Extract 70 
/J1 is talking about shadows/ 
I. well what is a shadow? 
J. when umh ••• there's something between a strong light 
and say a wall and the light can't pass through the 
flesh and bones and that's why you get a shadow ••• 
but not in natural light they don't happen 
I. and why's that? 
J. nor in darkness ••• you need a strong light to do it 
(J1,4L) 
Extract 71 
/A is talking about the mirror, L1/ 
A. no I don't think there's anything there about light ••• 
because if you're in the dark you can't see yourself 
in the mirror unless there's ordinary light ••• no I 
don't think there's anything special 
I. nothing special 
A. no ••• unless you're going to reflect a light onto it 
and then it would light it •.• it would reflect light 
•.• that's about it 
(A,3L) 
Extract 72 
/p is talking about seeing light reflecting in a shiny surface/ 
P. well umh ••• the reason they reflect light is its a 
shiny surface ••• well ••• a shiny flat surface •••• 
they're straight 
I. what light do they reflect? 
P. well it's all •• from all around ••• from the windows 
••• the general light in the room .•• lighting up the 
room and shining on the mirror ••• /later/ 
light is a natural substance ••• which allows you to 
see ••• umh ••• its the opposite of darkness •• 
(P,4L) 
For some students the gradation is not a sharp one, but one 
of increasing 'strengths' of light, with 'daylight' as the 
norm. 
C-L: Composite Light 
This framework represents those responses where students 
describe the composition of light. Some treat light as a 
single entity, simply with different strengths, as in the 
framework above. Where light is considered to be composed 
of invisible elements, these are described as 'rays' or 
'beams', sometimes colours, sometimes as rays of different 
colours. In some cases the composition is almost fibrous 
and students speak of 'strands' of light. 
Extract 73 
/P is discussing a person sunbathing, LS/ 
P. ies the light rays that causes your skin to •••• tan 
browner 
I. what are light rays then? 
P. • •••. /laughs/ •.• its umh ••. I was going to say a 
piece of light from the sun .•• because sometimes if 
you look at the clouds and the sun you sometimes see 
these streaks of light corning from the sun •••• and 
that's a light ray ••• it just sometimes appears to be 
a line of light from the sun •• /normally/ they're all 
clustered together •.• whereas as you see breaking in 
between the clouds you can see them separate apart 
(P,4L) 
Extract 74 
/Rl is discussing a rainbow, L4/ 
R. /raindrops/ splits it up ••• splits the light up into 
the basic components of white light ••• which are those 
coloured rays ••• and which are then all stuck together 
to make white light 
(Rl,6L) 
Extract 75 
I. well what would you say a ray was? 
C. . ••.•• well if you've got a torch it gives off a beam 
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... and I suppose a beam is made up of .. millions and 
millions of rays ... like waves .. single lengths ... 
like a piece of rope I mean ... a piece of rope is 
quite thick usually .•• I mean even the thin pieces 
.•• but they're made up of very .• you know .. loads 
and loads of very thin strands ..• and I suppose its 
like that and you've got to build them up and make 
••• and make beams ••• 
(C1,4L) 
This last extract is a particularly graphic portrayal 
of a beam of light. Nor does it contradict the notion of 
a 'wave' since the strands can undulate amongst each other 
as they are emanated. 
D-L: Decoupled Light 
The name for this framework comes from the study of 
light by Jung (198~) already discussed. He uses the term 
'de-coupled' to describe the responses students make that 
suggest that the action of seeing is removed from the ill-
umination Qf a particular event. Situations need light so 
that they are lit up; which means that they can then be 
seen. The observation of a scene does not of itself imply 
that light is reflected off all of the objects and must then 
impinge on the retina of the viewer. This kind of argument 
is used in a number of cases, for mirrors, lenses and a 
slide projector. For the latter, it is argued that the 
light is emitted from the projector, through a slide and 
puts the image onto the screen. The screen is not reflect-
ive; if that were the case the light would be deflected off 
onto another surface. The light is not reflected off the 
screen, any observer simply looks at, and sees, the screen. 
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Extract 76 
Icard LS/ 
I. somebody looking at a bright red painting 
M. . •. no •.. there's no light there it just has to have 
light shining on it so you can see it •• but it's no 
light otherwise 
I. what light are you talking of? 
M. the ordinary light that's everywhere ••• you've got to 
have light there to see it but it's not giving off any 
(Ml,4L) 
Extract 77 
/J is talking about the 'bright red painting' card (LS) and 
some 0f the others/ 
J •••..• well we can only see the picture 1f there is 
light ••• and you can only see the image •• or your--
reflection in a mirror if there is light ••• I don't 
think I'd put it with light /along with other cards 
she has in a pile/ .•.• its got nothing at all to do 
with light ••• I dont think they're made by light ••• 
(J2,4L) ----
Extract 78 
/s is talking about images in connection with a projector 
L2/ 
s. 
I. 
s. 
1. 
s. 
the image is what's on the screen ..• the object is 
what's being projected 
what is an image then? 
the image is what is being projected •. no hang on •• 
the image in a mirror would be what you see and the 
image on the screen would be what you see on the screen 
is it like a mirror? 
no •.• no its being projected onto the screen ••• so 
its not sort of bouncing off.:::-because that /the 
mirror/ is a reflection and you're seeing your image 
corning back •.. but this /the projector/ is something 
going away from you and you see it on the screen ••• 
(S,4L) 
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This is an interesting example because it exemplifies 
the difficulties in conceiving of something being projected 
away, and projected onto a screen, as coming back to any 
one of a roomful of (possible) viewers. The 'projection' 
then, is de-coupled from the 'viewing'. 
I-L: Illuminative Light 
It is intended that this framework represent those 
numerous examples of anthropocentric, teleological responses. 
If there is a purpose of light ( and there is) then it is 
generally described as making it possible for people (and 
animals) to see. As in the last framework, the implicit 
assumption is that, since we need light to see, then it is 
produced for that purpose. Some make a distinction between 
'natural' light and 'generated' light, but these are the 
subject of other frameworks. In this one the emphasis is 
upon the general purpose of light: to illuminate objects 
for us to see. 
Extract 79 
II has asked R to describe lightl 
R. what is light? .•. well its obvious •.• you can see 
where there's light of course ..• light makes things 
light~ •• you can't see when its dark can you •.• 
unless you turn the light on 
(R,4L) 
Extract 80 
ICard L10I 
J2. well of course you can make light •.• and you can 
control it ••• well you can-control an image by turn-
ing on and off •.• and yOU-can actually make light with 
a battery and a bulb to do things •.• something that 
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helps us ... if we didn't have light we wouldn't be 
able to ... if it was only darkness we wouldn't be able 
to see what was going on arounJ us. 
(J2,4L) 
M-L: Modal Light 
A number of students suggest that there is not just 
one kind of light, but many. These are different in kind 
and are discussed as being generated by different means. 
They are sometimes called different forms of light. 
Extract 81 
ICl is discussing the person sunbathing, L81 
C. that's obviously a lot to do with light and heat 
together ••• I mean the sun gives off not only light 
as we know it ••. from an electric light •.• just light 
on its own ••• I suppose light from an electric light 
is virtually pure ••• but light from the sun is mixed 
with all sorts of other light •.• ul~ra violet light 
... and radio active light I suppose 
(Cl,4L) 
Extract 82 
Jl. I mean there are lots of different kinds of light 
isn't there ••• the~'s daylight and that sort of blue 
light ..•..• umh .. light produced by electricity from 
a battery and light made from chemicals like burning 
magnesium and infra red light ••• and flu~rescent 
light. 
(Jl,4L) 
Different kinds of light have different properties 
so that some are strong, some produce heat, some are respon-
sible for suntans and some, like 'X-ray light', allow one 
to see through a person's body. 
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O-L: Obvi~~p Light 
Direct sources of light are perhaps the most straight-
forward to identify. Light is the property of obvious, 
conspicuous luminous bodies. 
Extract 83 
I. what would you say light is? 
J. . .... the sun ••• something that you can see ..• that 
you can see throughout a darkness ••• I'd associate 
it •• it with something that's producing light ••. that 
makes it ••• 
(J2,4L) 
Extract 84 
/Ml is talking about sun, moon and stars, Ll3/ 
M. they /stars/ don't need the sun to shine on them ••• 
they're lit up by themselves but the moon can't light 
up on its own so it hasn't got any light of its own 
I. oh? 
M. so it needs the sun to shine on it ••• some things are 
light and some things aren't ...• some things if they 
are small lights have to have dark behind them so 
they can show up and they ••• /stars/ we only see 
little spots because they're very far away. 
(MI,4L) 
Extract 85 
M. •. to have light you have to have powerful lights 
•••• to produce lots and lots of light ••• like elec-
tricity generators and hydro-electric power because 
light is energy and you need sources •.• well like 
the sun really ••• you know to get power to light the 
whole of London an all 
(M2,4L) 
P-L: Projected Light 
A large number of responses treated light as a sub-
stance that is projected, 'hits', 'bounces', 'rebounds', 
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and so on. In some instances light is seen as 'picking-
up' colours and transporting them; 'carrying them onto the 
screen', 'striking a wall' etcetera. In the second extract 
below, C describes how light must slow down having hit a 
screen. It travels at such a speed that it is only by 
slowing down that it can be seen at all! 
Extract 86 
/Y is explaining how a television set works, L3/ 
Y. and umh ..• there is a light say from the back of the 
television and it is producing light from the screen 
•••. its actually hitting it ••• it is working like 
the sun sort of ... bombarding the shirt lin a previous 
card/ to make it whiter ••. so you get the rays at the 
back of the TV bombarding whatever it is the stuff 
on the screen •... it hits it and starts up something 
in the screen glowing 
(Y,4L) 
Extract 87 
I. and what is an image? 
C. umh .•• it is something that's been projected ••• its 
something that's been thrown somewhere else .•• 
flater, card L2/ 
... the projector's throwing it out .•. at the speed 
of light because obviously light will move at the 
speed of light and then •.• just sort of abruptly 
hitting the screen ••• and stopping ••• throwing the 
image and then going back like the original /object/ 
..• it's /the screen/ just like a barrier I suppose 
... whereas a television just slows it /light/ down 
(Cl,4L) 
In other examples students talk of using a beam of 
light and directing it so that it 'shoots out' and reaches 
a target object. They give the impression of a fast jet 
of water that can carry things ahead of it, and along which 
things can be transported. 
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The next chapter looks at the relationships between 
the frameworks and with the questions that give rise to 
them. 
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CHAPTER 5 
fRAMEWORKS, FOCI AND BOUNDA~IES 
5.0 An introduction t~ the chapter 
5.1 Frameworks within the concept areas 
5.2 Inter-framework relationships 
5.3 Overlaps in meanings 
5.4 The incidence of frameworks 
5.5 Summary 
5.0: Introduction 
The twenty-nine frameworks described in the last 
chapter, evidenced by the many extracts from the interview 
transcripts, are now to be used to view the responses them-
selves. The frameworks have been described as constructed 
'types', useful as a way of denominating a variety of stud-
ents' responses and as means of representing sections of 
transcript. The aim here is to use them as a unit of 
analysis, to turn the frameworks back on to the data that 
generated them as a method of exploring the various argu-
ments and explanations the students have put forward. 
This procedure carries with it a number of assumptions. 
Whilst some of these have been made explicit there is benefit 
in further discussion here. One analogy for the use of 
frameworks has already been made - the way in which polit-
ical pOints of view are typified in common reporting. A 
second analogy might be that of classifying schools of 
art and artists. Cubism is a description of a style of 
art that does not belong to anyone artist, nor can any 
one artist be said to be (entirely) a 'cubist'. It is a 
general term to describe that geometrical style charact-
eristic of a number of works by different painters. It is 
also, then, possible to use it to describe a phase in an 
individual artist's output as he or she exhibits what might 
be called a 'cubist period'. Similarly an alternative 
framework can be seen as a generalised description across 
a number of interviews with different students which can, 
in turn, be used to describe various parts of an individual 
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student's response. 
There are limits to this process. Firstly, to examine 
interviews in terms of a framework is to consider the match 
between individual conceptions and the interviewer~ cons-
truction of several such responses. The individual trans-
cripts will vary in many forms and degrees from a charact-
erising framework. Some indication of the variety of 
response can be seen in the example of a 'category' concern-
ing the ice cube (E8) in the previous chapter. For some 
students there will be a very close match: they may even 
be pithily articulating the very essence of a framework. 
For others, there will simply be a tendency, a disposition 
evidenced from a range of expressions used, towards a part-
icular framework. One limit to the political, or artistic 
analogy used before is the level of interaction between the 
respondents during the course of the development of ideas. 
One might presume that the community of artists must have 
been in varying degrees of cooperation as new and different 
techniques and ideas are formulated. How much of this is 
true of groups of students is an open question. The origins 
of an individual's conceptions have not been explored here 
and can only be hinted at. How much they rely upon peer 
interaction, upon the classroom mileau or upon personal 
experience is not possible to know. What is important to 
remember, however, is that students are largely unaware 
of the analyst's frameworks as they talk: the responses 
come first and are not somehow a regeneration of some widely 
held opinion. Being interviewed individually they are not 
privy to the detailed responses made by others. The frame-
works did not originate from an overtly cooperative venture 
between students. 
Secondly, a student's conceptions are treated as 
minimally internally coherent. That is they make sense as 
a systematic, continuous, presentation of ideas - to the 
students - unless there are signals of specific contraindic-
ations. That is, the way in which a word is used in one 
situation is provisionally taken as indicating how it will 
be used in the next instance unless there is a notable 
change of ground, or a clear signal (verbal or non-verbal) 
that the new instance implies a shift of perspective and 
argument. 
A major assumption all along has been that it is 
possible to detect such changes, both in terms of an indiv-
idual's conceptions and of the boundaries of the more gener-
alised frameworks. Making these limits presents different 
problems in both cases. In the interviews the task of 
marking changes in conceptions is often straightforward. 
Students will simply say 'ah, it is different in this case' 
or will group together pictures they see as similar and which 
are also different to others. Their actions and reasons 
are clear indications of different conceptions. On numerous 
occasions they ask themselves the question 'is that the 
same meaning here?' (or words to that effect) and proceed 
to answer it. Another indication is where students negate 
the instance as . an example of the concept and this allows 
for clear distinctions in usage to be clarified. It is 
at this gross, and obvious, level of indication that changes 
in meaning can be, and have been, evidenced. 
The boundaries between frameworks are sometimes more 
5.3 
difficult to argue and since this occupies the sections to 
follOW, the examples will be left until then. One of the 
major reasons for describing and using frameworks at all -
particularly this description and use - is as an attempt 
to discern simplifying threads of argument amongst what 
are (in the event) some widely differing responses to the 
lAl cards. For example, to return to the ice cube categoDes 
in the last chapter, the responses were indeed very varied. 
One student claims the instance an example whilst another, 
for seemingly very similar reasons, claims it a non-example. 
Conversely, amongst those that do see it as an example, 
they do so for what can be seen to be very different reasons. 
The classification of examples and non-examples on its own 
is a poor guide to the conceptions of a student. This 
chapter, then, uses the frameworks as attempts to construct 
some general patterns across some very varied conceptions. 
The four parts of the chapter are as follows: the 
first considers the frameworks in each concept area, their 
focus of convenience (or key theme) and the limits, or 
boundaries, of their convenience. That is, the kinds of 
situations (and therefore the lAl cards) for each which 
each framework seems ·applicable as a summary of the explan-
atory accounts provided. The second part compares the 
frameworks across the concept areas in terms of some broad 
similarities in each set of frameworks. 
The third section makes a departure in order to examine 
these similarities more closely. Students'conceptions of 
force, heat, and light occur frequently in the context of 
the energy interviews - as they are bound to, given the 
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design of the cards described in chapter 2. Equally, energy 
and light (perhaps less so force) will be described in 
heat interviews and so on. During the course of the inter-
views, the students weave a network of meanings for a 
variety of terms, only a few of which can be explored in 
any detail. The scope and range of all the ideas presented 
in the 134 interviews is so vast and varied that it is as 
much as can be done to focus on the four target concepts 
already described. Terms like power, pressure and friction 
in force; temperature, melting, boiling and exothermic 
in heat; image, reflection and refraction in light are 
all the inevitable casualties of an analysis system that 
tries to delineate just four concept labels amongst many. 
The analysis in this section, then, looks at the overlaps 
in meanings across the interviews in each of the age 
ranges. 
The final section takes the analysis one step further 
and makes a comment on the pattern of distribution of the 
frameworks across the three age bands. 
5.1: Frameworks - Their Focus and Limits 
The frameworks in each of the four concept areas have 
been summarised in the tables in figures 13, 14, and 15 and 
16, in chapter 4. The purpose of this section is to consider 
the relationships between frameworks within each of the.se 
concept areas and to exemplify, as far as is possible, 
some of the distinctions to be made between them. To do 
this, it is useful,first to develop a set of distinguishing 
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terms based upon a notion of question types, an idea that 
itself needs explicating. 
Gilbert and Pope (1982) observe of their own study 
of frameworks that different types of framework appear to 
be evoked by different types of question. Given the part-
icular theoretical basis outlined in chapter 1, this 
observation is to be expected. That is, there can be no 
suggestion that an individual's conceptions are somehow not 
dependent of the question being asked. Nor, of course, 
are they entirely independent either - responses are not 
made 'out of the blue', nor would one expect the same 
response from a variety of questions. The relationship 
cannot be simple and straightforward. The frameworks have 
been distinguished from conceptions as compositions of 
responses (designed to bridge immediate contexts) and are 
therefore one level removed from single direct questions. 
The pOint to be made here is that they ~ be related to 
question 'types' and in this sense Gilbert and Pope's 
work is a useful indication to an approach. 
In order to examine the frameworks in each concept 
area, six question types are suggested as a means of loosely 
categorising the many different questions used in the 
interviews. These are: 
a. Locative questions, concerning the whereabouts of 
energy, force, heat or light in particular situations. 
b. Descriptive questions, requiring some description 
of a situation in terms of the concept, and perhaps some 
description of the concept itself. 
c. Operative questions. These questions concern the 
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way in which the entity behaves, how events occur and so 
on. 
d. Predictive questions. Since frameworks are designed 
to be predictive in some way, such questions concern what 
is likely to happen and how it might occur within a situat-
ion. 
e. Scalar questions which ask for some notion of size, 
or relative size between instances. 
f. Contingency questions: given that something is the 
case, what else might one expect of it. 
The central issue is not that frameworks are entirely 
dependent upon specific questions but that they are weighted 
towards question~types. For example, in response to a 
question such as 'Do you think this picture is an example 
of energy?' a student might start by referring to the energy 
inside a leaf. This in turn might lead to a question of 
why the leaf and not, say, the stem, petals, pot or the 
whole plant. The arguments put forward might be taken 
as evidence for . Depository Energy in a way similar to 
the extracts used in chapter 4, particularly where similar 
arguments are put forward elsewhere in the interview. 
This is not a straightforward relationship, then, between 
question and framework since locative-type questions might 
both initiate - and be initiated by - a 'location' frame-
work. 
Two points arise from this discussion. Firstly, 
frameworks vary in their weighting. For example, a student· 
might argue that energy is ~ to be found in anyone place 
but is the action of running or colliding. When the running 
stops then so does the 'running energy'. Runntng is a 
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description of the energy - a response that might be used 
as evidence for an Ostensive framework, weighted towards 
descriptive questions. Given a strong disposition to 
this view then it would seem uncertain that a locative 
question would evoke a locational framework. This can 
be seen in the following extract: 
Extract 88 
/B is talking about the card 'a bad smell' (EI3) where a 
person holds up a dead fish/ 
I. it doesnlt have to be a bad smell 6f course it could 
be a pleasant smell like Channel number 5 
B. (laughs) 
I. is there any energy in that? /instance card/ 
B. in the smell ••• ~ •••••• no the smell hasn't got any 
energy in it ••• but I suppose you smelling it is an 
action so there's energy there 
(B,4E) 
What is (in ideal circumstances) a poorly framed leading 
question by the interviewer is accepted by the student as 
a means of differentiating her application of energy in 
the situation, to reject a conception of energy indicative 
of a Depository (locational) framework for an Ostensive 
energy one. 
Secondly, there is a sense in which a student, whose 
personal conception closely matches a particular framework, 
would respond to a range of question types quite approp-
riately. Staying with the energy frameworks as examples, 
a student might have a conception of energy for which a 
Depository framework is a good description. From thiS, 
5.8 
they might feel able to answer a variety of questions 
concerning the site of the energy, its actions, its desc-
ription, futnre possibilities, size and so on. Hence, the 
weighting of a framework is not to be seen as an exclusive 
feature. As suggested, each has a predictive element as 
a deliberate part. The question-type weightings for each 
framework are shown below in figure 17. 
As has already been argued, the frameworks are not 
intended as mutually exclusive categories and it is some-
times difficult to attribute a section of transcript to 
a particular framework. This is particularly the case 
where the section of transcript, or a specific response, 
is short. For example, responses featuring people as the 
focus of discussion could be used as evidence for Anthro-
pocentric, Depository and Functional energy frameworks. 
In such cases, the context within the transcript is clearly 
important. The response is taken to be consistent with 
previous statements unless some indication is given to 
the contrary. 
The remainder of this section is taken up with 
each of the concept areas in turn. Each one is considered 
in terms of the descriptions above and, where relevant, 
example extracts are used to illustrate the point being 
made. Each set of frameworks is accompanied by two tables. 
These show the most popular frameworks that can be evidenced 
from the responses made to each of the cards. As suggested 
earlier, the cards are all shown, with appropriate numbers 
in appendix I. The second table is a revamp of the first, 
where the cards most likely to evoke typical framework 
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QUESTION TYPE 
Locative 
Descriptive 
Operative 
Scalar 
Predictive 
Contingency 
Figure 7 
ENERGY 
Anthropomorphic A-E 
Depository D-E 
Functional F-E 
Ostensive O-E 
Ingredient I-E 
Produced P-E 
Transfer T-E 
FORCE 
Affective A-F 
Designated D-F 
Configurative C-F 
Substantial S-F 
Impact I-F 
Motive M-F 
Operator O-F 
Encounter E-F 
Substantial S-F 
HEAT 
Conspicuous C-H 
Regional R-H 
Dynamic D-H 
Normal N-H 
Standard S-H 
Motile M-H 
Product P-H 
Conspicuous C-H 
Normal N-H 
Standard S-H 
All of the frameworks have some predictive weighting 
and are open to contingency questions 
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LIGHT 
Ambient A-L 
Decoupled D-L 
Composite C-L 
Modal M-L 
Obvious O-L 
Projected P-L 
Illuminative I-L 
Obvious 0-1.. 
responses are shown against each framework in turn. The 
tables are not a statistical exercise and are intended 
only as a guide to the more popular response 'types' and 
the most evocative cards. Not all of the cards are needed 
in all of the interviews: where students have manoeuvred 
the cards for themselves, or where time has been short, 
certain cards have not been used. The number of times a 
card has been used is indicated in the third column after 
the card reference number. 
Two more points are worth making about the tables. 
Firstly, the number of times the card is perceived as a 
non-exam~e of the interviewee's conception is recorded as 
a number of 'nmlegs'. The negation of a concept is often 
a very direct way of being able to distinguish between 
various conceptions. For example, in the table in figure 20 
showing the cards for energy, it can be seen that the 'ghost' 
card (E3) is commonly cited as a non-example of energy -
in seventeen of the twenty-three interviews in which it 
was used. This may not be surprising, except that in five 
interviews, including two 6th year ones, it was seen as an 
example of energy. However, the point here is that the 
reasons for it not being an example provide strong clues 
as to the conception being used ('there is no fuel', 'there 
is no person there'~ 'it is not alive' etc). These responses 
are in turn used as evidence for the various frameworks 
listed. 
Secondly, the 'counting' of frameworks is a difficult 
task. By definition, that type of response will already 
have occured at least twice in an interview. The figures i~ 
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the table give no indication of this, nor of the strength 
of commitment to that kind of response. Moreover, a wide 
range of frameworks might be evidenced from a single card. 
A long protracted discussion about the person eating a 
meal (card, E7) for example, could include a range of sub-
siduary conversations, the revisiting of cards, the revamp-
ing of ideas, and so on. Each set of responses would be 
evidence for, possibly, very different frameworks. What 
can be said is that in the analysis of each card these are 
the frameworks that could be evidenced best from what is 
being said. In what follows, the frameworks are discussed 
in the same order as before: energy, force, heat, light. 
1. The Energy Frameworks 
The energy frameworks, in alphabetical order, are shown 
below in figure 18: 
Anthropocentric/morphic A-E 
Depository D-E 
Functional F-E 
Ingredient I-E 
Ostensive O-E 
Produced P-E 
Transfer T-E 
Figure 18 
These frameworks can be grouped in a number of ways. 
The frameworks A-E and D-E are clearly connected and both 
can be seen as locative frameworks as depicted in figure 
19. A-E characterises those responses where humans are the 
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central focus of discussion. 
~----------->~~ 
Figure 19 
In this sense it can be seen that A-E is a special 
case of D-E, where energy is internal to (located in) objects 
and is consumable in a similar way. There is a difference 
between the two; often energy seen as deposited in a lump 
of coal, for instance, is a once-only kind, whilst living 
things are 'refuelable'. An example of this distinction 
is given below: 
Extract 89 
/A is discussing the flower-in-the-pot, E4/ 
A. I think there's energy here but not too much 
I. what are you thinking of? 
A. •. the roots •.•• in the pot ••• 
I. why there? 
A. well if it's just a ~ plant ••• if there isn't a 
root there ••• it'll die 
I. you mean if I cut the plant and stuck it in your 
button hole or something? 
A. yes .•• it couldn't get energy from its roots then ••• 
from the water an all that 
I. what about water? 
A. well the water's got energy ••• it comes with it ••• 
and the plant uses it ••• if you cut it off and put it 
in water ••• it may stay alive for a while •••• like 
sometimes it grows roots in the water and then you 
can plant them again 
I •••. and what about the water's energy? 
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A. . •.. well that's used up •••• water doesn't have energy 
then ... but the plant is alive isn't it and so it's 
got energy in it 
(A,3E) 
The energy in the water is denied to the plant when 
it is cut and yet is still consumable .• A similar case is 
made for oxygen, batteries, food and so on. Some substance 
to this can be seen in the tables in figures 20 and 21. 
The box (El): battery (E2): meal (E7): collision (E13): 
and flower (E14) cards all have a short 'life time' of 
activity. Whilst a number of other cards also have a short 
time of action (for example the hot water (E4): the sledge 
(E9) and the clock (Ell)), they do not seem to evoke the 
same level of anthropocentric and depository responses as 
do the others. How much the anthropocentric tendency per-
vades other responses in terms of implicit anthropomorphism 
is difficult to say. If a battery Or flower has a 'life' 
span, a period of activity before cessation, then it might 
be quite straight-forward to continue the metaphor to other 
situations. The depository framework is not explicitly 
anthropomorphic and a number of students make the kind of 
distinct±on illustrated above. However the distinctions 
are not always that easy to make. 
Functional (F-E) and o~tensive (O-E) energy can both 
be seen as descriptive frameworks (Figure 22). 
~ -EriP~ 
Figure 22 
5.14 
TIMES 
CARD NAME NO. USED YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
Box 1 ( 31) DE (4) DE (12) PE (1) DE (2) 
AE (7) AE (3) TE (1) AE (4) 
TE (1) OE (3) TE (4) 
Battery 2 (32) TE (9) IE (2) DE (12) PE (5) DE (6) PE (4) 
DE (7) PE (2) TE (7) FE (4) AE (2) OE (2" 
FE (3) IE (6) OE (2) FE (1) TE (4) 
Ghost 3 (23) AE C2} DE (1) DE (1) AE (1) DE (1) 
TE (2) OE (4) TE (2) 
FE C1} Noneg (3) PE Cl} Noneg (4) OE (l) Noneg (8) 
Hot Water 4 C27} DE C3} TE (I) DE (6) TE C1} DE (7) 
OE C1} - FE (3) PE (4) 
PE Cl} Noneg (4) OE (3) Noneg (4) TE (I) Noneg (1) 
Reaction 6 C30 } IE CS} PE Cl} PE C9} IE (3) PE C8} IE (2) 
DE C4} FE C I} OE (S) AE (1) OE (2) 
OE C3} DE (3) DE (2) TE (1) 
Lens 6 (31) DE (4) AE (2) DE (2) OE (1) 
FE C3} IE (1) OE (1) PE Cl} 
OE C3} PE (2) TE Cl} Noneg (10) TE (3) Noneg (6) 
Noneg C6} 
--
Meal 7 (31) DE (a) FE (2) AE (4) PE (5) IE (7) PE (4) 
AE (3) TE (2) DE (7) FE (3) AE (2) OE (2) 
IE C3} PE (2) IE (7) 'I'E (2) IDE (1) TE (2) 
Noneg (I) OE (6) Noneg (1) FE (1) Noneg (1) 
Continued ••• 
5.15 
·.LLM..I:oi:) 
----~-
C~DNAME NO. USED YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
Ice 8 (29) DE (2) TE (1) OE (7) IE (1) AE (1) PE (3) 
AE (1) OE (1) DE (2) PE (1) FE (1) TE (2) 
FE (1) Noneg (6) FE (1) TE (2) IE (1) 
Noneg (4) OE (3) Noneg (I) 
Sledge 9 (25) AE (5) FE (1) OE (8) TE (2) AE (4) PE (1) 
DE (2) TE (1) DE (3) TE (2) DE (1) 
OE (2) Noneg (4) PE (2) Noneg (1) DE (1) 
FE (1) 
Snow 10 (27) AE (7) OE (2) DE (4) FE (1) AE (1) TE (3) 
DE (1) PE (1) OE (3) IE (1) DE (1) PE (3) 
FE (1) Noneg (4) AE (1) PE (1) OE (1) 
Noneg (4) Noneg (3) 
Clock 11 (28) FE (5) OE (1) DE (10) OE (3) DE (5) IE (1) 
DE (4) PE (1) AE (1) PE (2) FE (2) TE (1) 
AE (1) TE (2) FE (4) TE (2) IE (1) 
Noneg (5) IE (1) Noneg (2) 
Collision 12 (19) OE (5) PE (2) DE (3) PE (1) OE (5) PE (1) 
AE (4) IE (1) AE (2) TE (1) 
DE (3) Noneg (1) OE (6) IE (1) 
Smell 13 ( 21) AE (3) TE (1) AE (2) PE (3) TE (2) 
DE (2) DE (1) TE (1) IE (1) 
FE (2) Noneg (4) OE (3) Noneg (6) Noneg (4) 
Continued ••• 
5.16 
TIMES 
CARD NAME NO. USED YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
Flower 14 (23) AE (3) OE (1) AE (2) OE (2) DE (4) 
DE (6) PE (1) DE (8) PE (1) 
FE (2) TE (2) FE (1) TE (1) 
IE (1) Noneg (1) IE (2) Noneg (1) 
Stars 15 (16) AE (1) IE (1) DE (4) PE (1) 
DE (2) FE (1) TE (1) 
FE (1) Noneg (1) OE (2) Noneg (3) 
Clouds 16 (16) AE (1) OE (1) DE (4) 
DE (3) OE (4) 
FE (3) Noneg (2) Noneg (3) 
Tripped 17 (8) AE (1) DE (2) 
DE (2) IE (2) 
FE (2) 
~--
-
----~~--
--
--
Figure 20 
5.17 
FRAMEWORK YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR G 
-
A-E BOX El SNOW EIO BOX ,b;l BOX EI 
GHOST E3 COLLISION El2 MEAL E7 BATTERY E2 
MEAL E7 SMELL El3 SMELL El3 SLEDGE E9 
SLEDGE E9 FLOWER El4 FLOWER El4 COLLISION El2 
D-E BOX EI MEAL E7 BOX EI CLOCK Ell BOX EI FLOWER E 
BATTERY E2 CLOCK Ell BATTERY E2 COLLISION El2 BATTERY E2 
14 
HOTWATER E4 COLLISION El2 HOTWATER E4 FLOWER El4 HOTWATER E4 
REACTION E 5 FLOWER El4 REACTION E5 SNOW EIO CLOCK Ell 
LENS E8 CLOUDS EIG SLEDGE E9 STARS El5 
MEAL E7 CLOUDS EIG 
F-E LENS E8 CLOUDS EIG BATTERY E2 CLOCK Ell 
MEAL E7 TRIPPED El7 HOTWATER E4 
CLOCK Ell MEAL E7 
FLOWER E14 CLOCK Ell 
I-E REACTION E5 BATTERY E2 TRIPPED E17 BATTERY E2 
MEAL E7 REACTION E5 MEAL E7 
BATTERY E2 MEAL E7 ICE EB 
FLOWER El4 
CONTINUED ••• 
5.lB 
FRAMEWORK YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
O-E REACTION ES COLLISION E12 BOX El SNOW EIO BATTERY E2 
LENS E6 BATTERY E2 CLOCK Ell COLLISION El2 
SLEDGE E9 GHOST E3 COLLISION E12 
SNOW EIO HOTWATER E4 SMELL E13 
REACTION ES FLOWER E14 
MEAL E7 STARS E1S 
ICE E8 CLOUDS El6 
SLEDGE E9 
P-E BATTERY E2 BATTERY E2 CLOCK Ell BATTERY E2 ICE E8 
LENS E6 REACTION ES SMELL E13 HOTWATER E4 SNOW EID 
MEAL E7 MEAL E7 REACTION E5 
COLLISION E12 SLEDGE E9 MEAL E7 
T-E BATTERY E2 BATTERY E2 CLOCK Ell BOX E2 SLEDGE E9 
MEAL E7 MEAL E7 BATTERY E2 SNOW EID 
CLOCK Ell ICE E8 GHOST E5 SMELL E13 
FLOWER E14 SLEDGE E9 LENS E6 
-- _. -
----
Figure 21 
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The F~ framework describes energy generated purpose-
fully in order to make things work; O-E in an action, or 
a chain of actions that take place - the obvious display 
of activity. In many cases for O-E,students appear to find 
it sufficient explanation simply to name an activity. For 
example, 'running energy' might serve as both an explanat-
ion and a description of the energy present before two 
people collide (E12). At the point of collision there 
might be 'colliding energy' and afterwards no energy at 
all since nothing is happening, or no one is 'doing' any-
thing. Functional Bnergy (F-E) summarises responses that 
contrast energy with something happening naturally. Conse-
quently, ice melting, or the wind blowing, might not have 
energy at all: they are natural. In this sense energy is 
a deliberate, purposeful contrivance. 
As mentioned before, it is the negation of energy 
that often makes it possible to distinguish between various 
responses as evidence for frameworks. So when a student 
answers of the sledge (E9) that it has no energy because 
'it has no engine', this is used as an indication of a 
Functional framework. O-E, on the other hand, relates to 
descriptions of events which are energetic and so 'melting' 
'blowing' or 'sledging' would all be energy. 
hE and F-E both revolve around human purposes. A-E 
considers humans as deposits of energy whilst F-E treats 
energy as designed for human use. It is a distinction well 
illustrated in extract 90 below. 
5.20 
Extract 90 
/J3 is talking about the person eating a meal, card E7/ 
J. • •• we need energy anyway to do what we want to do ••• 
we've got energy in us so we can walk and eat and 
all that ..• 'cos if we didn't we couldn't do the 
things that we want to ••• could we? 
I. I'm not sure ••• what are you saying? do we need 
energy to eat or do we need to eat to get energy? 
J. well i~s different at different times ••• at some 
times there's energy in us to do things we want and 
everything and other times you need more energy to 
move things and so you go and eat ••• 
(J3,3E) 
Here the phrase 'different at different times' marks 
limits to J3's conceptions.It is a clear indication of a 
change from one bounded set of meanings to another (or others) • 
Such phrases are the clearest kind of contraindication for 
a single conception and points to plural, different, con-
ceptions ('ah ••• but its different here', etcetera). To 
reinforce this point a second extract is included to illus-
trate a similar distinction between F-E and A-E. 
Extract 91 
/J2 has been discussing power stations and has moved on to 
consider differences between the energy there and the 'human' 
energy he has previously been elaborating/ 
I. well what's the difference then? 
J. • • •• 1 ike energy... (3)... alright.. you can go on 
for a certain time and the energy there lin a power 
station/ can go on for a long time ••••• the average 
person's not all that fit •••• their ~ strength is 
going to wear out sometime or other ••• and a plant 
is going to die sometime but the power station is 
going to carryon and on because people ~ it to 
have in their houses and that 
(J2,3E) 
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The other three frameworks are operative ones: they 
are weighted towards 'what happens' questions (Figure 23). 
Figure 23 
Ingredient Energy relies on some input or initiating 
action for it to be noted: Produced Energy is generated and 
then released, 'let off' or is 'given off' as a side effect 
of the action: Transfer Energy 'flows' from system to 
system. Energy would seem to be 'produced' typically in 
the battery circuit (E2), the chemical reaction (ES) and 
the meal (E7), although in a number of other situations too. 
These cards (particularly the electrical circuit E2) evoke 
the I-E and the T-E frameworks too. The distinction lies 
in both the forms of discussion and again, in the negation 
of energy. In the following extract T is talking about 
the 'meal' card (E7) and fastens first on instigating the 
energy (I-E) and then on transferring it from place to 
place (T-E). 
Extract 92 
J. • •• yes there is energy there ••• its to do with the 
food ••• 
Io what about the food? 
Jo well it gives you the energy and sort of goes round ••• 
its the vitamins I think 
Io has it any energy now ••• on the plate? 
5.22 
J. oh no •.. you have to eat it and then when the food is 
inside you it starts to give you energy ..• when you 
get it in your blood ••• 
I. what do you mean by 'it goes round'? 
J. well when you've got some but it's sort of leaking 
out 
I. why do you say that? 
J. because it might be cold and your energy is going 
into the air or into the ground through your feet 
I. what if the weather's nice? 
J. well its still going ••• when you do things its push-
ing out of you into other things ••• 
(J2,3E) 
The negation of energy in the food on the plate is again 
a useful indicator - in this case of an ingredient frame-
work. As one youngster remarked, if the food had energy on 
the plate it could move about on its own. Similarly, if 
the ice cube (E8) had energy it could melt itself. Ingred-
ient energy allows for situations where something is about 
to happen - when something else acts as a catalyst. There-
fore it is often in a situation which is a non-example 
'but •••• ' 
These are not the exclusive features of each of the 
energy frameworks. Each one, and not just the Ingredient 
framework, can lead to some element of prediction and con-
tingency. What happens to 'running energy' (O-E) for 
example, when people cease to run (card E12)? Unlike the 
example of Transfer Fnergy above, where energy might 'go in-
to' some other place, typical Ostensive responses invoke 
some other energies such as 'colliding energy' or 'sitting 
energy'. On the other hand, Depository Energy is 'used up'; 
5.23 
human energy is replaced; and ~roduced Energy (P-E) is 
simply 'released'. In this sense, the eventual outcome 
of the energy is also used as a guide to the framework 
that can be evidenced from the responses. 
2. The Force Frameworks 
In summary the force frameworks are: 
Affective A-F 
Configurative C-F 
Designated D-F 
Encounter E-F 
Impact I-F 
Motive M-F 
Operator O-F 
Substantial S-F 
Figure 24 
There are a number of parallels between the energy 
and force frameworks and whilst these are discussed later, 
one particular similarity is drawn on here. As in the 
energy frameworks there is streng tendency for students 
to respond in animistic terms. In some senses this 'source' 
of animation in the framework A-F is a subset of D-F. 
Both are locative frameworks, the latter being a 'source 
of force' generally, the former an animistic or human orien-
tated one. Both frameworks are elicited from a wide range 
of cards as shown in the table in figure 26. Moreover, 
the range of popular cards is fairly similAr across the 
three age groups: force is located in certain parts of 
5.24 
such situations. 
Figure 25 
As before, typical responses might be within a frame-
work either because the instance is, or is not, an example 
of the interviewee's conception. For example, in one of 
the two occasions that the rocket (F2) was seen as a non-
example of force it was because 'rockets do not need people 
in them to fly'. On other occasions, students have said 
that rockets do have force because they have people in them. 
There is a distinction between the two frameworks and 
this can be illustrated by the extract 93 below. R is 
debating as to whether a book on the table (Fll) has any 
force or not: whether the book is a 'source of force'. 
Extract 93 
R. it could have force especially if it's a heavy book •• 
but no •• I wouldn't say there is any force there either 
/having discussed other cards/ ••• there's only pressure 
on the table from the book ••• but no forces at all 
I. pressure 
R. yes ••• for forces its got to have someone to move 
·something 
(R,4F) 
Configurative (C-F), Impact (I-F) and Motive (M-F) 
frameworks are descriptive (figure2ro. C-F refers to that 
family of responses where position or some configuration of 
aspects of the situation are fastened on. They are often 
5.25 
TIMES 
NAME NO. USED YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
STONE 1 43 AF (7) MF (1) AF (5) MF (4) AF (5) MF (1) 
CF (2) OF (4) CF (3) OF (1) CF (2) OF (2) 
OF (6) SF (2) flF (7),: SF (2) OF (4) SF (1) 
EF (9) EF (10) EF (11) 
ROCKET 2 43 AF (4) MF (5) AF (5) MF (2) AF (3) MF (4) 
OF (11) OF (3) CF (1) OF (2) CF (2) OF (4) 
EF (3) SF (2) OF (5) SF (3) OF (3) SF (4) 
IF (1) Noneg (1) EF (6) Noneg (1) EF (12) 
TOLD 3 43 AF (11) OF (6) AF (6) AF (7) OF (6) 
OF (2) SF (2) SF (5) EF (10) 
EF (5) Noneg (9) OF (5) Noneg (9) MF (3) Noneg (13) 
OlVER 4 42 AF (8) IF (4) AF (7) IF (3) AF (6) IF (3) 
CF (3) OF (5) CF (4) MF (6) OF (5) MF (8) 
OF (11) OF (6) OF (2) OF (8) OF (2) 
EF (5) Noneg (1) EF (5) EF (10) 
TREE 5 43 AF (9) IF (2) AF (6) IF (3) AF (11) IF (2) 
CF (5) MF (3) CF (5) MF (4) CF (9) MF (2) 
OF (12) OF (8) OF (9) OF (2) OF (10) OF (4) 
EF (2) SF (2) EF (7) SF (3) EF (14) 
THINKER 6 43 AF (6) IF (1) AF (7) EF (1) AF (6) EF (7) 
CF (1) OF (1) EF (1) CF (2) SF (3) 
OF (1) SF ll) DF (1) Noneg (8) OF (2) Noneg (8) 
EF (1) 
SLEDGE 7 39 AF (11) IF (5) AF (4) IF (4) AF (3) MF (8) 
CF (~) MI-' (8) CF (4) MF (10) CF (6) 
OF (12) OF (2) DF (3) SF (1) OF (4) MF (10) 
EF (5) Noneg (2) EF (5) EF (10) 
5.26 Continued •.• 
TIMES 
NAME NO. YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
GOLFER 8 41 AF (7) MF (11) AF (2) MF (12) AF (5) IF (2) 
uF (11) OF (6) OF (6) OF (2) OF (4) MF (10) 
IF (6) IF (4) EF (10) 
GREEN 9 35 AF \5) MF (6) AF (3) IF (7) AF (2) IF (3) 
OF (3) OF (6) CF (2) MF (9) OF (5) MF (8) 
EF (4) None.g (1) OF (3) Noneg (1) EF (10) 
IF (4) 
ROBBER 10 38 AF (10) OF (2) AF (3) MF (2) AF (4) OF (2) 
010' (1) OF (3) OF (2) ®F (4) 
IF (1) Noneg (8) CF (3) Noneg (11) IF (3) Noneg (12) 
IF (1) 
BOOK 11 40 AF (2) Clo' (3) AF (4) EF (2) A1o' (2) EF (5) 
CF (9) OF (3) CF (7) OF (2) CF (5) MF (3) 
OF (4) Noneg (4) OF (4) Noneg (3) OF (1) Noneg (2) 
BALLOON 12 37 AF (9) MF (2) AF (6) MF (1) AF (5) MF (1) 
010' (4) OF (4) CF (4) SF (1) CF (5) OF (2) 
OF (10) OF (11) OF (9) SF (6) 
EF (4) Noneg (2) EF (4) Noneg (1) EF (5) 
ASTRONAUT 13 41 AF (5) IF (1) AF (5) MF (4) AF (4) IF (2) 
CF (8) OF (2) OF (5) OF (1) CF (4) MF (4) 
OF (4) OF (6) SF (1) OF (1) 
EF (6) Noneg (10) EF (6) Noneg (5) E1o' (9) Noneg (6) 
MOON '4 33 AF (9) IF (2) AF (5) MF (1) OF (3) 
CF (6) OF (5) OF (3) OF (2) EF (2) 
OF (8) SF (2) EF (2) SF (4) IF (3) 
EF (2) Noneg (3) IF (2) Noneg (1). MF (2) 
TORCHES 15 28 AF (2) OF (5) CF (1) AF (1) IF (2) 
CF (3) SF (3) OF (3) CF (2) MF (1) 
OF (9) Noneg (5) OF (1) SF (1) 
EF (2) Noneg (2) EF (4) Noneg (3) 
5.27 continued ••. 
NAME NO. TIMES YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
USED 
WATER 16 12 SF (1) AF (2) CF (4) 
Noneg (2) CF (2) DF (1)· 
DF (l) EF (1) 
Figure d5 
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FRAMEWORK YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 
A-F STONE Fl GOLFER Fa STONE Fl GREEN F9 STONE Fl GREEN F9 
ROCKET F2 GREEN F9 ROCKET F2 ROBBER FlO ROCKET F2 ROBBER FlO 
TOLD F3 ROBBER FlO TOLD F3 BOOK Fll TOLD F3 BOOK FII 
DIVER F4 BALLOON F12 DIVER F4 BALLOON F12 DIVER F4 BALLOON FI2 
TREE F5 ~STRONAUT F13 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 
THINKER F6 MOON F14 THINKER F6 MOON F14 THINKER F6 
SLEDGE F7 SLEDGE F7 SLEDGE F7 
GOLFER Fa GOLFER F8 
C-F DIVER F4 BALLOON F12 STONE Fl GREEN F9 DIVER F4 BALLOON F12 
TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 ROCKET F2 BOOK Fll TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 
SLEDGE F7 MOON F14 DIVER F4 BALLOON F12 THINKER F6 TORCHES F15 
BOOK Fll TORCHES F15 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 SLEDGE F7 WATER FI6 
SLEDGE F7 BOOK Fll 
D-F STONE Fl GREEN F9 STONE Fl ROBBER FlO STONE Fl GOLFER Fa 
ROCKET F2 BOOK Fll ROCKET F2 BOOK Fll ROCKET F2 GREEN F9 
DIVER F4 BALLOON F12 DIVER F4 BALLOON F12 DIVER F4 BALLOON FI2 
TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 
SLEDGE F7 MOON F14 SLEDGE F7 MOON F14 THINKER F6 MOON F14 
GOLFER Fa TORCHES F1S GOLFER Fa TORCHES F15 SLEDGE F7 TORCHES F15 
GREEN F9 
E-F STONE Fl GREEN F9 STONE Fl GREEN F9 STONE Fl GREEN F9 
ROCKET F2 BOOK Fll ROCKET F2 ROBBER FlO ROCKET F2 ROBBER FlO 
TOLD F3 BALLOON F12 TOLD F3 BOOK Fll TOLD F3 BOOK Fll 
DIVER F4 ASTRONAUT F13 DIVER F4 BALLOON F12 DIVER F4 BALLOON FI2 
SLEDGE F7 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT FI3 
SLEDGE F7 THINKER F6 MOON F14 
SLEDGE F7 TORCHES F15 
GOLFER 
CONTINUED ••• 
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FRAMEWORK YEAR 3 YEAR 4 Year 5 
I-F DIVER F4 MOON Fl4 DIVER F4 GREEN F9 DIVER F4 ROBBER FlO 
SLEDGE F7 TREE F5 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT F13 
GOLFER F8 SLEDGE F7 GOLFER F8 MOON FI4 
GREEN F9 GOLFER F8 GREEN F9 TORCHES FI5 
M-F ROCKET F2 GREEN F9 STONE FI GOLFER F8 ROCKET F2 GOLFER F8 
TREE F5 ROCKET F2 GREEN F9 TOLD F3 GREEN F9 
SLEDGE F7 DIVER F4 ROBBER FlO TREE F5 BOOK FII 
GOLFER F8 TREE F5 ASTRONAUT Fl3 DIVER F4 ASTRONAUT F13 
SLEDGE F7 SLEDGE F7 MOON FI4 
O-F STONE FI ROBBER FlO ROCKET F2 GOLFER F8 STONE FI TREE F5 
ROCKET F2 BOOK FII TOLD F3 ROBBER FlO ROCKET F2 ROBBER FlO 
TOLD F3 BALLOON Fl2 DIVER F4 BOOK FII TOLD F3 BALLOON FI2 
DIVER F4 ASTRONAUT F13 TREE F5 DIVER F4 
TREE F5 MOON Fl4 
GOLFER F8 TORCHES F15 
GREEN F9 
S-F MOON Fl4 STONE Fl MOON Fl4 ROCKET F2 
TORCHES Fl5 ROCKET F2 THINKER F6 
WATER F16 TREE F5 BALLOON FI2 
SLEDGE F7 
--
Figure 27 
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statLc features that form part of the argument. For 
example, an object at height is said to have 'more force' 
than 'one at a lower level - at the bottom of a slope, for 
example (F7). The book on the table (Fll) has force that 
it would not have on the floor. The interesting card for 
this framework is the one of the astronaut in space (Fl3). 
It is frequently seen as a nonexample (in about half of 
the interviews in which it was used) and the C-F framework 
is evidenced from both points of view. The astronaut is 
seen to have force in order 'to stay still where he is'; 
'there must be some force to keep him up there', and so 
on. Conversely there is no force because he 'is just float-
ing'~ '~here is nothing holding him there'; 'th~re is nothing 
hOlding him down', etcetera. The astronaut's local position 
is sometimes at issue, too. When asked 'what will happen 
next' some responses were that he would orientate to a 
vertical position with respect to the sides of the picture 
card. That is, his feet would 'sink downwards' to the 
bottom of the picture rather than remain in the 'horizontal' 
position depicted. 
This search fur 'bindin~' forces ta restrain 
objects, or forces by virtue of a stable 'position', contrasts 
with the other two frameworks I-F and M-F. 
Figure 28 
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Impact Forces (I-F) are collision forces, 'hitting' 
forces. Thus a faster moving body has 'more force' than 
a slow or stationary one. Whilst it is unlike the Motive 
framework (M-F) - which is associated with any movement, 
collision or no - they are clearly linked. In some cases 
M-F, as the more general framework, subsumes I-F. These 
can be seen in figure 27 in that whilst many of the cards 
are common to both frameworks, M-F is represented in rather 
more than I-F. The two do not entirely overlap and some 
distinctions can be noted: 
Extract 94 
/N is considering the size of forces present in the golfer 
picture (Fa) compared with the golfball landing on the green 
(F9)/ 
N. well its got more there fat the gOlfer/ 'cos it's 
just been hit 
I. I see 
N. well not there fat the golfclub/ but here~h where 
it gets off fue ground /she indicates a point before 
the position of the ball in the picture/ 
I. what ••• sort of between the ground and where it is now? 
N. yes sort of thing .•• where its moving 
I. and what about this one where it bounces? /the other 
card/ 
N. no force in ••• not really in that one no ••• not really 
force ••• it just bounces 
(N,4F) 
This kind of argument favours a distinction between M-F 
and I-F - again by negating force in the second aspect of 
the situation. In other cases it is not the M-F but the 
I-F framework that is indicated: 
5.32 
Extract 95 
IT considers the balloon card (F12)/ 
T. ••• there's no force anywhere ••• well there is a 
Sli,ht force because the balloon is still pulling 
he the person/ stops it you see •.• because he's 
bigger than it 
I. • •• what if he actually lets go? 
but 
T. it goes up out of sight because its lighter than air 
I. does that mean a force? 
T. no unless it comes into contact with something and 
bumps into it and that will be a force 
(T,4F) 
In some cases the difference between the two is one 
of magnitude - the 'force of impact' often being greater 
than the 'force of movement.' 
E-F and O-F frameworks are operative ones; as suggested 
in figure 29. 
Figure 29 
Encounter FOrces (E-F) are combinations of features 
described as forces and which indicate how situations occur. 
Hence 'pressure', 'power', 'strength', 'energy', 'speed' 
and so on are described, and included, as forces in order 
to account for changes. There are many occasions when such 
terms are used when they are differentiated ~ forces; 
R's extract 93 about pressure is a good example of this. 
In E-F they are used ~ forces, and this tendency is common 
- as indicated by the wide range of instances from which 
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it can be evidenced. Operative Forces O-F are discussed 
as a form of transmitted 'action', as a means of accounting 
for a chain of events - somewhat like a shock wave. One 
distinction between the two is whether responses depict 
some notion of sequence. E-F summarises those 'forces' 
which influence events simultaneously~ O-F where they are 
in succession, S-F is a scalar framework. The table in 
figure 27 is misleading in the way it might give the 
impression that S-F occurs only infrequently: it is the 
kind of response that occurs 'between the cards'. Like 
the word 'power', force is not something that comes in 
small doses. The societal meaning of force ('force of 
personality'~ 'by dint of brute force'~ 'by sheer force' 
etc) makes it inimical with something small and gentle. 
Force is therefore not often perceived in the context of 
feathers, babies, 'floating' balloons (FI2) or drops of 
water (F16): more so with large stones (Fl) and space 
rockets (F2). The dialogue at the end of the presentation 
of each card often revolves around comparisons between it 
and previous ones. It is during these points that addit-
ional, comparative, comments are made that are evidence 
for S-F. 
3. The Heat Frameworks 
To recap the heat frameworks, they are listed as 
follows in figure 30. 
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Conspicuous C-H 
Dynamic D-l1 
Motile M-H 
Normal N-H 
Product P-H 
Regional R-H 
Standard S-H 
Figure 30 
The tables of the frameworks for the various cards, 
and the cards associated most with each of the frameworks 
are shown in figures 31 and 32. 
Two of the frameworks have a strong locational weight-
ing, conspicuous (C-H) and Regional (R-H), figure 33. For 
the first, heat is located at, or nearby, very hot objects. 
Figure 33 
In this sense C-H is a 'scalar' framework also; heat is to 
do with hot and not just~) bodies. Regional heat is 
local heat, and as such allows for 'warm' (as opposed to 
hot). It is an area of suffused heat rather than a cons-
picuously hot Lody. It is static and remains local - it 
simply reduces in intensity as it cools. In the next 
extract D1 makes a distinction between the two in relation 
to a flower in a pot (H7). 
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TIMES 
NAME NO. USED YEAR 3 YEl~R 4 YEAR 6 
ILL 1 29 NH (9) CH (3) NH (10) CH (2) PH (2) 
PH (1) DH (1) PH (2) MH (2) RH (3) 
RH (3) MH (2) RH (5) NH (8) 
REACTION 2 25 CH (4) PH (2) CH (2) NH (3) CH (3) NH (2) 
MH (2) DH (1) PH (4) DH (1) PH (7) 
RH (2) Noneg (2) MH (2) Ncneg (4) MH (4) 
PIES 3 26 CH (1) CH (7) DH (2) 
MH (4) MH (7) MH (6) 
RH (4) RH (5) RH (5) 
ARGUMENT 4 30 bH (1) RH (3) CH (1) NH (4) DH (4) 
MH (1) DH (4) PH (4) NH (7) 
NH (5) Noneg (2) MH (3) Noneg (7) PH (1) Noneg (2) 
IRON BAR 5 22 MH (2) CH (2) NH (4) CH (2) NH (5) 
NH (2) DH (3) RH (5) DH (3) RH (4) 
RH (2) MH (7) SH (1) MH (9) SH (1) 
ICE 6 30 CH (4) CH (6) PH (2) CH (3) PH (1) 
RH (4) DH (5) RH (3) DH (3) RH (6) 
Noneg (2) MH (2) SH (7) MH (4) SH (5) 
NH (2) Noneg (4) NH (2) Noneg (1) 
FLOWER 7 27 CH (5) CH (5) PH (2) CH (2) PH (2) 
MH (1) MH (1) RH (2) MH (1) RH (2) 
NH (5) Noneg (7) NH (7) Noneg (4) NH (3) Noneg (8) 
Continued ••• 
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TIMES 
NAME NO. USED YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
PEPPER 8 26 NH (2) CH (3) RH (2) CH (1) PH (1) 
PH (2) Noneg (7) NH (5) MH (1) SH (1) 
PH (3) Noneg (7) NH (3) Noneg (8) 
HOUSE 9 22 CH (5) CH (5) RH (6) CH (6) RH (4) 
NH (2) MH (5) MH (4) 
RH (1) NH (5) Noneg (1) NH (2) Noneg (1) 
DUSTBIN 10 14 NH (3) DH (2) RH (1) MH (2) 
RH (3) MH (1) NH (1) 
SH (1) Noneg (2) NH (5) RH (2) 
CLIFF 11 22 DH (2) DH (3) CH (1) RH (2) 
MH (2) NH (3) DH (1) PH (1) 
NH (3) Noneg (8) PH (3) Noneg (5) MH (2) 
NH (1) Noneg (3) 
CAKE MIX 12 17 CH (1) DH (2) PH (3) CH (1) RH (4) 
DH (2) NH (1) DH (4) 
RH (4) Noneg (3) RH (3) Noneg (1) PH (7) Noneg (1) 
ASTRONAUT 13 20 CH (2) CH (2) CH (2) NH (4) CH (5) PH (1) 
DH (1) NH (3) DH (2) PH (2) MH (3) RH (1) 
PH (1) Noneg (1) MH (1) RH (3) NH (5) SH (1) 
Noneg (2) Noneg (3) 
Continued ••• 
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NAME NO. TIMES YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
USED 
FRIDGE 14 11 CH (1) RH (3) DH (1) MH (1) 
MH (1) SH (3) MH (2) NH (1) 
NH (1) Noneg (2) RH (2) Noneg (2) RH (1) 
RUNNER 15 11 DH (4) DH (3) PH (2) 
NH (6) MH (1) 
RH (7) NH (2) 
CUP 16 7 MH (4) CH (1) 
RH (6) DH (1) 
----- -- ----- ------
- - ~-----
Figure 31 
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FRAMEWORK YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
C-H REACTION H2 ASTRONAUT H13 ILL HI FLOWER H7 ILL HI FLOHER H7 
ICE H6 REA.C'T'ION H2 PEPPER He REACTION H2 HOUSE H9 
FLOWER H7 PIES H3 HOUSE H9 IRONBAR H5 A.STRONAUT H13 
HOUSE H9 IRONBAR HS ASTRONAUT H13 IC.E:. H6 
ICE 116 
D-H CLIFF Hll ARGUMENT H4 CLIFF Hll PIES H3 CAKEMIX H12 
RUNNER HIS IRONBAR H5 CAKEMIX H12 ARGUMENT H4 
ICE H6 ASTRONAUT H12 IRONBAR HS 
DUS'l'BI~ HIO RUNNER HIS ICE H6 
M-H REACTION H2 CU 1- HI6 ILL HI IRONBAR HS ILL HI FLOWER H7 
PIES H3 REACTION H2 ICE H6 REACTION H2 HOUSE H9 
IRONBAR HS PIES H3 HOUSE H9 PIES H3 DUSTBIN HIO 
CLIFF HII ARGUM~NT H4 FRIDGE HII IRON BAR HS CLIFF Hll 
ICE H6 ASTRONAUT H13 
N-H ILL HI HOUSE H9 ILL HI PEPPER H3 ILL HI ICE H6 
ARGUMENT H4 DUSTBIN HIO REACTION HI HOUSE H9 REACTION H2 PEPPER H8 
IRONBAR HS CLIFF Hll ARG.UMENT H4 DUSTBIN HIO ARGUMENT H4 HOUSE H9 
FLOWER H7 ASTRONAUT H13 IRONBAR HS CLIFF Hll IRONBAR HS ASTRONAUT H13 
PEPPER H8 RUNNER HIS lCE H6 ASTRONAUT H13 
FLOWER H7 RUNNER HIS 
P-H REACTION H2 ILL HI PEPPER He ILL HI 
PEPPER He RE.l1.CT10N 02 CLIFF Hil REACTION 02 
ARGUMENT H4 CAKEMTX H12 FLOWER H7 
ICE H6 ASTRONAUT H13 CAKEMIX H12 
FLOWER H7 RUNNER HIS 
5.39 continued ••• 
FRAMEWORK YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
-
-R-H ILL Hl DUS'fBIN HlO ILL Hl PEPPER H8 ILL Hl HOUSE H9 
REACTION H2 CAKEMIX Hl2 PIES H3 HOUSE H9 PIES li3 DUSTBIN HIO 
PIES H3 ASTRONAUT Hl3 IRONBAR H5 CAKEMI}( Hl2 IRONBAR HS CLIFF Hll 
ARGUMENT H4 FRIDGE Hl4 ICE H6 ASTRONAUT HI3 ICE H6 CAKEMIX H12 
IRONBAR H5 RUNNER HIS FLOWER H7 FRIDGE HI4 FLOWER H7 
ICE H6 CUP Hl6 
S-H DUSTBIN HIO IRONBAR H5 IRONBAR H5 
FRIDGE Hl4 ICE H6 ICE H6 
FLOWER H 7 
PEPPER H8 
Figure 32 
5.40 
Extract 96 
D. 
I. 
D. 
I. 
D. 
well there's no heat here at all ••• 
no heat 
no I don't think so ••. nothing that's hot ••• 
I don't think you're supposed to put flowers in 
heat are you? •• 'cos my mum always used to 
leave it on the window shelf or something ••• 
if they've got a lot of heat they don't usually 
grow they'd die 
why on the window shelf? 
well I suppose they have to be warm you know 
• •• warm in themselves ••• around them ••• but 
not next to any hot thing 
(D1,3H) 
However, these two are not the only scalar 
heat frameworks. In that they signal a scale of hotness 
then Normal Heat (N-H) and Standard Heat (S-H) are also 
scalar (figure 34). For these frameworks, heat is not so 
much located in (or nearby to) objects, rather these frame-
works typify responses where reference is made to some 
norm. For a student to refer to something's (or someone's) 
'normal heat' is a common occurrence in the interviews. 
Some indication of this is given by the wide variety of 
cards that elicit this kind of response as shown in figure 
32. 
Figure 34 
For S-H, the norm is melting ice. Not surprisingly it 
• 
occurs most commonly in those situations where ice is 
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depicted in the situation, for example in the melting ice 
(H6), fur-coat-and-dustbin (HIO) and the open fridge (H14). 
However, it is not exclusive to these cards and appears 
in responses to the iron bar (HS) and flower (H7) cards 
amongst others. 
Both N-H and S-H can also be seen as descriptive 
frameworks as descriptions of heat in terms of a hotness/ 
coldness dimension alld di~fer only in their norm. In both 
cases, cold 'cancels out' bQt to produce 'normal' or 'nought' 
in either case. From a Normal Heat framework, ice would 
have no heat - it would be decidedly cOld. From an S-H 
framework it would simply be zero heat. In this e~tract 
S is struggling to make a distinction between the two. 
Extract 97 
Imelting ice, H61 
S. yes ••• it's changing i~s melting 
I. how is that happening? 
S. it'~ being forced to ••. the water's not wanting to 
be heated or cooled •• but if it is •• it will go 
through a change because of the heat 
1. and is it similar to any of the others? II refers 
to other cards that have been discussed/ 
S. yes some ••• it depends on the materials ••• (6) ••• 
umh 1 don't know ••• some materials have different 
boiling points. melting pOints so they might be 
frozen at normal heat 
I. what are you thinking of? 
S. I'm not sure ••• I just know that there are •• well 
other things with high melting points ••• which is 
just another way of measuring heat ••• I can't remember 
if it /heat/ starts at ice or at a melting pOint ••• 
I can't remember which ••• 
(S,6H) 
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Leaving aside the anthropomorphism of ice not 'wanting' 
to be heated (but being 'forced' to) S is unsure as to 
quite where heat 'starts' and what melting points mean. 
Dynamic Heat (D-H) is also weighted towards discrip-
tion (figure 35) in that the movement or activity involved 
describes the action of heat. Heat produces motion - a 
description often in terms of molecules and particles. 
One subset of this is discussed in the next chapter and 
(as has already been mentioned) is called the 'hot molecule 
model' - a variation on the kinetic theory of matter. D-H 
is more general than one specific model and concerns other 
kinds of heat-action responses too. It encompasses people 
arguing (H4), projected stones (Hll), cake mixers (H12), 
people running (H15) and so on. 
Figure 35 
Figure 36 
Both ~otile (M-H) and Product (P-H) describe the 
operation of heat. Motile lleat is a fluid-like flow that 
is reminiscent of 'caloric' arguments about the spread and 
diffusion of heat. Product Heat is a by-product of other 
activities - or as one youngster called it, a 'side-effect' 
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of doing something. Motile can be contrasted with Regional 
Reat in that the latter remains stationary in, or around 
an object. The following extract (already used as extract 
68) is an example of this distinction being made: 
Extract 98 IC is discussing the ironbar picture, H5/ 
I. what happens to the heat at this end Ithe tap-water 
end/ of the bar? 
C. well when the cold water reaches the heated bar it 
cools it down 
I. and what happens to the heat? 
C. well the heat ••• it isn't actually ••• I don't think 
the heat moves ••• it just moves the particles /of the 
barf but then when water comes onto the particles it 
just cools them down ••• so its not a moving thing 
itself like water ••• if you pour that it flows along 
I. not like water 
C. well I don't know •••• I don't know its not a moving 
thing its sort of just saturated into the material 
(C,6H) 
C had previously described the heat as movin9 the particles 
along the bar and vibrating them, which is part of the 'hot 
molecule model' already mentioned and is taken as evidence 
for a Dynamic Framework. That is, it produces movement 
without itself moving: it just 'saturates' the bar and when 
affected by the tap-water merely reduces in intensity and 
'cools down'. Motile heat, on the other hand, is evidenced 
from other accounts as flowing or radiating out, being 
'given off', by various bodies like hot pies (H3), the iron-
bar (H5) and so on. 
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4. The Light Framewor~ 
A list of the light frameworks is as follows: 
Ambient A-L 
Composite C-L 
Decoupled D-L 
Illuminative I-L 
Modal M-L 
Obvious O-L 
Projected P-L 
Figure 37 
As before, the tables that follow in figures 39 and 
40 show the most popular frameworks that can be evidenced 
from the interviews for each card, and the cards that corr-
espond most to each of the frameworks. Two of the frameworks 
are biased towards a sense of location. Ambient (A-L) and 
Decoupled (D-L). 
Figure 38 
A-L is concerned with the responses that invoke 
'normal' light or 'natural' light as being something that 
is around in the daytime and by which we see. It is.not 
necessarily associated with sunlight,a term which is often 
reserved for direct light from a visible sun. 'No, not 
sunlight, I mean the ordinary light in the room now' is 
tho sort of phrase that distinguishes between A-L and O-L 
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TIMES 
NAME NO USED YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
MIRROR 1 24 DL (8) AL (5) IL (3) AL (2) IL (5) 
IL (1) CL (1) PL (2) CL (1) PL (4) 
DL (1) DL (9) ML (2) OL (1) 
PL (2) Noneg (4) OL (3) 
Noneg (1) 
PROJECTOR 2 21 IL (1) DL (7) PL (10) CL (1) OL (1) 
DL (1) IL (3) DL (1) PL (7) 
PL (7) OL (6) IL (1) 
T.V. 3 25 AL (1) OL (1) AL (1) IL (3) AL (2) IL (1) 
DL (2) PL (5) CL (2) PL (5) CL (1) PL (3) 
ML .(3) Noneg (1) DL (9) ML (4) DL (1) ML (1) 
OL (3) OL (3) 
Noneg (2) 
RAINBOW 4 27 AL (2) ML (1) AL {2) IL (1) AL (1) IL (1) 
CL (4) OL (1) CL (8) ML (2) CL (7) OL (1) 
DL (2) PL (1) DL (1) OL (3) DL (1) PL (2) 
Noneg (1) PL (4) 
PAINTING 5 24 CL (1) PL (3) AL (2) IL (5) AL (4) IL (1) 
DL (4) CL (1) ML (3) CL (2) ML (2) 
IL (3) Noneg (1) DL (6) OL (2) DL (1) OL (1) 
Noneg (5) PL (4) 
CANDLE 6 24 AL (2) PL (2) AL (1) IL (2) CL (1) OL (3) 
ML (3) CL (1) ML (3) IL (1) PL (3) 
OL (5) DL (1) OL (6) ML (3) 
PL (4) 
continued ••• 
S~4t5 
TIMES 
NAME NO. USED YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
X-RAYS 7 23 IL (2) PL (2) AL (1) XL (2) CL (1) 
ML (2) CL (2) ML (5) ML (1) 
OL (2) DL (2) OL (4) PL (5) 
PL (5) Noneg (1) 
Noneg (1) 
SUNBATHING 8 21 AL (1) PL (5) AL (1) ML (4) CL (4) OL (1) 
IL (2) CL (7) OL (5) IL (1) PL (1) 
OL (2) IL (1) PL (1) ML (1) 
Noneg_ -<I) 
LENS 9 . 23 CL (1) OL (1) AL (1) IL (5) IL (1) 
DL (3) PL (5) CL (2) OL (1) OL (2) 
IL (1) DL (7) PL (5) PL (4) 
Noneg (1) 
BATTERY 10 22 CL (1) ML (6) IL (2) PL (3) ML (4) 
DL (1) OL (1) ML (6) OL (1) 
IL (1) PL (4) OL (4) Noneg (1) 
Noneg (1) 
FLOWER 11 15 OL (3) AL (1) OL (3) OL (1) 
PL (3) CL (1) PL (1) 
IL (2) 
SHIRTS 12 13 IL (2) AL (1) IL (1) 
ML (2) CL (1) ML (2) 
OL (4) Noneg (1) DL (1) OL (3) 
PL (1) Noneg (1}i 
STARS 13 11 AL (1) PL (5) AL (1) PL (1) 
DL (1) DL (1) 
OL (4) OL (2) 
-~~---- -~----
Figure 39 
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FRAMEWORK YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 6 
A-L RAINBOW L4 MIRROR Ll TV L3 
RAINBOW L4 FJiINTING LS 
C-L RAINBo\-: L4 ItAINBOW L4 RAINBOW L4 
SUNBATHING L8 
D-L RAINBO\'1 L4 MIRROR Ll 
PAINTING L5 PROJECTOR L2 
LENS L9 TV L3 
PAINTING L5 
I-L PAINTING L5 MIRROR Ll LENS L9 MIRROR Ll 
X RAYS L7 PROJECTOR L2 FLOWER Lll 
TV L3 
PAINTING L5 
M-L TV L3 TV L3 BATTERY L10 PAINTING LS 
CANDLE L6 CANDLE L6 CANDLE L6 
X RAYS L7 X RAYS L7 BATTERY L10 
BATTERY L10 SUNBATHING L8 
O-L CANDLE L6 STARS L13 MIRROR Ll STARS L13 TV L3 
X RAYS L7 TV L3 SUNBATHING L8 CANDLE L6 
FLOWER Lll RAINBOW L4 LENS L9 LENS L9 
SHIRTS L12 CANDLE L6 BATTERY L10 
X RAYS L7 SHIRTS Lll 
P-L PROJECTOR L2 LENS L9 PROJECTOR L2 X RAY L7 MIRROR Ll CANDLE L6 
TV L3 BATTERY L10 TV L3 LENS L9 PROJECTOR L2 X RAYS L7 
PAINTING L5 FLOWER Lll RAINBOW L4 BATTERY L10 TV L3 LENS L9 
CANDLE L6 X RAYS L7 CANDLE L6 PAINTING LS 
SUNBATHING L8 STARS L13 
Figure 40 
5. 48 
(where the sun is the obvious source). Although the 
term 'when it gets light' might refer to the period after 
dawn, it is often taken to refer to a normal, more custom-
ary state of affairs. Similarly, having hidden in a dark 
cupbuard, a yo~ster might come out 'into the light' - an 
unspecified source, the normal circumstances. 
In some ways the Decoupled framework (D-U is 
an extension of this. Being able to see something is not 
taken as meaning that light is being reflected off it into 
an observer's eye. Or, put another way, the notion of a 
'picture', seeing an image of something, is not always 
attributed in cause to light. Certainly light might be 
reflected off a picture as one might see an overhead light 
reflected off the surface of a glossy photograph. However, 
that light is not the cause of the picture j the detail of 
the photograph being seen. This is a distinction,then, 
between direct sources of light (O-L) and the light one 
needs to be able to see something (D-L). Not surprisingly 
this kind of response occurs for those cards where some . 
viewing is mvolved - mirror ~~, projector ~~, painting ~~ 
and the television set ~~. The example extract gives an 
indication of this where a television is concerned. A 
television set is not seen as a direct source of light, but 
as something to be seen or watched. Moreover, this can be 
done in the ~: 
Extract 99 
I. 
J 
do you think a television has anything Ito do 
with light/ then? 
•••• hum ••• no ••• other than ••• 
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I. other than what? 
J. do you want the honest truth (laughs) 
I. yes please tell me the honest truth (both laugh) 
J. you'll laugh ••• my mother always watches the tele-
vision in the dark and the and the only thing I can 
say is that there doesn't have to be light there lin 
the picturel ----
I. why does shlthe motherl do that? 
J. I don't know ••• she says she finds it a better atmos-
phere to watch it and she says things about too much 
light being bad for your eyes ••• especially when you're 
concentrating ••• 
(J2,3L) 
O-L has been indicated in figure 41 as a descriptive 
framework, along with the composite and ~l~dal frameworks. 
Figure 41 
In extract 100 below, T makes a case for an O-L frame-
work by saying labout the television card, L31 
Extract 100 
T. well you can see it in a dark room so it's probably 
••• no ••• it ~ be a light source in itself •.• it 
certainly doesn't have a separate light source just 
to reflect the light from it ••• hmrnmm ••• I suppose 
that's the point isn't it •••• everything's either a 
reflector or a light producer and so that I the tele-
vision setl is a light producer... ----
(T,6L) 
This is a useful example of two contrasting implicat-
ions being drawn from similar statements. The statement 
'you can watch television in the dark', is likely to be 
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taken as evidence for two different conceptions of light -
dependent upon the predispositions of the person involved. 
The O-L framework is common to a large selection of the 
interview cards, but particularly the candle (L6) and those 
where the sun was discussed (the sunbather L8; the flower 
L1l) • 
The distinction between a Composite and a Modal Frarne-
work is straightforward. The implicit (if not direct) 
question is whether there is one kind of light which is 
composed of componential subdivisions, or whether there 
are many different kinds of light. 
In the next extract R2 is discussing why the red 
painting (LS) should reflect red light. 
Extract 101 
R. the light is reflected from the painting into your 
eye ••• though i~s not reflected like the other one 
/the mirror, Ll/ 
I. how do you mean? 
R. it's not reflected in the same way because it doesn't 
give a perfect image ••• well you can actually see an 
image ••• but if someone was standing next to you in 
front of a red painting you wouldn't be able to see 
them in the painting 
I. so what do you mean by reflect? 
R. I'm trying to decide if it is a different kind of 
light that comes out or just a part of the light that's 
falling on to it •••••• well I think the light that 
goes into it /the paint/ is made of different colours 
but ••• when they're in the within the substance they 
are turned into red 
I. how does that happen? 
R. because I don't think it actually absorbs all the 
energy I mean it doesn't get hot or anything ••• so I 
think most of it is turned in~red light .•• 
(R2,6L) 
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This conflict is a recogniseable debate: is 'pure' 
light pure because it is a single elemental entity from 
many similar kinds or because it's purely constituted from 
its various parts? R2 seems to opt away from a composite 
view and, rather than have just one small part of the- light 
reflected, he argues for the substance turning all of it into a 
different (red) light. 
Although the notion that light 'splits up' into various 
colours in a prism (and a rainbow (L4» is used quite often, 
the C-L framework is not used as often as the M-L one. 
It is much more common for students to argue for different 
kinds of light in order to explain various effects like 
suntans, Xrays, photosynthesis, fluorescent lighting and 
so on. Artificial light must ee just that~ a synthetic 
(in its pejorative sense) manufactured light that is 
different from natural light, or daylight. A second extract 
makes this point. M is talking about the candle picture 
(L6) • 
Extract 102 
M. this is different •• because ••• I don't know why ••• 
I mean its sort of a natural source of energy ••• I 
mean its there •• you don't have to make it ••• well 
there /battery L10/ you have to make that light and 
you have to make this /projector L2/ •••• well there 
you need that sunlight /sunbathing L8/ but I mean 
all there you have to make the light •• sor t of 
artificial while there~ndle/ its all for natural 
•••• its like plastic is artificial and leather is 
sort of natural 
(M2,4L) 
The operative frameworks here are I-L and P-L (Illuminative 
and projected) and operate in the sense that they are 
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Figure 42 
indicative of responses that describe what happens to light, 
or what it does. A Projected Framework summarises very 
mechanical responses about light, how it hits, bends, strikes, 
and bounces off various objects. Illuminative light, on 
the other hand, summarises anthropocentric responses, a 
'light is for us to see ( ••• otherwise it wouldn't have 
been inventedt kind of argument. P-L is very popular, 
encouraged no doubt, by the mechanical metaphor of light 
that pervades commonday language. It can be evidenced from 
almost all of the cards that are used, in particular the 
projector one (L-2) (whence the name) where light is seen 
to be 'thrown' out to 'hit' the screen. In the following 
extract P makes a distinction between P-L and A-L when 
someone is sunbathing: 
Extract 103 
P. its the light ••• the light from the sun causing him 
to tan 
I. how does that happen? 
P. the light rays hit him and pass through his skin ••• 
right through ••• and hit his cells and knock out 
his colouring in his skin cells ••• I mean you can't 
get a tan in ordinary light because it doesn't hit 
you hard enough ••• its got to be the st~eaks of light 
coming from the sun and hitting your skin ••• 
(P,4L) 
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Having considered each of the concept areas in turn, 
the next section now considers relationships between the 
frameworks, across the concept boundaries. 
5.2: Inter-Framework Relationships 
Given a degree of coherence in the analyst's const-
ructions of the data, it is to be expected that there will 
be some similarities between the groups of frameworks already 
described. Four major similarities can be argued for and 
these are as follows. Firstly, there is a strong tendency 
to anthropocentrism in each of the concept areas. Two of 
the frameworks, in energy (A-E) and force (A-F) have an 
element of anthropomorphism built in as well, in that they 
are described as 'human orientated'. Leaving this aside 
for a moment, it can be seen that the Functional Energy 
(F-E) , Normal Heat (N-H), Decoupled Light (D-L) and Illum-
inative Light (I-L) frameworks all have some anthropocentric 
features. A-E and A-F summarise responses where human 
beings are seen as a prime source of energy and force and 
as will be described in the next section, there is often 
a close overlap within this set of meanings for the two 
words. In the interviews youngsters are being asked (and 
often ask of themselves) to account for the causes of 
occur.ences and events. Many such accounts are made in 
terms of human causation, even when it is not obvious that 
a human being is concerned in the immediate situation. 
When a person is present in the environment they frequently 
become the focus of the responses so that other features 
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are not commented upon. In this sense both of the words 
'force' and 'energy' are subsumed within another often 
used expression - poweE. It is humans that have the power 
(the inner force, the active energy) to accomplish tasks, 
for example: 
Extract 104 
I. if you had to describe it to someone what would you 
say force is? 
A. it is the power you have to do things 
(A,3F) 
Extract 105 
G2. energy is ••• i~s the power to do things 
(G2,6E) 
It is in this context that animistic responses are 
included in both of the A-E and A-F frameworks. Piaget 
(for example his 1929 work) devoted a considerable amount 
of time to describing animism and 'artificialism' in young 
children. He generally maintained that such tendencies are 
not apparent in (his description of) their later stages of 
development (after 11 years). More recent studies with 
adults (for example, Looft and Bartz (1969) and Brurnby 
(1981» however, have cast doubts on this. Whatever the 
case, in the energy and force interviews here,a large number 
of animistic responses have been recorded at each of the 
three age levels. For example, the tree-blowing-in-the-
wind card (F5) is often described as 'trying' to get back 
straight: of 'wanting' to straighten up, or 'fighting' 
against the wind. When asked to explain these expressions, 
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it is commonly along the lines that 'the tree has its own 
force that helps it to go straight when the wind stops', 
or 'it forces itself up' etcetera. 
Within this discussion of anthropocentrism, two other 
frameworks are similar: Functional Energy (F-E) and Illum-
inative Light (I-L). In both cases the entity is seen as 
having been designed for the benefit of human beings. It 
is not that we merely avail ourselves of a natural resource, 
but that we contrive it as a commodity for our own purposes. 
Light (or energy) is for us to see by (or to make things 
work for us). The other pair of frameworks is Normal Heat 
(N-H) and Decoupled Light (D-L). Both use human beings as 
a reference pOint, although in different ways. In the first, 
body temperature is the reference by which judgements of 
heat are made in terms of 'hot' and 'cold'. The second 
is a more detached notion where light is conceptualised as 
a brightness (which is the condition for perceiving a 
scene) that is separate from the mechanism by which the 
scene reaches the person. 
The second area of similarity between frameworks is 
more of a linguistic nature - the use of the words energy, 
force, heat and light as nouns, verbs or adjectives. In 
every~ay language each of the concept labels can be (and 
often is) treated as a noun - can be nominalised. In 
taking on a real existence in this way the words become 
'entity denoting'. That is, when the word energy or heat 
is used in this way in an ordinary context it comnlits the 
user to the presupposition that it exists, that it is a 
particular kind of physical entity as such. This is what 
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Lyons (1981) refers to as 'existential presupposition'. 
One consequence is that it allows energy, force, heat and 
light to be located within things. This can be seen in 
the Deposited Energy (D-E) and Designated Force (D-F) 
frameworks which construe energy and force as sources of 
activity within objects. It allows for heat to be located 
at hot objects (C-H) , and light at obvious light sources 
(O-L) ~ all those frameworks that are locative in the way 
described earlier. As a noun, force is probably the most 
awkward - it is an unusual question that asks (for example) 
'does a book have force?' Interestingly, such a question 
is permissible in French where the term 'fort' has a wider 
meaning and includes the notion of 'strength'. This makes 
it difficult to ask compatible questions to those used by 
Piaget (1929) for instance, when he asked if som~thing like 
the wind has 'fort'. This difficulty of translation has 
been noted by others (Brown and Deforges (1979) for example) • 
In a different vein it is possible to use three of 
the concept labels as verbs - 'to force', 'to heat' and 
'to light'. [To energise' is possible rather than 'to energy' 
though it is much more common to treat energy as a noun and 
to 'give something energy'. This conceptualisation of the 
'doing' of the presence of the entity in the performance 
of an action, is apparent in the Ostensive energy (O-E) 
framework. 
A third area of similarity between the frameworks is 
the level of perception allied to each one. Both heat 
and light are 'pointatable', are direct sensations and are 
therefore 'obvious'. Conspicuous Heat (C-H) and Obvious Light (O-L 
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frameworks encapsulate this emphasis. SUbstantial force 
(S-F) has a similar (large and obvious) sense. In a number 
of ways this emphasis hinges on an allied distinction 
between the frameworks. Some can be seen as ways of desc-
ribing a single body or a focal object and attempting to 
account for its behaviour. Others can be seen as attempts 
to explain the same behaviour but in a slightly wider vein~ 
by reference to other aspects of the environment. The 
balloon card (F12) in the force interviews might serve as 
an example. In that instance, students might argue in 
terms of the forces inside the balloon (D-F), being given 
to the balloon (M-F) to make it move, or at the person 
(A-F). In contrast, they might discuss it in terms of the 
way the force operates and is transmitted through the per-
son's arm, the string, the air (O-F) , or by treating other 
features like pressure, energy, or 'floating' as forces 
(E-F) • 
A rough division between the frameworks along this 
line of focus, between an object and its interaction, is 
shown below as figure 43. 
ENERGY FORCE HEAT LIGHT 
OBJECT A-E A-F C-H C-L 
ORIENTATED D-E D-F N-H M-L 
S-F R-H O-L 
M-F 
INTERACTION F-E,P-E C-F D-H I-L 
ORIENTATED O-E I-F P-H D-L 
I-E E-F S-H A-L 
T-E O-F M-H P-L 
Figure 43 
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A final comment in this section concerns those 
frameworks on the bottom line of the table in figure 43: 
(T-E), (O-F), (M-H) and (P-L). In each case, the framework 
incorporates some suggestion of 'transmission' from place 
to place. Each one describes responses where something 
is seen as moving from one region to another - usually 
through some medium. Light is often depicted as being 
projected through air (as in cards L2 and F15) 1 energy 
through objects or from one object to another (boxes E11 
electric cables E21 and the digestive system E7) 1 force 
through various media (like trees F5; diving boards F4; and 
air F5) and heat along iron bars (H5) and dustbins (HlO). 
The next section considers some of the facets of the 
frameworks in greater detail. 
5.3: Overlaps in Meanings 
This section is best begun with an extracted quote. 
R is discussing the golfer card (Fa) in the middle of a 
force interview: 
Extract 106 
R. the person is using energy to move the ball ••• 
there isn't any energy really in the ball because 
••• there's nothing that makes::. how can I explain 
this 
I . wha t are you thinkin'g abou t? 
R. there isn't that inside it that will help it move 
•• that makes it move ••••• it hasn't got an engine 
inside it right? 
I. you have been talking about enerqy ••• what's the 
difference between force and energy? 
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R. the force you have to really move something has 
energy ... you have got to be healthy if its you 
that's got to move it ••• so you need your energy 
..• or when its to do with aeroplanes or something 
you need engines and chemicals in it .•• ~etrol •• 
like a car needs petrol ••• thats its source of energy 
(R,4F) 
There is evidence here for a number of frameworks. Firstly 
energy is associated with people - the person has energy 
to move the ball; one needs to be healthy to move things 
and energy is associated with health. This is evidence 
for an A-E framework. Secondly energy is also seen in 
terms of engines, aeroplanes and fuel for cars - evidence 
for a Functional (F-E) framework. Thirdly, a different 
notion, force needs energy (for things to be moved). Put 
another way, energy is needed to produce force. 
This section uses the frameworks to explore the 
overlaps between the concept labels in the interviews. 
This is made possible at two levels: 
1. Some cards are common to two or more of the IAI 
decks. These are listed balow in figure 43. 
Battery/Bulb Circuit E2 LI0 } Lens E6 L9 Energy/Light Stars E15 L13 
Reaction ES H2 } Energy/Heat Ice E8 H6 
Flower L4 EI4 H7 } Energy/Light/Heat Sledge E9 F7 Energy/Force Astronaut F13 H13 Force/Heat 
Figure 43 
2. Many of the cards evoke a wide range of responses. 
For example the 'torches' card (FIS) is obviously about 
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light in the context of a force interview; some of the 
discussion of the cakemix card (H12) is about the relation-
ship between frictional forces and heat. 
The overlaps to be detailed here are those that 
are indicated by the solid lines in figur~ 44. 
/<§R0~\ e r \ .. , ENERGY "- • GE;V ) ~~IG0.r' 
Figure 44 
The two dotted lines represent overlaps where, 
although th~re are discussions of the concepts in question, 
they are fewer and less extended than the other four. 
Here they are described where they do occur without so much 
detail. Before discussing the data, three more pOints need 
to be made. 
First, students often change their mind and/or 
give seemingly conflicting explanations during the course 
of a single interview. Where each response is sufficiently 
clear and detailed then they are used as evidence for the 
appropriate framework. Consequently one interviewee can 
generate more than one kind of overlap. 
Secondly, in presenting the data, one example extract 
will be used to illustrate the general area of overlap, 
rather than a large number of extracts for each subdivision. 
The first tables show the levels of response in each pair 
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of interviews; for example how many times force is discussed 
within energy interviews and vice versa. As an initial 
sorting process the responses have been categorised as 
being 
1. Separate and distinct - where no specific relation-
ship is perceived between the two; 
2. Synonymous - where force and energy, for example, 
are seen to be the same thing and are used interchangeably. 
3. Separate and related - where the two labels are 
treated as being clear and distinctive and yet some relat-
ionship is perceived between them. 
These sorting categories have been documented else-
where (Watts, 1983Q Watts and Gilbert, 1983). The age 
related trends in the data are left for discussion to the 
final part of this chapter. 
Thirdly, on numerous occasions, students make no 
mention of the other target concept during the interviews. 
These are recorded as a no-response (N/R) in the approp-
riate tables. It is an interesting question in itself that 
if a student does E21 mention energy during the course of 
a force interview, then what words/labels does (s)he use? 
One indication of this has already been given; students 
in this context frequently use terms like power, pressure, 
strength and so on. 
The overlaps are discussed in the order: 
A. Energy , • Force 
B. Energy +4----+. Heat 
c. Energy c , Light 
D. Heat +4----+. Light 
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E. 
F. 
Heat +4-------+' Force 
Light ~ • Force 
A. Energy+-+ Force Overlaps 
The data here derives from both of the sets of 
interviews of force and energy for the three age bands; 
34 energy; 43 force interviews, 77 in all. The data is 
combined and is discussed more in terms of frameworks rather 
than specific concept interviews. The figures are shown 
in the table in figure 45. 
ENERGY 
10 
14 
10 
34 
Figure 45 
FORCE 
15 
14 
14 
43 
TOTAL 
25 
28 
24 
77 
GROUPYEAR 
3 
4 
6 
To illustrate the complexities of responses in 
this overlap area between force and energy, an extract is 
taken from an energy interview with S in group 4E. She 
spends a considerable period of time during the interview 
framing a distinction between 'natural' energy and 'man-
made' energy. It is obviously a distinction she feels is 
important. It is one she draws between energy that occurs 
'naturally' (wind, clouds, the sun, stars) and energy that 
is nanufactured in power stations, turbines and so on. 
Natural energy occurs as a matter of course - quite natur-
ally', whilst manmade energy is quite deliberate and 
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contrived. She begins by discussing the sledge card (E9) 
which she decides is able to come down the hill on its 
own - 'automatically', because: 
Extract 107 
S. it~ just doing it ••• it hasn't got any thought behind it 
She continues by introducing an example of her own when 
someone shouts and produces an echo. This, she argues, is 
another example of natural energy: 
S. it just happens •••• I mean it~ nature it just happens 
••. we don't make it /the echo/ happen ••. we don't 
force it to happen 
In the conversation that follows the interviewer picks up 
the word force (this is the second time it has been mentioned 
in the interview) and asks 
I. you have mentioned force once or twice ••• what 
would you say the difference is between force and 
energy? 
S. • •• well it depends what sort of force. I mean •• 
there's when you aren't forcing something to do 
something ••• which is natural force .•• and then 
you've got force when youTe forcing something 
••• like cutting steak ••• (both laugh) 
I. I see ••• a tough steak 
S. yes ••• you're actually forcing that to be cut whereas 
the sledge is sort of natural force and the echoes 
.•• are natural force .• 
In this sense 5 seems to be using the terms force and energy 
synonymously. Her major distinction is not between force 
and energy but between natural and 'forced' occu~nces. 
In the discussion that follows she goes on to forge a further 
argument. Both natural force and energy occur without 
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premeditation (they just 'happen') whilst deliberate force 
and energy require some input or triggering agent to generate 
them. She discusses some hot water (E4) and says: 
s. it hasn't got that much energy because ••..• it 
wouldn't stay hot very long 
I. why's that? 
S. • ••• because that has got to be given energy to 
produce energy ••• that sort of forced energy 
I. how do you mean? 
S. like you've got natural force and that /the hot 
water/ is a pushing force sort of thing 
I. that's a pushing force? 
S. yes you force energy into it and then it produces 
steam ••• which we can use for energy again •.. so 
a sort of chain reaction 
I. I see 
S. yes we force force into it to produce force .•• to 
make force 
I umh 
S. and once the steam's used up ••• it just goes back 
to cold water again and it hasn't got much force 
in it •• 
(S,4E) 
This is a long and rather involved extract (later ones will 
be shorter) but it does serve to highlight the complexities 
of the responses. S is not confused or in doubt, she knows 
what she wants to say ••• she is a good example of a student 
who enters into the spirit of the interview and in the 
course of it engenders a platform for her own ideas. 
The last two parts of the extract suggest that 
whilst she is using force and energy interchangeably she 
actually has two separate meanings for the term force. To 
'force force' ~ water in order to make steam, points to 
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a notion of deliberately infusing the water with a potency 
so as to raise its temperature. There is evidence here for 
a range of frameworks: that natural energy is inherent 
within objects (D-E), that 'forced' energy is a man-made 
device (F-E) and that is generated when catalysed by some 
other activity (I-E). Moreover force/energy is something 
that can be transmitted from place to place (T-E; S-F) and 
undergoes changes. 
The tables in figure 47 are an expansion of 3E 
and 3F, 4E and 4F and 6E and 6F columns in the table in 
figure 46 
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N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
Figure 46 
3E (n=lO) 3F (n ==15) 
3 
2 
5 
1 
8 
4E(n=14) 
2 
3 
1 
12 
16 
10 
3 
2 
4 
9 
4F (n=14) 
2 
4 
2 
12 
18 
6E (n=10) 6F (n=14) 
4 
1 
1 
4 
6 
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1 
3 
6 
25 
34 
3E+3F(n=25) 
13 
5 
7 
5 
17 
4E+4F(n=28) 
4 
7 
3 
24 
34 
6E+6F(n=24) 
5 
4 
7 
29 
40 
CATEGORY 3E+3F INTERVIEWS (N=25) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 13 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 5 ENERGY: A-E(2): D-E(2): F-E(2); P-E(2); 
T-E (1) 
FORCE: A-F(2): C-F(2): D-F(2): M-F(1); 
O-F (1) 
SYNONYMOUS 7 O-E/M-F(2): O-E/I-F(1): O-E/D-F(l); 
T-E/C-F(1): D-E/D-F(1): D-E/A-F(l) 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 5 ENERGY 'PRODUCES' FORCE 2 
-
D-E~A-F: T-E~I-F; 
FORCE 'PRODUCES' ENERGY 1 
-
D-E~D-F 
OTHERS 2 - D-F~F-E; D-F~D-E 
CATEGORY 4E+4F INTERVIEWS (N=28) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 4 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 7 ENERGY: A-E(3): D-E(3); F-E(2); I-E(1); 
O-E (1); T-E (1) 
FORCE: A-F(3); C-F(1); D-F(3); E-F(2); 
M-F (1) 
SYNONYMOUS 3 I-F/O-E(2): D-E/M-F(1) 
SEPARATE AND RELATED ~~ ENERGY • PRODUCES' FORCE 9 { D-F~-E(2): D-E(1): O-E(1); M-F~P-E(1); T-E(2); I-F~T-E(1); P-E(1) 
FORCE 'PRODUCES' ENERGY 9 1 D-E+O-F(1): M-F(2): A-F(1); E-F(l); A-E+A-F(3); P-E+C-F(1): T-E~I-F(l) 
FORCE A TYPE OF ENERGY 5 
-
D-E~M-F(2); D-E~-F(2); D-E~D-F(l) 
OTHERS 2 
-
D-E~C-F(1); D-F~O-E(1) 
-. 
5.68 Continued ••• 
CATEGORY 6E+6F INTERVIEWS (N=24 ) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 5 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 4 ENERGY: A-E 
- FORCE: C-F 
SYNONYMOUS 7 D-F/D-E; D-F/O-E; O-E/D-F; A-F/D-E; 
O-E/M-F; C-F/D-E; E-F/O-E 
SEPARATE AND RELATED (29) ENERGY 'PRODUCES' FORCE - T-E~-F; A-E~M-F; O-E~I-F; T-E+A-F 
FORCE 'PRODUCES' ENERGY { M-F+D-E; C-F+T-E; D-F~-E(2); E-F~P-E; C-F+O-E(3); I-F.T-E; D-F+D-E; E-F~-E(4); 
O-F+O"E 
OTHERS t M-F+D-E(2); M-F+O-E(3); D-E~A-Fi D-E~ I-F(2); M-F+T-E 
- -
-- --- ---
Figure 47 
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In table 3E + 3F, thirteen students make no comment 
about the other concept in the interview and, as has already 
been suggested, make use instead of words like power, 
strength, push, pull, speed and so on. In the remaining 
twelve interviews in this third year group, force and energy 
are co-discussed some seventeen separate times. On five 
occasions they are separate and unrelated. The responses 
offered as explanations of this are evidence for a wide 
range of (ten) different frameworks. On seven occasions 
the two terms are used synonymously so that they are inter-
changeable between the pairs of frameworks indicated. 
These are along the lines 'well force and energy are the 
same ••• it's what's inside you to let you do things'. 
Where a relationship is delineated it is either 
in terms of energy being needed to produce or generate a 
force (for example in humans pushing (EI», or a force being 
required to produce energy (for example, a force in a 
battery being required to produce electrical energy (E2». 
In 'other' cases the relationship is unclear (for example, 
where the force and energy of a golfball (F8) both 'get 
weaker' as it goes upwards). 
Although the figures in the 4E -+ 4F table in 
figure 47 are different (with a considerable increase in 
responses, particularly in perceived relationships between 
force and energy) the shape of the table is the same, as 
is that for 6E + 6F. The 'others' group of relationships 
are ones often difficult to designate to particular frame-
works. In the majority of cases where students use 'energy' 
in a force interview (for example) they discuss it in 
5.70 
sufficient length to allow a reasonably clear notion of how 
they intend it to be used at that particular instance. 
Where 'one-liners' occur they are much more difficult to 
assess. Some examples are given below, all from the GE 
and GF table. 
Extract 108 
A. • •• force ••• that's what energy ~ 
(A, GE) 
Extract 109 
P. well ••• energy is proportional to force 
( P, 6F) 
Extract 110 
A3. • •• force is ••• the energy you need to do something 
(A3, GF) 
Extract III 
T. I think energy is the measure of force 
(T,6F) 
These rather clipped extracts indicate some of the 
levels of response. It needs to be said here, to be comm-
ented upon later, that (~ included in the 6E + GF table) 
of the seventy-seven interviews, two responses are what 
might be termed orthodox physics answers in terms of ~. 
These both occur in the Gth year group, GF. 
The overall impression of the three tables in figure 
47 is of the wide variety of frameworks that are evoked in 
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the joint consideration of force and energy. The most 
common rejoinder from a student is 'well in this case .•. ' 
or 'here it's different because ••• 
' 
The two terms are used 
generously and with differing levels of meaning and impli-
cation in order to account for features in the ;pictures. 
The most popular sequence in the 6th year group is where 
energy is treated ~ a force. It is described as a force 
in 'counterbalancing' other forces (like gravity or friction). 
In doing so it changes into other forms and I becomes I gravit-
ational potential force (or energy) or produces heat, and 
so on. This is ref lected in sequence E-F -+ T-E in the 6E 
-+ 6F table. 
B. Energy +-t Heat Overlaps 
There are 34 energy interviews and 29 heat ones 
making a total of 63 in this combination. They can be seen 
in terms of year groups in the table in figure 48, and in 
more detail in figure 49. 
ENERGY HEAT 'l'OTAL GROUP YEAR 
10 9 19 3 
14 11 25 4 
10 9 19 6 
34 29 63 
Figure 48 
The extract used to introduce this set of interviews 
is taken from a discussion with C2, from group 4H, where 
she is talking about human body heat and the blood's 
circulatory system (card HIS, the runner). 
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N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
Figure 49 
3E(n=lO) 
1 
4 
1 
13 
10 
4E(n=14) 
4 
6 
3 
27 
36 
6E (n=10) 
1 
4 
o 
23 
27 
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3H(n=9) 
6 
1 
o 
2 
3 
3E+3H(n=19) 
7 
5 
1 
15 
21 
4H(n=ll) 4E+4H(n=25) 
1 
3 
3 
24 
30 
6h(n=9) 
1 
5 
8 
24 
37 
5 
9 
6 
51 
66 
6E+6H(n=19) 
2 
9 
8 
47 
64 
Extract 112 
C. we have oxygen ... carbon dioxide .•• glucose or 
starch •. proteins and they're all made out of 
carbon and hydrogen and nitrogen and stuff 
I. aha 
C. and they use the oxygen .•• and they're oxydised 
and when you oxydise something it gives off heat 
and our circulatory system carries the heat round 
and if there's too much heat we get rid of it by 
sweating and give off the heat 
I. why would there be too much heat? 
C. well when we're running we take in too much oxygen 
and we're making too much energy and there's too 
much energy and there's too much heat and that 
means we sweat ••• we get hot and our veins go to the 
surface and we look red 
I. and energy ••• what's energy? 
c. umh •• i~s a type of force I suppose •• its like a 
fuel ••• when your face goes red and things like 
that i~s probably because you've used so much energy 
I. and what does it do? 
c. with the oxygen ••• you need red cells in you and 
they need energy ••• I would think they're using 
the energy to get round in your blood 
(C2,4H) 
This level of response is the norm in the interviews. 
The student is trying to make sense of aspects of physics 
lessons as well as parts of chemistry and biology. If, as 
she supposes, heat is produced as part of chemical reaction 
in the body then she must turn to what she knows of such 
reactions in order to structure her response. Energy is 
seen to be part of physics and so when the interviewer 
picks up on that word in her account she makes sense in 
her answer by organising her ideas in physics. The red 
blood cells are then described as using up the energy in 
the body in order to circulate within the blood. It is a theme 
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she returns to several times in the interview, when a person 
is standing in snow (in relation to the dustbin card HIO) 
and when they fall ill (HI). The energy is seen as related 
to the heat in the sense that it is required to mobilise 
the red blood cells in order that heat might be 'given off' 
through sweating. 
As previously for force and energy, the analysis is 
taken a step further by expanding the E . + H column of 
figure 50 so as to indicate the most popular frameworks 
involved. Again, as with force and energy, there is an 
increase with age-group of the numbers of responses where 
there is a perceived relationship between heat and energy. 
A number of interesting points can be made from the tables. 
First the number of responses where heat and energy are seen 
as separate and distinct (unrelate~ decreases after year 
three. Of the 25 responses in the year 3 interviews, 5 
suggest that the two are distinct - some 20%. In year 4 
this is 9 out of 66 responses (about 14\) and in year 6 
about 14%. Although it is not possible to make strong 
comparative statements from the small numbers involved, it 
is tempting to look for some indicators. One might expect 
the two concepts to be seen to be related more by the 6th 
year group, given their longer exposure to physics and 
their greater homogeneity of achievement in physics. This 
is not immediately bourne out, however, by any marked increase 
in the use of the aphor~.sm 'heat is a form of energy'. One 
particular distinction made between heat and energy is worth 
noting. It centres around the card depicting some hot water 
in a beaker (E4). The notion is that hot objects - or in 
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CATEGORY 3E+3H INTERVIEWS (N=19) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 7 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 5 ENERGY: A-E; O-E; D-E(2); F-E 
HEAT: N-H(2); C-H(3) 
SYNONYMOUS 1 C-H/D-E 
SEPARATE AND RELATED ~~ ENERGY 'PRODUCES' HEAT - 7 
-{ I-E~-H; F-E+R-H; D-E~-H;F-E.P-H HEAT 'PRODUCES' ENERGY - 3 A-E~N-H; D-E.N-H; P-E~R-H 
OTHERS 
- 5. - M-H~O-E; R-H~P-E; R-H~O-E (heat is a form of energy) 
- ---- -- - - --- - ---.----.-~--~-- - - - - - -- - --- - -----.--------~-~---
CATEGORY 4E+4H INTERVIEWS (N=25 ) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 5 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 9 ENERGY: D-E(3); O-E(3); F-E(2) 
HEAT: R-H(3); C-H(3); P-H; M-H 
SYNONYMOUS 6 D-H/O-E(2); C-H/O-E; C-H/D-E; R-H/ 
D-E; P-H/P-E 
SEPARATE AND RELATED ~~ ENERGY 'PRODUCES' HEAT - 34 1 O-E~N-H(2); D-E~P-H(7); D-E~R-H (2); A-E~P-H(2); T-E~C-H(2); < O-E~P-H(6) • 
HEAT 'PRODUCES' ENERGY - 13 - C-H-D-E(2); D-H-O-E(2); D-H-D-E(3) 
OTHERS - 4 
(heat is a 'form'of energy) (only the most popular of all the 
combinations are shown) 
-- --------
~ ~-----.- - ---- - - ---- --- ----
Continued ••. 
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CATEGORY 6E+6H INTERVIEWS (N=19) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 2 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 9 ENERGY: O-E(4)i D-E(l)i A-E(2) 
HEAT: N-H(4), C-H(4); R-H 
SYNONYMOUS 8 R-H/P-Ei C-H/P-Ei G-H/I-Ei N-H/I-E; 
T-E/M-H 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 47 ENERGY 'PRODUCES' HEAT 35 { P-E~P-H(6); O-E~P-H(5)i T-E~P-H(3)i 
D-E~-H(4); D-E~P-H(5)i D-E~N-H(3) 
HEAT 'PRODUCES' ENERGY 5 t M-H+O-E(2) i R-H~-E(l); M-H.D-E(l); S-H+T-E (I) 
OTHERS 7 (only the most popular of all the 
(heat is a form of energy) combinations are shown) 
--
- --~-
- - - ----------
Figure 50 
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this case, a beaker of hot water - does not have any energy. 
That is, in that situation, energy and heat are separate, 
distinct and unrelated. The commonly presented reason is 
that the water has no energy within it to be able to do 
anything. This is represented in the tables as a distinction 
between conspicuously hot bodies (C-H) and internally activ-
ated ones (D-E). This distinction appears in table 3E+3H, 
and is the most popular in both tables 4E+4H and 6E+6H. 
Some extracts below, one from each year group, are intended 
to illustrate this distinction. 
Extract 113 
C. 
I. 
C. 
I. 
C. 
well water's got energy and that ••• when it keeps 
you alive ••• but that's /the picture/ not showing 
that ••• 
what do you think the picture's showing? 
well not the energy ••• that's just showing the 
heat of the water ••• I don't think it's really 
energy of water 
is there any connection between heat and energy? 
• •• heat •••• energy ••• well this /the water/ is 
heated but it isn't heat •••••• it's not really 
hot ••• the heater had the energy but this hasn't •• 
(C2,3E) 
Extract 114 
H. 
I . 
H. 
I. 
H. 
no 
no? 
I mean things have got energy or they haven't 
and that hasnt ••• 
why do you say that? 
well it can't do anything •• it can't make itself 
to go anywhere ••• it hasn't anything in it to move 
anything ••• it's just hot water ••• 
(H,4E) 
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Extract 115 
G. hrom ••• heat energy .•• heat energy I would have 
thought was when it gets really hot ••• -I mean 
okay that's hot ••• but if the water was boiling, 
then you would say there's a sort of energy there 
----but I wouldn't have thought that was really 
hot enough to be described as heat energy ••• if 
i~s boiling it's got some power to do something 
but not as it is now --
(G2,6E) 
In these three extracts the energy within the water 
ranges from being that which can keep us alive, to that 
which can make things go, and finally to some power that 
can do something. In each case it is contrasted with water 
that is static and simply hot (and, according to G2, not 
hot enough) . 
A second pOint to be drawn from the tables is the 
large number of responses that can be grouped under the 
heading 'energy produces heat'. Rather than seeing heat 
as one amongst a variety of 'forms' or 'kinds' of energy, 
heat is separate from energy (is~ an energy) but is 
produced by it. It occurs as a result of some energy being 
expended. This response is similar in both the macroscopic 
discussion (in terms of human bodies, car engines, blocks 
of ice or whatever) to the microscopic (in terms of molecules, 
atoms, particles or electrons). An element of this can be 
seen in CiS (C2,3E) extract 113 above. The water is heated 
by some source external to the beaker of water. It is the 
heater that has the energy in order to produce the heat 
which in itself is not energy. 
A later extract from the interview with G2 illust-
rates similar expectations of heat and energy at a microscopic 
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level. Whilst the initial focus to this part of the con-
versation is the block of ice (E8), G2 returns to the hot 
water card during the discussion. 
Extract 116 
G. it's interesting isn't it ••• I hadn't thought of 
it /the hot water/ like that lin terms of 'molecula~ 
activity/ ••• well I suppose the water molecules 
being the hot water must be moving •• so therefore 
.• they will have some sort of energy .•• I suppose 
as they're moving •• they must be getting hot •• which 
I suppose is because they are being heated (laughs) 
but that isn't real energy I wouldn't have said •• 
i~s not what you'd call actual real energy there •. 
At this point G is still maintaining a distinction and 
separation between the two although he now perceives some 
link (they must have 'some sort of energy'). He goes on 
to talk about electricity generated by steam driven turbines 
and then about nuclear reactors. 
I. and when you talk about nuclear fuel what do you 
mean? 
G. well its radio-active decay •• the way it works is 
you get the neutron emission from •• like uranium 
238 which cOllides with other uranium atoms and 
produces a lot of heat •• but basically the heat 
is produced when the atoms and that collide •. 
I. what do you mean when you say produced? 
G. when the neutrons collide they must sort of react 
together to give the reaction and part of that 
must come off as heat •• which goes to the water 
until it boils ••• it gives steam •.• steam drives 
the turbine and so on •• 
(G2,6E) 
By taking this longer look at G's conception of heat and 
energy, the intention is to i~lustrate and exemplify one 
of the many combinations of frameworks that are included 
in the tables. It wou~d clearly be an unduly lengthy 
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process to detail all of them. These extracts, though/do 
highlight the pOints to be made. The separation and dist-
inction between heat and energy, and in the latter part a 
perceived relationship between the two, is continued from 
the macroscopic into the microscopic level. This is seen, 
too, in the extract 112 from (C2,4H) which was used to int-
roduce this area of overlap. The energy a person needs is 
a 'kind of fuel' and this undergoes a mechanism ('oxydisa-
tion') which in turn 'gives off' heat. It is a by-product 
of the process, the energy being required (at the micro-
scopic level) in order to move red cells in the blood stream. 
From the extract 116 by G2, a subsiduary pOint can 
be made. Both the separation of heat and energy (as unrel-
ated) and the eventual relationship (of energy producing 
heat in the nuclear 'reaction') are both present within 
the same interview. The term 'produced' is still a vague 
mechanism (although perhaps not to G2) even when explained: 
heat is 'some part' of a collision that 'comes off' and 
which then 'goes' into water. Some aspects are reminiscent 
of the 'hot molecule model' already intimated and which is 
discussed further in the next chapter. 
C. Energy 4--t Light Overlaps 
In these interviews there are 28 light ones to be 
added to the 34 energy interviews, a total of 62 in all. 
This is shown in the table in figure 51 below. 
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ENERGY LIGHT TOTAL GROUP YEAR 
10 9 19 3 
14 11 25 4 
10 8 18 6 
34 28 62 
Figure 51 
The opening extract in this set of combined inter-
views is from Y in group 4L, who is relating energy to the 
production of light. He discusses this by considering the 
battery and bulb circuit (L10) although he then generates 
his own example in terms of a hypothetical chemical reaction. 
Extract 117 
Y. well ••• let~ say that you have a chemical reaction 
••. i~s the same kind of thing as what's happening 
inside the battery or something ••• i~s two things 
reacting together /he extends his arm as if holding 
an imaginary test tube between index finger and 
thumb/ .•• and producing energy ••• because its 
bubbling away quite happily there so it must be 
producing ~ kind of energy which is .••• moving 
it about 
I. and what has light got to do with energy? 
Y. there could be .•• if i~s something that produces 
light when it reacts with something else 
I. what are you thinking of? 
Y. well ••• if you put •• le~s see •• put lithium into 
water you should get it .• it starts to sort of it 
melts and then it bursts into light •• it burns to 
produce light 
(Y,4L) 
This extract represents an example of where some 
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relationship is expected between energy and light although 
it is not explored in depth and remains quite vague. Energy 
is suggested as being present in a test tube of bubbling 
chemicals (because they are bubbling and moving about) , 
and some chemical reactions are capable of generating light. 
This particular relationship is not expanded upon any 
further in the interview although he does argue at some 
pOints that light produces energy (inside the chloroplasts 
in leaves and in solar panels) • 
The summary tables for these interviews are shown 
in figure 52, and as in the previous cases, the more detailed 
breakdown of the E+F column is shown separately (figure 53). 
A similar trend is notable as in the previous ones~ there 
is a greater number of responses showing perception of some 
relationship between the two after year three. As before, 
there are "some points of interest to be drawn from the tables. 
To begin with, since so many cards in both decks would 
seem to be 'obvious' examples of light and energy, the 
incidence of no-responses needs to be examined. How is it 
possible to discuss the battery and bulb circuit (E2~LIO): 
the hand lens (E6~L9) ~ the flower (E14~Lll) or the stars 
(E15iL13) without some mention of light - if only to make 
some kind of distinction between it and energy? Three 
different reasons are apparent in the transcripts. 
Firstly, the students make no attempt at an explan-
ation and might offer variously that they simply do not 
know; they have not yet 'done' this in lessons yet; that 
this is biology and they no longer do biology; they have 
covered it in lessons but they no longer remember and so on. 
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N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
Figure 52 
3E (n=lO) 3L (n=9) 
o 
13 
o 
13 
26 
4E(n=14) 
2 
6 
0 
36 
42 
6 
o 
o 
4 
4 
4L (n=11) 
5 
0 
1 
15 
16 
6E(n=10) 6L(n=9) 
2 
7 
o 
17 
24 
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o 
o 
3 
22 
25 
3E+3L(n=19) 
6 
13 
o 
17 
30 
4E+4L(n=25) 
7 
6 
1 
51 
58 
6E+6L(n=19) 
2 
7 
3 
39 
49 
CATEGORY 3E+3L INTERVIEWS (N=19) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 6 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 13 ENERGY: F-E(3)i D-E(7) i P-E(2) i A-E(I) 
LIGHT: D-L(5) i A-L(I) i D-L(4); I-L(2); 
P-L (1) 
SYNONYMOUS 0 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 17 ENERGY 'P.RODUCES' LIGHT 12 t D-E~-L(3)i F-E~O-L(2); T-E~-L; D-E+C-L; 
F-E~M-L; D-E+I-Li T-E~P-Li T-E~I-L; I-E~ -L 
LIGHT PRODUCES ENERGY 4 
-
O-L~F-E; P-L~A-E; O-L~-E; I-L+D-E 
OTHERS (light is a form of 
energy) 1 
-_._----
-- - -
-
--- --- ------- - -- -- --- ---
CATEGORY 4E+4L INTERVIEWS (N =25) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 7 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 6 ENERGY: D-E(3) i F-E(2); T-E(l) 
LIGHT: P-L(2)i D-L(2); O-L; A-L 
SYNONYMOUS 1 I-L/F-E 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 51 ENERGY 'PRODUCES' LIGHT 35 f D-E+P-L(5); T-E~P-L(5); D-E+O-L(6); F-E~ 
O-L(2); T-E+P-L(2); P-E+P-L(3); F-E~-L(2) 
LIGHT 'PRODUCES' ENERGY 9 
-
O-L+P-E(5); P-L~D-E(2) 
OTHERS 7 
-
(only the most popular combinations are 
shown) 
----- -- --- - -- -
continued ••• 
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CATEGORY 6E+6H INTERVIEWS (N=19) FRAMEWORKS 
N/R 2 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 7 ENERGY: F-E(3); D-E(2); T-E; D-E 
LIGHT: D-L(2); P-L(2); I-L 
SYNONYMOUS 3 P-E/P-L(2); C-L/T-E 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 39 ENERGY 'IRODUCES LIGHT 24 t T-E~-L(3); T-E+P-L(3); D-E+P-L(4); T-E+O-L(2); D-E+M-L(3) 
LIGHT 'PRODUCES' ENERGY 9 t M-L+P-E(3); O-L~P-E(3); P-L~-E; P-L~A-E; O-L+D-E 
OTHERS 6 
-
(only the most popular are shown) 
---
~ 
- --~ -------- - - --- - --
Figure 53 
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Secondly, the conception has developed a partic-
ularly strong line so that the thrust of the argument does 
not encompass light (in an energy interview, say) and so 
it passes without comment. An example of this might be 
where a student has developed a strongly anthropocentric 
conception of energy and is judging each situation on 
whether the energy 'does anything for us'. In this context 
'stars' (E15) might be classified as a non-example on the 
basis that they 'serve no practical human purpose, so that 
their light is not even considered. In contrast, the hand 
lens would have energy because it 'lets us see things 
better' but again without light being mentioned as somehow 
necessarily involved. 
Thirdly, although one specific conception might 
not dominate the discussion, within the range that is 
offered none is brought to bear on the other concept. 
So, for example, even though a flower might be discussed in 
terms of energy, it would be energy from water, the soil, 
nutrients, its leaves and so on. Energy from the sun might 
be considered in terms of heat, or just as 'the sun's energy' 
but without light featuring in the response. The battery 
and bulb are sometimes spoken of as 'electrical energy', 
or the 'power' from the battery 'making the bulb work' 
etcetera. 
In terms of the year groups, the two 'no-responses' 
in the 6th year table (6E+6L) shown in figure 53 fall one 
each into these last two categories. One is a strong argu-
ment in favour of 'deposits of energy', the second a widely 
ranged set of explanations that feature no comment on light. 
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The first category of no-response - the 'I don't knows' -
is more common in the year groups 3 and 4. There, the 
spread is more often between these three kinds of no-
response category. 
The number of distinctions between light and energy 
is worth noting, too. It prompts the question that if 
light is not energy, then how is it described? A popular 
distinction - occuDing a number of times within each year 
group - is between energy seen as deposited within objects 
(like lumps of coal, or vitamins in food), and the happen-
stance of being an observer to a scene or view. That is, 
between a D-E and a D-L framework. In this case, the watch-
ing of other youngsters through a window as they walk past 
outside the room is not related to a specific light source. 
In the event, light is needed (so that they are not in the 
dark) but the onus is on the observer to look in that dir-
ection and 'see', rather than for light energy to be reflec-
ted into the observer's eye. 'Looking at' is an activity 
that does not involve any fuel or power source, there is 
no 'battery' to make us see, and SO 'energy deposits' and 
'watching an activity' are seen as separate and distinctly 
unrelated. An example extract helps to make the point: 
Extract 118 
lthe hand lens E6/ 
c. 
I. 
••• well energy was probably needed to make it •• 
you know to mould the glass and the plastic but 
I don't think it has any energy in itself ••• I 
mean it doesn't produce any ••• the piece of glass 
stays a piece of glass ••• the plastic stays a piece 
of plastic ••• there's no energy in it to come ~ 
of it 
you mentioned before that it might be a powerful 
lens 
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c, 
I. 
c. 
(laughs) ah yes but I didn't mean it that way 
how did you mean it? 
no •. the shape of the glass ••. the letters are 
always the same it's just the shape of the lens 
is magnifying them so we can see them better ... 
we just look through it and see them bigger .• it 
doesn't have energy there to do that ••• 
(C2,3E) 
Argued in this way, C's distinction seems reasonable and 
self contained: there is no 'obvious' power source to a lens 
(unlike, say, an electrically illuminated microscope) and 
the seeing of the magnified image is simply a property of 
the lens. Similar arguments occur in the 4th and 6th year 
interviews. 
Interestingly, light being synonymous with energy 
occurs in the older year groups, although (in comparison 
with synonymity between force and energy) quite infrequently. 
The P-E/P-L combination of frameworks shown in the tables 
can be illustrated from a 6L interview where photons are 
discussed: 
Extract 119 
/0 is discussing the candle (L6)/ 
O. 
I. 
O. 
light is eeing emitted by the candle but (laughs) 
what is a flame •••• I don't really know ••• burning 
material I suppose (laughs) 
(laughs) yes but what does that mean? 
hmmm ••• a good one ••• well light is made up of 
photons •• that can be described as elementary 
particles which •• okay •• are a unit of energy and 
•• since this material is ~eing destroyed or what-
ever ••• and then from E~c the energy is given 
out and that's the light ••• energy and light are 
the same thing ••• it's being produced in the flame 
and then given out into space ••• 
(O,6L) 
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In one sense this extract can be clearly earmarked 
as corning from a 6th year transcript about light. Express-
ions like 'emitted'; 'photons'; 'elementary particles'; 
2 
'units of energy'; 'E=mc ~ and so on are not commonly part 
of, say, a year three transcript (although there are one 
or two). However, the general organisation of such elements 
of explanation, the confabulation of the features being 
described that produces a coherent yet unorthodox conception 
is similar across all year groups. Moreover, the themes 
are still present - energy is produced (P-E) by a mechanism 
(the destruction of material) and projected - as photons -
out into space (P-L). 
As can be seen from the tables the relationships 
between light and energy are very varied and, given the 
flavour of the extracts used so far, can each be seen in 
its own right as cogent and coherent. Of these~ny relat-
ions hips one is ~lected here for comment. It occurs once 
in each of the year group interviews and is shown as P-L~ 
A-E. It does not appear in the table 4E+4L in figure 53, 
because it is not one of the most popular. However it does 
serve to highlight the diversity within the accounts being 
put forward. The relationship is one between a Projected 
Light framework (beams or rays of light being directed to 
hit objects to some effect) allied to an Anthropocentric 
Energy framework. It is an alliance, too, that is inCluded 
with others where light is considered to be producing energy. 
That is, human beings derive energy fer. themselves from 
incident light. In many school classrooms, such an unortho-
dox combination of arguments - in that unadorned style -
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might probably be greeted with frank disbelief, if not 
derision. In the more discursive and open atmosphere gener-
ated in the interviews they transpire as follows: 
Extract 120 
fsunbathing (L8)f 
c. ••• I don't know ••• you always feel better •• you 
know if you're suntanned •• you always feel well 
it just feels better ••• obviously if its ultra-
violet rays it could be sort of re-charging your 
body and doing something to your body cells ••• 
fa moment later/ 
••• I mean if you go somewhere really hot for a 
month ••• a month every year. then it'd keep you sort 
of in trim ••• I don't know •• its a difficult thing 
thinking about a suntan •• I mean you can't get a 
tan from an electric light •• but you can now buy 
sun ray lamps •• they're giving off 4ltra violet 
rays and that does brown you and make you feel 
more energetic •• 
(Cl,4L) 
Within the context of the interview, this particular 
discussion was sandwiched between CiS personal debate as to 
why white European people should ever get a suntan - on the 
basis that white objects reflect all light. 
The next three of the areas of overlap receive 
rather shorter and more cursory treatment than these other, 
more direct, overlaps. In designing the IAI cards, the 
exploration of the interrelationship between the concepts 
was envisaged with respect of the areas of overlap already 
discussed. With the introduction of each new target concept 
deck of cards the possible combinations multiply rapidly 
and so for pragmatic reasons the analysis of overlap is 
restricted. There are however, one or two interesting 
pOints to be drawn out of these remaining, minor, boundaries 
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between frameworks and so they are mentioned here briefly. 
D. Heat +--+ Light Overlap 
This discussion begins with an extract taken from 
an interview with Y (4L). He has been talking about light and 
energy when he introduces the notion of heat, in relation to 
the sunbathing card (La). Like C(4L), at the end of the 
last extract (Extract 120), Y is puzzled by the action of 
heat and light. 
Extract 121 
Y. • •. the person will absorb all the ••• well a white 
person will absorb all the light ••• but that's a 
funny thing because when you go out and sunbathe 
you should reflect the light but you don't you 
turn dark and then that absorbs the light not 
reflects it ••• and the brown is meant to protect 
you (laughs) 
I. yes .• how do you think it works? 
Y. I don't know •• perhaps if you want protection you 
should go shiny ••• tin-foil people (laughs) •• but 
perhaps its the heat that does it not the light 
I. and how would that work? 
Y umh ••• light is sort of different ••• I know light 
travels in waves •.. I don't think heat travels in 
waves. I think it sort of .• you can get rays 
which produce heat •• but heat is different, because 
its actually in things. 
I. can you tell me anymore about heat and light? 
Y. well light is little waves radiating and I think 
heat can get radiated if you put something cold on 
something hot ••• the sort of wiggling particles 
in the hot thing will start moving •• start exciting 
the ones in the cold thing 
I. and what does it do here? lin the sunbathing instance/ 
Y. well that's the little rays which come from the sun 
••• they must be sending things with them as well 
I suppose 
5.92 
I . 
Y. 
what sort of things? 
ultra violets .•. yes that's it •.. ultra violets •. 
(y,4L) 
There is much to comment on in an extract like 
this - which makes it so useful as an illustration. It is 
illustrative of a range of pOints and comments already 
made. The~e are elements in Y's explanation (which continues 
for much longer than this extract - or this study - permits) 
that are clearly recogniseable as features in school science: 
reflect; absorb; waves; radiating; wiggling particles; 
exciting; rays; ultra violet and so on, which are all terms 
to be found commonly in descriptions in lessons and school 
texts. They are synthesised here, however, to serve a 
different - personalised - purpose. In retrospect and with 
the benefit of hindsight it is more easy to see what Y's 
conflicts are. Having focused upon a dilemma concerning 
sunbathing he deci~es that heat is the agent responsible 
and not light. However he has a conception of heat that 
is local to objects (is ~ things) and is transmitted by 
wiggling particles when objects are in contact. He is 
aware here of another conflict~ how then is heat from the 
sun responsible for a suntan? He has a notion that rays 
can produce heat and eventually argues that light rays 
must then carry something - if not heat itself then some-
thing else. 
This particular synthesis of ideas may not have 
occurred to Y before and might have been instigated by 
his own personal questioning of phenomena in the context 
of the interview, along with the interviewer's questions. 
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It is an example of an interview where Y entered into the 
discussion wholeheartedly (the transcript runs to forty 
six pages of typescript in a way similar to that shown in 
appendix ill and quite often Y's contribution to anyone 
card is many pages long - with only minimal intervention 
by the interviewer. In the course of it he discusses his 
own ideas (like tin-fOil people); parts of science he says 
he 'knows', and those parts where he is puzzled by apparent 
contradictions. 
In this immediate context, concerning the overlap 
between heat and light, Y's description shows that they are 
separate yet related. The relationship is not well estab-
lished (beyond light acting as a carrier for heat), however 
they are not entirely independent. Whilst Y's description 
does not fall easily into evidence for anyone framework, 
there are some facets that give some indications. In that 
heat is local to objects it suqgests a Regional Heat (R-H) 
framework, whilst light is projected as a wave/ray (P-L). 
The analysis of both the heat and light interviews 
enumerated below in figure 54, is shown (as before) in the 
tables in figure 55. 
Figure 54 
HEAT 
9 
11 
9 
29 
LIGHT 
9 
11 
8 
28 
TOTAL 
18 
22 
17 
57 
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YEAR GROUP 
3 
4 
6 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
N/R 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
SYNONYMOUS 
SEPARATE AND RELATED 
NO. OF RESPONSES 
Figure 55 
3H(n=9) 
5 
3 
o 
1 
4 
4H (n=11) 
4 
6 
2 
2 
10 
6H(n=9) 
o 
7 
o 
4 
11 
5.$ 
3L(n=9) 
4 
8 
1 
7 
16 
4L(n=11) 
0 
6 
5 
20 
31 
6L{n=8) 
3 
o 
1 
10 
11 
3H+3L(n=18) 
9 
11 
1 
8 
20 
4H+4L(n=22) 
4 
12 
7 
22 
41 
6H+6L(n=17) 
3 
7 
1 
14 
22 
The overall pattern of responses is less even than 
has previously been the case and this in itself requires 
comment. There is a clear indication that the two decks 
are not even in that there is more discussion about the 
relatedness of heat and light within light interviews than 
in heat ones. This is certainly the case in the third and 
fourth year interviews. Here, two possible reasons are 
suggested for this. Firstly, the two decks ~ uneven in 
that the cards used for light favour a discussion of heat 
more than the heat cards do for light. It is to be remembered 
that the two decks were not designed to give equal facility 
to the other concept: they are ones that 'work' for their 
target concept. With this in mind, the light cards most 
likely to encourage talk of heat have been: 
Candle (L6) Battery Circuit (LIO) 
Sunbathing (La) 
Lens (L9) 
Flower (Lll) 
In addition, once heat has become a topic of debate 
in relation to these cards, the slide-projector (L2) and 
television set (L3) are also included (as 'warming up': 
'needs a fan cooler' and so on). In the heat deck the 
'light orientated' cards are mainly: 
Flower (H7) House (H9) 
Astronaut (H13) 
In some cases, reference is made to a relationship 
between colour (ie., Fed) and heat although this is left 
for separate comment. 
A second, allied, reason is that whereas heat and 
light are seen as related, like that of Y(4L) in the initial 
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extract, the relationship is often vague. The most often 
quoted aphorism is that 'where you've got light you've got 
heat, but where you've got heat you don't always get light'. 
There are some examples of this being overturned - one 
student talks about the 'cold light of day'; another of 
being able to see a street light but not being able to 
feel its heat. The majority, however associate heat with. 
very light objects, but not light with hot ones. 'You 
wouldn't expect boiling water to glow would you?' is one 
rationale. In this sense the two most widely used heat 
frameworks (N-H and R-H) militate against an easy union 
with the light frameworks. Heat is in and around things, 
it is what you feel and not what you see. Given this, it is 
to be expected that the sunbathing (L8) and lens (L9) cards 
provoked much discussion. 
An example of a distinction being made between 
the two is given in extract 122. Extracts 123 and 124 show 
an example of synonymity and of a relationship, in that 
order. 
Extract 122 
D. 
I. 
D. 
no they're /heat and light/ different 
what makes you say that? 
well this /battery card, L10/ does I suppose I 
mean if you had a car and you.put your headlights 
on your lights wo~t get any heat •••. your battery 
might. start getting heat up. and things like the 
plug and the fuse what gets hot really ••• like a 
battery if you keep on driving in a car sometimes 
you got to stop because of the heat and everything 
because it starts smoking ••• but that's not light 
(D,3H) 
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Extract 123 
lastronaut card, H13/ 
I. what about this one 
A. I think if he's out in space it would be cold really 
I. why do you say that? 
A. because space is lonely and cold .•. I don't actually 
know what its like (laughs) 
I. (laughs) uha 
A. i~s the darkness really •• I think of light as 
warm •• and associate darkness with cOld ••• I mean 
i~s never actually warm at night is it? 
(A,4H) 
Extract 124 
I. what I wanted to ask you then was what has heat 
got to do with light? 
P. they're both forms of energy. light and heat and 
energy can be intra •.• inter converted into the 
two forms •• and there is an equation relating the 
two together •. light and heat 
I. so when you talk here /the lens card L9/ about 
a principal focus •• what is being focussed? 
P. it's the light ••• you are actually focussing the 
light rays and when they intricate here you get 
destructive interference and they produce heat 
(P,6L) 
This last extract is a useful example of the inter-
viewer having the facility (in comparison to some other 
data collecting methods) of 'picking under the surface' 
of a response. That is, of being able to press for a further 
explanation after an initial response has been made. What 
some might consider as an adequate and acceptably 'scientific' 
explanation of heat and light being forms of energy, is just 
one facet of a more elaborate and less orthodox explanation. 
P argues that the heat produced at the focus of a lens is 
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caused by rays of light in destructive interference (allowing 
that this is encompassed in her use of intricate as a verb) . 
E. Heat~ Force Overlaps 
Of the seventy two. interviews shown in figure 56, 
very few made any comment about the juxtaposition of the 
concepts heat and force. Those that did can be grouped into 
two main categories of response: where forces (like friction) 
'produce' heat: and where heat is described as a force. 
Figure 56 
HEAT 
9 
11 
9 
29 
FORCE 
15 
14 
14 
43 
TOTAL 
24 
25 
23 
72 
YEAR GROUP 
3 
4 
6 
By far the greatest majority of responses fall into the 
first category where heat is treated as a by-product of 
some activity that involves forces and movement. Friction 
itself is not always treated as a force (sometimes as a 
kind of 'rubbing energy') and quite why such an activity 
should produce heat is not always clear (except that 'if you 
really rub your hands together it really gets warm'). An 
interesting example of this kind of argument is given in 
extract 125, whilst the following one (Extract 126) is an 
example of heat described as a force. 
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Extract 125 
/the stone thrown of a cliff card, Hll/ 
C. 
1. 
C. 
1. 
C. 
there's no heat ... except. if we're talking about 
friction or something like that •• I mean the stone 
falling through the air 
you mentioned friction before •• didn't you what 
has that got to do with it? 
oh .. as the stone is falling. its sort of making 
a hole in the air as its cutting through it •• and 
as its cutting through it i~s sort of going each 
side of the stone and its rubbing against it •• 
that's what makes things like the shuttle red 
what about the shuttle? 
the space shuttle .••• its going quite a bit faster 
(laughs) and les coming through the atmosphere •• 
coming from miles up in space and its got further 
to fall and i~s bigger /than the stone/ •• and more 
speed and it~ tearing through quicker and rubbing 
past quicker ••• cos if you strike a match along 
a box and strike slowly it won't work but if you 
go like that /he demonstrates a quick match-strik-
ing movement/ then it will .•• 
(C3,4H) 
This is interesting because of the analogies he uses in 
order to make his point about friction and yet still leave 
the action of rubbing (and the consequent production of 
heat) quite vague. It is interesting, too, how he draws 
on two other pieces, of information and experience, in 
order to structure his response. 
Extract 126 
I. 
C. 
what would you say heat is? 
• •• I suppose you could say •• if you light a candle 
and put your hand over it •• you feel pain in your 
hand and this is ex;erted by the candle's heat •• 
. t' 
•• ~ 5 an energy-force ••• 
(C,6H) 
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In some circumstances - for example, for the 
beaker of hot water (E4), or the iron bar (H5) - the heat 
is sometimes described as a force in that it 'forces' the 
mercury up a thermometer, or forces the iron bar to expand. 
In another example a student, talking about a very large 
bonfire, spoke about being 'hit by the force of the heat' 
as she walked nearby, and of the 'force' of the flames as 
the wood burnt 'fiercely'. 
F. Light f )Force Overlaps 
Even fewer responses make any link, distinct or 
otherwise, between light and force. In a sense this area 
of overlap is included partly for the sake of completeness 
and partly for the few interviews (out of 71; figure 57) 
where an overlap does occur. 
Figure 57 
HEAT 
~ 
11 
8 
28 
FORCE 
15 
14 
14 
43 
TOTAL 
24 
25 
22 
71 
YEAR GROUP 
3 
4 
6 
Commonly, such overlaps occur at the torches card 
(F1S). Although this card focu~s upon differences in force 
on the lit and unlit torch, this is clearly an invitation 
to discuss light in the context of force. As is the case 
with heat, already mentioned, some students talk about light 
having to force its way through air in order to project. 
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An example of this is given in extract 127. Only one student 
discusses light ~ a force, but does so in a manner so 
graphic as to merit inclusion (extract 128). In relation to 
the torches card, for example S2(6F) says: 
Extract 127 
S2. • •• well I don't know if there's any difference 
gravity is the same on both of them except 
this one /the lit onel will need force to get it 
through the air 
I. why do you say that? 
S. well it /the light/ is moving so there must be a 
force there somewhere and then it has to push its 
way through at the air molecules ..• 
(S2,6F) 
In this sense the light needs a force in order to 
be moving (M-F) and this acts to clear a path for 
it through the air. For T,light is perhaps even more 
tangible: 
Extract 128 
T. 
I. 
T. 
I . 
T. 
the force is really in' the batteries and the 
bulb 
is it the same as before ? IT had previously been 
arguing that forces are things that one can feel/ 
well if you put your hand over the light you could 
feel it. pushing forcing ••• (6) ••• well you could 
see the light forcing itself through your hand •• 
your fingers 
uha 
well i~s not like the force where you're pulling 
something its a force where its ••• umh •• how shall 
I say •• light in fact does move things if you have 
it •• strong enough •• i~s like putting your hand 
over it. it tries to get through 
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I . 
T. 
how do you mean? 
sometimes. say for instance you shake up a bottle 
of coke and put your finger over the top •• well 
that's a force upwards. so i~s the same sort of 
thing well sort of .• 
(T,3F) 
This section on the areas of overlap between the 
four main target concepts is rounded off here with a final 
quote. As with some of the previous ones, it. centres on 
a particular dilemma, or paradox that has occurred to the 
student. It is part of a light interview when R(6L) is 
talking about the rainbow card (L4). He describes the light 
as 'splitting up': 
Extract 129 
I. how does it do that? 
R. well the light has different wavelengths and as it 
goes through they're each slowed down different 
amounts. and bent different amounts by the changing 
•. as it goes from air into water •• and I think 
it's slowed down going into the water and it speeds 
up coming out again •• so when it comes out it's 
split 
I. how does it speed up when it comes out? 
R. I don't know. it really puzzled me and we did get 
into a massive great argument once lin class/ about 
where it gets the energy from •• where it gets the 
force to accelerate and speed up again 
I. and? 
R. (laughs) it was never explained to us .•• I don't 
think he /the teacher/ wants us to bring it up 
again ••. 
(R,6L) 
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5.4: The Incidence of Frameworks 
The purpose of this section is to review and 
recast some of the major pOints made in relation to the over-
all distribution of frameworks. Since this is not a straight-
forward and direct exercise, a number of other pOinters 
are used in order to discern trends and patterns in the use 
of frameworks. These trends are discussed in particular as 
they relate to the three age groups of the students inter-
viewed. It has already been said that the three age groups 
are very different in terms of their composition. The 
students in the year three age group are heterogeneous in 
terms of both their motivation towards matters physics, and 
their level of achievement. In contrast, the sixth year 
group is quite homogeneous (being mostly A level candidates 
in physics). Whilst the year four group lies somewhere in 
between. 
It needs to be said that, as a normative evaluation 
of the responses made, there is a clear trend towards 
'acceptable school science' with an increase in the age 
group. Given what has already been said this should not 
be suprising. It would be more suprising if there was no 
movement towards an inculcation and interpretation of 
orthodox school science with age, motivation, achievement 
- or simply with greater exposure to physics. However, 
this is not a normative study and is instead, more concerned 
with the incidence - and therefore the durability - of 
'sets' of ideas, in the three qroups. Given the greater 
maturity, fluency, scientific literacy and so on, with year 
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group, the question is one of how to document the changes 
and the spreads of frameworks that do occur. 
An initial feature is the designation of instances 
as non-examples. The design of the cards allows for clear 
non-examples (in the physics sense) clear examples and 
'borderline' cases. Figures 21, 27, 31 and 39 show how some 
of these fare. Given the composition of the year groups 
as described, the expectation might be that the clear non-
examples in each deck would increasingly be recognised as 
such (in comparison with an orthodox school response) and 
so grow in number with age. Moreover, the borderline cases 
might decline for the same reason. This can in fact be 
seen to be the case; in energy, the ghost (E3) increases as 
a non-example from 5 (year group 3) to 8 (year group 6). 
In the force deck 'told' (F3) and 'robber' (FlO) also show 
this increase. It is worth noting that if in eight of the 
6E interviews the ghost is treated as a non-example, this 
still leaves two students who treat it as an example. 
Similarly; thirteen out of the fourteen interviewees treated 
the 'told' card (F3) in the force interviews as a non-example, 
leaving one student who thinks it an example. Along the 
same lines two sixth year students see 'thinking' (F6) as 
involving force. It is less obvious (almost by definition) 
as to what constitutes' a borderline situati9n. There ~ cards 
which show a decline in being classified as non-examples.These arE 
energy: hot water (E4) ice (E8) 
sledge (E9) clock (Ell) 
force: book (Fll) balloon (F12) 
moon (F14) 
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light: 
heat: 
mirror (Ll) 
cliff (Hll) mixer (Hl2) 
However, it is difficult to argue that these in 
themselves illustrate a general inclination towards a greater 
appreciation of school science. The example of the ice 
cube-used as an illustration of categories of response in 
chapter 4 - indicates how the classification of a situation 
as a non-example can occur for a variety of unorthodox 
reasons. Interestingly, too, some of the 'borderline' cases 
remain fairly constant over the three age groups. These 
are: 
energy: lens (E6) 
snow (ElO) 
force: 
heat: 
astronaut (Fl3) 
flower (H7) 
meal (E7) 
smell (E13) 
torches (FlS) 
Again, the inclusion of the astronaut (for instance) 
as an example or a non-example of force is for a variety of 
reasons that do not suggest evidence for any overall pattern 
of changing frameworks. 
Along these same lines, it is interesting to note 
which are the cards in each set that are not considered 
as non-examples at all. That is, that might be seen as 
stereotypical examples of the concept (for any reason). 
These are: 
force: stone (Fl) 
golfer (Fa) 
heat: ill (Hl) 
iron bar (HS) 
energy: box (El) 
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tree (F5) 
'pies (H3) 
runner (Hll) 
battery (E2) 
light: 
reaction (E5) 
projector (L2) 
flower (Lll) 
candle (L6) 
Three of these cards have generally been (but not 
on all occasions) the first card to be responded to in 
the pack. They were chosen during the pilot study as 
'good examples' as an attempt to provide an easy entry into 
the task of the interview and to establish an early basis 
for discussion and questioning. What is suprising in this 
case is that the mirror card (Ll) should have been seen as 
a non-example, on five of the twenty-four times used. On 
each of these occasions it is rejected on the basis of a 
D-L framework: it is not an example of light but of 'seeing' 
an image on the mirror. 
The other cards all seem to fit the bill as stereo-
typical examples of energy, force, heat and light with the 
possible exception of the chemical reaction as an example 
of energy. There is perhaps a suggestion here of chemical 
reactions being stereotypical examples of matters 'scientific' 
and therefore of expecting energy to be involved somewhere. 
The most popular frameworks involved see energy as being 
generated at the point when the two chemicals mix (I-E), 
and of it being produced as a side effect of a rather 
longer and more drawn out process (P-E). 
A second major feature of the data shown in this 
chapter is that indicated in figures 46, 49,52 and 55: 
in the areas of overlap between concepts. There is generally 
a greater willingness, with age, to entertain the possibility 
of a wider web of concepts within a particular construction 
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and explanation. That is, to provide responses that construe 
relationships between the target concept and others. This 
is less so with the relationship between heat and light. 
This feature too, needs interpreting with some caution. 
It has already been pOinted out that, although the year 
three students did not tend to explanations of energy which 
overlap with force, they did use a variety of other express-
ions which have not been examined in detail. For example, 
the word power is one that pervades each of the concept 
areas and the year groups. Just as one may have a powerful 
burner or furnace (in terms of heat) so one might have 
powerful lights, a powerful force and the energy or power 
to do something. ~tronq is another such term. 
A third feature to note is the smaller amount of 
evidence for anthropomorphic/anthropocentric frameworks 
in the sixth year group. There is strong evidence there 
for anthropomorphism at all ages, and in force (A-F) the 
decline is not noticeable at all. However, a strong pOint 
to be developed in the next chapter is that there is consid-
erable variation within the year groups. It would seem 
quite often to be the case that anthropomorphism and anthro-
pocentrism is an individualised, personalised approach. 
A fourth feature is one that is possible to detect 
within frameworks. The frameworks themselves are useful 
as a way of epitomising similarities in responses. It is 
possible to notice some variations in these similarities 
with age. The analogy used before was that the framework 
is a 'family' of elements. For example, the Depository 
Framework (D-E) is evidenced extensively from each of the 
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three age groups and for a wide variety of situations. 
Previous extracts have noted the tendency to see energy 
as deposited inside certain substances. These substances 
are shown in the table below, in figure 59. 
D-E YEAR 3 
oxygen, water, food, 
soil, people, petrol, 
sleep, cars, fire, 
animals. 
Fiqure 59 
D-E YEAR 4 D-E YEAR 6 
turbines, chemicals,glucose, carbohy-
electricity, food, drates, proteins, 
light, people, vitamins, people, 
batteries, plants radioactivity, 
hills, atoms. elecbons,molecules, 
bonds. 
That is, the range of convenience of the framework might 
alter in order to encompass new instances whilst the focus 
of convenience remains the same. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6.0: Introduction to the chapter 
6.1: Colin's Interviews 
6.2: Cushla's Interviews 
6.3: Petina's Interviews 
6.4 Susie's Interviews 
6.5: Summary 
6.0: Introduction 
The forty or so extracts used in the last chapter 
are intended to serve a number of purposes. Central to 
these has been the mapping of the alternative frameworks 
in the four target areas, first by arguing for intra-concept 
differences, then for similarities across areas, and then 
finally, for overlaps between them. A subsidiary but 
increasingly important role for the extracts has been to 
emphasise the variety and diversity of the responses to 
the IAI cards. The frameworks, in representing a broad 
complex of responses, are a way of handling disparate 
conceptions of the situations in the IAI cards. They provide 
a common link so that the responses can be accounted for as 
analyseable wholes. Constructing frameworks is a process 
of synthesis that runs the risk of obscuring the spirit, 
breadth and forthrightness of the answers. It was pointed 
out at the end of the last chapter that the thrust of this 
study is not to focus on success or failure in physics 
per se, but on the interplay between individual and multiple 
accounts of the phenomena portrayed in the pictures. The 
frameworks are clearly an important interpretative basis 
by which to infer the boundaries of such multiple accounts. 
But they obviously do not suffice to explain all facets 
of the responses given. This chapter approaches some of 
those facets in more detail. 
The major part of the chapter is taken up with an 
examination of the conceptions of four students. Each one 
has been interviewed on all four of the concept areas -
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a total of sixteen interviews. One of the original intentions 
of the study - at the outset - was to have a much larger 
sample of students interviewed in this way. The purpose 
behind this was to explore the overlaps between concepts 
with the benefits of generaliseability of a large sample. 
However, for the reasons already outlined in chapter 2, 
this has not been possible and so use is made of the bene-
fits of detail and insight that can occur from a smaller 
sample. Although these four case studies lack generalise-
ability in a strong sense, if viewed within the context of 
the larger samples in chapter 5 some valuable general 
points can still be made. 
The four students (one male, three female) are Colin, 
cushla, Petina and Susie. They are identifiable as before, 
in terms of their initial, year group and concept inter-
view. For the sake of this chapter Colin and Cushla will 
be known as Co and Cu respectively. Some extracts have 
already been used from these transcripts and the four 
students have been identified (and appear in tables in 
appendix I~ as shown in figure 60. 
Co lin (Co): ( C 2 , 3 E): (C 1 , 4 F): (C 3 , 4 H) ; (C 1 , 4 L) . 
cushla (Cu): (C,4E); (C2,4F): (C2,4L): (C,6H) 
Petina (P): (P1, 4E); (P2, 4F); (P, 4L); (P, 6H) 
susie (S): (S4,4F); (S,4E); (S,4L); (S,6H) 
Figure 60 
The timetable of the interviews adds something to 
the biographical detail of the four students. This is 
illustrated in figure 61. Two of the students (Cu and P) 
were interviewed in the September shortly after having 
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moved into the 5th year. These are counted in the year 4 
group for the sake of this study. The three sixth year 
interviews were recorded in the period December/March of 
their first year of A-level work. This means that the 
longest span of time between anyone studenes first and 
last interview (for Cushla) was about thirty months. The 
longest time between any two interviews was for Susie (4L 
and 6H) - about sixteen months. The interviews closest in 
time are those of Colins', who underwent all four interviews 
within a period of about ten months. 
The first four parts of the chapter deal with each 
one of the students in turn - in the temporal order shown 
in figure 61. Thus Colin's are taken first, Susie's last. 
Colin's energy interview is one of the first interviews to 
have been conducted at the begining of the study. It is 
such a rich and varied discussion of energy that, although 
the decision to re-interview a sample of students had already 
been taken, this interview spurred that policy into action. 
Colin is willing - and able - to talk about his ideas and 
also ventures opinions on force, heat and light (along 
with power, weight, and so on). This makes him an ideal 
candidate for further interviews. 
During the interviews a number of features are sought 
and emphasised. These are as fOllows: 
a) evidence from these conceptions to illustrate partic-
ular frameworks: 
b) indications of the kinds of overlaps discussed in the 
last chapter. whilst these will be mostly for the target 
concepts, some other, persistent, concept-overlaps are 
noted too; 
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STUDENT 
COLIN (Co) 
(all boys school) 
CUSHLA (Cu) 
(all girls school) 
PETINA (P) 
(all girls school) 
SUSIE (S) 
(Co-Ed. school) 
Figure 61 
SCHOOL YEAR 3 SCHOOL YEAR 4 SCHOOL YEAR 5 A-LEVEL PHYSICS 
3E (General ~4F· (after entry 
science group) Ig (0 mixed o/cse 
physics group) 
4H 
L (becomes 
prospective 0-
level candidate) 
ti~ ~~F 
(after en~ry 4L (shortly 
o-level group) after entry 
5th year) 
~6H (after beginning 
to I ~-level physics 
GE (after entry 4L'(shortly ~6H (after beginning to o-level group) fter entry to I -A-level physics) ~F_ 5th year) 
GF (after entry to o/cse group) 4E ~L (becomes pros-
pective O-level 
candidate)~ 
6.4 
~6H (after beginning 
A-level physics 
c) the development of specific conceptions through the 
accounts - both within a single interview, and between the 
interviews with the same student; 
d) attempts by the student to confirm or substantiate 
an aspect of their conception. This can happen within the 
interview (in terms of logical contingency, other cards, 
force of argument etcetera), or 'outside' of it by recourse 
to personal experience, what they have been told and so on. 
These pOinters are considered during each of the student's 
four interviews. The final part of the chapter comments on 
all sixteen interviews, as a summary. 
6.1: Colin's Interviews 
a) The Energy Interview (C2,3E) 
The outline of Colin's responses in terms of frame-
works, overlaps, and supplementary comments, is shown in 
the table in figure 62. The arr.ows are a"h attempt 'to illust-
rate some of the many connections he makes during the course 
of the discussion. 
He begins by making a strong case for an anthropocentric 
framework: he conceptualises energy as being ~ the person 
pushing the box (El) up the hill, who needs energy in his 
legs because the hill 'makes it hard to push the box'. 
Colin suggests the person has energy whilst the box has 
force (because 'it has no energy in it'). The battery, in 
card E2, he says, !! energy, which then 'runs' through the 
wires. The bUlb needs the energy to 'get electrified'. 
The battery will 'run down' when the reaction (the 'bubbling' 
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IAI CARD 
Box (El) 
Battery (E2) 
Ghost (E3) 
Reaction (ES) 
Hot Water (E4) 
Meal (E7) 
Ice (E8) 
Sledge (E9) 
FRAMEWORKS 
A-E; D-E 
D-E; T-E 
A-E noneg 
D-E; I-E; O-E 
T-E; F-E 
D-E; F-E; A-E 
T-E; F-E; 
noneg 
A-E; F-E; 
noneg 
OVERLAPS 
distinction A-E and D-E; 
power; force 
synonymy between energy 
and electricity 
distinction F-E and R-H; 
force 
distinction between F-E and 
and D-E r man-made and 
natural energy 
. ! Contl.nues 
Distinction - force not 
energy 
6.6 
COMMENTARY 
The person has energy; the box has force 
but not energy 
The battery is energy; the bulb needs 
energy for the filament to 'get elecbified' 
People-energy to dig the grave 
Chemicals are energy, and react together 
to produce~. The bubbling and gas 
are also energy 
Gas or electric is energy; heat is energy 
but the water is not heat - it is heated. 
Heat forces the mercury up the thermometer. 
People need energy to eat, and food gives 
them energy. It's in glucose, vitamins, 
etc. It makes you feel lively and good . 
There must have been energy (natural or 
man-made) to make the ice, but no energy 
in it. ----
See Extract 3, force is downhill, energy 
is the person enjoying the ride and 
pushing it back up 
continued ••• 
IAI CARD 
Flower (14) 
Snow (10) 
Clock (11) 
Smell (13) 
Figure 62 
FRAMEWORKS 
T-E: D-E: A-E 
A-E: O-E: D-E 
D-Ei F-E 
noneg 
A-E: D-E 
noneg 
OVERLAPS 
1 
Continues with natural 
energy 
1 
Continues 
1 
Distinction between D-E 
and O-L. 'continues manmade 
natural uistinction 
power~ Distinction above 
continued 
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COMMENTARY 
Energy is in the vitamins and minerals 
in the soil, in UV rays and oxygen. 
Plants are like humans they move (open 
and close) and feed and breathe. 
The person is losing energy - the cold 
'doesn't do you any good.' Weather is 
energy: and heat is energy. 
Energy must be controlled to be of use. 
The clock is manmade (and controlled) 
and so must the winding-up be. 
A smell is not to ao with people, nor 
is it powered so it must be natural 
energy in the wind and not the smell. 
inside) stops. The ghost (E3) is designated a non-example 
because he does not believe in such things. He decides, 
however, that energy must have been used by the people who 
had to dig the grave. 
The chemicals in the reaction (E5) are deemed to be 
energy which, when joined together (I-E), react and cause 
even more to be produced. Again, as with the battery, the 
assumed activity (O-E) of the reaction is also energy (in 
terms of bubbles in the liquid and the gasses 'corning out'). 
The energy 'is no longer' when the 'bubbles have stopped 
and it's all brown and nasty'. The 'beaker of hot water'card 
(E4) is more problematic. Tee only possible activity in 
the situation is the mercury rising in the thermometer. 
This is a good example of the operation of a change of 
conception (and in multiple cases, of a framework). During 
the first few cards of the interview a number of conceptions 
are voiced - for example, energy is in substances1 energy 
is activity, energy is made in reactions. Over two or 
- -
three cards one of these is seen as more successful and is 
the first to be considered when a new instance is discussed. 
Colin's transcript, for the 'hot water' card is diff-
icult to explain without this interpretative gloss. He 
appears to look for activity (mercury moving up the thermom-
eter) and decides that such movement is insufficient to 
account for the energy present. He says, then, that the 
heat is forcing the mercury to move and suggests that the 
'water is creating energy to push the mercury up the therm-
ometer'. Being asked to explain that, Colin's then in an 
uncomfortable position. The range of convenience of his 
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'activity' conception of energy is insufficient to cope with 
a stationary ceaker of hot water. There are a number of 
broken pauses, anacolutha and stray phrases. One of these 
is that 'heat is a form of energy' which is clearly diffi-
cult to reconcile with his prevailing conception. At this 
pOint, he makes a distinction. Heat is energy, he says, 
but the water is not heat - it is heated. The heat is 
the gas or electricity external to the situation, which is 
energy. The water and the thermometer 'get heated up' , 
an action that pushes the mercury along the thermometer. 
Over the next three cards, Colin forges a second 
distinction that flavours the remainder of the interview. 
It is one between man-made, or manufactured energy, and 
'natural' energy. The former is energy generated in some 
process that has a function; the latter is energy deposited 
inside objects, 'naturally'. In this sense the lens (E6) 
is a non-example. Energy was required at one time to make 
the glass and plastic but the lens has no energy in it. 
Moreover, a person needs energy to look through the lens -
which is a good example of a Decoupled Light framework 
(D-L). The meal (E7) is 'natural' energy, it being located 
in vitamins, minerals, glucose, sugar and in oxygen. There 
are three interesting features in this argument. Firstly 
he supports his arguments by some 'self-evident' statements. 
Food must have energy 'otherwise people wouldn't buy it'; 
if you are hungry, you 'don't really ~ a lot •• you just 
sit around'. Oxygen is energy, he says, because: 
Co. well, oxygen's energy I mean •• liquid oxygen burns. 
that's a fuel •• they're using it in space rockets at 
the moment •• in the space shuttle. 
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Secondly, man-made energy is re-chargeable whilst natural 
energy is not. Once the 'goodness' is taken out of the 
food by the 'acids' inside you, it cannot be recovered. 
The man-made batteries can be re-charged. Thirdly, Co. 
introduces an element of human well-being into the discuss-
ion. Energy makes one feel good. 
The remaining cards in the interview are discussed 
very much in these terms. A refridgerator is man-made 
energy, a winter's day is natural energy, so it would 
depend on how an ice cube (E8) was made for a proper answer 
to be given. The sledge itself coming down the hill is an 
example of force (not energy) - the energy involved is at 
the person who finds it 'exhilarating coming down the hill 
fast so he's enjoying it'. The flower (E14) is natural 
energy, from the vitamins and minerals from the soil in 
the pot, and the oxygen in the air. A person standing in 
the snow (EIO) has natural energy. Also, 'the weather is 
energy and the snow is part of the weather so it must have 
natural energy'. 
When asked for his definition of energy Colin develops 
these themes and invokes his own example of a power station 
- particularly a nuclear power station. 
Co. obviously there's a lot of energy coming from there 
/a power station/ ••• its being made ••• its man-made 
energy ••• most of them burn coal to turn turbines to 
drive a dynamo to produce electricity ••• and burning 
coal is energy ••• the turbine turning is obviously 
creating energy •• I mean they're starting to close 
down power stations now because they're too wasteful 
starting to use other things 
I. what sort of things? 
C. nuclear power obviously ••• now that really comes into 
energy ••• its full of everything ••• its so dangerous. 
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... its full of energy •.. I mean the energy is so 
strong it kills you ••• well it would kill you from 
radiation sickness. its like a bomb let off 
I. I see 
Co. and it doesn't stop •• I mean oil is energy but as 
soon as its burnt its burnt •• the same with coal. 
when the energy's used it turns into something that's 
no good •• coal turns into ash and oil just burns away 
I. and what happens with nuclear power? 
Co. well even a little piece of nuclear energy I mean 
just keeps going on it doesn't stop. I don't think 
we'll run out of it •• it keeps going for millions of 
years and then we have to store the waste. 
These three central conceptions, of manufactured l 
natural and human centred energy remain throughout the 
interview and are developed along the way. The final cards, 
the clock (Ell) and a collison (E12) see the three co-exist 
as distinct but compatible conceptions. The clock is man-
made energy (in the spring and the luminous dial) which 
needs natural (human) energy to wind it up. Colin spends 
almost seven minutes discussing the collison (with very 
few interjections from the interviewer). It is a very 
human-energy conception and can be paraphrased as: 
- running is energy 
- a collision can be painful, and pain can induce shock 
- shock can drain you of energy 
- energy is a mental thing 
- if people can control their minds to overcome shock 
they can regain their energy 
- energy is 'mind over matter' 
His justification comes in a section as follows: 
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Co. if they're in pain they'll be down but if they think 
like 'its only a bump I'll be alright' and carryon 
running then they'll be alright and have energy again 
••• I mean obviously if you're ill. if you've got a 
germ •• that's different •• but if you've got enough 
control over your body you think to yourself. I mean 
I do quite a lot of rowing in my spare time and when 
you're rowing it hurts and I mean if it doesn't hurt 
you're not rowing hard enough. and you make it hurt 
and you think to yourself. 'it hurts bu~m not 
going to let it make me stop •• I've got to keep on 
going if I want to win this race'. and I'll be collect-
ing a medal in house assembly on Tuesday. but you've 
got to control your energy if you're going to win 
•• its mind over matter isn't it? 
This feature of 'controlling energy' he develops a 
little further. Natural energy needs be controlled so 
that we do not run out of oil and coal resources; or (in 
terms of food) because ~f we get too many vitamins, minerals 
sugars and calories we get fat.' Man-made energy needs to 
be controlled for our benefit ('we wouldn't want it to be 
out of control') and people-energy needs to be controlled 
so that we feel good. 
The gloss of interpretation used here, is, of course, 
just one of a number of possible interpretations. Colin 
would seem to use the early cards of the interview to voi~e 
some conceptions and to become familiar with the task and 
the 'rules of the game'. One such rule is that he is 
likely to be asked 'why' questions, or be asked to explain 
his words, at various intervals. Another 'rule' is that 
he is pretty much free to shape what he says and to move 
backwards and forwards between the pictures. The upshot 
of this, is that he becomes aware of the possibility that 
future cards and questions are going to test his commitment 
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to previous statements. The possibility of the interviewer 
saying 'ah, but a moment ago you said ..• ' looms large. 
In this case, he picks his words - and his conceptions of 
energy - with an element of care and develops successful 
ones he can substantiate to some degree. 
One interpretation - that this leads to him voicing 
his most safe, most anodyne and least controversial of 
answers - is clearly not the case. One reason is that he 
becomes involved both with the issue (in identyfying and 
describing energy) and with the task (in discussing such 
issues, and developing ideas at length with an attentive 
adult). In addition, there is evidence of his discussing 
and then rejecting, or amending, specific conceptions in 
the face of new instances. 50 whilst he is exploring conc-
eptions along lines that look 'profitable' he is not afraid 
to stay, or to change them. An example of this comes when 
he is considering, towards the end of the interview, the 
'smell' card (E13) of a dead fish: 
Co. I don't really know ••• I mean odour •• it could be 
about us. I mean if you didn't have a nose it wouldn't 
bother-You. but we've got noses and we smell these 
things. no its not that •• I don't really know I 
suppose a smell is energy. its got it in it ••• no 
there's no real energy or power of a smell. well 
it can be a powerful smell but that's not its energy 
•• no its just natural energy. its blown along in the 
wind and hits into our noses. I don't really know 
about smells. 
This is taken as evidence of his first testing, and 
then rejecting, an anthropocentric and a 'manufactured' 
conception in favour of a 'natural' energy conception. 
6.13 
PAGE 
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Colin's Force Interview (Cl,4F) 
Some similar patterns emerge in this interview even 
though it was recorded some three months after the energy 
one. The early cards establish a backdrop and by the 
fourth one he begins to make some distinctions that form 
the bases for many of the arguments he puts forward in 
the middle and later parts of the discussion. The outline 
of the interview is shown in the table in figure 63. 
Colin begins by discussing objects in terms of force, very 
much as a Designated F.ramework (D-F). The stone (Fl) has 
force, as does the rocket (F2). He mentions gravity (as 
he did at one point in the energy interview) as being 'like 
a magnet'. However, it is in addition to the force of the 
objects themselves, so that, for example, he says: 
Co. the stone has got a force in itself •• a force onto 
the ground ••• ~ its being held there by gravity •• 
For the rocket, the 'ignition' is treated as a force 
which pushes against the ground and which is forcing the 
rocket into the air. He includes another force which holds 
it upright on the ground and keeps it 'straight' as it 
moves upwards through the air, so that it does not 'topple 
over' (C-F). 
In card F3, (being told to do something) he makes a 
distinction between force and power. So far, he says, all 
of the cards have been examples of force (including F3) 
but only the first two have had power. In this instance, 
the person is being 'forced to do something' but there is 
'no power going into it'. In the tree card (F5) he makes 
another distinction, between man-made and natural forces -
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IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Stone (Fl) D-F; C-F 
Rocket (F2) E-F; D-Fi C-F 
Told (F3) A-F 
Tree (F5) O-Fi C-Fi A-F 
Diver (F4) I-F; C-F; A-F 
Robber (FlO) A-t'; D-F 
Golfer (Fa) D-F; M-F 
OVERLAPS COMMENTARY 
Gravity synonymous with force The stone is force, there's force in 
the men's legs; gravity is like a 
magnet. 
Distinction between force 
and power 
Overlaps between pressure; 
elasticity; distinction bet-
ween natural and manmade 
force. 
Elasticity 
Distinction: A-F / D-F 
manmade force has power; 
natural does not. 
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The force of 'ignition' pushing the 
floor; there's a force in the rocket, 
also a force holding it-Upright. 
Person is forced to do something but 
there is no 'power' going in to it. 
The blowing of the wind is a force; 
as is the tree being held upright in 
the ground. The tree is alive, cut it 
has no choice (natural) it must bend 
or snap. 
A force holds the boards in position 
(like the tree); man uses muscles and 
forces himself upwards to dive. 
The bank clerk is forced to hand over 
the money; manmade force is 'doing 
what is forced' (eg., rocket, gun, 
diving board). 
Manmade force is put into the ball to 
make it go 
continued •.• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Green (F9) D-F; I-F; M-F 
Sledge (F7) D-F; I-F; M-F 
Thinker (F6) A-F 
Book (Fll) A-F; C-F; D-F 
Balloon (F12) A-F; O-F; D-F 
Astronaut (F13) M-F; E-F 
Moon (F14) A-F 
Figure 63 
OVERLAPS 
Synonymy between power and 
force, and electricity and 
force 
Distinction between moving 
force (fades away) and static 
force (remains) . 
Power. For manmade there is 
no choice. 
Gravity 
prerure. 
Pressure; 
1 
Pressure 
density 
strain; gravity. 
6.17 
COMMENTARY 
Ball loses power in flight and as it 
lands. The ground absorbs some force. 
The sledge has the force of coming 
down. The ground pulls it down and 
slows it down. Snow is a force, like 
rain, in a tornado. 
Manmade forces in people are allowed 
a choice. In objects, it is not. 
Natural forces have no chOice at all. 
Table and legs are a force, so is book. 
Also the person who put it there. 
There is force in the boy's arm and in 
the balloon. Pressure in atmosphere -
increases with height (continuously~. 
The strain in the astronaut's line is 
a force. Pressure is still present and 
'high' in space 
Little force SO the astronaut would not 
get hurt falling. Pressure model 
continues. 
one similar to that in the energy interview. The wind 
is a natural force, whilst the';others show something being 
made 'to do something' by people. The wind's force is 
derived from pressure: the tree has force (to keep it 
upright) and a lot of elasticity (not force) to return it 
to its own position should the wind stop. Also, within 
this discussion, he says of the tree that: 
Co. it's alive •• sucking water from the earth •• vitamins 
and minerals •• that gives it strength •. I mean if it 
was dead •• if it was a dead tree it'd just snap 
Over the middle selection of cards he develops the 
classifications he has been making, between natural and man-
made forces. The latter he subdivides into those that 
have power and those that do not. Those with power have 
no choice and are ~ to do something, those without, 
have a choice and can resist or 'out-power' things. Power 
in this sense is a gas, electricity or fuel of some kind. 
When the golfball (Fa) arrives at the green (F9) it is 
because the power (from the golfer) has gone out of the 
ball. He argues his point as follows: 
Co. the power goes out of the ball and it comes down 
and hits and it obviously won't go as high as the 
first one and then on the second one /bounce/ it'll 
only go a little bit. then a little bit and eventually 
it'll roll 
I. when you say the power goes •• where does it go to? 
Co. well its got to slow down sometime hasn't it as it 
comes down •• I mean any ball if you bounce it once 
the second time it'll bounce again but it won't go 
so high. and it'll get lower as it loses power •• 
every time it bounces it loses a bit of power •• like 
a car will slow down if you take your foot off the 
accelerat~r •• ~ and I think the ground absorbs a bit 
of it as 2t h2ts. the ground gives a little bit and 
takes the force. like if a cricket ball's hit towards 
you you don't just catch it because you st~ng your 
hands up •• you have to cushion it .. slow it down a 
bit before you actually stop it 
He uses the distinctions he has established to reor-
ganise the cards and he sorts them according to the divis-
ions he has made. One or two prove difficult; the sledge 
(F7) is force sliding down, but he cannot decide whether 
snow is or not. Like rain, it is a force if it is 'coming 
down' hard or in a drift. A person thinking is a force 
because: 
Co. he's using force. power from his brain •• thinking 
about physics 
The book on the table is a force because, amongst other 
ones, someone must have used force to put it there. 
The latter part of the interview takes a different 
line and introduces an unusual conception. In discussing 
just three cards, the conversation takes up some twelve 
minutes - over a quarter of the interview. 
Colin's is a conception of air-pressure that increases 
with altitude. It begins in consideration of the forces 
on a helium balloon (F12). Where he suggests that the 
gas is a force, inside the balloon, to make it rise. If 
the balloon is released, he says, it will 'burst from a 
high altitude' because: 
Co. I mean. as it goes up the air's getting slowly and 
slowly denser so the pressure's pushing in on it 
A moment later, when he is asked to explain this he makes 
the following comparison: 
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Co. it /the air/ gets slowly denser and denser I mean 
its like if you walk out now and just keep walking 
.•• slowly it gets darker and darker as it gets into 
night or its quite foggy out there now so. slowly as 
you keep walking the fog's going to get thicker and 
thicker ••• 
This description is particularly apt - the interview was 
being conducted just at the end of the school day on a dark 
and foggy January evening. The notion of walking away from 
the school lights into the gathering gloom is a graphic 
analogy of increasing atmospheric pressure and density. 
The two following cards concern the astronaut in 
space (F13) and on the moon (F14). Whilst other forces 
(like 'strain' in the astronaut's line: in the rocket, 
and gravity) are mentioned, the conversation keeps return-
ing to the pressure model. For example, an astronaut's 
suit is seen as preventing the pressure 'pushing in on you'. 
Asked about forces on the moon, he says: 
Co. •• well again its the pressure on there •• pushing 
against his suit •• there's not much oxygen in it 
/the suit/ •• its pushing him down 
I. what kind of pressure is it? 
Co. well its obviously a force. I mean it'd kill you •• 
it can kill you if you haven't got a proper suit •• 
it'd just burst through your suit ••• it's a very strong 
force I should think 
He does not explain what causes the pressure except 
to return to the balloon and discuss its implosion. In 
this sense he presumeably assumes that both space and the 
surface of the moon are subjected to high air pressure -
much higher than that on the Earth's surface. The inter-
viewer's rather inept question (above) to find out more 
about the pressure, only results in a description of what 
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it might do to an illclad astronaut. 
This is an unusual conception - only one other inter-
viewed student has hinted at anything similar. In that 
case it was based upon the notion that, if hot air continues 
to rise, then it must be 'much more dense up there than 
it is down here.' (J,4H). Colin's is a well developed and 
consistently used conception that is, to all intents and 
purposes, idiosyncratic. It is neither sufficiently general 
nor widespread, in the context of this study, to be called 
a framework. 
Colin's Heat Interview (C3,4H) 
In the context of the four interviews, this one on 
heat is Colin's most subdued and low-key. He does not 
display the same degree of involvement with the topic or 
the task and is less inclined to be as forthcoming as in 
the others. At one point, he comments that he does not 
'see the problem' with heat - it is 'pretty obvious what 
it is'. He still retains the propensity to forge distinct-
ions and then to follow these through, but in this inter-
view they are less rigidly held and he treats them more 
flexibly than in the other cases (Figure 64). 
As before, the first few cards can be seen as gener-
ating some opening arguments, as he appears to re-famil-
iarise himself with the requirements of the task. For 
these instances he conceptualises heat very much in the 
mould of a Normal Heat (N-H) framework - heat is hotter 
than himself, cold is anything cooler than body temperature. 
Temperature itself he describes as a measure of heat. 
6. 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
III (Hl) N-H; R-H 
Reaction (H2) N-H 
Pies (H3) C-H; R-H 
Argument (H4) Noneg; N-H 
Iron-bar (HS) R-H; M-H; N-H 
Ice (H6) S-H; N-H 
OVERLAPS 
Temperature (is a measure 
of heat) 
Relationship between temper-
ature and mass. 
Distinction between heat 
(sense) and heat (emotion) 
Distinction in temperature 
between hot, cold and 
freezing 
6.2 2 
COMMENTARY 
A thermometer tells you what the heat 
is, in a person's body. 
No special heat needed, just normal. 
Some reactions do need heat. 
There is steam so the pies 
hot. The bigger basin holds 
A bigger mass attracts more 
(depending on what it is). 
must be 
more heat. 
heat 
Sensory heat I feel means 'I'm sweat-
ing'. The other heat means a fierce 
dislike. 
The burner is the heat, the water is 
just wet. The bar heats only the first 
quarter - on the outside - cooler on 
the inside. Heat rises, some heat 
travels. Heat reacts with the iron: 
water + iron = rust 
heat + iron = a liquid (which turns to 
iron) 
water on iron = corrosion. 
Things can be hot or cold, very cold is 
'freezing' - when things free~e - and 
crystallise. 
continued ••• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Flower (H7) Noneg 
Pepper (H8) Noneg 
House (H9) R-H; C-H; O-E 
Cliff (H11) P-H 
Astronaut (H13) Noneg; C-H; 
N-H; R-H 
Figure 64 
OVERLAPS 
Distinction continued between 
sense and emotion; relation-
ship between heat and energy 
heat and light 
Friction produces heat 
6.23 
COMMENTARY 
Does not need heat; would die without it 
Not heat, just taste. 
Heat is what we feel, not taste or 
smell; it's produced by friction, gas, 
electricity, etc., it is an off-shoot 
of some act. Can a house 'feel' warm. 
Extract 125. Friction produces measure-
able heat in the stone. 
Space is cold, heat rises. Is it hotter 
over the sun? 
He also treats heat as being quite local, to a person's 
head, for example, if they are ill (HI). The bigger pie 
(H3) can hold more heat because it has 'a bigger basin 
which holds heat'. In this instance he associates heat with 
mass and suggests that there might be different things in 
the pies that might 'attract' heat differently. 
In the fourth card he begins a distinction, one part 
of which he develops further. The card shows an argument 
• (H4) and Colin argues that heat is 'what you feel' (by ones 
senses) and not what you feel (in terms of 'feelings', or 
emotions). He seems to enjoy this ambiguity in the term 
'feel' and says: 
Co. I mean if you're having a fight or sometl~ing like that 
then you don't ~ warm but you do feel heat against 
the other person •• your whole body doesn't change I 
mean you're thinking about the person and you feel 
frightened and you probably don't like him muc~t 
it's a different kind of feel it doesn't mean the 
same. its only a connection 
The s~nsory aspects of heat - feeling heat from a source 
of heat - are the ones he develops further. 
The iron bar card (HS) evokes four interesting points. 
He suggests, firstly, that heat is retained very much at 
the burner end of the bar and that the other end is unheated 
and simply wet. Secondly, he maintains that the heat mostly 
rises off the bar (although some does travel along it) and 
thirdly, that the heat is 'reacting' with the iron. Lastly 
he suggests that the heat is very much on the exterior of 
the bar and that - if you were able - 'to touch the inside 
then you wouldn't get burnt'. He makes these pOints in the 
following way: 
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Co. well you're heating one end and making the other one 
wet •.• its going to be much hotter at this end than 
it is at that end because here i~s reacting with 
the heat ... but in an amount of time even this /tap/ 
end is gOing to feel warmth 
I. why do you say that? 
Co. well first of all the heat's going to heat the end of 
the iron for only about a quarter of the way and 
then the heat's going to rise off the bar. but some 
heat's going to move along to this end •••• 
1. go on 
Co. well heat naturally rises I mean. once the thing gets 
hot •• past red hot or something then you just get 
waves of heat .• some of it goes fading down the bar 
to the end.. -
I. you said that it's reacting with the heat •• I wondered 
what you meant by that •• 
Co. oh there is a certain reaction between both of them 
.• I mean water and iron produces rust ••••• heat and 
iron produces a liquid •• which then tUrns into iron 
.• and then there's corrosion. water on iron-produces 
corrosion. 
These last three are quoted rather like memorised 
chemical formulae and reactions. 
The remaining cards in the interview take up some of 
the points he has made so far, but without anyone concept-
ion prevailing as dominant. Some lead him into paradoxes 
upon which he deliberates at length. For example, if heat 
is a (sensory) fe:eling then how can a house 'feel warm'. 
Or, put another way, does the word 'feel' refer to the 
object one is feeling o~ to the person engaged in the act: 
is it the hguse that feels warm or a person who feels the 
house warm? 
He discusses friction, too, in a way that has already 
been described in extract 125 at the end of the last chapter. 
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When he is asked to define heat, he calls it an 'off shoot' 
of something: 
Co. •• its an off shoot of something .• like friction. 
you rub your fingers together and then there's heat 
generated •.. 
This is separate and distinct from light, because: 
Co. they don't always go together •• I mean you can't 
feel the heat of a match if it was over the other 
side of the room but you can still see the light •. 
I mean there are some places •• places-like the axc·tic 
and that •• there's sunlight but there isn't much heat 
•• if there ~ heat you wouldn't have ice there would 
you? 
Another paradox sterns from the astronaut card (HI3) 
where he returns to heat rising. He has said that space 
is cold ('well spacemen wear thermal clothes and special 
socks') but is then unsure if heat rises 'above' the sun 
to make it hotter there. He finishes by saying: 
Co. well most heat rises but tne sun generates heat all 
the way round. i~s a big ball. hut it's just a known 
fact it's colder in space and I don't know why (laughs) 
Colin's Light Interview ,Cl.4L) 
If, whilst discussing heat, Colin is muted, in discuss-
ing light he is ebullient. It is a conversation of about 
an hour's duration when (comparatively) little is said by 
the interviewer. The full transcript is the sample trans-
cript provided as appendlxIII. The outline is shown in 
figure 65. Not only does he volunteer ideas, definitions, 
and distinctions, he also extrapolates on these to explore 
certain issues. He puts forward what he calls 'his theories' 
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and expands on these at some length. Moreover, he artic-
ulates a number of paradoxes - for which he can see both 
sides of a problem yet confesses to having few solutions. 
These occur in the transcript as questions he asks out loud 
and, although they might appear to be directed at the inter-
viewer, they are mostly for his own benefit in that he 
leaves no space for a response but answers them himself. 
He is clearly familiar with the routine of the inter-
views and, unprompted, refers many of the cards back to 
previous ones discussed in order to draw out parallels or 
distinctions. He shapes much of the conversation himself 
and makes considerable use of his own personal experiences 
to enhance conceptions he has previously adumbrated. 
During the session, Colin makes two distinctions which 
form the major part of the discussion. The first is a dist-
inction between 'natural' and artificial light. At the 
centre of this is an ~ncertain~y as to whether light is a 
sin9le pure substance, or is itself a composite entity. 
In order to account for various situations (for example, 
rainbows, X-rays, and suntans) he feels the need to post-
ulate different kinds of light (dayl~ght, sunlight, electric 
lis~t and so on). The rroblem arises not 50 much with pure 
li~ht as with impure: is it minus some vital ingredients 
or does it have added impurities? The first moves towards 
-
a cOffiposite view (C-L). whilst the other augers for different 
modes of light (M-L). He uses both at different times an~ 
eventuallY reaches an uneasy truce between the two. 
~he second distinction is between 'projected' and 
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IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Projector (L2) P-L; D-L 
Television (L3) O-L; D-L; M-L 
P-L 
Flower (Lll) 
Rainbow (L4) 
Painting (LS) 
Shirts (L12) 
I-L: O-L: A-L 
O-L: P-L; C-L 
I-L: D-L; 
Noneg 
A-L: P-H; D-L 
OVERLAPS 
Distinction between mirror 
images and projector images 
Light and sound are separate 
and related 
1 
Both are waves 
1 
Spectrum; sound waves and 
electrical waves are separate 
COMMENTARY 
Light travels. It is projected (thrown 
onto a screen) but there's no light 
on the screen. A projected image is 
'exact', a mirror image is opposite. 
The aerial catches light waves and the 
T.V. reforms pictures. Similar (but 
bigger) to a projector: the screen 
'throws' the image. 
Flowers need light (and move towards 
it). Both light and sound are waves. 
Light lasts longer than sound. 
Rabdrops act as prisms. The sun hits 
and, because of angles, splits into 
colours. Sound waves cannot be received 
on a radio. Rainbow is similar to a 
projector. 
One can see in the dark; light brightens 
things up so they can be seen. A red 
painting is not an example unless it 
is luminous. Similar to the flower. 
Heat and light are related. One holds things up to the light. Hedt 
A distinction between natural and light connected, natural light is 
light and sunlight not the same as sunlight. 
continued ••• 
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IAI CARDS 
Mirror (Ll) 
Lens (L9) 
LIGHT IS ••• 
X-Rays (L7) 
FRAl-lEWORKS 
A-L; I-Li D-L 
P-L 
M-L; C-Hi O-L 
P-L; D-L 
M-Li O-L: C-L 
Sunbathing (L8) M-L; I-L; C-H 
E-L 
Figure 65 
OVERLAPS 
Reaction 
Distinction between pure 
sunlight and electric light. 
Heat produces light. 
Radiation; beam: ray 
Relationship between light 
and heat. Distinction 
between electric light and 
sunlight. 
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COMMENTARY 
Similar to projector - light hits you 
and hits mirror to form a reflection. 
Difficult to explain why light reacts 
with mirror. 
Similar to mirror - hard to explain. 
Pure sunlight can burn but electric 
light wo~t. Light is given off from 
heaters in both cases. Electric heaters 
give light and burning too produces 
light. Snow reflects light. 
Travels at the speed of light; is a 
wave: splits like an atom; is trans-
parent; hits screens and slows (TV) or 
stops (projector); is reflected off 
mirrors and stretched by a lens. 
X-ray machine is like a camera; is 
sensitive to radiation. Radio active 
particles give off light. A beam is 
composed of rays (extract 75). X-rays 
are very sensitive light. 
Light and heat given off by sun, but 
light causes suntan. Electric light is 
pure Sunlight has additives (extract 
81). Snow is like a mirror. Suntan 
makes you feel better (extract 120) 
which is why sunray lamps work. 
'received' light. It is a distinction between sending out 
light and getting back pictures. He reconciles these two 
aspects of the cards by hypothesisi~q a 'barrier' model of 
light. In this, lightmrries an 'image' and is 'thrown' 
against a screen, wall or some barrier. Here the light 
stops and leaves the image on the surface. It is a dist-
inction between a projected Light framework (P-L) and a 
Decoupled one (D-L). 
Needlesstosay, neither distinction is entirely tidy 
and he voices a number of difficulties (for example, in 
explaining what happens at a mirror). Some complications 
that contribute to h~s voiced difficulties are, firstly, 
that whilst we use light in order to see things, we can 
also see through light (it is 'transparent'). Secondly, 
he is entirely unsure why light should penetrate some 
surfaces (like skin) and yet be reflected off others (like 
snow) 
He begins to forge these distinctions from the beginning 
of the interview with the projector card (L2) and the 
television set (L3). He suggests that the projector image 
is thrown from the projector onto the screen, and that for 
the T.V., it: 
Co. •• comes down the aerial. the waves. and there /inside 
the T.V. set/ it's transferred to a picture •• 
I. is that an image? 
Co. yes. its an image rather than just light or a picture 
•• its an image. a thrown image same as the projector 
really •• its just that its on a bigger scale. I mean 
the television company are throwing out more waves 
than a projector would. 
Later he pursues the similarities between the projector and 
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a television. He is asked to say what light is, and begins 
a discussion around the speed of light. He suggests that 
the waves arriving at the T.V. set are light waves, travel-
ling at the speed of light, and which are slowed by parts 
inside the television and then re-constituted to their 
'original form'. 
Co. I mean. this television set ,ore. I mean obviously 
it's. the waves are travelling at the speed of light 
•• I don't know. I suppose they're travelling at the 
speed of light because I mean it is light you could 
say. and its got to be travelling-at the speed of 
light and then as it hits the aerial and gets into 
the circuitry it slows it down and puts it back into 
its orn~inal form 
/a moment later/ 
•• its like the screen I mean. the projector's throw-
ing it out at the speed of light because obviously 
light will move at the speed of light and then ••• 
just sort of abruptly hitting this screen and stopp-
ing ••• throwing the image. and going back to its 
original image. its like a barrier I suppose ••• 
whereas the television just slows it down •• 
This is also part of the conversation about the con-
stituents of light and in this description he has opted for 
a 'composite' view. Light is split up into various 'bits' 
like colours; parts of a picture, or is broken up 'like 
waves', and is then re-formed so that the image can be seen. 
This view is epitomised in extract 75 where he describes 
the composition of a 'ray'. In this manner he uses a 
'composite' view for the television (L3); the projector 
(L2); the rainbow (L4) and in defining light. The 'modal' 
view surfaces when he is discussing sunlight - for example, 
in cards showing the flower (LII); clean and dirty shirts 
(L12); a lens (L9) and a sunbather (La). 
He begins by maintaining that natural light (ambient 
light (A-L» whilst different, is quite similar to sunlight. 
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Although the latter is often shown to be yellow, if you 
look directly at it ('which you're not meant to do anyway') 
you see it is white. Later, when pressed, he finds it 
difficult to describe 'natural light'. Natural light is, 
in some senses, part of a De-coupled framework. It is the 
light which means we can ~ things. Yet is not due to any 
specific source. Consequently, in talking about a clean 
shirt (and holding it up to the light), one is holding it 
up to be seen and ~ towards a particular light source. 
When asked to explain it, he concludes that all light is 
artificial except sunlight ('I wouldn't call anything you 
know charged with electricity natural'). He finds this 
difficult to maintain, however, when talking about sun-
bathing. Because one can not become suntanned under an 
electric light, he argues that it is 'electric light' that 
is pure and that sunlight is mixed with lots of other 
lights (like ultra-violet light and radio-active light -
see extract 81). 
A conception of light, like a Decoupled framework, 
is evident in the discussion about the painting (LS), the 
lens (L9) and the mirror (Ll). For example, of the paint-
ing he says: 
Co. if it's just a bright red painting. I shouldn't 
think that that's got anything to do with light at 
all •• oh I suppose the only reason its bright red 
is because there is actually light shining on it •• 
I mean if the lights were off you wouldn't probably 
notice that it's. exactly bright red •• he might be 
able to work out it's red but not bright red •• 
It is very similar to other descriptions where light 
is used to 'brighten things up' rather than for the image 
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to be transmitted to the eye. 
This description of Colin's interview has inevitably 
left out a range of points he makes. Some are excellent 
examples of some of the difficulties he has in his under-
standing of light; of the paradoxes he perceives between 
what is said about it and the ways in which he' believes 
that it operates. He draws on his own experience to sub-
stantiate conceptions (from skiing in Switzerland, operat-
ing a hand-warming device in cold weather, having X-rays 
of his arm and teeth, to burning the varnish off his desk 
with a hand lens). 
He considers the meanings of a range of terms like 
image, heat, reflection, ray and wave, and introduces a 
number of logical contingencies to support his hypotheses 
and suppositions. As a final quote, an example of a 
debate with himself about waves in the wake of the flower 
(Lll) card: 
Co. light's more or less the same as sound I should 
imagine. with waves I mean •• I mean talking I'm 
transmitting sound waves and this light bulb's /he 
points to an overhead light/ transmitting light 
waves as well •••• I'm just giving out sound waves 
while I'm speaking and that's giving out light waves 
as it's •••• I don't know-r-suppose it /light/ goes 
on longer than sound waves. I mean. as soon as I 
stop talking you don't hear my voice but the light 
is sort of bouncing around all the time ••• 
6.2: cushla'S Interviews 
cushla's interviews are both shorter and less expan-
sive than Colins': the average length of the sessions is 
about twenty five minutes. A period of about thirty months 
elapsed between the first and last interviews. The sequence 
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of interviews is different to that of Colins', for CusHa 
it is energy, force, light and then heat. As with all the 
interviews, the sequence results more from circumstances 
than from deliberate planning. 
In the organisation of the study, Cushla was not 
originally a student singled out to be re-interviewed. 
Her responses in the interviews, particularly the first 
energy one are fairly perfunctory - jejune in some instances. 
She closes responses quickly and in only a few cases does 
she link together arguments across the cards. The decision 
to re-interview came about more as a result of her interest 
in another session (as expressed to her teacher) and in her 
volunteering to another discussion. In the last~o inter-
views she begins to detail her responses more than in energy 
and force. 
One consequence of her numerous single clause answers 
is for the question style employed by the interviewer. In 
the case of Colin's responses, the basic questioning strat-
egies are to re-arrange some of the words in his answer and, 
by inflection, to pose a question - or to simply reflect 
the last few clauses. This is not very successful with 
Cushla - to repeat her answer back to her leaves her simply 
saying 'yes' or 'no' without further elaboration. In one 
or two instances, it seems to cause her considerable doubt 
and as she becomes uncomfortable, she enters into several 
reversals, retracting what she has said. She appears to 
interpret reflected questions as stark incredulity on the 
interviewer's part. More successful are direct questions 
and, on one or~o occasions, for the interviewer to act as 
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'devil's advocate'. Because of this, her transcript allows 
for a more direct relationship to be established between 
conception and question-type. 
Cushla's Energy Interview (C,4E) 
Her dominant conception here is typified by an Osten-
sive Erergy framework: in most instances she recognises 
energy because something is happening. Where she fails to 
find anything, she regards it as a non-example. Her comments 
introduce a number of terms like heat, light, sound, kinetic, 
potential and work although largely she is reluctant to 
talk through any of these. She likens potential energy to 
an elastic band and kinetic to movement of any kind. How-
ever, this represents her only attempt to extend her ideas. 
The interview is quite short (the outline is given in figure 
66) and of the fifteen cards that she responds to, she 
considers five of these to be non-examples. 
Cushla's Force Interview (C2,4F) 
In this interview, she is considerably more forth-
coming, volunteering both detail towards the conceptions 
she suggests and (once) in personal detail about herself. 
She does not comment about the previous interview although 
it had been only about six weeks earlier. The outline is 
shown in figure 67. At this stage, it is difficult to know 
if her more forthright approach to the interview is because 
she identifies more with the task or with the issue, in 
that she finds force easier to discuss than energy. 
She makes clear three particular conceptions, which 
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IAI CARDS 
Box (El) 
Battery (E2) 
Hot water (E4) 
Reaction CES) 
ENERGY IS ••• 
Lens (E6) 
Meal (E7) 
Ice (E8) 
Sledge (E9) 
FRAMEWORKS 
D-E 
I-E 
O-Ei Noneg 
O-Ei Noneg 
D-Ei O-E 
O-E; noneg 
O-Ei D-E 
O-E 
D-E 
OVERLAPS 
Potential 
Potential; work; synonymy 
between energy, heat and 
light. 
Heat and energy are separate 
and distinct 
Kinetic, potential 
Kinetic; potential 
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COMMENTARY 
There is energy in the box and in the 
person. 
Heat and light are energy~ the pOint 
of the battery is to make the 19ht work. 
There is energy if the mercury is 
rnoving-.-Hot water is not energy, it has 
heat but not energy. 
Maybe there's energy in the putting of 
the chemicals together. Otherwise none. 
Energy is in batteries and elastic 
bands, and mostly in movement which is 
kinetic energy. A large amount of energy 
is Concorde. 
Because ~ isn't dOing anything. 
Energy is part of the food, and the 
person is moving. 
The water is moving as it drips. 
The hill has energy at the top. It 
gives this potential energy to the 
sledge which moves. 
continued ••• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Snow (ElO) O-E 
Clock (Ell) O-Ei F-E 
Collision (EI2) O-E 
Smell (El3) Noneg 
Flower (EI4) O-E 
Stars (EIS) O-L 
Clouds (EI6) F-Ei noneg 
Figure 66 
OVERLAPS 
Sound; light: work: A 
synonymy between energy and 
power. 
Sound 
Light 
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COMMENTARY 
There's energy because he's shivering. 
There's energy in the ticking and the 
movement. Also in the light of the 
luminous dial. Energy is the power to 
make things work. 
There's movement and they might cry 
out in pain. When they stop, the 
energy stops. 
No reason. 
There's energy in the movement of it 
growing. 
Light is energy. 
Stars have no energy, energy is in 
cars and trains. 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Stone (Fl) E-F; A-F 
Rocket (F2) a-F; E-F 
Told (F3) O-F; A-F 
Tree (F5) E-F; C-F 
Diver (F4) E-F; C-F 
Robber (FlO) A-F 
OVERLAPS 
Synonymy between pressure 
and force 
A distinction between verbal 
force and the force of 
machines; radiation. 
Gravity, energy 
Potential: gravity 
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COMMENTARY 
The forces are at the ring where the 
ropes join. The stone is fighting back 
against the people. 
Forces are at the 'nose' of the rocket. 
Force is in the pushing up. Machines 
are stronger than people and can 
exert more pressure. 
There is force in pushing, but a person 
is less forceful than a rocket. Verbal 
force is a force although there's no 
contac~- like radiation there need 
not be contact for a force. 
Similar to the rocket. The wind is not 
touching but is creating energy. The 
tree reverts to normal when wind stops. 
Gravity - and roots - hold the tree up. 
The board has potential force. The 
board goes back to normal where it is 
kept by a force. The diver creates 
a furce to dive. Gravity acts when 
he is up. 
Similar to 'told'; it is a force of 
the mind. The person is 'forced by 
instinct' to hand over the money. 
continued. 
IAI CARDS 
Golfer (FS) 
Green (F9) 
FORCE IS ••• 
Thinker (F6) 
Book (FII) 
Balloon (FI2) 
FRAMEWORKS 
A-F; M-F 
I-F; M-F 
A-F 
C-F; D-F 
C-F; D-F 
Astronaut (FI3) C-F; D-F 
Moon (FI4) O-F; D-F 
Figure 67 
OVERLAPS 
Gravity 
Force and energy are separate 
yet related 
Gravity; weight 
Gravity 
Gravity 
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COMMENTARY 
The force is the gOlfer's strength. 
The ball continues to travel with the 
'force put on it'. At the top, the 
force finishes and gravity then pulls 
it down. 
The ball hits the ground and 'gets' 
energy to rebound. Both energy and 
force diminish as the ball goes along. 
Forces are given by energy and energy 
is what is produced by a force. 
There are different forces; the force 
of the mind, the force of giving energy; 
gravity force (large) and moon force 
(small) • 
Forcing yourself to think. 
The book has weight and gravity holds 
it down. 
The person has force to:hold it. Gravity 
doesn't effect it; it would if it 
weighed more. 
There are forces·in the rocket and 
some holding him there. 
None on the moon. He has force - the 
kinetic force of mOVement 
bear similarities to the Affective (A-F), Configurative 
(C-F) and Encounter Eorce (E-F) frameworks. She tends to 
the view that gravity is something that 'holds things down' 
and yet (as far as projectiles are concerned) operates only 
on their downward path. In this sense she makes an inter-
esting point where she distinguishes between two frameworks. 
In discussing the book on the table (FIl) she argues that 
it has both a force 'holding it in place' and its own weight. 
That is, the book itself has a force (D-F) pressing down 
on the table and gravity also operates to prevent it float-
ing away. This argument is continued into the balloon 
card (Fl2) where she deciaes that there may be gravity on· 
the balloon but it does not affect it. Gravity would she 
says, if the balloon were heavier. 
As in the energy interview, she introduces the term 
'potential' a number of times, although here she refers to 
potential force. Other terms, like pressure, energy and 
radiation are also deemed to be forces. She also emphasises 
the humanity of the situations in some instances - so that 
all of the orthodox non-examples she considers to be examples. 
In these cases, she calls the force a 'verbal force', or 
a 'force of the mind', which (although it does not make 
contact) is still a force. 
In this interview, as with the energy one, her responses 
are taken mostly to infer locative and descriptive frame-
works. certainly, her responses are given more readily to 
the somewhat limiting and closed nature of the locative 
question type ('where is there force?') and to descriptive 
questions ('what is (are) the force(s) doing?'). Most of 
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her explanations, then, can be seen as evidence for Affect-
ive (A-F), Designated (D-F) (both largely locative frame-
works), and a Configurative (C-F) framework (a descriptive 
one) • 
Cushla's Light Interviews (C2,4L) 
There are a number of similarities between Cushla's 
view of light and that of Colin. She, too, has a conception 
of light that is decoupled from the observer, particularly 
in the context of mirrors, lenses and television sets. 
She also moves between a composite and modal conception of 
the nature of light. She expresses particular difficulty 
in explaining the action of mirross and lenses. The other 
expressions she emphasises within her accounts are also 
similar, colour, heat, image, reflection and radio-active. 
The outline for this interview is shown in figure 68. 
The D-L framework is the most clearly evidenced. For 
example, of the mirror (L1) she says: 
Cu. well there has to be light for him to see himself in 
the mirror •• and the mirror acts as a sort of reflect-
ion of his image the light ••••• urn portrays the image 
on the mirror and that's how he can see himself 
I. and how does it do that. do you know? 
Cu. I think its the light that picks up the colour of 
him and the shape of him •••••• no its not •• no ••• 
no I don't think that 
I. why's that? 
Cu. because it's the mirror that picks up the image not 
the light ••• I mean the light can give a sort of 
silhouette but it doesn't give an image. 
This extract gives an example of one of Cushla's 
reversals - not only a contradiction of argument between 
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IAI CARDS FRAMEWORK 
Mirror (Ll) D-L 
Projector (L2) O-L 
Rainbow (L4) M-L; C-L 
Lens (L9) D-L; O-L; P-L 
X-Ray (L7) M-L; Noneg 
Battery (L 10;' M-L: C-L: P-L 
OVERLAPS 
Colour; reflection 
Ray; a distinction between 
real and virtual images 
Distinguishes between colours 
and images 
Heat is related to natural 
light and not artificial 
(electric) light; 
Radioactive material 
Distinction between natural 
and artificial light. 
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COMMENTARY 
There must be light so that he can see 
his image on the mirror. Perhaps light 
picks up the person's colour - or 
light gives a silhouette and not an 
image. 
The bulb in the projector shines a ray 
onto the screen. The screen captures 
the image (which is real). A virtual 
image cannot be caught on a screen. 
Rainbow. is either caused by light 
shining through different colours in 
the atmosphere or moisture breaking 
the light up. Must be the first since 
colours are 4ifferent shades of light, 
it is not an image. 
Lens bends the light. It would work 
in the dark except that the person 
wouldn't be abe to see it. Natural 
light is warm, electric light is not. 
X-rays are very intense light that 
can't pass through bones. Or it is 
radio-active material and not light. 
Circuit produces artifidal light using 
chemicals. The intense white of the 
filament . produc~ light 
continued ••• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
LIGHT IS ••• M-L 
Television (L3) D-L; P-L; C-L 
Figure 68 
OVERLAPS 
Energy, radio activity 
Image; distinction between 
light and waves. 
6.43 
COMMENTARY 
Light is energy in the form of a ray. 
Some objects have so much energy they 
produce light. The sun = light + 
radio-active rays. 
T.V. works by a light at the back that 
shines through an image on the screen. 
It is light plus radio-active material. 
T.V. studios send out waves which are 
caught on the screen. 
explanations but also a kind of 'shear' in the account. 
Her discussion on the composition of light begins 
with the rainbow card (L4). She is unsure quite what a 
'colour' is, whether it is a shade of light (that is, pure 
light subjected to some change) or a constituent of light. 
She concludes by moving towards the first because it is not 
just that moisture in the air, but also mirrors, that can 
cause rainbows. She takes this as an argument that light 
changes rather than 'splits up'. Like Colin, she describes 
the sun as 'natural' light whilst electrically produced 
light is artificial. She says of the battery card (L2): 
Cu. ..this is a way of producing light artificially using 
chemicals 
I. how does it work? 
Cu. the electricity is in here /the battery/ and then when 
it gets into contact withfue light /bulb/ it lights 
•• it heats the filament which becomes very hot and 
produces light •• 
This follows a discussion about heat where she had 
suggested that natural light is warm but electric light is 
not. When pressed here, she argues that although the fila-
ment gets so hot it 'turns an intense white'; this is only 
hot for filaments (as opposed to people) and that anyway 
it is only a little bulb. 
A final similarity with Colin's ideas is that of the 
television 'catching' waves from a studio. In Cushla's 
case, they are not so much re-formed into a picture as 
'shone through' to make an image. 
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Cushla's Heat Interview (C,6H) 
At the time of this discussion, Cushla had entered 
sixth form and begun A-level work. She elaborates rather more 
on her constructions and so offers more than is asked for in 
the questions. She draws on a few inferences from what 
she herself says, sometimes quite creatively. One distinc-
tion (see figure 69) she makes throughout the interview 
that energy 'produces' heat. She says this of four instances, 
ill (HI), reaction (H2), house (H9) and the cake mixer (H12). 
In each case, it is produced from energy rather differently. 
In the first two it is caused by reactions - either by 
chemicals in food producing energy and then producing heat, 
or from chemicals reacting in a test tube to the same effect. 
Later on it is the sun's energy that produces heat (by its 
'rays cutting through the atmosphere') and then by the 
mixer blades 'creating friction energy' which 'creates' 
heat. 
She makes two other distinctions, one between 'heat' 
and 'being heated', the other (more unusually» between 
the 'air' and the 'atmosphere'. The first is a difference 
between the temperature of an object (it's heat) and the 
act of raising it's temperature (being heated). The latter 
she refers to as 'exarting actual heat'. The second comes 
in the discussloncr ice melting (H6) - when she suggests 
that the sun warms the atmosphere and this then warms the 
air. The air is moved about as people move around so allow-
ing a transfer of heat to the ice. 
Two more pOints about the interview are worth noting. 
Firstly, she makes some comments about heat and particles 
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IAI CARDS 
III (HI) 
Reaction (H2) 
Argument (H4) 
Pies (H3) 
Iron bar (HS) 
HEAT IS ••. 
FRAMEWORKS 
N-H; P-H 
D-H; P-H; P-E 
I-E 
Noneg 
P-H; R-H 
C-H; M-H; R-H 
D-H 
C-H; N-H; P-H 
OVERLAPS 
Temperature; reaction; 
energy 
Distinguishes between react-
ions between chemicals and 
cells, energy 
Distinguishes between heat 
and emotional heat; temper-
ature is a measure of heat. 
Density 
Particles 
Synonymous with energy and 
force 1 
6.46 
COMMENTARY 
Bedclothes produce heat; reactions 
occur in the body to produce heat -
food produces energy and that produces 
heat. 
Heat is given off by chemicals - it 
could be violent. The energy is not in 
the chemicals but when they meet-.--
Heat and emotional heat are different. 
There is no rise in temperature in the 
latter unless the person jumps about. 
Both pies produce heat. The small pie 
has the highest temperature because it 
would cook faster and heat up more 
quickly. In the sam~ time it would be 
browner and burnt. The larger is more 
dense and would cool mcre slowly .. 
Heat is exerted on the bar, going in 
and out. It moves~he particles through 
the bar though the heat doesn't move. 
(Extracts 68 and 98). 
Obvious heat sources and heat that is 
produced. You can feel it (extract 126). 
continued ••• 
IAI CARDS 
House (H9) 
Ice (H6) 
Astronaut (HI3) 
Mixer (HI2) 
Cliff (H8) 
Pepper (Ha) 
Flower (H7) 
Fridge (HI4) 
Figure 69 
FRAMEWORKS 
C-H; D-E; M-H 
R-H; O-L; P-L 
C-H; N-H 
Noneg 
D-H; P-H; P-E 
Noneg 
Noneg; P-H 
Noneg 
N-H 
OVERLAPS 
+ 
Energy; rays; a distinction 
between heat and light. 
Distinguishes between 
atmosphere and air 
Friction; particles; energy 
produces heat 
Reaction 
6.47 
COMMENTARY 
Sun is an energy source - it sends out 
energy rays which cut through the 
atmosphere to produce heat and light. 
Tropical islands have heat. Iceland 
does not. 
Ice is cold - air (warmed by the 
atmosphere) is warm. It is not actual 
heat. 
No reason given. 
Mixer creates energy (friction) which 
in turn creates heat. Friction is 
caused by particles rubbing tog~ther. 
No reason given. 
It is not an example because it does 
not produce heat. Like (HI) and (H4). 
It might react with body cells. 
No reason given. 
The fridge might cool the room down 
given time. 
used as evidence for a Dynamic H.eat framework (D-H) and 
in particular for a 'hot molecule ' model. This has been 
mentioned in previous chapters and can be seen as a sub-
siduary of a D-H framework. Not only is heat involved in 
producing movement - in this case on a molecular level -
it also induces the microscopic particles to migrate along 
an object (commonly the iron bar (Hs». Here, CUshla is 
less certain than other students about this phenomena and 
at one point makes a distinction between hot particles that 
move and heat that 'saturates' into the material of the 
bar. This comment has already been described in extracts 
68 and 98. 
The general comments to be drawn from all four sets 
of interviews are left to the end of the chapter. It is 
worth noting here, however, some early differences between 
students. These are particularly marked between Colin and 
Cushla. For example, Colin uses a few minutes of each 
interview to orientate his thoughts and then begins to 
develop and pursue strong ideas. The conceptions he devel-
ops however, do not always carryover from interview to 
interview. He identifies closely with the issue in each 
case and ~ the interview in order to explore his own 
confident explanations. His ideas are firmly in mind, he 
tests his own statements; uses his own personal experience, 
balances and assembles his conceptual ising over each inter-
view. Cushla, on the other hand, grows in involvement both 
with each task, and issue, and with every interview that 
takes place. Despite this, her ideas remain remarkably 
consistent - even though the interviews are spread over a 
6.48 
much longer period. For example, her account of a chemical 
reaction is very similar even after a period of some two 
and a half years. She rarely refers to personal experience 
and seldom overtly tests her own statements. More than 
Colin she is apt to offer standard 'school science' 
aphorisms and when pressed, rather than weigh ideas and 
substantiate conclusions, makes statements she then recants. 
She entertains fewer borderline cases and designated a much 
larger number of non-examples (often without proffering a 
reason) • 
It is interesting now to compare these students with 
the next two. 
6.3: Petina's Interviews 
Petina's interviews are like COlids". She warms to 
the task quickly and soon becomes involved with the task 
so that she takes advantage of the situation to expand her 
ideas. The order of the interviews is like that of Cushl~s 
- energy, force, light and then heat. Each interview is 
almost exactly forty minutes long - within a minute or two, 
and in each session she manages to shape it very much her 
own way. 
Petina's Energy Interview (Pl,4E) 
She has one dominant conception throughout the inter-
view. It might best be described by using the analogy of 
a cold water cistern. Like the water in the cistern she 
conceptualises energy as something that continuously builds 
up inside something to be then released. 
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rapidly (quickly flushed) and used. It is a continuous 
process so tnat even as the expenditure takes place the 
energy is continuing its slow build-up. She calls the 
build-up energy 'potential' and the release 'kinetic'. 
In the interview it is a conception that is discussed at 
length - she relates it to batteries; ghosts; food; sledges 
and it forms a" central part of her own definition of energy. 
The interview outline is in figure 70. She describes it 
thus: 
P. it /energy/ changes things ••• I mean it makes them move 
and if things are still it keeps them still •••• and 
if they're still then the energy builds up •••• and as 
they move they sort of ~ the energy •••• if they're 
staying still they're not really using the energy they've 
got •••• they're using a little bit but they're not 
really using as much as if they're dOing something ••• 
I. when you say you ~ it. what are you thinking of? 
P. well •••• if you have a good sleep I think the energy's 
building up for the next day •• but the body's also 
using up energy to make sure everything's alright 
inside the body ••• the flow of blood •• the heart beat 
•• in the m~scles •• but as ~ its building up for 
the next day. 
It is a conception of energy as an inexorab'le (drip-
ping) aggregation that is released in movement, but even 
as it is, the next accumulation is being began. 
It is a conception of energy that lies to one side of 
the energy frameworks. It is 'depository' in that she sees 
it as deposited within objects and yet it is (continuously) 
refuelable. She indicates its outcome in terms of overt 
activity - D-E and O-E frameworks are the most straight-
forward to evidence from the transcript. 
At various times in the interview she suggests that 
energy is synonymous with force, heat, electricity and power. 
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IAI CARDS 
Box (El) 
Battery (E"') 
Ghost (EJ) 
Hot water (E4) 
Reaction (E5) 
Lens (E6) 
FRAMEWORKS 
D-E 
D-E; O-E; F-E 
D-E 
D-E; P-E; C-H 
D-E; P-E; I-E 
P-H 
Noneg; D-E 
OVERLAPS 
Potential 
Energy and electricity are 
synonymous, electrons, 
potential difference, force; 
heat; pressure 
Distinguishes between static 
and moving objects 
Distinguishes between heated 
and hot; heat and energy are 
synonymous; molecules, 
particles. 
Reaction, chemical energy 
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COMMENTARY 
The energy is in the men and is poten-
tial energy in~he box. 
Energy travels round the circuit from 
the battery. The bulb uses up elect-
rons which leaves less in the battery 
which then wears away. The resistor is 
a pressure-force a~ainst the electricity 
it becomes hot bnd gives off liqht. 
Energy is produced to do something. 
Ghost has energy inside it if it moves 
If it is stationary then it is building 
energy ready for the next move. 
There is energy in the water. It has 
been heated but it only gives off 
energy if its reall~ hot. Particles or 
molecules are moving about because it 
is hot, they're still if it is cool, 
though water itself has energy. 
Reactions are usually violent and then 
produce energy the more violence the 
more energy. Chemical energy comes 
from chemicals - this is similar to 
the battery (E2). 
There's no energy in it and it doesn't 
do anything. There:maybe energy to 
enlarge the letters. 
Continued .•• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
ENERGY IS ••• 
Meal (E7) I-E; D-E; T-E 
Ice (E8) T-E; D-E 
Sledge (E9) O-E; D-E; T-E 
Clock (Ell) O-E; D-E; F-E 
ENERGY IS P-E; D-E 
Figure 70 
OVERLAPS 
Synonymous with force 
Carbohydrates. Energy is 
synonymous with fooo. 
Heat; light; temperature 
Kinetic energy; potential 
energy; gravity is a force 
not energy. Weight and 
gravity are separate 
Light; work; radioactivity 
is separate yet related to 
light. 
Power and energy synonymous 
6.52 
COMMENTARY 
It changes things - makes ther,: more and 
keeps them still. If still they buil~ 
up energy ready for mov~ment. This is 
true of people when they sleep. 
Energy is used to eat, and produced by 
eating. Body sends energy in the blood 
to the narts that need it. Food is 
energy though some (mars bars) have 
more than others (lettuce). 
The molecules are being broken down 
by energy in the ice and around it. 
Both heat and light are connected and 
corne from the sun. 
It has dnwnhill energy and some stored 
in the sledge. Potential energy is 
energy that builds up inside something. 
Both gravity and the weight of the man 
pull the ~edge down. Energy is both a 
fuel and a force. 
The bell is doing energy as is the 
ticking. There's energy inside to make 
it .,.iork Luminous dial is radioactive 
and continuous. Energy is in the 
'spring works.' 
The power to make things work; power 
is a build up of large amounts of 
energy inside you. 
Gravity, however, i~ a force and not energy and operates in 
addition to an objects weight. Both power and potential 
energy are 'build-ups' of energy, the former in particularly 
large amounts, the latter when objects are stationary - in 
preparation for action. Like Colin, she maintains that 
water itself is energy, like Cushla she presents her own 
version of kinetic theory in her account of water and ice. 
Petina's Force Interview (P2,4F) 
The interview outline is figure 71. There are three 
interesting points in the interview which are themes that 
run through it. The first is a distinction she draws between 
physical force and mental force. This latter is indeed 
a force and she uses it to include the three orthodox non-
examples (told (F3), robber (FlO) and thinker (F6» as 
j 
examples. 
The second pOint is her separation of force and energy. 
Her conception of energy is very similar to that of her 
previous interview - it is deposited inside things and is 
refuelable. Force, on the other hand, is applied to things 
and lasts as long as is necessary. She establishes this 
conception of force (of 'physical' force) early on and 
argues that forces are not in things but are applied ~o 
them. Thus the stone (Fl), tree (FS), diver (F4) and golfer 
(FS) are all examples of physical forces whilst the three 
cards already mentioned are mental ones. The rocket is a 
non-example because she cannot see anything pushing it. 
She introduces energy to account for the golfball landing 
on the green (F9) and explains it as follOWS: 
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IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Stone (FI) O-F 
Rocket (F2) Noneg 
Told (F3) A-F 
Tree (F5) E-F 
Diver (F4) C-Fi E-F 
Robber (FlO) A-F 
Golfer (F8) M-Fi I-F 
OVERLAPS 
Distinction between physical 
force and mental force 
Kinetic energy 
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COMMENTARY 
Obviously a force because you can see 
it being physically pulled by the men. 
It's not obvious that there's any force 
there. Could be in the blast to push 
it up. 
Person is being forced to do as he's 
told. Would be a physical force if the 
other person dragged him along the 
floor. Mental force is a force. 
A good example of force because there 
is actually something pushing the tree. 
Wind is a force on the tree. The tree 
has nO-force - i~has kinetic energy. 
Force is from the person to the board. 
When released the board just springs 
back free to its 'normal' position. 
It doesn't have force but is a force 
on the diver:--
A mental force -'hand over the money 
or be ki lIed'. 
The force is the·hi~. There's also the 
force of movement as it goes - in the 
direction of movement. 
continued ••• 
IAI CARDS 
Green (F9) 
Sledge (F7) 
Thinker (F6) 
Book (FII) 
Balloon (FI2) 
FRAMEWORKS 
M-F; D-E; A-E 
Noneg 
I-F 
A-F 
C-F 
C-F; D-F 
Astronaut (FI3) Noneg 
Moon (F14) C-F; noneg 
Figure 71 
OVERLAPS 
Power; gravity, a distinction 
between energy and fmrce. 
Energy 
Gravity 
Gravity 
Gravity 
Gravity 
6.55 
COMMENTARY 
This is an example of energy not force. 
Gravity pulls the ball down until it 
runs out of energy. Energy runs out 
because it is powered by something -
it must be refuelled. Force is applied 
to things and lasts as long as you 
lIke. Gravity is a force you can't 
avoid that tugs things down. 
This is force not energy since nothing 
is pushing it. Movement force mi~ht 
run out. There's no force at the 
bottom of the hill. 
It is a natural, mental force. 
Gravity is holding book and table down. 
otherwise they'd float. Gravity is 
longlasting. 
The man acts like gravity to hold the 
ball down. The balloon has a force 
inside it and would go upwards if 
released in space. 
There is no gravity, nothing to push 
on or grip. 
There's no real force, gravity is very 
small. Gravity is to do with atmosphere. 
P. you put force ~ something you could push it or pull 
it .. tug at it. you could move it in a certain way 
.. any way you want to. but energy has got to be. 
something that contains energy has got to be refuelled 
• it will run out of fuel· eventually and so. it's 
something that only lasts certain times. whereas 
force can last as long as it wants to really •. 
For this reason she classifies the green card (F9) a non-
example since it is energy and not force. 
She then faces a difficulty on the next card showing 
the sledge coming down a hill (F7). It is not energy 
(because 'there is no energy pushing it') and yet it 'runs 
out of force'. She decides that maybe some 'moving' forces 
can run out and makes it a special case by putting it separate 
from the other pictures on the bench. 
The third interesting point concerns gravity, and in 
particular in relation to the balloon. Gravity is her 
typical example of a durable non-refuelable force that 
'holds things down'. The balloon, however, has a force in 
it so that it is able to 'overpower' gravity to escape -
her one piece of evidence for a D-F framework. During the 
course of this discussion she develops a small 'thought-
experiment' for herself: what would happen if an astronaut 
took a hydrogen balloon such as this into space and released 
it? If there is no gravity to overpower what would happen? 
She decides: 
P. well if it was up in space •• I suppose the balloon'd 
go away justas soon a.s the man let go of the balloon 
••• the balloon'd just go on UP •• 
The reason being that the hydrogen would be a force 
in the balloon. 
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Petina's Light Interview (P,4L) 
In a manner very similar to the other two light inter-
views, Petina's discussions are dominated by responses that 
fit a Decoupled framework. She discusses each card at length 
and categorises only one (the x-rays) as a non-example. 
The outline is provided in fiqure 72. Her 'decoupled' 
responses hinge on her conception of an image - something 
she returns to three or four times in the conversation. 
The session ends with her discussing the eye, when she re-
introduces the notion of an image. She has previously said 
that an image is an exact replica that is 'planted' on a 
screen and when talking about the eye, says that an image 
is made on the retina. She then ~ays: 
P. at least I suppose its an image ••• it's not the same 
sort of image las previously/ 
I. why what are you thinking of? 
P. • ••.• I'm not sure if the image in your eye is turned 
upside down or something isn't it •• the light crosses 
over •• two rays of light cross over at the back and 
eventually join at the retina ••• whereas here lin a 
mirror/ you just get a straight reflection in the 
glass and that doesn't happen at the back of your 
eye •• 
/a moment later/ 
the lens lin the eye/ causes light to come to a point 
at the back of your retina to a dot whereas here /the 
projector/ they're projected straight onto the screen •• 
An interpretation of this response is as follows: 
Petina has been taught the operation of the eye in physics 
using a (customary) ray diagram to show two lines converging 
on the retina - often part of a disctlssion about defects of 
the eye and so on. This stylised explanation is far removed 
from the dynamic, colour-full, 'living' image she experiences 
each time she opens her eyes (or that she sees in a mirror, 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Mirror (LI) D-L; A-L 
Projector (L2) P-L; D-L 
Rainbow (L4) C-L; A-L 
T.V. (L3) P-L; D-L 
Battery (LIO) P-L 
X-Ray (L7) Noneg 
OVERLAPS 
Image; reflection 
Image; reflection 
1 
Image 
Power; electricity 
Radiation 
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COMMENTARY 
Light shines on the mirror so that the 
person can see himself. The light is 
the ~eneral' light in the room. It is 
said that the image is as far behind 
the mirror as the person is in front. 
This is not so. tbe in.age is on the 
mirror not in it. (Extract 72~ 
A beam of light is projected onto the 
screen and that light makes the image 
appear. It is not reflected back but 
just 'planted'-oll the screen. 
Light is made of seven colours. The 
white light 'all around' separates when 
it shines on rain (or glass). This is 
not an image since it is not a replica 
of something. 
Same as projector. Light projects onto 
the screen and allows you to see the 
picture. I~s a screen and projector 
all in one. 
Power passes down the wires and goes in 
circles. Light is projected from the 
bulb by the power. Electricity is 
made from chemicals. 
It is not light but radioactive rays 
(<<, p and~) which penetrate the body. 
continued ••• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Lens (L9) D-L; C-H; N-H 
Sunbathing (La) O-L; P-L; C-L 
A-L 
LIGHT IS ••• 
Figure 72 
OVERLAPS 
Heat and light are separate 
yet related; power; colour; 
density. 
Ray 
Image 
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COMMENTARY 
Light going into the lens makes words 
appear larger. They would still be 
magnified in the dark - we just wouldn'l 
be able to see them, unless you switch 
on a light. It is caused by the density 
of the glass. Bright spots of light 
produce heat. Power from the sun is hot. 
Both light and heat from the sun cause 
suntan. A ray is lots of pieces of 
light clustered together. Clouds make 
them break appart and separate. In a 
room they are all joined up to give 
just a lighted room. 
Hard to define. Is natural and opposite 
to dark, causes reflection and images 
in the retina. This is unlike other 
images - it is an upside down dot. 
or on a screen). She distinguishes, then between light 
rays and seeing 'exact' images. The action of light in 
terms of rays, reflections, focusing etcetera is decoupled 
from the action of looking and seeing. 
Clearly there are other interpretations, and whether 
this description could be used for other students' 'decouoled' 
responses is doubtful. However, her discussion does offer 
a possibility of an explanation for this particular concep-
tion. She says at one point that 'if you let your eyes get 
used to it you ~ see in the dark'. This leads her to 
wonder if a hand lens will 'magnify a word' in the dark and 
she says: 
P. in the dark it will ~!!!! be magnified but you won't 
be able to see it •• well you WOUldn't be able to see 
it unless you switch on the light and then you would 
be abe to see it ----
I. but in the dark 
P. yes it would be magnified 
Another pOint of interest is the 'planting' of the 
image on the screen by the projector. It resembles COlin's 
'barrier' model: the light is projected from the projector 
but goes no further than the screen (she is quite clear that 
it is £21 reflected). Similarly the television is a kind 
of 'back-projection' so that the image travels to the screen, 
is lit, and then seen. 
She describes a beam, too, as a composition of rays -
all clustered together - and which break appart and separate 
when corning between clouds (for instance). On a number 
of occasions she says that it is difficult to explain light 
or to describe how it works. She says she despairs of ever 
knowing about rainbows - and decides to ask her teacher at 
the end of the interview. 
Petina's Heat Interview (P,6H) 
Like the energy and light interviews, this heat one is 
dominated by a single conception. Each of the instances 
discussed is judged as to whether or not heat is ~iven off' 
- five of the thirteen cards are categorised as non-examples 
on this basis. 'Given off' means transmitted to the immediate 
surroundings and is not just a property of hot objects but 
of chemical ~eactions, moving objects and electricity as 
well. The outline of the interview is figure 73. 
In the interview, Petina is especially forthcoming 
and generates five separate debates with herself (with 
some assistance from the interviewer). The first of these 
- about temperature - she leaves unresolved, but the other 
four she brings to some conclusion. She develops each of 
these arguments at length throughout the interview, return-
ing to them cards later, and tests her ideas both against 
her own personal experience and its logical consequences. 
The first debate is the temperature one. It begins 
with the chemical reaction and continues with the card about 
two pies (H3) which follows. Temperature she says, is a 
measure of how 'high' the heat is: 
P. •• temperature is how high the heat is •• sort of •• 
I'm searching for an example. heat given off at a 
hundred degrees has a higher temperature than heat 
given off at fifty degrees. thats what I think temper-
ature is ••• 
Of the pies, she decides that the larger pie is giving 
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IAI CARDS 
III (HI) 
Reaction (H2) 
Pies (H3) 
Argument (H4) 
Iron bar (HS) 
Ice (H6) 
Flower (H7) 
Pepper (H8) 
FRAMEWORI:S 
M-Hi N-H 
M-Hi P-H 
M-H 
Noneg; M-H 
D-H 
M-H; R-Hi P-H 
Nonegi M-H 
Nonegi M-H 
Noneg; M-H 
OVERLAPS 
Temperature 
Temperature; reaction 
Temperature, 
Reaction 
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COMMENTARY 
Heat is given off from objects. Temper-
ature is a measure of the heat given 
off. Person gives off heat if they are 
above normal temperature. 
Heat is given off in chemical reactions 
when chemicals combine. For example, 
ACID + ALKALI gives heat. Temperature 
is how high the heat is. 
The larger pie has more heat given off 
yet both are at the same temperature. 
The smaller pie cools more quickly. 
No heat given off. You can get hot if 
you wave your arms, your blood rises 
and you go red. 
Heat given off by the burner moves 
along the bar because it is a conductor 
The heat spreads and is cooled at the 
water end; it just reduces. It is 
similar to the reaction card - burner 
and iron produces heat. 
No heat given off. Some heat in the 
air from other 'given-off' heat. 
No heat given off. 
No heat given off. Just a taste. 
Continued ••• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
House (H9) N-H 
Dustbin (HIO) M-H; R-H 
Cliff (HII) Noneg; M-H 
HEAT IS ••• M-H; G-H; N-H 
Mixer (HI2) M-H; D-H 
Astronaut (HI3) C-H; R-H 
Figure 73 
OVERLAPS 
Rays; light 
Energy 
Electricity; insulator 
Energy; radiation 
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COMMENTARY 
The sun's rays heat the house - the 
tiles and bricks but not the glass. 
Heat and light come together from the 
sun. 
No heat is given off. There is some 
heat in the bin and coat, they might 
retain some heat. 
No heat is given off. 
Energy given off by hot bodies. A 
lighted match is hot and gives off 
heat and burns your hand. Heat can 
accumulate in things. 
Electricity is hot, bare live wires 
will show a rise in temperature. Wires 
are normnlly (heat) insulated. The 
mixer blades produce heat as they turn 
- fast rubbing makes heat be given off. 
There is heat from the rocket motors 
Also space is hot - rockets at the top 
of the atmosphere get hot. Silver space 
suits radiate heat less then black ones 
would. Black attracts heat which is 
why windows don't get hot. 
off more heat and yet both pies are at the same temperature. 
A moment later, she decides that the smaller pie will cool 
most quickly since it looses its heat to the air 'more 
quicker'. She is aware of some of the ambiguities of what 
she has been saying, begins a rationale in terms of surface 
area and then asks to shelve the idea. 
P. no I can't think about that •• no. put it aside here 
and we'll go on •• 
She returns to it a little later as she sorts through the 
cards but again abandons it. 
Her second debate centres on whether heat accumulates 
in things rather than staying at a constant level. A flame, 
she says, is hot because it gives off heat and: 
P. a radiator is hot ••• if you put your hand on it long 
enough you get burnt •••• well I remember that one 
because my aunt put somethi~g on a radiator to dry 
and it started burning eventually •• yeS it did actually 
•• it started burning. that's what I associate with 
something getting hot 
I. how does that happen? 
P. I'm not sure •• I think it gets hotter up to a point. 
I'm' not sure. I've tried it actually •• you put your 
hand on a radiat~r and I think it gets hotter and 
hotter and then after a while you don't really seem 
to feel any difference ••• I don't know but you might 
get burnt •• it does get hotter but then I think it 
stops after a certain amount of time •• 
She suggests that things have their own temperature and that 
when this is reached 'the temperature stops'. 
The third debate concerns glass and whether it can 
heat up. When discussing the hou~e card (H9) she thinks 
bricks and tiles will get hot but not windows: 
P. when there's a really hot day and I've put my hand 
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on the glass I don't think I've ever really felt it 
being hot .. whereas if you put your hand on slate or 
something. its hot. 
She returns to this later and decides that it is because 
glass is silvery and does not attract heat. 
p. that's probably why windows don't really get all that 
hot ••• probably because they're shiny and transpar~nt 
•.• the heat's not really attracted towards them. and 
that's why hlack slates are really hot with the summer 
••• it could be the property of glass I'm nor really 
sure •••• 
The fourth is a discussion as to whether electricity 
itself is hot. Here, again, she designs for herself a small 
'thought experiment': 
P. I was thinkjng of an elp.ctrical appliance and •• umh 
•• does electricity have to .be· hot? 
I. a good question 
P. I'm not sure about that one. if. you know. when current 
is flowing it comes hot ••• it vou actually parted the 
wires so they were bare and then stuck a thermometer 
in there between them ••• 
I. what do you think? 
P. I suppose they'd be hot. I've never tried it reall" ••• 
I guess it would go up. it would have to because an 
electric kettle ••••• yes it does because the filament 
in an electric kettle gets hotter and boils the water 
so it ~ to go up 
I. and what about an ordinary wire carrying it /electricity/ 
P. its a higher temperature than the surroundings yes 
I think so 
I. can you feel it? 
P. no because its got an insulator around it. 
The fifth debate is about heat is space. Unsure, she 
eventually decides that space is hot because she remembers 
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something about rockets getting hotter at the top of the 
atmosphere. 
These (mostly) self-generated discussions illustrate 
clearly the level, and the qualitv, of the arguments she 
uses. As with Colin, they betoken an involvement with the 
issues at hand and a willingness to reflect openly - with 
little self-consciousness - about her own puzzles. They 
illustrate, too, the sources of some of the conceptions and 
the rationales for them. There is little in this last inter-
view to indicate her most recent A-level work and many of 
her conceptions - about reactions, energy, force and so on, 
remain remarkably consistent over time. 
6.4: Susie's Interviews 
Susie's interviews develop in two distinct ways. 
She builds upon each one of the interviews in turn and 
continues to elaborate on themes across all four. In 
particular, she begins a distinction in the first between 
natural and unnatural ('forced' or 'deliberate') effects 
which she returns to and incorporates into each successive 
discussion. The essence of this conception of common phen-
omena - that the distinction exists and can be seen to 
operate in all things - changes little in the two years or 
so that separates the first and last interviews. 
In contrast, her responses can be seen to develop in 
terms of school science orthodoxy - she incorporates more 
'acceptable science' into her answers. This is particularly 
so at A-level where her discussions of heat show a mArk~d 
difference in terms of quality of argument to (say) her 
fifth year discussion of energy, where she also discusses 
heat. Nor is this 'A-level ihFluence' simply at an aphor-
istic level - there is evidence for a change in a range of 
her conceptions. Susie's interviews are in the order force 
energy, light and heat. 
Susie's Force Interview (S4,4F) 
The outline of the interview is figure 74. She begins 
to delineate 'natural' and 'deliberate' forces in the fou~th 
and fifth cards about the tree (F5) and the diving board 
(F4). For the tree, she makes the case that the wind is 
a force which 'pressurises' the tree over from its natural 
position. Similarly, when a diver walks out onto a diving 
board he is deliberately 'forcing' the board, which returns 
to its natural position after the diver leaves the board. 
It is at this point she wants to reserve the term 'natural' 
for the wind as a natural ferce and'deliberata forces for 
man-made occurences. She then re-phrases her summary of the 
wind card (F5) to say that, should the wind stop, the tree 
returns to 'its usual position'. 
This distinction carries over into the orthodox non-
examples - told (F3) and robber (FlO). In both.:cases she 
includes them ~ examples of deliberate force - forcing 
something to do something it would not otherwise do. This 
allows her to include a number of anthropomorphisms. 
The other interesting feature of this interview, is 
her conception of gravity. It is invoked to explain the 
falling of objects in flight rather than any already on 
the ground. Discussing the landing golfball (F9) she says: 
s. there's a gravity force pulling it down •••• it's like 
the apple dropping from the tree (laughs) 
I. I see. tell me about gravtty 
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IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Stone (FI) O-F 
Rocket (F2) E-Fi A-F 
Told (F3) A-F 
Tree (F5) E-F 
Diver (F4) D-F 
Robber (FlO) A-F 
Golfer (F8) M-F 
OVERLAPS 
Energy and force separate 
and related. 
Contact and noncontact 
forces. 
Pressure 
Gravity 
1 
6.68 
COMMENTARY 
Force is in the molecules in the 
shoulders-and in the ropes. 
There's a lot of energy present so 
there must be force, where its trying 
to push itself off the ground. More 
energy means more fcrc~ - force is 
produced by energy. Without energy we 
cannot force anything to do anything. 
There is force in the speech of the 
person - a noncontact force. Some 
forces - like forcing a screw into a 
hole are contact. Others - like the 
wind - are not. 
The wind is a force. It is forcing the 
tree because the wind has pressure. 
The tree has no force it returns to 
position naturally. 
The person is the force, not the board. 
There is no force in water. The board 
returns to its USUnl position because 
like the tree, it is flexible. 
Robber has force because he has a 
weapon. 
The golfer is the force which goes 
into the ball. Gravity pulls it down. 
Continued ••• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Green (F9) C-F; M-F 
Sledge (F7) E-F; M-F 
Thinker (F6) Noneg 
Book (Fll) Noneg 
FOHCE IS •.. M-F; D-F 
Balloon (FI2) D-F 
Astronaut (FI3) D-F 
Moon (FI4) Noneg 
Figure 74 
OVERLAPS 
Gravity 
movement 
movement 
1 
movement 
Gravity; pressure 
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COMMENTARY 
Gravity forces ball down. It has some-
thing to do with air. It doesn't act 
if you are stuck down on the ground, 
only if in the air. 
Sledge has force and speed. Force is 
in the slope which gives force to 
sledge. Force runs out on the straight 
and there's no movement. 
You don't pull your brain. 
There's no movement - its just sitting 
there. There's nothing moving it. 
The ability to move something or to do 
something. There must be movement for 
there to be a force. 
The gas inside the balloon has force to 
go up. No gravity on the balloon unless 
it comes down. 
The astronaut has force; will float 
like the balloon if he's not tied to 
the rocket. 
No gravity on moon; pressure is diff-
erent too. Astronau~ will float. There 
is no gravity he's not falling. It's 
hard to sit on the floor in space. 
s. I think it's got something to do with air hasn't it 
.. I'm not sure 
I. you haven't mentioned it before with these /other 
cards/ 
s. . ... air. in a way they're /the earlier cards/ linked 
with this. the gravity's in the air but ••.• no they've 
really got nothing to do with gravity because they're 
stuck down •• 
Later, she discusses the balloon - which has no gravity 
unless it bursts and is then brought down. For the astro-
naut on the moon she also argues that therp i~ no gravity -
consequently in tripping he will not fall. She says 
S. there's no gravity and the pressure there's different 
so everything floats •• he'll just float. he won't 
fall down or hurt his bottom he'll just float like 
that ••• its like this one /the astronaut in space/ 
•. there's no gravity because he's not falling •• 
It is not just that she identifies gravity as being 
present because of objects falling but that it is only 2ll 
falling objects. 
Susie's Energy Interview 
Susie categorises over half (seven out of thirteen) 
of themrds as non-examples. This is generally on the basis 
of whether or not something is happening in the picture. 
She returns to the distinction began in the force interviews 
in the sledge (E9) and meal (E7) cards and particularly when 
she is asked to define energy. This teen dominates the 
remainder of the interview so that the remaining cards are 
all considered in this vein (figure 75). Energy and power 
are synonymous throughout. She uses ~his more to describe forced 
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IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Snow (EIO) Noneg 
Sme 11 (E13) Noneg; D-E 
Lens (E6) Noneg 
Ice (E8) O-E 
Sledge (E9) O-E 
Clouds (E16) Nonegi O-E 
Clock (Ell) Noneg; F-E 
Meal (E7) A-E; O-E 
Stars (ElS) Nonegi O-E 
OVERLAPS 
Power 
1 
Poweri speed 
speed 
Power 
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COMMENTARY 
Not much ene~gy there. 
No energy. Maybe ~ome in the person. 
No energy at all. Not power but strengt 
There must be energy- somethi~g is 
happening in the ice. The ice is 
producing some enargy. 
Speed is energy, it is the power of 
the movement- The sledge has no power 
in itself but in the way it comes d0wn 
There's no energy if its standing still 
Even snow has more energy than clouds -
at leas~ it is doing something (ie., 
falling) • 
Like the sledge it has no power itself 
it works automatically. There's no 
thought behind it. Power is when you 
~ things happen. Otherwise its 
nature. 
Energy comes from the person in their 
movements. 
They're not dOing anything. 
continued ••• 
IAI CARDS 
ENERGY IS •• 
Flower (E14) 
Hot Water (E4) 
Box (EI) 
Battery (E2) 
Figure 75 
FRAMEWORKS 
T-E; I-E 
P-E; D-E 
P-E; I-E; D-E; 
T-E 
Noneg; O-E 
A-E 
D-Ei I-E 
OVERLAPS 
Power and energy are synon-
ymous; A distinction is 
drawn bptween natural (force 
energy} and 'forced' (force; 
energy) • 
Force 
Force 
1 
Power and energy are synon-
ymous; force 
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COMMENTARY 
There are different sorts of energy -
physical energy; electrical energy; 
movement energy; chemical energy; in 
the steam in power stations to turn 
turbines. It originates in coal or oil 
and when the steam is used it turns 
into electricity and produces power. 
Energy is stored and teen released to 
the parts that need it. Must do some-
thing to it to release it. 
Makes its own energy in the leaves. 
If there's steam then there's energy 
but not much. The water won't stay hot 
for long. It needs energy to produce 
energy. Some energy is rechargeable 
(like in water) but others not (coal) 
Hot water is forced force. 
The box has no force or energy; the 
person has. The box can't do anything 
the person has 'forced' force and 
can walk away. 
There is stored energy in the battery 
which produces power from the chemicals. 
The circuit must be joined before 
energy is released. It's 'forced' 
force: the chemicals are not naturally 
found together. 
energy situations (deliberate ones) rather than natural 
(automatic) energy cases. The search for things 'happen-
ing' in each instance is important and evidence for an 
Ostensive framework (O-E). The 'forced-natural' distinction 
takes place only after some occurence has been established. 
Part of the 'forced-natural' distinction is in the 
deliberate release of energy. That is, typical of an I-E 
framework, energy can be present in an instance but waiting 
for some agent to release it, or some action to take pla~e 
for it to occur. In describing the battery for example, 
she says: 
S, when the power lin the battery/ is allowed to be let 
loose it can go along to the bulb and light it •. but 
I'd call that forced force", because the chemicals 
are thrown together •• I mean they're not naturally 
found together so I'd call that forced force 
r. I see well tell me what happens in the circuit 
S. well it's /energy/power/ sort of all along the wires 
••• but it won't do anything unless something else 
comes alonq to push it around 
I. how do you mean? 
S. its a bit like the sort of energy in the food t~at 
won't do anything until we digest it or something 
like that 
I. and in this case 
s. its the switch that does it ••• 
Susie's Light Interview 
This is a comparatively short interview and many of 
the responses are recogniseably similar to responses in 
the other three light interviews in this chapter. Susie 
responds to mirrors projectors and lenses in a way that is 
typical of a Decoupled framework. 
b • 'J3 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Mirror (Ll) D-L 
Projector (L2) O-L; P-L; D-L 
Candle (L6) O-L; P-L; M-L 
Rainbow (L4) M-L; C-L 
T.V. (L3) P-L; C-L 
OVERLAPS 
Reflection 
i 
Reflection: image 
Synonymity between heat and 
light from the sun; other-
wise separate and related. 
Refraction; colour. 
Distinction between pure 
(natural) and manmade light 
colour. 
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COMMENTARY 
Light is reflected. If the room was 
dark, one couidn't see the reflection 
there must be some light in orcpr to 
see it. 
The bulb in the projector is obviously 
light which produces the image on the 
screen. An image is what you see. It 
is projected ~ the screen and does 
not bounce off. A reflection comes 
back. A projection is something gOing 
~y onto a screen to be seen. 
Candle is an obvious source of light -
it 'throws' it out. Burning produces 
light (as does electricity). Light is 
to do with heat but not heat with 
light - except both the same in the 
sun. Otherwise heat produces light. 
Refraction r.auses rainbow by light 
going through water and then being 
refracted into colours. Colours are 
different forms of light: light is a 
mixture of colours, rainbow is a 
mixture of primary colours (!). ColourE 
from a filter are given to light. 
The picture is made of light (manmade) 
to produce three colours projected 
from a gun at the back of the screen -
faster than the eye can see. 
continued ••• 
IAI CARDS FRAMEWORKS 
Painting (L5) Noneg~ O-L 
Sunbathing (La) O-L; C-H 
Lens (L9) 
X-Ray (L7) Noneg 
Battery (L10) 
Figure 76 
OVERLAPS 
Heat and light are separate 
yet related 
Reflection; image 
Radioactivity 
Heat and light are combined 
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COMMENTARY 
It is not a source of light. If it 
were dark, you couldn't see it. 
The sun is a source of heat and light 
combined. The light causes the tan 
(as in sunbeds). 
Light is reflect~d onto words and then 
magnified. The lens pulls and stretches 
the image to magnify it. 
These rays are radioactive and not 
light. They pick out the light and 
dark bits of the body. 
The bulb is heated by electricity and 
gives out light. The battery is like 
a pumping station, so that electricity 
is pumped out of the battery to the 
bUlb. It eventually runs out. 
Initially she treats images md reflections as synonymous 
but later makes a distinction, so that an image is what 
one sees on a surface whilst a reflection bounces off it. 
Similar to others, she makes a separation between pure 
(natural) light and artificial (man-made) electric light. 
The interview outline is figure 76. 
One point of difference is that she makes references 
to refraction as the 'separation' of light into colours. 
This is in the context of the rainbow (L4). It is an 
interestinq discussion because it embr~es the colours in 
a slide projector as well as those (later) on a television 
screen. Although she is sure that refraction is the separ-
ation of light into colours. She is unsure if it is separated 
into the primary colours or not. A second complication 
arises with a question about a colour filter (for the 
projector). That does not separate the light but caanges 
it (later, the television relies on primary colours again). 
The conversation is as follows: 
S. we only get rainbows when its raining and the sun's 
out so the light goes through the water and is refracted 
into its colours 
I. •• what are colours? 
S. • ••• they're different forms of light •• the white 
light is refracted into its different colours 
I· is it similar to what you were saying about the proj-
ector? 
s ..... that's light being shone through something and 
it just sort of gives that colour which it's being 
shone through it's not being refracted •• it's just 
going through something straight •••• you see when 
you have a slide its not just a blur of colours it 
has definite areas of colour ••• in this case /she 
waves her hand in front of her to indicate the light 
in the room/ it's white light which is a mixture of 
colours 
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I. why can't we see them? 
s. because they're not refracted .. but in that / a colour 
slide or filter/ as the light goes through. its white 
• and as it goes through say red so it turns to red 
I. what do you mean when you say it turns red? 
s. it's just sort of being given that colour which it's 
shone through. it /the filter/ is just giving that 
colour •• 
This conception of light filters as 'giving' colour, 
or d~ng the light is part of a Modal Light framework. 
That is, white light has things added to it in cenain circ-
umstances. Susie is clearly unsure quite how refraction 
works (she does not, for example, elaborate on what a 'form' 
of light might be) • 
susie's Heat Interview 
This final interview again, raises some already fam-
iliar issues. It entertains notions of temperature (as a 
'measure of heat'): of particles in motion: of heat rising, 
of cold as the opposite of heat and other such conceptions. 
It is outlined in figure 77. There are two departures from 
the other heat. interviews discussed in deail so tar. Firstly 
it presents a slightly different conception of energy, in 
terms of exothermic and endothermic reactions. Secondly, 
it retains a remarkably consistent conception of phenomena 
- ~fter natural force, natural energy and natural light 
an introduction is now made to natural (as opposed to 
'forced') heat. 
The first of these departures is of interest because, 
like Susie's conception of refraction, it represents an 
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IAI CARD FRAMEWORKS 
III (HI) N-H; R-H 
Reaction (H2) D-E; P-E; P-H 
Pies (H3) M-H; R-H 
Argument (H4) N-H 
Iron Bar (H5) R-H; M-H; A-F 
OVERLAF'JS 
Temperature 
Reaction; energy; exothermic; 
endothermic; atoms; molecules 
electrons. 
Temperature 
Force 
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COMMENTARY 
There's some body heat and some heat 
in the blankets. Temperature is a 
measure of heat. 
Endothermic reactions take in energy 
so that the surrounding air temperature 
drops. Exothermic reactions give 
out energy so air temperature rises. 
It is how atoms combine - they either 
have energy to give out orreyuire it 
to combine. It depends on the chemicals 
Both pies have the same heat since 
they're in the same oven. The top of 
the oven is hotter since hot air rises. 
Both pies cool at the same rate. The 
small one heats up more quickly though 
as long as there is enough time, they 
both then have the same heat. 
Maybe body teronerature rises if 
adrenalin flows in the blood. 
The hot end will be hot, the cold end 
cold, the middle cool. Heat might 
spread but coldness will move up the 
bar from the cold end. The bnr is not 
forcing itself to be heated, it's 
just happenin; to it. 
continued ... 
IAI CARD 
Ice (H6) 
Flower (H7) 
Pepper (H8) 
HO'lse (H9) 
FRAMEWORKS 
A-E: D-H; C-H; 
M-H 
C-H 
P-H 
C-H; R-H 
Astronaut (H13) Noneg 
Mixer (H12) R-H 
HEAT IS ••• 
Figure 77 
OVERLAPS COMMENTARY 
~ 1 
Force; temperature; particles The temperature of the ice is ri~ingi 
Energy; light, is separate 
yet related to theat, photo-
synthesis. 
Exothermic reaction. 
Light is produced by hent 
Vacuum 
Force; electricity 
Distinction between natural 
and unnatural heat 
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it wouLdn't melt otherwise. The room 
must be heated by gas or electricity. 
Frozen particles can't move, if heated 
they move about. Ice does not want 
to change but is forced to by heat or 
cOld. Some substances are frozen at 
room temperature. Heat makes mercury 
particles move about and u~ a thermomet 
The energy frem the sun is needed for 
photosynthesis:is heat not light. There 
are different kinds of energy (for 
example; heat, electricity). The 
flower is similar to a hUIr.an b 0 d.Yi .it 
has its own temperature. 
Pepper must be a chemical reaction -
exothermic. One could do an experiment 
to see if one's temperature rises. 
~he sun is a ball of fire. Heat prod-
uces light. The heat accumulates in 
the house. 
There is no heat in a vacuum. Also 
its colder on other planets - one is 
just ice. 
Electrical appliances get hot where 
the electricity comes in. They are not 
meant to - the electricity forces them. 
There's natural heat in bodies and 
unnatural heat from electricity. 
attempt to explore and examine (quite consciously) and 
to introduce it into her account. It is an account that 
lasts for about four minutes, that may not ~ long but it 
represents some 12% of the whole interview (thirty three 
minutes). During that period she describes reactions com-
fortably - it is a description she seems to feel is system-
atic. That is, the strong impression One has of her descr-
iptions suggests that she makes sense of the propositions 
and images that she has incorporated into her conceptions 
of 'reactions' and 'energy'. At one point, for example, 
she says: 
S. it is to do with how the molecules combine •• it depends 
on the electron structure of the reactants ••• the 
electron structure is besically re-arranged and if 
it's more stabe ••• or if it's less stable heat will 
be taken in •• and heat. sorry.-not necessarily heat 
but some form of activity will be given out if the 
reactant. if the products are more stable:7. its the 
electrons in the chemical reactions which determine 
whether there's any e~ergy change 
Curiously, to balance this level of argument and 
explanation, she refers at another time to heat in contrast 
to cold (as spreading up the iron bar, for example). It 
is a juxtaposition of sophisticated A-level explanation 
(almost) alongside a more unorthodox conception of hot and 
cold. Of the iron bar she says: 
S. is it cold or hot water? 
I. well let's say it's cold 
S. well in that case that end /burner/ would heat up 
and that /tap/ end wOuld •••• remain ••• the same •• 
it depends how cold the cold water is 
I. and what happens at th~ middle? 
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s. oh •.. if it's very cold water then the sort of coldness 
wo~ld. move up the bar .. 
In the course of the interview this apparent disloc-
ation of explanation (bet\'reen reactant stability and spread-
ing coldness) is not immediately discernible. Each card is 
taken as it comes and, in a period of just over half an 
hour, it is only possible to ask for inter-linking explan-
ations once or twice without disrupting the flow of conver-
, f 
sation. Hence the single reference to exothermic in the 
'pepper' card. 
The second departure - the reintroduction of the 
natural/unnatural distinction - begins, again, with the iron 
bar card (H5). At the very end of this discussion - as 
she is about to consider another card - Susie says: 
S. • •••••• er •• the iron bar's sort of •.• it's not forcing 
anything on itself it's just being heated or cooled 
by different means it's the same as the pies ••• 
Within the flow of events this statement is allowed to pass. 
However, some minutes later (during the next card, H6), she 
says of the block of ice~ 
R. ..the water lin the ice/ is being forced ••• no ••• 
the water's not wanting to be heated or cooled but if 
it is iforced/ it will go through a chnnge ••• 
This element of anthropomorphism con tlnues, Farticular1y 
towards the end of the interview. She says of a cake mixer 
(H12) : 
S. I suppo~e most things do get hot ••• after a while. 
but. ~hey're not meant to get hot •• they're meant to 
do scmething else lik~ mixing cakes 
/a moment later/ 
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the thing /mix~r/ is not actually meant to get hot 
..• but it does of its O\ffi accord because the 8 1 ect-
tricity makes it .. 
She then continues, following a requestb define heat, to £ay: 
S. yes. I'd say there's sort vf ••• natural heat ••• body 
tem~erature ••• the san .• and there's •••.• unnatural 
heat (laughs) •• sort of electricity 
6.5: Summary 
Chapters four and five have both been entirely concerned 
with alternative frameworks. This chapter has been taken 
up with more personalised conceptions. Four young people, 
four separate interviews each. The intention has b~en 
both to flesh out some of the frameworks that have been 
discussed previously . (beyond the example extracts that have 
been provided) and to draw specific insights from a more 
detailed appraisal of individual interviews. 
Before embar~inq on a gen~ralised summary, however, 
a number of caveats are in order. One thing which is 
clearly problematic is th~ status of a par~icular utterance 
in the response of an individual about a specific instance. 
The person may, of course, be lying, fantasising or teasing 
the researcher throughout the interview. Whilst any, or 
all, of these is possible, where it is discernible it is 
noted as such and due allowance is made. If it is a subtle, 
forty minute charade undetected by the interviewer then it 
is included here as a serious and respectable transcript. 
The researcher has no other way of knowing. 
More serious is the probability that, to another 
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interviewer, in another context, these students would have 
percieved different opportunities to examine the same con-
cepts. Perhaps the experience of having formulated a posit-
ion and allowed it to mature is both context bound and yet 
context independent - the next time it happens it is a 
little different. In this sense the interviews are moments 
in the history of conceptions that are changing. At the 
same time uttering and reconstructing a view of a situation 
(some months later) does a considerable amount to change 
that view. The interviews are quite clearly potent learn-
ing events. 
The first general pOint focuses on the uneasy alliance 
between their 'school science' explanations, and the students' 
own. This division is, of course, a contrived one and not 
easy to maintain. School, after all, is a major component 
of the students' own world and therefore their 'own' awareness 
cannot be independe nt, ,·tarring factions against those they 
use from science. Yet it seems unlikely that the natural/ 
man-made division of phenomena is one that is emphasised 
in school science. All four of these students use it at 
some pOint and two of them (Colin and Susie) make use of it 
as a strong theme for many (for Susie, - all) of the concept 
areas. Arguably, fuen, it is a conceptualisation of phen-
omena they find useful that is independant of the state-
ments made in school science. 
It is interesting to speculate why it might be useful. 
Tempting as it may be to look for parallels between Aristotle's 
natural and 'violent' (forced) events, these are not pursued 
here. It would seem that for these students these two 
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categories allow them to organise, and reorganise, explan-
ations. They have different expectations of each set of 
actions and of their own confidence in beng able to invoke 
explanations for them. To some extent this rests on their 
expectations of repetition and generaliseable application 
to new situations - part of the 'rules' of the interviews. 
This works both ways: if an occurence can be designated 
'natural' then it can be given a cursory explanation, safe 
in the expectation that one need not have explanations for 
nature - and can carry this expectation over into other 
situations. It is man-made, artefactual, actions that are 
to be expained - and ~ be explained - because they are 
deliberately done for reasons which are supposededly known. 
On the other hand, there are man-made explanations they can 
hint at, but not provide, because they are not privy to 
them ('we haven't donethat yet'; 'I don't do chemistr0. 
In this sense they might be more willing to give 'natural' 
explanations in their own terms (of power, speed, strength, 
flexibility and so on) rather than attempt complex 'scien-
tific' explanations which they might feel are beyond them. 
One problem with that interpretation of their use of 
natural and man-made categories is that it suggests the' 
students opt for safe, cO~lfortable explanations and reasons. 
This, however, is certainly not always the case and Colin's 
transcript (appendix !II) is a useful example of a student 
using the interview to explore tentative ideas and to voice 
puzzles and paradoxes. However, the two categories do 
appear useful as a means of organising the ~ of explan-
ations one might expect of it. 
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A second feature of these four sets of interviews is 
the abundant evidence for a Decoupled framework. To recall 
from chapter four, this framework derives its name from a 
study reported by Jung (19 8 m. In the report, Jung says of 
a common-sense framework of light that: 
'Light is conceptualised as brightness, which is 
the condition for actually percieving colours through a 
transparent medium such as air, water or glass 1 •.... 1 
In this and many similar arguments the re~ation between 
light and the eye remains implicit 1 ... 1 there is a clear 
indication of the decoupling between seeing the mirror 
and receiving light from the mirror into the eye' 
(emphasis added) ----
Much of this can be read into the responses given 
by all four of these students. Part of it is a distinction 
between (pure white) light and images. It is one thing to 
discuss ray optics in terms of the streaks of white light 
from a ray box and quite another to explain seeing an image 
in a mirror. Light of course, reflects off a mirror, as 
happens when one 'dazzles' a friend by reflecting the sun 
into their face. But it seems far less obvious that ones 
image reflects off a mirror (if so, where does it appear?). 
The school science answer that a visual image is formed in 
the eye would seem too remde a description for the 'living' 
image on the mirror in front of you. 
Not all of the responses should be seen as an anti-
pathy between personal models and school science. As is 
quite clear, many responses are reconstructions of school 
science and examplescr this are the many discussions of 
energy, forms of energy, the behaviour of energy and so on. 
Needless to say, all of those reconstructions take place 
in a personalised way so that Cushla's 'happening' energy 
and Petina's (and COlin's) 'rechargeable energy build ups' 
6. 
are individual conceptualisations. 
A final point of interest to be drawn from this ~t 
of interviews concerns some of the differences discernable 
in tee accounts. None of the responses to the same card 
are identical in detail which, given the theoretical pers-
uasion of this study, is entirely to be expected. For 
example the four responses to the iron bar (HS) can be 
paraphrased as follows: 
Co: The burner heats the first quarter of the bar - on 
the outside. The other end is simply wet from the 
water. Heat 'reacts~ with iron in various ways. 
Cu: Heat is excerted onto the bar from the burner. Hot 
molecules move but heat itself does not. 
f: Some three quarters of the bar is hot and only the 
end at the tap is cOld. The burner reacts with the 
iron to produce heat. 
S: Some one third of the bar at the burner end is hot, 
the middle third cool and the fuird by the tap cold. 
Heat spreads in one direction and cold in the other. 
The bar is not forcing itself to be heated or cooled. 
Given that these descriptions are significantly diff-
erant across the interviews, the question is, how well do 
they sit with responses within the interviews? The answer 
is that, as can be seen from figures 64, 69, 73 and 77, 
that they are at once both within and 'wHhout' of the remain-
der of the interview. As much. of course, can be said for 
any of the responses to any of the cards. However it is 
worth staying with iron bar card (HS) as an example. For 
Colin, this instance marks a departure from other explan-
at ions in that he does not use it to develop the dominant 
conception of heat being a sensory experience. Nor in 
other instances does he restrict heat to local regions as 
he does here. However, in terms of 'reactions' taking place, 
he uses this in a number of other cases (the chemicals, the 
ice and the flower). 
For eusha this is the only example where she discusses 
heat moving (if only later to contradict herself and decide 
otherwise). However she discusses 'particles' in other 
instances. Petina incorporates it, partly, into her con-
ception of heat as 'given off' (by the burner) but introduces, 
for the only time, the notion of the heat at the tap end, 
simply 'reducing'. Elsewhere she describes it as being 
transmitted to the surroundings. Finally, for Susie, the 
bar is another example of her forced/natural conception of 
phenomena and yet is the most explicit description of 'moving 
coldness' • 
The point to be made is that there is no overall 
general trend towards a greater unification of ideas across 
all instances. In some cases, students create new concep-
tions quite separate from previous ones; they amend on-
gOing ones to cater for new circumstances and, in'many cases 
persist with initial theories for as long as they can. 
In some situations they effectively override comolicating 
factors and argue a simplified case, in others they intro-
duce seemingly unnecessary developments and argue an expan-
sive and elaborate construction. Moreover, these different 
conceptions can sometimes sit side by side in an interview 
with apparently no anomaly being acknowledged by the student. 
A powerful example of this, is Susie's description of exothermic 
and endothermic reactions followed a few moments later by 
iron bars not 'wanting' to be heated. 
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Introduction 
The preceding chapters have endeavoured to explore the 
central themes and pervasive concerns of this study. This 
final chapter is an attempt to review some of these, to 
raise further points, and to re-place the study in a wider 
educational context. In broad terms the major issues 
concern the particular methodology used; the research out-
comes and their relation to the research questions; the 
implications of these outcomes for future research and 
pointers discernible for the principles and practice of 
science education in schools. These issues are discussed 
in this order and are accorded a section each. 
7.1: Methodological Considerations 
In chapter 2, part of the discussion focused on the 
methodological checks to be employed. It was argued there 
that methods of justifying research outcomes in paradigm 
2 research might well differ from the traditional methods 
of paradigm 1. The proposal in this study is that the 
traditional meanings of the terms reliability and validity 
are innapropriate in their application to the style of 
work accomplished here. Terhart (1983) describes this 
shift in perspective from paradigm 1 to paradigm 2 as 
follows: 
'The old empiristic idea of reaching truth by a 
maximum correspondence between facts and concepts has been 
changed to the idea of gaining 'truth' by establishing a 
maximum correspondence between the 'naive' folk-models 
and their scientific description and systemisation.' 
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Terhart continues by accusing more recent research of 
solving the problem of validity by ignoring it on the 
grounds that 'the quest for validity is seen as a treason 
leading back to the old 'positivistic' obsessions.' 
In this study there is no intention of ignoring the 
necessity to present the outcomes of the research to critical 
scrutiny and re-interpretation. However the traditional 
meaning of the term validity encompasses something to one 
side of this: commonly the assessment of a measure in terms 
of its degree of association with dimensions whose natures 
are, supposedly, already understood. The options are, 
therefore, either to redefine the term validity to encompass 
a broader set of 'validating' activities, or to choose a 
separate term which does not address validity in its narrow 
sense but focuses attention on a wider range of validatory 
processes. The first course is one taken, for example, 
by Bliss, Monk and Ogborn (1983) who pOint out that any 
system of description needs to be 'in some sense' both 
valid and reliable. They suggest that validity can encompass 
the notion of being 'appropriate in kind', 'complete', 
'faithful', whilst reliability might include a 'good enough 
degree of agreement between people as to how to use a system 
to describe data.' 
The intention here is to choose the second course. 
Without wanting to lose the richness and functionality 
suggested by a broader meaning of validity, the term still 
retains its overtones of prediction and measurement rather 
than description and interpretation. This is not to eschew 
the use of the term, suitably defined, in other contexts. 
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However, to be compatible with a study that hopes to gain 
insights into the 'constructed worlds' of the participants 
and the researcher, the 'validity' of such constructions 
is not at issue. Here, the term chosen is 'communicative 
authentication'. The position to be adopted is that: 
a) it is a necessary outcome of conducting research in a 
constructive alternativist mode that there can be no ~ 
single set of criteria by which to judge the outcomes of 
an interpretative exercise; 
b) it also follows that the opposite pole of the notion 
of authentication need not necessarily be in-authentic, 
or false. The process of authentication is not a validation 
whereby failure to concur with various criteria demarcates 
a particular interpretation as in-valid, but rather as an 
alternative (if less useful) one; 
c) therefore, the methodological procedures of checking 
and authenticating data outcomes are party to the same 
arguments as shaped the generation and ana~ysis of the 
data in the first place. As Bannister and Mair (1968) 
suggest, they are 'an intrinsic part of the same argument 
and not a sudden breakthrough into an independent reality': 
d) that a constructive alternativist approach informs 
methodological pluralism (Swift, watts and Pope, 1983). 
That is, not only are there many varied criteria by which 
to judge research outcomes, but there are many methods by 
which these criteria can be approached, so long as they 
are consistent with the metaphysical assumptions implicit 
and explicit in the study; 
e) an important criterion for the authentication of 
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research must be the utility of the outcomes to both the 
researcher, the researched and the appropriate interested 
community. The outcomes must be more than just ends in 
themselves and some attempt must be made to assess the 
possible consequences of their proposed use; 
f) it is incumbent upon researchers in such inquiries 
as are encompassed by paradigm 2 to test out their hypo-
theses by generating and developing different ways of 
evaluating the significance of their research outcomes. 
The 'box of tools' (Swift, Watts and Pope, 1983) available 
in the field is still short of varied yet appropriate 
instruments. 
Much of what has been said of validity can be applied 
to the term 'reliability' as well. In this study, for 
example, the interview is not intended as a closely replic-
able 'reliable' test instrument nor, given the basic assump-
tions of active personal construal by the students involved, 
would that be an obviously useful avenue of approach. 
Bliss, Monk and Ogborn (1983) do offer some guide-
lines, which are that a system of description: 
be judged within the terms set by the mode of research 
within which it is embedded; 
give a description of data intended(that is, intended 
by the' analys~ and be judged by how well it fulfills the 
analyst's intentions; 
should be clear and complete enough for its purposes: 
it ought not to leave obvious relevant holes; 
should be self-consistent, not allowing self-contra-
dictory or absurd accounts of things, 
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have a level or grain of detail that matches the 
task, given that it is best if concise; 
be understandable and learnable: 
should avoid clumsiness of expression; 
should be fitting, give a faithful rather than a 
distorted picture; 
should, in some significant sense, transcend the 
original, to describe data ~ something rather than merely 
repeat or copy it. 
Such an approach to the justification of research is suffic-
iently different from paradigm 1 accounts of reliability 
and validity as to deserve renaming. Here, the term 'comm-
unicative authentication' is chosen in the sense of a 
process of establishing and attributing credence for a 
piece of work and as a process of facilitating the generation 
of alternative interpretations. Thus it is not justific-
ation in a passive sense but a dialogical engagement with 
the participants to explore the interpretations of the 
data. 
There is no suggestion that the activities to be 
described are comprehensive, complete or in any sense a 
finished and polished 'product'. They do, however, represent 
an exploration of the views of three groups of people on 
how far, and within what limits, the research outcomes are 
seen to be feasible. At a personal level, this means 
checking that the interviewer has managed to avoid misin-
terpreting or misrepresenting the responses of an interviewee. 
At a more public level, it means generating debate as to 
whether the reported research outcomes (in terms of frameworks) 
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are credible, coherent, functional and, in some cases, 
utilitarian. 
Terhart (1982) gives three general criteria for 
considering the sucess of such a dialogical authenticating 
exercise, that: 
the production of the data and the research process 
itself be lucid and understood by all its members, including 
its subjects. This 'communicativity' is similar to some 
of the criteria used by Bliss, Monk and Ogborn (1983) 
above; 
the results gained should enhance the consciousness 
of all those involved in the research process, and make 
visible its implicit rules of action and routines. That 
is, interpretative research aims at the lucidity of the 
implicit grammar of educational processes, a notion Terhart 
calls 'transparency'; 
the transparency of structures must be displayed in 
such a way that it is possible to draw out consequences. 
This suggests that above being a subtle description of 
the processes in question the results have to be action-
able. Terhart calls this 'intervention.' 
One potential line of approach to authentication, 
then, might be one that observed some of ~e check list 
guidelines of Bliss, Monk and Ogborn (1983) and might be 
evaluated as to their appropriateness by Terhart's (1982) 
criteria. As suggested earlier, the three audiences adjudged 
to be relevant are the researched (the students involved), 
the possible users of the outcomes (science teachers) and 
interested members of the research community. In the 
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discussion of the processes of communicative authentication 
used here, these three groups are discussed in this order. 
It needs to be said that the chronology of events differed 
from this, a pOint to be taken up in the summary. 
i) Authenticating the Outcomes with Students 
There are two levels at which authentication can take 
place with the students - at the level of their own concep-
tions and at a level of constructed frameworks. Both levels 
present their own advantages and difficulties. 
The first involves an attempt by the interviewer to 
re-present the conceptions argued for by an interviewee, 
during a particular part of the session. The intention is 
both to summarise some specific set of pronounciations and 
to gain comment from the student on the interviewer's 
interpretations of their arguments. This strategy is 
described at the beginning of the interview when outlining 
the task and commonly follows the pattern established in 
the following (interviewer's) extract: 
I and then one of the questions I'll ask you is if 
I've got it or not ••• I'll be trying to work out 
if I can see what you mean and some times I'll try 
and sum it up • what I think you've said. and ~ 
sometimes you don't agree that that's what you've 
said you'll have to tell me •• say 'f never said 
that' you know. because sometimes I don't quite 
get what people mean and might go away without properly 
understanding what you meant to say ••• 
During the conversation the interviewer signals 
this process by (typically) saying 'hang on a moment. 
let me see if I understand what you're saying'. In the 
following extract J (J,3H) is conceptualising heat as 
being either 'artificial' (as in chemical reactions or 
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chili powder) or 'natural' (as in body-heat or a burner 
flame) . 
Extract 130 
I. aha. okay. can I see if I've got you right! you've 
got some /cardsl as natural heat and this one Ipepper 
Hal YOU-call this one artificial do you? 
J. because that one is like an artificial heat and so 
is this one /chemical reaction H2/ 
I. I see and have I got you right about the natural ones? 
J. yes ••• I'd call that one 1111, Hl1 natural. ill in 
bed. and these are natural. they're kind of • they 
come from us so they're natural but these are made 
up • and sO's that one lIce, H61 so I think them 
three should go together •• lin one pilei 
(J,3H) 
On some occasions, students take the opportunity to deny 
or amend the interviewer's summary, however, the majority 
of such summations (on average four or five in a forty 
minute session) are similar to that above. An ammendment, 
for example, might aake the form: 
Extract 131 
I. • •• have I got it? 
C. well it sounds different when you say it like that • 
I mean its almost like that but there are other 
things as well and you have to mention those 
I. oh what sort of things? 
(C,4H) 
In both of these extracts, whilst there is (almost) 
agreement on the interviewer's interpretation of meanings, 
it is rather more the case that the summary serves as a 
pOint for elaboration or further description. Whereas the 
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interviewer is searching for some check on similarities 
between constructions, the interviewee makes use of the 
opportunity to secure the argument and 'drive it home'. 
The advantages of such an authentication process are 
that it allows some clarification of conceptions at the actual 
time of their presentation - an attempt to test out const-
ructions at the pOint of issue. That the student uses this 
as a platform for consolidating the conception is not a 
disadvantage unless there is no disagreement at all. That 
is, if the roles of the two participants are perceived as 
such that the student will not contradict or dispute the 
interviewer's representations. Whereas there ~ examples 
of this, more so with students in the youngest age groups, 
there is ample evidence of 'differences of opinion' in the 
majority of interviews to allow some modicum of confidence 
in the interviewer's eventual interpretations. 
The second level of approach concerns some authenti-
cation of the constructed frameworks from a number of 
transcripts. In practice this has taken on a more elaborate 
procedure than that described above. It has reVOlved 
around a questionnaire concerning the frameworks from 
each of the concept areas. An example of one such quest-
ionnaire (on the energy frameworks) is shown in appendix 
II. The questions for each set of frameworks follow a 
similar pattern. As can be seen from the energy example, 
the first page is a set of instructions. These are 
presented as follows: 
'On the following pages you will find some of the 
sorts of things that young people in school might 
say about the word energy. Their discussions of 
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of energy have been summarised by seven different 
statements, one on each page. I would like to know 
how you react to each statement. Under each one, 
are some extracts from their talk that could be 
examples of the statements. There are also some 
pictures of what is being talked about'. 
The statements are non-technical sUmmaries of the 
frameworks, the extracts are 'tidied' by the inClusion of 
punctuation and capital letters and the pictures are reduced 
versions of the relevant IAI cards. The instructions 
continue by requesting: 
'Please read each statement and write a brief note 
of your reactions in response to the following three 
questions: 
- Do you find it believable? That is, do you think 
these are the sorts of things that young people would 
say? 
- Is it sensible? Does it make sense for someone to 
talk about energy this way? 
- Is it a useful way to talk about energy?' 
The three questions stem from an attempt to tackle 
Terhart's 'transparency' in the particular context of this 
research. That is, it is a process of going beyond some 
interpretation of students' 'inner worlds' to generating 
a dialogue {between the interpreter and the interpreted) 
concerning the plausibility of the interpretations. The 
purpose is threefold: 
to assess the credibility, sensibility and utility 
of interpreting concepts (and students' responses to them) 
in this way: 
to sharpen the presentation of the research outcomes; 
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to develop further insights into other interpretations 
of the same phenomena. 
Whereas in some cases (discussed later) the frameworks 
have been presented in full along with sample transcript 
material, here it was thought necessary to 'decode' the 
frameworks into the framework-statemeris on the questionnaire. 
These have been used in three distinctive ways. 
Firstly, students have been asked to complete the task as 
a written questionnaire to gather individual assessments 
of the frameworks portrayed. Secondly, and most commonly, 
they have been used as a basis for interviewing individual 
students. Thirdly, and in one case only (for enerqy), 
they have been used as a focus for a group discussion with-
out an adult present but whilst being videotaped. In 
the first two cases, the students who responded to the 
questionnaire have been students previously interviewed 
about the concepts. 
These procedures and the responses gained are discussed 
in this order below. 
a) The students' written responses 
It needs to be said that this was the least success-
ful approach to gathering responses to the frameworks. 
In all, nine energy and three each of force, heat and 
light questionnaires were used in this way. They were 
all used with year 4 students, bar two energy questionn-
aires, which were used with year 6 students. The responses 
received in this way were cursory, often in the extreme. 
Few gave any other response other than a 'yes' to each of 
the questions (some simply ticked each one). The energy 
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questionnaire was prepared and used first, and from that 
pOint it became quickly apparent that i~ use as a simple 
written exercise was flawed. 
One notable exception to this low level of response 
is on one of the energy questi~naires where a year 6 student 
made an attempt to provide fairly detailed responses. 
She answered for all of the framework statements that they 
are believable - that they are the sort of statements one 
might overhear someone else saying. She made one exception, 
to statement 6,where energy is said to be associated with 
machines. She noted that this might well be what 'young 
boys' might say, but that it was neither a sensible nor 
useful way of talking about energy. Of the others, she 
suggested that they are all in part both sensible and useful 
but are rather 'limited' ways of talking about energy. 
b) The questionnaires as a basis for interviews 
Given the shortcomings of the first approach it was 
decided to continue to explore this process of authentic-
ation by adapting the questionnaire for use as a basis for 
interviews. The interview's were conducted in a manner 
similar to the concept interviews themselves, that is, in 
an anteroom to the classroom, one-to-one and audio-recorded. 
In total, four energy and three each on force, heat and 
light frameworks were conducted. The interviews on the 
whole are of much shorter duration than the concepts ones 
- being about 15 to 20 minutes long. 
There are two main categories of response detectable 
in all thirteen of the interviews. The first concerns 
comments about the interviewee's o~ conception of energy, 
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force, heat and light. The second concerns their comments 
around the framework - statements as attributed to other 
students. For the first of these, it is quite clear that 
students find great difficulty in commenting upon other 
people's statements without raising, structuring and devel-
oping thar ~ conceptions. Their own conceptions are 
then used as a backdrop against which to judge the frame-
work-statements. That is, they are often unwilling to 
attempt a disinterested scrutiny of the credibility, coherence 
or utility of someone else's argument. The evidence of 
these interviews is that they prefer to make such judge-
ments as and when other students' arguments interact with 
their own. This aspect is more pronounced when disparities 
occur, rather than in agreement with the statements. In 
the latter case it is more difficult to decide whether 
the students see the framework-statements as credible, 
sensible and useful because they themselves would use it, 
or because they see it as useful for someone else to argue 
in that fashion. In disagreeing with the statements, 
however, they are more inclined to pOint out its short-
comings by reference to their own conceptions. For example, 
B is a year 4 student discussing framework-statements 
about force. In this example B is discussing a short 
statement of the Operative Force framework (O-F): 
'Force is an action: the amount of force is related 
to the amount of activity taking place.' 
In response to this B says: 
Extract 132 
B •••• yes I •• I understand what they're getting at • 
you know they sort of think of it as things happening 
and the more force there is the more things are 
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happening. I mean I can believe someone would be 
actually talking about it like that 
I. you see what they're getting at 
B. I think I do . I mean I wouldn't say it like that 
but you can see why someone else might 
I. does it make sense to talk about force that way? 
B. in a way it does you know where there are lots of 
things going on there must be some forces there but 
I think there's some force there too. /a person 
holding a balloon; card F12/. I mean he's holding 
the balloon but he's not doing much •• I think there's 
force in him 
I. so is it a useful way to talk about force? 
B. well it is in a way but it doesn't cover everything 
I mean its useful because it can be understood and 
people know what you're talking about ••• 
In this example B has reservations about the sensib-
ility of the statement only in that it is a partial desc-
ription of force and fails to encompass his own view that 
force would be designated to the person (evidence for a 
Designated Force (D-F) framework). 
A second example is taken from an interview about 
the energy frameworks. E is a sixth year student who is 
discussing the last statement on the energy questionnaire 
- about the 'flow' of energy. In the questionnaire the 
statement reads: 
'Energy is something that can flow from place to 
place. It can also move from one object to another'. 
Extract 133 
E responds as follows: 
E. • •• I think its quite a useful way of describing it 
I suppose. I mean it doesn't actually flow (laughs) 
in the literal sense but ••• umh •• electrical energy 
•• that would be a good way of describing it • the 
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battery and the bulb and all that Ithe electrical 
circuit card E21 •. and the energy goes through him 
to the box IEll (laughs) it does in a sense I mean 
••• I suppose youngsters talk about energy like that 
that'd be the way they'd describe it 
I. do you find it believable? 
E. yea I can believe somebody would say you know ••• 
a child would say that. yea •• 
I. do you think it is a useful way of talking about 
energy? 
E. • •• yes I think •• well •• in the case of electrical 
energy it is because I mean it's sort of flow of 
electric and electrons ••• I'm not sure about things 
like light and heat •• that's a bit more difficult 
I. and does it make sense to talk about it in terms 
like that • in the case of the box for instance? 
E. no (laughs) not really ••• no its because ••• you've 
pushed and got energy into the box and sort of give 
••• you transfer some of your energy •• to make the 
box move •• I mean you don't actually •• oh I don't 
know ••• maybe a child or a youngster might see it 
that way I mean they might understand it like that 
I mean pushing the energy through them into the box 
•• it could be I suppose ••• ':/. 
Here E is unsure as to whether or not her own notion 
of energy transfer is the same as a flow of energy. Although 
she says that it is not a 'literal' flow and that it is 
not 'actually' the case, she is not at all sure how her 
own notion of 'transfer' differs from that of the statement. 
These two extracts are also useful in pointing up 
the second category of the interview responses - comments 
directed at the statements themselves. These can be seen 
to fall into three groups - full agreement with the state-
ments, partial agreement and no agreement at all. Of 
the thirteen interviews, seven responded positively to all 
of the frameworks. This is taken as evidence that these 
students could identify with the researcher's analysis 
and re-presentation of typical statements about the four 
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concepts. They could accept, too, lhow those statements 
mjght have been made in a serious attempt by other students 
to use the concepts during explanations of the situations 
depicted. In the remaining six interviews (2 energy, 2 
force, 1 heat, 1 light) some of the statements met with 
only partial agreement and some were disputed. Examples 
of partial agreement are illustrated in the two extracts 
above. In all cases, the paint was made that various 
statements were inadequate as a !£ll description of the 
concept in question although it served to describe some 
aspect of it. This is a pertinent comment. Given the 
description in previous chapters of how the frameworks have 
been constructed, and how they can be seen to be weighted 
towards different question types, it is likely that they 
might be seen as only partial in their description of a 
concept. As has been pointed out at several points, because 
the frameworks are not intended as all encompassing desc-
riptions, they are likely (quite rightly) to be seen as 
descriptors of one line of argument. These comments then, 
are not taken as evidence of the unrepresentative nature 
of the frameworks (or the statements) but of the recog-
nition by students of the limited range of convenience 
and applicability of the frameworks. 
The frameworks most discussed in these terms are as 
follows: 
Energy: I-Ei O-Ei P-Ei F-Ei T-E 
Force: C-Fi O-Fi S-F 
Heat: N-Hi P-Hi R-H 
Light: A-Li C-Li I-L 
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The third level of comments concern student disagree-
ment with some of the framework statements. An example 
of this is given below, where M, a year 4 student is discuss-
ing one of the energy statements. It says: 
'Energy is to do with machines where there are no 
machines switched on there is no energy.' 
(Statement 6) 
M responds to this by saying: 
Extract 134 
M. 
I. 
M. 
I. 
M. 
I. 
M. 
I. 
M. 
••••••• no I don't agree with it (laughs) no •• no 
I think that's a bit of rubbish really (laughs) 
I see (both laugh) •• in what way? 
• I 
well ~ts sort of silly 
do you believe that someone would say that sort of 
thing? 
they might. but then I'd say ~ they're wrong 
do you think it would be a sensible thing to say? 
• ••• well it all depends on what you're talking about 
• what ~ of energy • energy as a whole • no not 
really because I mean light sound heat that isn't 
really anything to do with machines 
is it a useful thing to say? 
no • lim not happy with that one it doesn't help you 
to think of energy just with machines 
A year 6 student, L gives a similar response, as follows: 
Extract 135 
L. • •• energy isn't to do with machines necessarily. 
it has something to do with them .•• and the second 
statement doesn't sound right as well 
I. not the second statement 
L. no. a machine can have energy even if it~ off • its. 
difficult to think that someone would say it's /energy/ 
just about machines when you've got fires and the 
sun and that 
I. I see •• do you think it makes sense at all? 
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L. well in a way .. I'd understand how they thought of 
energy but I wou~dn't agree with it •• it isn't very 
useful. I suppose either. I'd want to correct them 
and say what about other things' all the time .•• 
These extracts highlight the fact that it is possible 
and worthwhile representing outcomes to students, that 
they are able and willing to comment upon them , and that 
they can make their opinions clear to the researcher -
particularly in an interview situation. 
c) VideQ-taped peer discussions 
This aspect of the process is noted here for complete-
ness rather than for comparison. As an adjunct to their 
main study on children's perceptions of energy, Gilbert 
and Pope (1982) used the energy questionnaire as a basis 
for group discussions of the framework-statements. After 
an introduction to the task the students were left to 
discuss the questions without an interviewer. At this 
point of writing the resulting videotape data awaits a 
detailed analysis by the original researchers and so specific 
comments are not possible. 
From a number of brief viewings of the tapes, however, 
it is possible to say that in general, the data is consis-
tent with Gilbert and Pope's (1982) analysis of peer group 
discussion about energy itself and with comments made above 
about the use of the framework questionnaire. That is, 
youngsters are able to empathise, if not sympathise, with 
the framework-statements (and the included extracts) often 
on the basis that they represent credible - if partial -
descriptions of energy. 
7.18 
Before moving on to the next phase a general comment 
is worthwhile. Magoon (1977), in reviewing constructivist 
approaches in educational research, argues that researchers 
need to take the constructions of participants seriously 
if the discipline of educational research is to be 'reason-
ably comprehensive and self critical as a scientific 
endeavour'. Communicative authentication with these student 
participants has shown that the critical process is both 
possible and worthwhile. 
ii) Communicative Authentication with Teachers 
Authentication with teachers has taken a different 
approach to that described above: based on group discussion 
rather than individual interviews. A small group of four 
science teachers were asked to consider the frameworks 
in each of the concept areas in turn. These were discussed 
within the group so that the teachers made themselves 
familiar with the frameworks, the research technique and 
the purpose of the exercise. They were then provided with 
a" short (3 page) extract from four separate interviews, 
one each on energy, force, heat and light. They were 
asked to discuss each of the transcript extracts in terms 
of the relevant frameworks. The teachers are all experienced 
(London) teachers (more than three years of physics teach-
ing), the session lasted some 2; hours~ and notes were 
taken on the discussion (it was not audio-recorded). 
Once described, the process of generating the original 
transcript data seemed to be taken on trust (without query) 
and all four teachers took the remarks made by students as 
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credible. In this sense the authenticity of the data-
base was not questioned - in some cases it was supported 
by anecdotal evidence provided by the teachers themselves. 
The majority of all the frameworks in each of the concept 
areas were accepted as being cogent summaries of the 
responses made by students, particularly in relation to 
those frameworks which could be evidenced from the sample 
transcript material. Five frameworks (one in each of the 
concept areas, two in light) did generate debate: Produced 
-Energy; Configurative-Force; Normal-Heat; Composite-Light 
and Modal-Light. It is important to note that none of 
these frameworks were evidenced from the sample transcripts. 
In most cases the debate was concerned not so much with 
the frameworks as a pithy articulation of a common view-
point, but rather with the style and reasons for students' 
responses that gave rise to the framework. Typically the 
questions asked of the researcher were 'what sort of things 
were said in the interview?' and 'what would prompt the 
student to answer in that way'. Rather than challenging 
the framework as an interpretation of the data it was more 
an act of trying to see how such responses might have come 
about. 
In three cases the frameworks ~ challenged. The 
configurative force framework was felt to be too broad; 
it attempted to summarise too wide a range of responses. 
In part this criticism stems from the discussion above 
and the researcher's reporting of typical responses as 
evidence of the frameworks. Composite-Light and Modal-
Light were also debated at length. Much of the discussion 
centred on whether or not the division between the two 
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frameworks was 'forced' or not. In contrast to the Con-
figurative-Force discussion, it was felt here that perhaps 
the two frameworks were overly constrictive. A good deal 
of the latter part of the discussion on all of the frame-
works was taken up with debating common curriculum approaches 
and teaching points - whether or not they 'compounded' 
students' conceptions or not. In this context the frame-
works were felt to be an invaluable source of information 
on likely individual conceptions in a class. 
The debate as a whole has resulted in two outcomes. 
The first is a degree of confidence concerning the clarity 
and communicability of the frameworks to classroom pract-
itioners. The frameworks, the data, the purposes of the 
methodology and the intentions of the analyst can all be 
communicated - and handled - by others so that constructive 
criticism ~ emerge as a consequence of discussion. The 
second outcome is that the researcher undertook a consider-
able re-examination of data and frameworks, resulting in 
a tighter, clearer, more economically worded description 
of frameworks in relation to the transcripts. 
The advantages of such a process of authentication 
are much in that vein; it allows for some credibility of 
the frameworks to be established or contested, it allows 
the researcher to portray the mode of research within which 
the frameworks are embedded, it focuses debate on the 'fit' 
of frameworks to data in terms of commission or omission, 
it highlights the comprehensibility of the frameworks by 
others, and gives some indication of the utility of the 
research outcomes to the possible users. The disadvantages are tnt 
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it is difficult for people other than the analyst to make 
judgements of categories on the basis of a small amount 
of data, and yet a substantial amount of data is both 
unwieldy and time consuming. Certainly by bringing a 
particular audience together to consider research outcomes 
as a group, rather than approach them singly, means that 
the session is richer in the cross hatching of ideas and 
can therefore cover only a small amount of data and inter-
pretation of frameworks in any depth and detail. 
iii) Authentication with Co-Researchers 
This has taken two main forms using frameworks from 
only two of the concept areas. Both forms of the approach 
have been with- members of the Personal Construction of 
Knowledge Group at the University of Surrey, both working 
sessions of some 1; hours duration. The first, on force, 
fOllowed a similar design to that discussed earlier for 
teachers. The force frameworks were provided and discussed 
although in this case, the people present (11 members of 
the group) were already fairly familiar with the methodology 
'and purpose of the research. Each person was then provided 
with sample transcript material from three separate inter-
views and asked to code the responses towards the provided 
frameworks. The process was audio taped by permission of 
the group. The latter part of the discussion was taken 
up by focusing on one or two issues in the procedure. 
The data was left with the group members until a short while 
after the session to be completed and returned to the 
researcher. All were returned within two days. 
The outcomes of this process can be described as 
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follows. Specific comments concerned with attributing 
responses to certain frameworks met with a high degree of 
agreement. Most of the differences of opinion lay more 
with attributing certain responses than with the formul-
ation of the frameworks themselves. That is, they were 
disagreements about interpretations of the intentions of 
the speakers and not So much with the wording of the frame-
works. The overriding comment was how simUa r responses 
were in the three transcripts therefore how the task of 
attributing the responses grew easier with each one. The 
three were not originally chosen on that basis but were 
part of a batch of transcripts which had only recently 
been analysed and were, so to speak, on the top of the 
pile and so easily available. They were all from year 
4 age group interviews, two female, one male. 
Some general comments concerned the transcripts and 
the responses of the students in the wider context of 
science education. It was noted, for example, how unwilling 
(or unable) students are to differentiate between force, 
pressure and gravity, gravity and weight, force and energy 
etcetera. It was also noted that students seem quite 
willing to use 'thought experiments' to clarify their own 
thinking. A further pOint focused upon the consistent and 
widespread anthropomorphism in the responses. A final 
point concerned the interview itself being a 'learning 
event' and therefore not open in a straightforward way to 
traditional approaches of replicability. 
The second approach to authentication with co-researchers 
used a similar working session, of similar duration, but 
this time with the energy framework questionnaire discussed 
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earlier and shown in appendix V. Again, the exercise 
was introduced by a short discussion of the task and its 
context, and the session was then spent by the group 
responding in writing to the questions. Nine questionnaires 
were returned at the end of this session before a general 
discussion on the activity itself. As before,the framework 
statement most singled out for comment was number six 
concerning energy related to machines. In contrast to 
the other statements this was seen to be the most unbeliev-
able, unlikely and limited framework. Only one of the 
nine returns suggested that they might 'see how children 
could think this way from experience.' The other eight 
very much thought it was a 'rogue' statement and some 
hinted that it was a deliberate strategy by the researcher 
to insert into the questionnaire a clear 'non-example' 
of students' frameworks. All of the other framework-state-
ments met with both agreement and approval in the sense 
that they were taken to be authentic re-presentaotions of 
students' frameworks. 
General comments within the group about the authent-
ication procedure were mixed. It was seen to be a viable 
means of gaining perceptions on the outcomes from interested 
people only where they are prepared to make extended written 
responses. Otherwise it seems much more appropriate as 
a focus for individual or group interviews. 
iv) A Summary 
The methods used in this study for authenticating 
interpretations of the data bear little resemblance to the 
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traditional methodologies of educational research. A 
plurality of methods have been used to generate dialogues 
with relevant audiences concerning the interpretative 
outcomes, and the process of 'communicative authentication' 
has been explored in action. The order of presentation 
has not been the order of events and this is an important 
point. The discussion of the force frameworks with the 
research group preceded all of the other work with the 
exception of the summarising and representation of argument 
• 
during the course of the student concept interviews. 
Much of the discussion and comments which resulted 
from the discussion session with co-researchers has helped 
to shape the generation and development of the four frame-
work-statement questionnaires. These in turn have been 
adapted for use as interview schedules after their initial 
use with students as written questionnaires. That is, 
the methods have evolved over time in response to critical 
scrutiny and dialogical argument. 
The fruits of the exercise can be seen in the light 
of Terhart's (1982) criteria discussed earlier. The 
communicativity of the process of data production and 
analysis has met with very few obstacles. In some senses 
this has been eased by taking the research outcomes back 
to students who have been through the data gathering stage 
- even if they have been asked subsequently to comment 
about outcomes in concept areas different from their 
own interviews. In this context the co-researchers, too, 
have been familiar with the style and operation of the 
research. It is important, then, that the teachers (as 
the audience most removed from the research context) quickly 
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accepted the basis and conduct of the research without 
debate and instead focussed comment on the outcomes and 
the authentication process. 
Two main comments about the process of authentication 
can be noted. The first concerns a strong statement by 
both teachers and co-researchers that the enactment of a 
similar process with students, whilst desirable in principle 
is doubtful in practice. The reason given is that one 
could never be sure that agreement reached between student 
~d researcher is trustworthy. It was argued that because 
the relationship between researcher and researched is not 
equivalent when this is between student and adult, then 
social roles playa part in distorting perceptions. That 
is, students will agree, or fail to disagree, simply 
because of their perceived subordinate position. 
This argument, coming as it did before the use of the 
questionnaires with students, did not concur with the 
broad basis to be employed in this study. Some evidence 
to counter the argument - to indicate that students (part-
icularly older ones) are both able and willing t~ debate 
interpretations of the interview data - has been given. 
The second comment concerns the frameworks and the 
framework-statemerts used in the questionnaire. The frame-
works themselves have generally been quite straight forward 
in terms of their communicativity with notable exceptions 
(already mentioned) where some minor re-phrasing and re-
shaping has taken place as a result of dialogues with 
teachers and researchers. The concept-statements, however, 
have been subjected to greater debate. 
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The process of de-coding the frameworks into pithy 
summary statements has in some cases resulted in too great 
a dislocation from both the frameworks themselves and the 
originating responses. The decoding itself has been 
criticised as disembodying the frameworks to such an extent 
that it invites confusion as to the purpose of the task -
is it to judge the students who might have said such things, 
the framework - statements orfue frameworks themselves? 
Moreover, pithy framework-statements open the possibility 
to missing the essence of the framework and therefore of 
either being summarily dismissed or not allowing critical 
appraisal of the framework itself. This is taken to be the 
case in the discussion of statement 6 of the energy quest-
ionnaire. Whereas the Functional Energy (F-E) framework 
is readily summarised and evidenced from a range of trans-
cript responses, the framework-statement used may have 
had the effect of rendering the framework unrecogniseable. 
This is a dilemma for this style of validatory act-
ivity that remains unresolved. The mechanisms of decoding 
from constructed research outcomes to more available re-
presentations are essentially explicative. Within this 
explication, as the complexity of the outcomes is reduced 
so the risk of minimalising their import increases. To 
interpret data in a way that resulting descriptions trans-
cend the original might often require some re-description 
to make them available to differing audiences - with the 
attendant risk and vulnerability to dismissal. 
However, the enterprise is not geared to consensus 
but to debate, and the approach adopted here is taken as 
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a qualified success. The quality of comment generated 
from all three audiences - as evidenced by the example 
extracts - has allowed shaping to take place on the 
emphasis, wording and presentation of the frameworks in 
chapter 4. Clearly, it is important that such an authen-
tication process take place alongside the analysis of 
data (formatively) rather than at the very end as a one-
off summation. 
Terhart's (1982) notion of 'transparency' is less 
easy to evidence as a criterion of success. There is a 
very strong suggestion from each of the audiences (and 
most particularly from the students) that the procedure 
did raise awareness of their own conceptions of each concept 
area. In this sense it can be said to have enhanced the 
conciousness of the participants not least when making 
such remarks as 
'I hadn't thought of heat that way before' (student, 
year 4) 
'I don't think of it Iforcel like that but I can see 
how some of them would think that sort of thing' (teacher, 
about student frameworks). 
In this sense transparency can be seen as a growing 
appreciation of other viewpoints (as represented by the 
stylised frameworks), an appreciation of the very essence 
of constructive alternativism. 
The application of the frameworks to school science 
- their facility for intervention - is as yet untested. 
This is a pOint to be taken up later. In this case the 
most appropriate audience to judge (the teachers) were 
unanimous about the potential of the frameworks, even if 
they were less than clear as to how best operationalise 
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that potential. 
7.2: A Consideration of the Research Outcomes 
Much of the early work of this study within the first 
few chapters has been to establish the field of enquiry 
and the terms in which the discussions have taken place. 
Much of school science is broached in terms of concepts 
and it has been necessary to make a distinction between 
the concepts in the public-collective domain and the 
personal conceptions of individuals. The latter have been 
portrayed as actionable processes in the intentional 
internal organising of experience that are endemic to human 
affairs. They very much resemble Vygotsky's (1962) sense 
when he says: 
'A concept is not an isolated, ossified, changeless 
formation but an active part of the intellectual process, 
constantly engaged in serving communication, understanding 
and problem-solving ••••• concept formation is a creative, 
not a mechanical passive process: a concept emerges and 
takes its place in the course of a complex op~ration aimed 
at the solution of some problem, and the mere presence of 
external conditions favouring a mechanical linking of 
word and object does not suffice to produce a concept.' 
This approach to concepts has engendered a number 
of pervasive streams of emphasis in the work, which are 
as follows. Firstly, there is a strong leaning to a 
relativistic view of knowledge. The 'changing format' of 
knowledge is not something that takes place simply through 
the gradual vee.ring of time but is alternatively constructed 
by people in a manner that is dependant upon their vantage 
pOint as theory builden; 
This aspect of the approach is illustrated from the 
individual conceptions which are detailed in chapter 6. 
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Intuitive and implicit ideas on the nature (for example) 
of light are articulated to solve the problem as posed 
by the students' own perceptions of the instance cards. 
Selected snippets of previous experience; fragments of 
public knowledge from lessons, text books, television, 
hearsay; all combined with attitudes and interests, are 
synthesised to find a solution to the task that confronts 
the student. For Colin, for example, the need to account 
for images on screens (projector and television), the 
notion that these involve light, which in turn travels at 
a colossal speed, the vague workings of television trans-
mitters and receiver circuitry, are coalesced to form a 
conception of light that can be projected and yet slowed 
(to 'normal' speed in the television) and stopped (on the 
projector screen). Other such conceptions about energy, 
force, heat, molecules, gravity, pressure and so on 
illustrate this active creative process admirably. 
The abundant diversity of responses to each instance 
card has made the most obvious strategy, of simply categ-
orising responses, inoperable. In Kellyis (1970) words, 
the 'wit and imagination' of the students' alternative 
constructions is such as to preclude a direct collation 
of accounts. The frameworks are at a separate level of 
interpretation of the data, based on the cyclic process 
of analysis described in chapter 2, and are in terms of 
'modes' of light, 'regionalisation' of heat, 'affective' 
force, 'depository' energy and so on. They are an inter-
pretative device that has been a means of coping with the 
notion central to Kelly's theory: that people construe 
situations in a wide variety of different ways depending on 
their needs, imagination and the courage of their (in this 
case, linguistic) experimentation. The emphasis has been 
upon the very breadth of contextual variation of meaning 
employed by these youngsters. 
Secondly, this approach (and the emphasis of the 
study) leaves open the question of the durability of either 
conceptions or frameworks. How long lasting, for example, 
is Colin's conception of light, is difficult to say. The 
design of the study has not allowed for re-interviewing 
on the same concept area (with the same, or equivalent, 
cards) and so the issue cannot be approached directly. 
However, some pOints can be made. For instance, Susie's 
conceptions of 'natural' and 'unnatural' (or 'forced') 
entities are ones she retains for some two years and over 
four concept areas. They serve her throughout her O-level 
physics work and into her A level studies. In contrast, 
some of her other conceptions do not re-emerge even within 
the duration of a single interview. Clearly, some concep-
tions are much more relevant and/or useful than others. 
As with Colin's conception of pressure (which increases 
with height) conceptions are put forward at a particular 
moment in an interview so that they offer a good chance 
of both accounting for the phenomena and of potentially 
coping with others yet unseen. 
One point to be taken from this is that conceptions 
will last for as long as they are found to be useful. 
And utility may well be more a function of the purposes 
to which the conceptions are put (communication, under-
standing, problem-solving) than simply of time. It emphasises 
7.31 
Kelly's (1969) notion of the 'tentative utility of / ... / 
constructions' which he suggests are tested against 'such 
ad interim criteria as the successful prediction and control 
of events.' Petina's main conception of energy in chapter 
6 can be seen much in this vein. It is useful because it 
allows her to cope with a wide range of the instance cards 
(batteries, ghosts, food, sledges, etcetera) successfully 
and yet it is tentative in that she shapes it during the 
progress of the interview and does not rely on it for all 
of the instances. In this case, Petina's main conception 
lasts throughout the interview and it remains an open 
question as to how long afterwards she will find it useful. 
A further point to be made about Petina's 'energy' , 
Colin's 'light' or Susie's 'force' is that these are strong 
and pertinent conceptions as they are being used. They 
are not seen as a lapse, or as a retreat into a more 
primitive form of account in comparison with school science. 
It is their way of making sense of what they know and what 
they have been taught and it runs parallel and in some 
cases, complementary, to their other more scientifically 
orthodox conceptions. As Zylbersztajn (1983) so aptly 
points out: 
'The fact that some pupils fail to align their views 
with those of 'curricular science' does not mean that they 
are less intelligent than the ones that do. It could be 
that they do not have compelling reasons for changing their 
current views if these, from a personal perspective, enable 
them to cope with everyday life situations.' 
A similar point can be made about frameworks. In 
that a framework is a constructed type and belongs to no 
one individual then the durability or stability of frameworks 
cannot be discussed in the same terms as conceptions. 
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However, the tables in chapter 5 provide some suggestion 
that certain frameworks (particularly anthropomorphic and 
anthropocentric ones) are not so in evidence in the year 
6 group. An interpretation consistent with what is said 
above would be that this group of students see this as a 
less useful way of accounting for situations than others 
and so the responses that evidence the frameworks are less 
frequent. It is clear, however, that ~ year 6 students 
still do find this a useful way of discussing, say, the 
force on a golfball. 
A third and major part of the study is about the 
interlacing of the relationships between conceptions. The 
complex multi-level overlaps in meanings emphasise the 
notion that personal conceptions are not solitary isolated 
entities, but, though bounded, are fluid and protean. 
The meanings held for each of the concept-labels are 
sustained, shaped and balanced by a web of interrelated 
conceptions. It is not that students fail to differentiate 
terms, or to integrate previously diverse notions under 
one label. Their differentiation is made on a different 
basis (things have force if they are alive, large, or 
moving, etcetera); or across different lines ('natural' 
energy, 'forced' energy for example). Similarly, the integ-
ration of various elements does take place but based upon 
a wide variety of contingencies. 
This strongly militates against an all-or-nothing 
view of conceptual development. As conceptions are being 
forged around one particular term, so other words are used 
to s·tore up its meaning, words which are left suitably 
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vague at the time of use. Force is 'a bit like pressure'; 
'is a kind of energy'; 'has power'; 
thing has' are typical statements. 
'is the strength some-
On balance the tables 
in chapter 5 show a growing differentiation of terms so 
that, for example, light and energy are more often seen 
to be separate and yet related with increasing age group, 
particularly so between years 3 and 4. This indicates a 
growing awareness to both place semantic constraints on a 
particular word (to sharpen the focus of convenience) and 
to organise the relationship between them (mark the ranges 
of convenience). There are several possibilities as to 
why this might be the case. Part of the semantic constraints 
might be to realise, for example, that the verb form 
(to force, to light) differs in substance within science 
to the noun (a force, light) and that this difference is 
significant. Part of the greater organisation of relation-
ships might arise because of the growing appreciation of 
a larger number of discriminations (net force, centripetal 
force, police force; red-light, neon light and so on) • 
Two pOints c,an be drawn from this. The conceptions 
that students use in responding during the interviews both 
shape, and are shaped by, the words that are used. In the 
former case, the exercise of advancing an hypothesis concern-
ing the nature of,say, heat in relation to the IAI cards 
may be a new experience for the student. In this case 
their meaning for the word is shaped, differentiated, and 
integrated in his/her system of conceptions in a way that 
might not have occaTed explicitly before. In the latter 
case, their previous meanings for the word (and experiences 
of it) quite clearly shape the way in which it is used 
during the interview. This process of semantic development 
applies not only to the target word, but to all the support-
ing terms as well. Whilst heat may be the word under 
discussion, other words (temperature, radiation, conductors 
etc) are used functionally to generate a 'total' meaning 
to be expressed:a process that might be called 'constructive 
formulation'. 
An analogy for this exercise might be an attempt to 
cross a river with insufficient materials to build a bridge 
that would reach from one bank to the other. At each stage 
a small island is constructed by di sassembling the structure 
previously assembled to reach that pOint, and re-construct-
ing it to advance the journey a further stage. The elements 
from which the fabricated island is made remain much the 
same in each case yet lessons are learnt from each previous 
assembly and new ideas are tested in each move forward. 
In terms of the responses students develop during the 
interviews, it is not always clear where, or how far, the 
other bank is. Therefore, some of the resting places need 
to be fairly durable in order to form a substantial platform 
before continuing - allowing some retreat to a safe base. 
Some of the safest and most durable bases are tried 
and tested constructions which, in the course of the inter-
view, are being subjected to both internal and external 
examination. To be consistent (to have continuing utility 
in the face of new situations) a conception must also be 
related to other conceptions so that it makes sense within 
a larger whole. This is not to say that, as has been shown 
in chapter 6, a student might not use a number of apparently 
incompatible conceptions to structure similar sets of 
situations. As was mentioned earlier, it is this individual 
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diversity that supports both Kelly's (1955) notion of 
constructive alternativism and his fragmentation corollary. 
An example element from the supporting structures 
used in a large number of interviews is the term 'power'. 
It is a word that is used functionally as part of the account 
for numerous instances. In only one or two interviews 
(at year 6) was it given its orthodox school science defin-
ition. Even in these cases this was not strictly adhered 
to, rather it was used in a general sense to support descr-
iptions of the cards and of the target concept. Through-
out the interviews all of energy, force, heat and light 
are seen to 'be a form of power', to 'need power', 'use 
power' or 'have power' and so on. 
This very much impinges upon the fourth major emphasis 
of the study which is the use of the interview as a data 
gathering instrument. Part of what has been said can be 
seen as a consequence of the tasks inherent in the interview, 
which is not only for students to describe and account for 
situations, to articulate their own conceptions both in 
terms of the instance cards and (implicitly) those to 
follow, to draw out expectations in terms of a particular 
concept-label, but also to justify and elaborate on their 
answers. This is Harr6's (1982) appropriation and catachresis 
in the context of these interviews. Put this way, it seems 
a daunting set of requirements which, on the whole, students 
undertook without overt reluctance or mistrust but with 
diligence, flair and assurance. 
One aspect of this style of interview is that it is 
linear. That is, in most cases, the IAI cards have been 
discussed one at a time and then grouped together in some 
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appropriate way. An alternative approach might have been 
to ask for the pictures to be sorted first and then discussed 
in terms of individual cards and the piles they are in. 
Such an approach might allow students to anchor their 
conceptions and to defend them _by such a compositional 
strategy. The linear model that has been used contrasts with thi! 
.by asking students to begin to shape explicitly their 
conceptions from the very first card, to initiate their 
preferred web of meaning from the outset. The question 
at the heart of this is, of course, which method (if either) 
is the best to draw the students into making explicit the 
understanding they have? They are not under any requirement 
to reveal their personal theories (in this light it is of 
immense credit to them - and relief for the interviewer -
that they do so, so freely) and it may mean that differing 
approaches might suit different students. As an hypothesis 
(because there has been no attempt to find out) Cushla 
may well have benefited from a different approach whereas 
Colin (witness the transcript in appendix III) seems to 
have managed extremely well on the format used. 
7.). Some Directions for Future Research 
Seven distinctive directions for further work are 
indicated here as developments of this study. The first 
revolves around the general stance adopted - of a second 
order enquiry within a paradigm 2 tradition. The balance 
between first and second orders, and between paradigms 1 
and 2, is far from equitable and much more work is required 
. 
in order to gain some understandings of personal meanings 
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in many spheres. Systematically following learners' act-
ivities, and inviting them to discuss their actions and 
their impressions at the time of acting, will bring a closer 
understanding of the learning process. Important though 
this is for science education it is important too, for many 
other aspects of learning. However, within science alone 
much needs to be explored in terms of the learning that 
takes place in relation to the reading of science texts, 
to the writing of science (and of learning experiences 
within science), to practical work and laboratory experi-
mentation, to problem solving, to computer simulations and 
assisted-learning software, to individualised-learning 
materials, to peer-group interaction and so on. Each one 
of these aspects of science education implies that students' 
own conceptions of both the task itself and the substance 
of the task are important elements in the learning process. 
As Cicourel et al (1974) suggest, the treating of students' 
own understandings: 
'as natural aspects of educational encounters would 
enable the participants to have access to them and become 
less preoccupied with a rigid notion of what is right and 
what is wrong.' 
The direction to be suggested, then, is that an exploration 
of students' conceptions, of the personal theories of what 
(and how) they learn deserves considerable study. 
Secondly, there is a clear indication that much work 
needs to be done in terms of semantic development in ado le-
scence and later. Much of the research into language 
development, and semantic development particularly, seems 
not to extend very far beyond 8 or 9 year olds. This 
leaves the mistaken impression 
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that language development ceases somewhere near this pOint. 
Given the fruits of this study, that the paths of develop-
ment are varied - differing for individual words and indiv-
idual students - then a progression towards semantic comp-
etence must (in a large sense) continue throughout life. 
There is much to be learnt about the way in which (older) 
students corne to terms with a new and unfamiliar lexicon 
be it in science, social science, the philosophy of science 
or whatever. 
A third avenue of research to be indicated concerns 
a specific part of Kelly's theory. Whilst many aspects of 
the theory have been explored and developed the Fragment-
ation corollary seems to have suffered some neglect. Beyond 
the work described in chapter 3 there is considerable 
scope for activity. The notion of conceptual 'subsystems' 
- so important to this study - is still in need of further 
elaboration. In terms of science (and students' conceptions 
of science) the consistency, coherence, compatibility or 
contradiction of the subsystems are all aspects that require 
drawing out in greater detail. The local domains of under-
standing themselves, their dimensions and attributes are 
clearly important to both the learning process and the 
teaching of science. 
In the most obvious sense, too, such conceptions as 
have been discussed here for the four target concepts can 
be explored for many more. The candidate most urgently in 
need of examination is power. Discussions earlier have 
earmarked power as being a fairly deep seated notion within 
the fabric of everyday meanings. In many senses its role 
in physics is a peripheral one (the 'rate of transformation 
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of energy') that is, it is not a 'basic' or 'fundamental' 
concept. This would pOint to an interesting juxtaposition 
if (as seems possible) it is an important unifying (super-
ordinate) conception in many stUdents' accounts whilst being 
relegated to a more marginal one in physics. 'Reflection' 
in light is perhaps a similar example. At first glance 
this term seems less complex than 'power' because many of 
the uses of the term reflection are as a noun rather than 
a verb. In this sense a 'reflection' and an 'image' are 
interchangeable - and differ from the orthodox process of 
rebounding light at an optical boundary. 
Other terms, like 'form' and 'system' also feature 
in differsnt roles both within and without of science. 
Do, for example, the statements 'heat is a form of energy' 
and 'diamond is a form of carbon' have the same meaning for 
the word form? Quite what students make of such terms 
is much in need of clarification. 
A fifth avenue of inquiry concerns some of the origins 
of individuals' conceptions and the role played by informal 
sources of science education {as suggested, for example, 
by Ryder, 19821 and Lucas, 1983). What roles do sight, 
touch, hearing and smell play in forming conceptions of 
phenomena? How do experiences in science museums, exhibit-
ions, fairs and so on, influence conceptions already held? 
Can individual students trace back through various strands 
of experience in order to catalogue some of the influences 
that have been brought to bear in its formation? Such 
questions seem to be of direct relevance to shaping both 
the formal (and, as far as possible, the informal) science 
education that is currently made available. 
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A sixth and important research direction to add to 
this list is in terms of the methodologies that have been 
used. The interview method itself is open to diverse 
variations both in terms of the IAI approach and in its 
other forms. Many of the lines suggested above are suitable 
for exploration using the IAI method - other concepts, 
notions of touch or hearing, what it means to learn, where 
ideas are derived from, could all be tackled by a sensitive 
use of the IAI format. A particular approach might be 
an increased use of students' own drawings (as indicated 
in Swift, Watts and Pope (1983) under the label Responding-
Within-Pictures (RWP)). It is a procedure that has, so far, 
raised more questions than it has answered. There is a 
point at which such a task is both very familiar (making 
their own drawings) and yet quite foreign to students 
(sketching their own examples of science concepts). In 
this sense 'exploratory drawings' (to use "Ryder's (1982) 
term) are not common features of science lessons - any 
more than exploratory talk is. Exploratory drawings, as 
the basis for interviews, seem to be another way forward. 
Other arrangements of the interview need further study 
too. For example; group discussions and interviewer-less 
interviews around the IAI cards (as initiated by Gilbert 
and Pope, 1982) need more development. 
Beyond the interview lies the important process of 
authentication. The activities explored in this study 
have been just some in a number of possibilities. Given 
that the active engagement of the researched in the process 
of research is important, then there are many more 'tools' 
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to be added to the box. One example might be to take back 
the analysis of a single interview to the student a short 
while after the session. There might not have been, by 
then, the possibility of analysing a wide range of inter-
views, however the student's perceptions of the outcomes 
might be productive whilst the data is still 'fresh'. 
Authenticating frameworks is more difficult because they 
are deliberately more de-personalised. One approach might 
be to ask students to role-play a particular framework in 
order to explore how plausible and credible it might seem 
- an exercise perhaps more suited to older, more articulate 
students. 
The seventh direction of research lies in the applic-
ation of the research to classroom practice. The ~oblem 
here lies in examining the many ways in which students' 
conceptions and illustrative frameworks can be both expli-
cated and used in a classroom setting. These are, in 
essence, two separate problems. Explication not only 
implies the articulation of individuals' conceptions (or 
small group frameworks) but the generation of a working 
atmosphere that will allow these to stand and be elucidated 
without the threat of ridicule. Using the frameworks is 
then another problem. Little has been uncovered so far 
as to an optimum set of working procedures for safe-guard-
ing exploratory ideas whilst at the same time detailing 
their relationship with an orthodox set, less still .about 
engendering meaningful conceptual change along these lines. 
The gulf between what has been said and what has been 
achieved is still very wide. 
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7.4: Some Implications for Classroom Practice 
Some pointers to be taken from what has been said 
can be summarised as follows. Firstly, the very nature 
of knowledge and of learning itself are matters for some 
deep consideration by both teachers and students. So 
often learning is seen as an 'increase' in knowledge that 
comes about by memorising or acquiring facts, procedures, 
or rules etcetera. Seldom is it seen as a person's 
imposition of meaning, as an interpretative process aimed 
at some understanding of reality. If this epistemological 
orientation has some basis then it suggests a widely differ-
ent role for teachers and students. In the normal context 
of school science the teacher might cease to be solely a 
conveyor of information but become a facilitator of learn-
ing. It has been a basic assumption all along that students' 
personal conceptions are of importance, a cry that is being 
taken up in a number of quarters. The Association for 
Science Education (1981), for example, say: 
'The key role for the teacher of science is that of 
enabling each pupil to relate to his or her own perception 
of scientific understanding to the wider community of 
scientific ideas. Whilst such a process involves moving 
the pupil closer to the 'accepted truth', all concerned 
should accept the absolute legitimacy of the 'perceived 
truth' - the right of the individual to interpret his or 
her experience in his or her own words.' 
Pursuing this vein, one of the aims of the Secondary Science 
Curriculum Review (1983) is that: at appropriate stages 
in their science education (in this case between the years 
of 11-16) all students should have adequate opportunity to 
'discuss, reflect on and evaluate their personal 
understanding of the key concepts, principles and general-
isations of science.' 
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This approach is taken as heralding a clear movement 
towards an appreciation of students' conceptions within 
science classes. It indicates the beginning of a shift 
away from memorising long tracts of written science towards 
a genuine reconstruction of science to meet the students' 
own needs. The important aspect of this is that such a 
shift is a necessary prerequisite for any implementation 
of what is said here. 
Following from this, a second implication for class-
room practice concerns the processes by which the relation-
ship between the students' personal conceptions and the 
orthodoxy of s~ience become realised. It seems entirely 
reasonable from what has been said (in chapte~ 5 and 6 
particularly) to see shifts by an individual student towards 
orthodox concepts in science as piecemeal and of varying 
strength and duration. Much will depend on the shape and 
utility of his or her conception for a particular phenomenon. 
One possible outcome is that as the phenomenon is approached 
by a student in terms of a specific conception then the 
conception (and the phenomenon) might both be changed and 
incorporated. A second possibility is that the phenomenon 
is rejected from one conception to be incorporated within 
some other (less useful) one. Thirdly, it might remain 
as an isolated unintelligible entity without much meaning 
at all. 
For the teacher, the important facets are an under-
standing of an individual's conceptions before, during and 
after some exercise in school science. 
This is simply to recapitulate on the general emphasis 
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of much that has gone by in earlier chapters. What is 
picked up from what a person says (writes, or does) is a 
small snapshot in the development of a conception that 
will change. To influence the change is to know about it 
as and when it is happening. Arguably it is easier to 
influence the development of conceptions in their early 
stage of an exploratory, little-formed, rejectable state. 
However, as Driver (1983) suggests, science teachers are 
often in the position of wanting to discard various models 
in preference for progressively more sophisticated ones. 
This argues for an understanding by the teacher of the 
conceptions held by the students of the old model before 
a new one can be introduced. 
The process of 'realising' student conceptions might 
fall into two categories: 
a) student initiated 
b) stage-managed 
The first concerns the many instances when a student 
begins to articulate his or her own conceptions either as 
a question, in response to a question, in the course of 
requesting information or clarification, or as a source 
of doubt or puzzlement. This pOint is arguably a most 
important time since, given favourable circumstances, it 
has been shown here that students are both willing and 
able to volunteer their own conceptions, analogies, metaphors, 
paradoxes and generalisations. In situations where circum-
stances are not favourable, where students' views are not 
seen as valuable, where teaching is directed towards memor-
ising to the exclusion of understanding, where the approach 
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is directed exclusively towards the 'transmission' of 
knowledge, then such a fruitful exchange of ideas is 
unlikely to take place. 
The second concerns the variety of teaching strategies 
and methods that allow adequate opportunity for students 
to articulate their own ideas. Some of these have been 
explored at different levels - in principle (for example, 
Watts and Pope, 1982; Watts and Gilbert, 1983) and in 
exploratory practice (Gilbert and Watts, 1982). These 
might include small group discussion techniques, or the 
whole class tactics as used by Nussbaum and Novick (1981) 
and Minstrell (1982). The teacher audience of the authen-
tication process made much of the potential use of the 
frameworks as indicators of possible student conceptions. 
Herein lies their utility, though yet untested. The poten-
tial is that early diagnosis and preparation for a particular 
part of science education can be made on the basis of 
identified frameworks. A group about to tackle force in 
year 4, for example, might be asked to consider the lAl 
cards in small groups or as a whole class. Early indicat-
ions (a straw pole, for instance) might establish the 
prevalence of some or all (or other) of the frameworks 
so that preparation can be made to explore further, or 
to challenge various aspects. 
It is arguable that in some parts of science (force, 
the particulate nature of matter, for example) sufficient 
work has now been achieved to allow some early design of 
classroom programmes that overtly take into account student 
conceptions and frameworks, along with the very process of 
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active conceptualisation. Ogborn (1983), for example, 
has suggested that the laws of 'naive' dynamics are now 
sufficiently familiar for instructional programmes to 
exploit them purposefully. 
One aim of science education must surely be to tap 
the creative resources of students like the ones here, as 
they struggle with the task of imposing meaning on a some-
what mysterious and enigmatic set of theories and principles 
called science. For the teacher this poses the very real 
problem of how to approach a person who may be immersed in 
one particular set of personal conceptions (or personal 
paradigms, to coin a term from Driver and Easley, 1978) 
and to inveigle them towards another (hopefully, more 
powerful and functional) set. Clearly they need to know 
much more about the systems - and subsystems - of the other 
person. One way must be to stay with youngsters' language 
in an exploratory mode until they are prepared to make the 
move to another mode. The burden of the teacher becomes 
clear. If he or she wishes to guide the student, the 
guidance has to be given in a language, and directed at 
systems, that the student can understand. The role is that 
of teacher/translator. The translator has to understand 
the usage of terms in other people's languages and also 
large parts of their network of beliefs and expectations. 
He or she has to find some way of discussing scientific 
ideas that preserve the meanings of words used by students 
and be able to express new intentions in such a way that 
new meanings are possible and that a new understanding 
emerges from an initial engagement of old terms. For the 
teacher to become translator means they have to take seriously 
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the views of those they would hope to guide. 
7.51 A Concluding Remark 
There has been no attempt to disguise the ways in 
which this work is reflexive - how it is itself an example 
of what it tries to explore. In discussing the exploratory 
ways in which young people draw together elements of ideas, 
propositions, theories and personal experience this study 
has (necessarily and unavoidably) followed a parallel route. 
Suitable judgement of the result, of course, lies elsewhere 
except to note that, as many students have noted in the 
aftermath of the interviews, how the exercise has been 
both salutory and exhilarating, and how, in their words, 
'its funny how you understand things differently now.' 
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Appendix II The IAI Cards for ~nergy, Force, Heat and Light 
E1 E3 
~ 
t 
,-
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Appendix IIs The Interviewees and the Extracts Used 
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THE ENERGY INTERVIEWEES 
GROUP INITIAL SEX SCIENCE/PHYSICS GROUP EXTRACTS 
3E C1 M 3yr physics 2 
(10) J1 M 3yr physics 
A M 3yr science 89 
J2 F 3yr science 8, 91, 92 
J3 F 3yr science 18, 90 
J4 M 3yr physics 
J5 F 3yr science 19 
J6 F 3yr science 
D F 3yr science 
C2(Colin M 3yr science 3, 113, 118 
4E D F 4yr physics O/CSE 14 
(14) M M 4yr physics O/CSE 6, 13, 24, 134 
S(Susie) F 4yr physics O/CSE 4, 11, 16, 107 
J1 M 5yr physics O/CSE 7, 12 
G M 4yr physics O/CSE 15 
A1 F 4yr physics CSE 
P1 (Petina) F 4yr physics o level 22 
H F 4yr physics O/CSE 10, 114 
P2 M 4yr physics CSE 
e (eushla) F 4yr physics o level 17 
B M Syr physics O/eSE 88 
E F 5yr science O/CSE 133 
J2 M 4yr physics CSE 9, 21 
A2 F 5yr physics o level 
6E G1 F 6yr CEE group 
(10) G2 M A level physics 26, 105, 115, 1 
A M A level physics 108 
K M A level physics 20, 23 
L M A level physics 25 
J F A level physics 5 
D M A level physics 
M1 F A level physics 
M2 F A level physics 
H F 6yr eEE group 
, 
THE FORCE INTERVIEWEES 
GROUP INITIAL SEX SCIENCE/PHYSICS GROUP EXTRACTS 
3F Cl F 3yr science 
(15) Rl M 3yr science 
A M 3yr physics 104 
P M 3yr science 50 
01 M 3yr science 29, 51 
K F 3yr science 
R2 F 3yr science 
C2 F 3yr physics 44 
V M 3yr physics 27, 42 
Y M 3yr physics 28 
02 M 3yr physics 43 . 
Ll F 3yr science 
T M 3yr physics 49, 128 
L2 F 3yr science 33, 36 
03 F 3yr science 31 
4F Sl M 4yr physics O/CSE 
(14) S2 F 4yr physics O/CSE 
S3 F 4yr physics O/CSE 
Jl M 4yr physics o level 
Pl M 4yr physics O/CSE 
G M 4yr physics O/CSE 
R F 4yr physics o level 93, 106 
T M 4yr physics O/CSE 37, 47, 95 
C1(Colin) M 4yr physics O/CSE 45 
P2 (Petina) F 4yr physics o level 
C2(Cushla) F 4yr physics o level 34 
J2 M 4yr physics O/CSE 35 
S4(Susie) F 4yr physics O/CSE 32 
N F 4yr physics o level 38, 41, 94 
6F Z F A level physics 
(14) Sl M A level physics 
S2 F A level physics 127 
S3 M A level physics 
A1 M A level physics 
T M A level physics 111 
G M A level physics 
A2 M A level physics 
S4 M A level physics 48 
0 M A level physics 30, 39 
A3 M A level physics 110 
P1 F A level physics 
M F A level physics 
P2 F A level physics 40, 46, 109 
, 
~HE HEAT INTERVIEWEES 
GROUP INITIAL SEX SCIENCE/PHYSICS GROUP EXTRACT 
3H R M 3yr physics 69 
(9 ) P M 3yr physics 52 
D1 M 3yr physics 59, 96, 122 
D2 F 2yr science 
J F 3yr science 53, 130 
C1 F 3yr physics 58 
C2 F 3yr science 
A M 3yr science 
B M 3yr science 132 
4H N F 4yr physics O/CSE 56 
( 11) 13 M 4yr physics O/CSE 
C1 F 4yr physics O/CSE 57, 67, 131 
J F 5yr physics o level 60, 62 
C2 F 5yr physics o level 55, 66, 112 
F F 4yr physics o level 
C3(Colin) M 4yr physics O/CSE 125 
A M 4yr physics 0 level 123 
D M 4yr secondary science 
R1 F 4yr physics O/CSE 61, 65 
R2 M 4yr secondary science 
6H P(Petina) F A level physics 54, 63 
(9) C(Cushla) F A level physics 68, 98, 126 
N M A level physics 
J1 M A level physics 
M1 M A level physics 
S(Susie) F A level physics 64, 97 
J2 M A level physics 
M2 M A level physics 
L F A level physics 135 
• 
THE LIGHT INTERVIEWEES 
GROUP INITIAL SEX SCIENCE/PHYSICS GROUP EXTRACT 
3L Gl M 3yl.- physics 
(9) A M 3yl. physics 1, 71 
L F 3yr science 
G2 F 3yr science 
P F 3yr science 
R M 3yr physics 
J1 F 3yl.- physics 
J2 F 3yr science 99 
T M 2yr science 
4L Cl(Colin M 4yr physics o level 75, 81, 87, 120 
( 11) P (Petina) F Syr physics o level 72, 73, 103 
C2(Cushla) F Syt physics o level 
J1 F 4yr physics O/CSE 70, 82 
S(Susie) F 4yr physics o level 78 
R F 4yr physics O/CSE 79 
J2 F 4yr physics O/CSE 77, 80, 83 
M1 M 4yr physics O/eSE 76, 84 
Y M 4yr physics o level 86, 117, 121 
M2 M 4yr physics O/CSE 85, 102 
0 M Syr physics CSE 
6L R1 M A level physics 74 
(8) P F A level physics 
T F A level physics 100 
R2 M A level physics 101, 129 
S M A level physics 
0 M A level physics 119 
C F A level physics 
H M A level physics 
, 
Appendix 1111 A Sample Transcript (Cl,4L) 
, 
, 
Tape 175 Colin Hackney Downs 
1 I don't believe it is it going to be like that all 
the time do you reckon • 
2 C I don't know 
3 I or is it 
4 C when they get a teacher it'll probably be better 
•• it doesn't sound as if they've got one 
5 I no it doesn't it. it's alright ••• oday •• the 
same sort of routine • as before lin the other 
interviews/ 
6 C •• hurn •••••• 
7 I got a teacher •• 
8 C • obviously (laughs) 
005 9 I urn. and ••• some of them you'll recognise cos some 
of them are going to be the same •• some of th.em 
are different •• 
10 C •••••• so er ••• you want me to say about it 
11 I 
011 
12 C 
13 I 
014 14 C 
15 I 
16 C 
17 I 
18 C 
urn •• well as before it's it's do you think there's 
any light there? and then eventually I'll ask you 
what you think light is •• and you have to sort of 
say what you think and then •• I ask you uou know 
whether you think it's an example or not of your 
idea of light whether you if what you think light 
is can be described using the pictures and I try 
to sum up your ideas to see if I've understood them 
or not.. okay? 
yea I see yea okay 
• okay what about that one? /projector L2/ 
well there's obviously light there 
okay 
coming from the projector •••• from the bulb •••• 
and it's being projected. on to the screen. its 
travelling •• 
okay urn •• and then I • as usual I sort of ask you· 
what questions come to me as as as you're talking. 
is there any where abouts would you say the light 
is? 
• well the light. there is • the light is obviously 
originated from the projector but it's being ••• 
, 
Tape 175 
020 
19 I 
20 C 
21 I 
22 C 
23 I 
025 24 C 
25 I 
26 C 
27 I 
28 C 
Colin 
••• thrown on to the screen ••• well it's 
travelling to the screen • there is no liqht on 
the screen itself 
so so light travels 
yea ••• yea 
yea okay and you say it's going from there /pro-
jector/ and on to the sc.:reen what happens to it 
after it's got to the screen? 
•. well it depends. it depends what. what sort 
of screen it is I mean if it's a mirror it'll 
reflect if it's •• if it's a black screen •••• 
it'll absorb it. if it's a white screen it'll re-
flect it and. show it up • and you'll see the 
light . 
say it's a slide projector or film proiector? 
well then if if there's a slide in there 
yea 
then you'll see the image ••• because the light'll 
be darker • or lighter or a different colours in 
different places • 
• okay and what's an image? 
. . . . . . . . . . . uh (both laugh) an imaqe 
29 I yea 
031 
30 C 
31 I 
32 C 
33 I 
34 C 
urn •••• is something. that's been ••••••••••• 
projected ••• it's something that somewhere •••• 
that's been thrown somewhere else. it's the same 
thing but in a different place and • maybe bigger 
as well or the same size 
I see the same thing somewhere else I mean I was 
thinking if sometimes you • urn can look in a mirror 
and see an image 
yea 
is that the same thing? 
•••••••••• more or less it's it's not quite the 
same as you know. an image from a projector •• 
because that's being thrown that's ••• that is. 
an ~t image I mean a mirror's a • ooposite 
image 
, 
Tape 175 Colin 
036 
039 
045 
35 I 
36 C 
37 I 
38 C 
39 I 
40 C 
41 I 
42 C 
• okay. and in this case it's a sort of thrown 
image? 
yea it's thrown On to the screen 
okay lets leave that one for a minute • 
alright 
and have a look at some of the others 
right • /television set L3/ 
again is it an example of what vou would call light? 
do you think it's got anything to do with light? 
well I I don't really know much about the. insides 
of television sets I should imagine there are ••• 
bulbs and things somewhere in there • but obviously 
••••••• the light comes ~ a television screen. 
I mean if you turn all the lights off • it will • 
you will see light. coming from it ••• in differ-
ent forms 
43 I and what happens to that light? 
44 C 
45 I 
46 C 
47 I 
48 C 
49 I 
•••• well. urn ••• its picture. its waves. coming 
through are beinq caught on the aerial and being 
transferred to the from the tele into a picture • 
and it's obviously bright I mean. oh I don't know 
(laughs) I don't quite know why it's bright ••• 
urn ••• I suppose •••••••••••• I don't know I don't 
•• I suppose electric. electricity. really ••• 
l! light I don't know •• I suppose 
you've got a feeling it's got something to do with 
electricity? 
yea 
and the pictures are caught on 
that's definitely 
the aerial? 
051 50 C yea 
51 I 
52 C 
and and then? 
comes down the aerial the waves •• and there lin 
the television set/ • it's transferred into a 
picture 
53 I is that an image? 
Tape 175 Colin 
056 
54 C •• yea. it's an image rather than .•• just light 
or a picture it's an image ••• a thrown image 
same as the projector really. that it's it's just 
that it's on a bigger scale I mean the television 
• company are throwing out •••• more waves. than 
a projector would • 
55 I I see so in this case it would be similar to the 
56 C 
57 I 
58 C 
59 I 
60 C 
61 I 
urn • 
like the 
the projector 
projector 
would it? 
yea the projector would be the sort of transmitter 
or something yea and the urn. screen • more or less 
the aerial picking it up 
I see and then what does a T.V. do then in that 
sense? 
059 62 C ••••• um ••• it's more or less the same. the er 
••• the projector should be sort of like the. 
antennae the aerial at the T.V. station and it's 
being caught on here wand er •• see what I think 
what they do is um •• jumble up the picture into 
•• light waves or sound waves and the the circuitry 
of the television set • unjumbles it and puts it 
back in its original place 
63 I okay and then then then that how does it get from 
the circuitry on to the screen? 
064 64 C on well I I mean ••• sort of • there there's a 
picture valve I mean I don't know what it does 
069 
65 I 
66 C 
no okay (laughs) 
I mean there's loads of transistors and things in 
there that's somehow that that gets it onto the 
screen 
67 I and then what happens to the light at the screen? 
68 C I don't know I th.ink I think there's urn something 
in there that lights it UP like I mean there's all 
• if you look closely at a television set there's 
urn • a little sort of • dots of different colours 
•••• and they they light up or they darken or 
they change colour things like that so you know to 
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•• adapt to the picture. 
69 I • okay • and and then what happens to the light 
after it hits the screen? 
073 70 C 
077 
well it •••• well he's /the person viewing/ I 
mean it's the same as this I mean if you're sitting 
there. and you're looking at that screen and the 
projector one you'll see. you'll see the picture 
there fat the screen/ it's the same •. but ••• 
that screen /the T.V. set/ the Ii you can actually 
see the light I mean in a dark room you'll be able 
to see the light waves coming through before they 
hit the screen but here. there'll be light pro-
jected from the screen ••••• in a way it's also 
like the projector I suppose throwing the picture 
as well as ••• having a picture 
71 I when you were first talking you were saying that 
080 72 C 
73 I 
74 C 
7S I 
76 C 
77 I 
the sort of transmitter was a bit like the projector 
throwing the 
but then again 
waves 
but this itself could also be a bit like it 
yea •••••• yea okay we'll leave that one. 
right I'll put that one with that one /puts L3 and 
L2 together/ 
you would 
082 78 C yea 
087 
79 I 
80 C 
81 I 
82 C 
, 83 I 
84 C 
what about something like that then. /flower L11/ 
••••• a flower in a pot ere 
anything to do with light? 
well • flowers I mean obviously everything needs 
ligh't to live ••• is um •••••••••• flowers open 
in light and close in dark well most of them do 
••••••••• and depending on what flower it is I 
mean if it's a sunflower it'll always ~ort of aim 
to face the sun 
do they? 
• yea ••••• it's the like heads they sort of turn 
round to face the sun ••• and urn. 
, 
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090 
095 
85 I 
86 C 
87 I 
88 C 
89 I 
90 C 
w~ll why do they do that then 
• I don't know (laughs) obviously they ~ .•• 
obviously they they pick up •• the heat •• coming 
from a certain direction I mean it's not visible 
but. if one if • if the sun's urn is changing 
direction you'll notice the flower changes with it 
•• you can't well you could if you had a slow 
motion • a camera and then showed it back in • 
screen it up you'd see it moving 
•• oh I didn't know that before 
yea 
so • you said then it was it it might have been 
the heat from the sun 
yea the heat from it 
91 I 
097 92 C 
do you mean the heat or the light? 
the ~ •• yea I don't think it's the light. 
that makes a flower •• open or anything it's the 
heat ••• I mean it I mean (laughs) in this sort 
of a day there's not much sun about and there's 
• not much heat well I mean obviously it's still 
light because the sun's still up there behind 
the clouds 
93 1 right st;" it it. as an example then if if you 
you actually ,stuck one of these things out. in 
the weather like today would it still operate? 
101 94 C 
95 I 
96 C 
97 I 
106 98 C 
it's oh yea that's a point I should imagine it's 
no • I suppose it'd die • so I suppose it needs 
heat more than light 
so you've got a feeling it needs light 
yea because in in the tropics and things the plants 
are open almost all the time because it's hot all 
at night as well 
would you say this one was more heat or more light? 
yea I I'd say this is more heat and not light 
q9 1 okay are you going to put it with those ones or 
100 C 'well sometimes flowers react with light • anyway 
I mean they change colour depending on ••••••••• 
the waves I suppose • of the light 
, 
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101 I • that's the. second time you've said waves I 
mean what have waves got to do with light? 
102 C • well light's more more or less tLe same as sound 
I should imagine with waves I m~an I SUppOSE: it's 
III still ••••• I mean talking I'm transmitting light 
waves and this. this light bulb's transmitting 
light waves as well ••• I'm just I'm giving out 
sound waves while I'm speaking and that's giving 
out light waves as it and it's •••••• I don't know 
I suppose it goes on longer than the sound wave 
I mean. as soon as I stop talking. you you don't 
115 heat my voice but the light is sort of bouncing 
around all the time •• lighting the whole world 
103 I that's what you think of it as sort of .' being like 
a a wave that's coming out of there /the light 
bulbI and then bouncing around 
10.4 C coming in different directions yea 
105 I have I got you right it's different to sound is 
it bf~cause 
106 C yea 
10,7 I eventually it sort of 
10 & C fades away with time yea 
109 I ••• okay. lets go on a little bit further has 
that /rainbow L4/ got to do with light? 
110 C well ••• it's a rainbow it obviously. the sunlight 
has got a lot to do with rair.bows cos it's urn •• 
you' know like prisms .r the rain it's raindrops 
122 and the sun • they the shape they fc.rm ••• acts 
as a prism ••••• and er •••• as tne sun h1~s i~ 
it gives the colours of a spectrum and er 
11'1 I I mean how does it do that •• or why does it do 
it • do you know? 
112 C .1 well ••• it's the angles. the angles it hits 
the er I mean if you had a prism just say raindrops 
were the exact shapes of ••• a prism as it hits 
127 one side I the angles are at such an angle that 
it'll bounce up •• and I don't know why it • splits 
" the I the urn • cos pure light is made up of all 
the colours •••••• or all the colours is pure light 
you could say 
113 I and so what's the prism dOing? 
, 
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114 C a prism is splitting light yea ••• into the true 
colours /Cputs L4 with the television card L3/ 
115 1 does a colour tele work then I mean does that do 
something'similar? 
133 116 C •• urn ••••• I suppose •••• I'm I don't really know 
much about the waves that they send out • for tele 
I mean I ••• obviously radio it's electrical waves 
obviously. I mean cos it's got to be sent through 
elec electricity and all this •• but I mean it's 
not sort of like sound waves is it I mean ••• if 
I shout out nobody's going to pick it UP on their 
139 radio ••••• and er • I don't know ... I suppose 
they sort of •. split it up ••••••• which which is 
the same as the urn •• rainbow is it's the (*) the 
prisms are splitting the light up and I suppose 
they split the er picture up • and throw it ••••• 
which is what this does it forms a semicircle 
f44 11;7 I uhum. uhum so you can see some sort of Similarity? 
118 C yea though not quite but there's. they are 
similar .yea in the way it sort of breaks light up 
119 I aha •. aha okay right let let's let's do you see 
that as being similar to the others or is it 
different? 
147 12D C I'll put it • near the television and the. 
projector but it's not. sort of • on the same 
basis 
12:1 I okay 
12~2 C although 1: don't know •• I mean you could say the 
sun is the projector •• and it's going through a 
prism as the lens and. just the air is the screen •• 
12a I •• lets see if I get you because in this case 
something like I mean ••• 
124 C yea 
125 I in this case you've got the sort of 
151 126 C you've got the projector your lens. which is urn 
••• focusinq it and then the screen which you coul~ 
say about the rainbow as well .' 
127 I okay well l~ave it up there what about something 
154 like this is just a •••• somebody looking at a a • 
briqht red paintinq or something like that ILSI 
, 
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128 C • (sighs) • well obviously there's electric light 
on or he wouldn't be able to see it 
129 I why do you say that 
130 C •••• well he just wouldn't see it your our eyes 
aren't well. he if he stood there for hours •• 
he probably eventually would get to see it ••• but 
not the colour I shouldn't think he'd just be able 
158 to see the. outline of the painting ••• so I suppose 
if he had the light off •••• it'd still the red 
painting uhm I don't see that the red painting 
unless it's luminous is giving off any light. 
131 I •• okay well wh what's special about luminous. 
then? 
132 C •••• well you can get all sor I mean something 
like ••• I mean this is kind of obviously we don't 
they don't make pants sort of out of radium any 
more that are radio active ••• but for instance 
radium glows in the dark I mean I don't know why 
165 •• I don't know the physics of it yet (laughs) 
133 I yea. it's got something to do with physics? 
134 C yea 
135 I then has it ••• 
136 C • and urn •••••••••• I don't know luminous ••• I 
suppose certain colours ••• are just ••• glow in 
the dark I don't know why 
169 137 I uhum but that's not what you'd. I mean 
172 
138 C I •• if it's just a bright red •• painting I shouldn't 
see ••• that that's got anything to do with light 
at all 
139 I I see • 
140 C •• oh it • oh I suppose it's the only reason it's 
bright (*) red is because there are is actually 
light shining on it I mean if the lights were off 
you wouldn't probably notice that it's. exactly 
bright red he • might be able to work out it's 
red but not bright red •• 
141 I okay but are there 
141 C cos it's reflecting light isn't it and. showing 
you what colour it is. 
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142 I and and is the is the fact that it's coloured 
anything • like what you were talking about with 
the projector and about the sort of rainbow • has 
it got anything to do with that or is it different? 
177 143 C •••••••••• no I.don't think cos this is urn •••••• 
more like the flower really ••• I mean if if the 
flower if all the light was turned off. and that 
for the flower •••••• it'd probably ••••••• you 
wouldn't really notice it •••• I mean flowers. 
it's oh it's more or less the same it's colour 
basis the urn •• the only reason you notice a bright 
red flower • is because its light out • if it was 
183 dark it'd just be a flower in your eyes and I 
suppose it's the same with the painting you wouldn't 
notice if it was dark 
144 I hurn •• okay so you you see a sort of similarity 
between? 
145 C I'll put I'll put that. by the •• flower 
146 I okay what • this one /shirts L12/ is supposed to 
be you know like the T.V. advert where one shirt's 
supposed to be white and the other one's whiter 
than white or something •• I mean has that got to 
188 do with light 
147 C • er •••••• obviously if it was dark you wou~dn't 
notice if the shirt's dirty or clean but urn •••••• 
••••••••• I suppose the only reason you can work 
out •••••• that that shirt is clean is •• because 
of the light I mean if you hold it up you can see 
through and you know • notice all the particles 
have gone I suppose •••••• if •• supposing this is 
195 natural sunlight this is in •• then urn •• the 
light is obviously. giving off heat as well •••• 
and I suppose heat helps dry it out and then most 
of the dirt would falloff I mean heat's • I 
suppose heat and light are very •• very •••• tightly 
connected 
148 I yes that's a question I mean •• can you can you get 
heat without light or can you get light without 
heat? 
201 149 C well I • all fires give off light more or less • 
and all light bulbs give off heat ••• so I don't / 
know •• and the sun gives off heat and light ••• 
yet yet the moon gives off • no the only reason 
, the moon gives off light is •• through the light 
of the sun anyway I mean •••• 
150 I ••• how do you mean? 
, 
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151 C well I I don't know the li the moon isn't bright 
is it it's not like the sun giving off continuous 
206 light • the only reason we can see the moon • is 
because it's being lit up by the sun wherever the 
s I mean obviously we can't see the sun because 
it's round the other side we've gone round it •• 
but the moon's still in view of it and you know 
can •• depending where you are it might be a full 
moon cos you it's all lit up well half of it's 
211 lit up one side. and only a part of it's lit up 
152 I right I think I get it • okay so is what you're 
saying in this case though it's in natural sunlight 
• it 
153 C it yea is it's in natural um •• sunlight •••••• 
then urn ••••••• I don't know I mean it wouldn't 
I'm not saying it'd make it cleaner or anything. 
but in natural sunlight you'd definitely be able 
to tell which one was best • 
216 154 I • okay I've got a I suppose I was thinking of 
something like • um • people sometimes say • they 
don't want to .look at the colour of something in 
a shop un un under the sort of shop light 
155 C under the shop light 
15~ I they take it out and have a look at it in sunlight 
or something like that 
157 C yea because they want to check and see what the 
colour of the material is or something whatever it 
is a shirt or trousers or something •• natural 
220 light obviously isn't the same as sunlight I mean 
••• when you look at the sun •• I mean depending 
on how how cloudy the day sometimes it'll look 
yellow which most people paint it as yellow but 
if on a really clear day if you look straight at 
it which you're not meant to do anyway but if you 
224 do anyway it's just pure white I mean I don't I 
don't think it's yellow I mean it might be but 
I don't. know. 
158 I okay but you're not quite sure that that's going 
159 C no (shouting) (both laugh) urn •• 
229 160 I okay lets leave that one for a minute 
161 C yea I'll leave it on the side 
162 I if you get any further ideas about that one 
; 
, 
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163 C yea 
164 I you know just shout about it •• (both laugh) 
• that was a mirror one /Ll/ 
165 C ••• well ••• obviously ••• if it was pitch black 
in there he wouldn't be able to see himself 
233 166 I so what's happening there? 
167 C ••• well the mirror because it's •• transparent. 
you know on one side ••• and you get a reflection 
off it in light but in dark you don't. see what 
it is is urn • I suppose .• I suppose it's like the 
projector the sun's behind you. or in front of 
you or wherever it may be •••• and it's urn project-
ing you on to it •••• the the light waves waves 
are hitting you. and they're also hitting the 
mirror • and rebounding off the mirror and • hit-
ting you and ••••••• forming a reflection I suppose 
••••••• er •• I don't know mirrors are strange 
things ••• they're difficult to explain because 
••••••• I mean you don't know what really makes 
them work I mean obviously you know •• in principle 
but you you you don't really know the physics of 
245 it all you know •• anything like that •• fully 
••• why it • you know light reacts with it 
254 
168 I uhurn but you've got a feeling it I mean it is • 
what you were saying that they have something to 
do with light? 
169' C I think like the light's sort of projecting you 
on to it •• yes I'm I've got a feeling it's some-
thing like that •• 
170 I hum •• hum •• good okay 
any of the others? 
. . . and is it similar to 
171' C •• I'll put it... sort of near the rainbow and 
projector and •• stuff like that hecause I thi 
• I don't know I've got a feeling it's you know 
sort of ••• on the same basis •• but in a diff 
using a different metnod 
1'72 I okay okay good what about something like that 
then this lIens L9/ • do you remember that one? 
Ifrom previous interviews/ 
173. C ••• yea I do • er ••• a hand lens ••••••• well 
./ 
it's obvi I mean the only reason it makes it bigger 
is obviously the shape of the lens •••• urn •••••••• 
174 I do you know what happens? 
, 
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175 C oh well you need it's I suppose it's like the 
260 mirror I mean •• you need •••••• you see if with 
a hand lens you can burn paper and things can't 
you with pure sunlight you can't do it with 
electric lights on a hot day you can •• I don't 
know whether you're catching rays or whatever but 
you can •• sort of • fiddle about with the lens 
265 higher and lower ••• and you can get ••• pure light 
almost • and it gets so hot that it just burns 
straight throught the paper and it can go through 
sort of • burn varnish off desks and things as well 
17~ I get away really 
177 C yea Iboth laugh/ I •• I've seen it at home once 
/both laugh/ burning a bit of paper and-r-burnt 
the varnish on my desk as well 
178 I I mean is that the light that's doing that or is 
that is that the heat? 
270 179 C well it's ••• aqain that's that's the difficult 
part about the difference between light and heat 
276 
••• I mean I've •• I've never s • although ••• 
you ••••• no I was just thinking those things I 
mean you can buy these things now that are • hand 
held. heaters theY're meant to be I was just saying 
they I was thinking to myself they don't give off 
light but I suppose if you take them ••• apart 
there's got to be a ••• piece of wire that's heating 
up inside maybe it's not •• hot enough to see 
that it's light but I suppose under a real1¥really 
dark ••• situation you would be able to tell •••• 
or if you just charged the electricity up a bit 
more • then it would go • you know and light up 
sort of like electric fire or something 
180 I it would be glowing? 
278 181 C yea or pieces of it would be anyway 
182 I how how do they work have they got a battery in 
them have they? •••• and then a little sort of 
183 C no I think it's a dynamo •• it's more or less the 
same and you've got to hold it like this • rub 
it up /e demonstrates with an imaginary onel and 
281 then it gives off the electricity and it warms up, 
the •• filament 
184 I and then it just keeps you hands warm 
185 C yea.. it's not very good but •••• I suppose if 
, 
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283 
287 
292 
186 I 
187 C 
188 I 
189 C 
190 I 
191 C 
you you know really went mad with the dynamo you 
could get it • to light up but I mean that's not 
likely but •• then that's 
to put it in your 
electricity 
pocket or something is it and then 
no you hold it in your hands it's meant to keep 
your hands warm 
oh oh I see is it worry go on 
but this is a •••••••• I mean. that's elec that's 
electric again that's sort of artificial light •• 
pure sunlight. I've never s I mean ••• all light 
is artificial apart from the sun I should imagine 
oh I don't know if you can call you can't really 
call fire artificial it gives off light and heat 
I mean then but. then again •• we suppose ••• that 
the sun is just burning off hydrogen allithe time 
which is then fire • which then you could call 
it natural light 
192 I what are you thinking of when you say natural light 
if it's not the sun and it's not urn? 
193 C I don't know I think I suppose. 
194. I what's the natural sort? 
195 C I mean all light all the lights really we're used 
to are electric •• and you can't call it's man-
295 made isn't it it's not natural it's not •• I mean 
if •• if we didn't have the technology to make 
electric liqht bulbs ••• I mean it'd be dark in the 
d in night apart from certain things then aqain 
you've qot fires and candles and things which is 
•••• you know very closely related to the sun 
196. I hum ••• so which one would be the natural one and 
which one would • would? 
197. ewell .I'd I'd call I WOUldn't call anythinq you know 
• charged with electricity naturalit's just heating 
up a filament • and qetting the gas • around the / 
filament. to brighten up •••••• urn •••••• so I 
but I mean obviously I don't know may be you could 
I've I've never seen anybody. sort of set a piece 
of paper alight of a hand lens from a ••• fire •• 
a coal fire or anything •• but then again it's not 
you know it's not as intense as the heat from the sun 
, 
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307 so it's I don't know I suppose light and heat are 
very very closely related then •• if you're talk-
ing you know in sort of natural form ••• hum .• 
it's difficult to think of something like snow 
having to do with you know I'm and sort of walking 
out there as having anything to do with light • 
you know you there you're 
198 I what are you thinking about sort of .? 
199' C • but then again I mean •• or or this thing here 
the radiator for instance yea •••••• you see this 
312 radiator is warm is because somewhere • in this 
school I don't know whether it's •• an oil burner 
I I doubt if it's coal it's probably oil ••••• 
heating the water and it's the only reason they're 
warm 
200 I and wherever that, is • there's going to be some 
light? 
201 C yea because um something's obviously burning ••• 
and it will produce light 
L02 I I see I see 
317 203 C urn ••• I mean snow •• snow's obviously •••• very 
.~ •• cold to be in but it's also very briqht •• 
but that's only because it's pure white and it's 
giving off reflections from the sun 
204. I I see uhurn uhurn 
205; C but a hand lens I don't I don't 
206 I yea it's a hard one isn't it? 
207- C yea it's a difficult one I mean it's not ••• I 
doubt you can't use it without light ••• and you 
can also produce heat with it • well it's not 
producing heat it's sort of • enlarding or intens-
ifying the heat from the sun • 
324 208 I •••••••• good yea I mean again 
209- C I wouldn't. I don't know it's •• it's difficult 
it's like the mirror I mean. without light it's 
obviously totally useless ••• yet ~ it it's " 
difficult to explain so I'll put it with the mirror 
210' I okay good ••• maybe now's the time to ask you. 
you know what you think light is I mean you you 
said something before that you~hink it's it's got 
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waves or something • how would you how would you 
describe it to somebody I mean? 
211 C I don't well. if I was describing it to somebody 
I don't know. I'd sayer •••• obviously you wouldn't 
be able to see without light •• so there's obviously 
334 some •••••• -nerves • or you know •• something in 
your head •• in your brain nerves that um react to 
light very strongly. and colour ••• um •••• then 
you. wh when you're say when you're talking about 
waves you get you know to the sort of contro •• 
controversy of the speed of light • and when some-
body says the speed of light I mean obviously we 
don't know wh what it'd be like to travel at the 
340 speed of light but people have got different theories 
I mean I think •• if you ever got to the speed of 
light you'd end up like a light wave it'd break 
you up and then as you slowed down and slowly • 
I suppose I don't •• I mean the television this 
television set. one I mean obviously it's. the 
waves are travelling at the speed of light •• as 
far I mean. I don't know I suppose they're travel-
ling at the speed of light •• because I mean •• 
348 it is light you you could say and it's got to be 
travelling at the speed of light and as it slows 
it I mean as it hits the urn aerial • and gets into 
the circuitry it slows it down and puts it back 
onto its original form •• I don't know I've never 
really sort of thought for a long time about that 
• light. and the •• speed of light 
214 I ••• well why do you think the speed is important 
I mean? 
353 213 C well I don't know it's going so fast that it's 
breaking •••• I don't know well they s I mean •• 
there's all this about splitting the atom maybe 
• maybe it's the atoms that are •• splitting. 
but you know they're not ••••• not react~ng •• 
as we found with nuclear bombs splitting the atom 
••• I suppose it's splitting up • and then re-
359 forming not actually •• breaking. just splitting 
into bits. so that it's tran • well it's I don't 
light light !! transparent • you can see through 
it ••••• urn ••••••• yea I mean obviously no nobody 
really ••••••• and truly knows. 
364 214 .. I hum ••••• which makes it a bit of an unfair question 
215. C yea /laughs/ 
216. I for you /laughs/ I mean. but I mean you've got this 
feeling that it it that it's it's travelling very 
fast. 
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217 C • yea. 
218 I and that the 
219 C definitely 
220 I speed of the speed of light is important and that 
the sort of pictures we were talking about (*) 
for instance on the television before 
221 C yea 
222 I are gOing at the speed of light? 
369 223 well they ~ before they actually I suppose 
224 I until they get to the television 
225 C yea and then it's like the screen I mean •• the 
projector's throwing it out at the speed of light 
because obviously light will move at the speed of 
light and then ••••• just sort of abruptly hitting 
373 this screen and stopping •••• throwing the image 
keep and then going back to its original image 
it's like a barrier I suppose. whereas the tele-
vision just slows it down 
226 I aha so something like the screen'll actually. sort 
of • is a barrier 
227 C yea 
228 I and stops it and then • 
229 C but then again if if you was projecting that into 
379 a mirror it wouldn't would it • it'd reflect off 
depending on your angle I mean if you were straight 
on it it'd reflect •• but if you were slightly at 
an angle it'd reflect off somehwere else 
230 I hum •• and what about the lens? 
231 C ••••• well that that this this has come back to 
the hand lens this is bringing it into focus I 
mean it's you've got your p1cture there and you're 
• you've got a light bulb •• behind the picture 
383 • and 1f you just let it go you'd have to you know 
be sort of standing nearer and further. you're / 
straining trying to get it •• in focus and •• it'd 
end up probably beinq very very small ••••••• urn 
, and a lens. depending whether it's convex or con-
cave •• urn ••••••••• makes it bigger or smaller 
and you know nearer or further. depending what you 
want 
, 
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390 232 I that's interesting actually I mean well as you 
think about it I mean how can it make it bigger 
I mean does that mean there's sort of ~~ or it? 
233 C it's not ••• you're •• well it's is sort of more 
of it isn't it but obviously the further •• I mean 
•. for instance that coat there. I can see it 
quite big now but if I was um .•••.•• five hundred 
yards away •• it'd look small 
396 234 I yea •••••••• but if you put a lens in front of it? 
235 C yea but then again it depends what lens it is 
doesn't it I mean if it was a hand lens if if you 
didn't have a lens in your projector you just had 
your. light here •• and urn and your slide or 
399 whatever you're film or whatever then you could 
fiddle about going backwards and forwards with 
your hand lens •• lens and eventually get it into 
focus and because of the shape of the urn hand 
lenses ••• it'd it breaks it sort of pushes it 
outwards •• and makes it bigger. well enlarges 
it I wouldn't say makes it bigger cos it's. 
the same picture • and then obviously if you go 
too far back •• it's going to you're not going 
to get a clear picture anyway no matter what you 
do • it's going to be faded 
406 236. I doesn't that mean that when it's gone through the 
lens you've got ~ than there was beforehand? 
237 C no it's not more it's just •• spreading it out 
stretching i~. it's not more it's the same 
picture I mean •• I suppose ••• I don't know ••• 
. . . . . . . . . um •• 
238 I yes I see you are getting at I mean it looks as 
411 if you're ~ of getting more when it's 
239 C but •• but you're not no 
240 I I'm I'm going to I'm going to ••• quickly ask ask 
you about another one what about something like 
that this is to • you know IX-rays L71 
241 C oh •• may be totally different or maybe not I don't 
415 know it depends. something ••• an x-ray 
./ 
242 I yes an x-ray machine 
243 C •• alright. well this is obviously ~ ~ with urn 
••••••• light. and radio-active light •••• I mean 
I I don't really know much about. you know um •• 
radiation •• I mean I've I've had x-rays when I've 
, 
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broken bones or anything 
244 I have you ever seen them afterwards? 
245 C yea 
420 246 I hum and you can actually sort of see like a white 
shape where your elbow 
247 C yea 
248 I where your where your bones were or whatever it is 
that 
249. C yea 
250_ I you you've broken yea 
25t C •• um •••••• but I've I've never actually seen 
one like this where you stand behind it and • ah 
yea the only ones I've ever seen like that are sort 
of chest x-ray ones where you actually have to • 
um there's a there's a sort of er a end of the 
box like that and you have to stand with your chest 
426 against it • all it does and but you never see it 
doesn't look like that you don't you don't actually 
you don't see it through the other side 
252 I no no 
253 C no 
254 I you don't no you don't. cos they they they take 
one of those 
427 255 C its just 
256 I sort of you know square plastic sheets 
257 C yea 
258 I things and do it that way • no no here I was just 
259 ewell 
260 I trying to sort of • as a picture 
261 C urn •••••• obviously. what they it's like it's " 
like (*) sort of a camera. I mean a camera's 
obviously got a lot to do with light •• urn •• and 
this is like ••••• a very strong camera •••••• I 
mean I I the ••• most of the x-rays that I've 
actually seen of myself have been of my arm •••• 
and my hand •• and urn •• you know you just sort of 
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437 
440 
• you've got to put your hand down and keep it 
very very still ••• and •• well no • when I've 
had them done of my teeth •• at the orthodontist 
they put they put your the plate in your mouth 
• and then they bring this thing up to you it's 
like. I don't know it's black sort of plastic 
thing you know 
262 I oh it comes to a point 
263 C vea 
Z64 I a bit like a cone 
265 C like a cone yea and they touch it agains~ you and 
you know they stand bacK cos obviously they can't 
be • in contact with the radiation too. often • 
444 • and they press it and. I don't know I suppose 
it gives off a very limited amollnt of the radiation 
•••••• and whatever's in front •• oh I don't know 
•• Is • yea. you see they're always when I've 
had them done the um plate's always been it's never 
actually been behind me ••• behind the set of my 
teeth 1t'S always been in front •••••• I don't 
know why 
266' I yes I know what you mean because • 
267 C because I 
268 I they put it in 
269 C I think 
451 270 I between they put 
271 C they have to 
272 I it inside your gum don't they 
273 C yea •.• by your gum and I I think they'd have to 
• really thinking about it. put it behind to get 
the picture of the tooth ••• underneath the gum 
but then I'm not sure. oh see that's that's a 
very difficult matter. 
274 I it is isn't it 
275 C I've never really thought of that before 
456 2-76 I • well has that got umh just to just bring you 
back a bit has that got anything to do with light 
at all I mean that sort of camera? 
, 
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277 C yea I'd say it has yea because the urn •••.•• 
radio active particles •••.• are urn assumably 
462 giving off light •••• and urn ••••• hitting this 
um •• paper or whatever that's very sensitive to 
the light •••• and ••••• giving you an image which 
you've then got to develop and you can see it 
278 I I suppose what made me think was what you said 
before that that that that light was translucent 
that you can see through it • and and I was thinking 
of seeing through things that's why I thought of 
that •• 
279 C •• yea urn ••••••••••• yea. that's that's a good 
point actually if you I mean you can see through 
•••• and that is helping you see through •• yea 
but that I mean. that's again I mean we if we 
hadn't. you know ••• discovered anything •• about 
radiation well you know or radio activity •• we'd 
never know about x-rays • then again I suppose 
sort of • x-rays • once people have discovered 
about. radium and radio activity I suppose that's 
just sort of • an enlargement of a camera yo~ know 
on a sort of diff ••••••••• 3-D scale you could say 
280 I when you were talking about the the hand lens you 
were talking about collecting rays of light •• 
you weren't sure but you thought it could be some-
thing like rays of light I mean does that is x-ray 
anything to do with rays of light •• I mean is the 
ray the sort of same thing in that? 
486 2'81 C well I 
2'82 I well what would you say a ray was put it that way. 
283 C ••••••••••••••• well if you've got a torch it gives 
off a beam . and I suppose • a beam is made up of 
• millions and millions of • rays •• like waves .• 
single lengths ••• like a piece of rope I mean •• 
a piece of rope • is quite thick usually I mean 
even the thin pieces but they're made up of very 
you know loads and loads of verv very thin strands 
and I suppose it's like that you know you get very 
thin strands •• and you've just got to build them 
497 up and make ••••••• yea •• and make urn beams. get 
single rays. but I don't know x-ray ••• I mean 
that's. I don't •• I don't think that's a very / 
apt name for the thing. because I • I mean ••••• 
••• obviously you know •••• there are rays ••• of 
radio activity or • radio active light • passing 
through your body hitting this ••••••••••• see wh 
• I mean ••• oh see this is • this is confusing me 
now cos when you stand up against these chest ones 
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510 and you know they they click the thing • thinking 
about it now I think to myself why aren't you in 
front of it ••• to get one of your chest why are 
you in front of the urn • thing standing back to it 
• then the radio activity is passing through your 
bones and then hitting the film.' giving an image 
but this isn't if you sort of ••• 
2&4 I is it a bit like back to the tooth one again? 
285 C yea 
517 286 I where the where it seems to be in the wrong place? 
287 C yea that's right it seems it seems all to be in 
the wrong •••••••••••••••••• although •••••• I 
can't really remember I sup. if if I suppose •• 
wh I've sometimes I've when I go to an orthodontist 
• you know to find out about my teeth you lay you 
you have to sit on a chair and keep your head 
525 laid down on a plate to get you know the sort of 
whole jaw effect • and they put this plastic thing 
here. so the radiation's passing through you and 
then going on to the plate • so I suppose on this 
they probably put the ••• thing •• oh of course 
it is you've got the plate underneath you for 
instance on my arm • and then the radiation goes 
531 through it's still the same. so I suppose on this 
one they'd put the urn • thing that gives off the 
radiation on your back and it's sort of giving off 
a light a very sensitive light that the plate can 
pick up •• and producing an image on the other side 
288 I • hum. so you've got a feeling then it it 
289- C then it .!.! light 
290 I it could be? 
536 291 C yea I suppose it is light •••••••• urn • yea 
292. I okay then let's stick that one somewhere and let's 
look at another one are there • are are these more 
difficult or easier than some of the others I mean 
/from other interviews/ •••••••••• are are you 
finding 
293 C • it's I don't I find it difficult I mean. just I 
542 sort of sitting here thinking about it's quite 
good because • you know sometimes you think of 
things •• that you haven't thought of before er • 
I'll put this •• I don't know. I'll just. put 
it • on its own /not with the other cards/ 
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294 I •••••••• let's jump those for a minute and how 
about how about something like that that . 
295 C •••••••.•••• sun-bathing /L8/ 
296 I attractive picture though isn't it? 
29~ C yea (both laugh) great I can't also can't work 
out how a stick man's got bones like that 
551 298 I (laughs) I mean that one's (both laugh) that one's 
actually sort of like a bit of a cartoon isn't it 
299 C yea 
300 I you know where you've got the sort of the (laughs) 
I didn't know how else to draw it I mean (laughs). 
301 C •••• er someone sun-bathing ••••••• that's obviously 
a lot to do with. light and heat together •••• 
I mean. the sun gives off. not only •• light as 
we know it • from an electric light just • light 
on its own I suppose light from an electric light 
562 is virtually pure ••• but light from the sun. is 
mixed with all sorts of other lights you know • 
ultra violet light and ••• radio active light 
I suppose and that's I don't know I think it's the 
ultra violet light that browns you 
) 302 I hum •••••••• I mean how does it do that I mean 
what were you thinking of? 
303 C ••••••• well this is again heat 
304 I does it do it normally on your hand when you're 
out sort of walking around every day? 
570 305 C •• I don't know your. your hands are sort of ••• 
obviously urn •••• because it's not hot enough. 
like it's got to be • hot enough and bright enough 
although I don't know you I mean •• I've been to 
Switzerland ski-ing and it's very cold. and yet 
you come back with a sun-tan •••• 
306 I •• you've been to Switzerland ski-ing 
579 307 C yea and you come back with a sun-tan I mean • only 
on your face and the back of your hands and your / 
arms if I I sometimes I used to walk around in 
the hotel or whatever in a T-shirt •• and then you 
, I you know I came back with a sun-tan but obviously 
that's. the sun is • there's har • there's when 
I was there there wasn't a cloud in the sky ••• 
and the sun was very very strong but it wasn't hot 
, 
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it was still very cold ••• and um ••.••••••••.• 
•• and. the um light reflecting. off the sun 
• oh um off the snow •• because the snow's you 
593 know. virtually like a mirror •••••••• was giving 
um •• giving me the burn 
596 
603 
308 I do you actually get an image in snow? 
309 C no 
310 I I mean you said it's like a mirror 
311 C I mean •• if you polish it down to ice then you 
can but then again snow and ice is different I 
mean then it's not really the same you don't get 
an image it's not ••• it's you're not it's not 
like an im a mirror because you know. it's like a 
mirror because it's reflecting something not just 
because you can see your face in it and it's refl-
ecting something •• and I don't know r .. this is 
• what. as I said (*) you know I think •• light 
and heat are very very ••••• closely •• together 
312 I yea •• but which one is actually dOing the sun 
tanning you're not ~ure? 
313 C well I don't it's I'm not sure 
314 I when you say burn do you mean sun ~ 
315 ewell .you don't always get burnt I mean you usually 
611 go brown ••• some people do burn and go red but 
it's not really a ~ it's a tan •• I mean it's 
just •••••• well I don't know I mean •••••••••••• 
I suppose hitting a white person it's reflecting 
•••••• yet hitting a black person it's absorbing well 
620 .0. I mean obviously that's why black people come 
from hotter climates originally 
316 I hum ••• well can a can a black person get a suntan? 
317 C •••• no that's oh that's a difficult question I 
suppose. they can •• I don't know you always feel 
better somehow. you know if you're sun tanned 
you always feel well usually it feels better I 
mean obviously •• it relaxes you and. I don't 
630 know (*) I suppose if it's ultra violet rays. it 
could be sort of re-charging your body •••••• an~ 
dOing something to your body cells I mean I don't 
know if a black person get a can get as I suppose 
they can yea urn ••••• but then again it obviously 
depends what part of the world they originated from 
I mean my theory is • I mean it may sound a bit 
638 silly but a black people that are living in this 
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country now as the generations are going on I 
mean you can notice it visually they're slowly get-
ting lighter and lighter whether they've had 
you know.. a white person in their family at 
any time they. whether they have or haven't they're 
644 slowly getting lighter and lighter because of our 
climate ••• and they're saying at the moment. 
that we're going to have snow like this for the 
next ten years anyway • in the winter 
318 I and you imagine people get paler and paler? 
319 C yea and er •••••• I mean unless you know •• you 
go to • Jamaica or • somewhere really hot for a 
month. month every year then it'd keep you sort 
of ••••• in trim I mean •• I don't know ••• some 
656 •• it's different it's a difficult thing thinking 
of a sun tan (you know I mean?) you can't tell 
whether it's the •• I mean you can't get a tan 
from an electric light •• but. you can now you 
buy. sun ray lamps. they're giving off ultra 
violet light and that does brown you •••••• so 
it's definitely something to do with ultra violet 
rays 
664 320 I okay wh what about something like that one • 
/candle L6/ 
321 C I don't know this is the thing it's a candle •• 
you can obviously get ••• it's giving off light 
because it's •• a flame ••• and it's. I mean it 
671 gives off heat as well well a candle will only 
give off a bit of heat ••• 
322 I •••• oh yea you can actually burn yourself when 
vou stick your hand on top of it 
323 C yea. but I mean it's not enough to sort of if 
you're freezing cold to huddle round the candle 
675 but you can obviously burn yourself yea ••••••• 
urn •••••••••• but it 
324 I can I ask you another question ••• does it make 
a difference to the candle whether it's whether 
it's day or night? •••••• if you stand away from it? 
325 C yea ••••• I see what you mean no it doesn't does 
it • it doesn't make a • blind bit of difference / 
to a candle whether it's day or night ••••••• I 
688 mean at it at night obviously it will shine out 
, brighter. because there's no other light. around 
•• but it during the dav 
(end of tape) 
• 
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Appendix VI The 'Energy' Authentication Questionnaire 
, 
, 
On the following pages you will find some of the sorts of things that 
young people in school might say about the word energy. Their 
discussions of energy have been summarised by seven different statements, 
one on each page. I would like to know how you react to each statement. 
Under each one, are same extracts from their talk that could be examples 
of the statements. There are a~so some pictures of what is being 
talked about. 
Please read each statement and write a brief note of your reactions in 
response to the following three questions: 
Do you find it believable? That is, do you think these are the 
sorts of things that young people would say? 
Is it sensible? Does it make sense for someone to talk about 
energy this way? 
Is it a useful way to talk about energy? 
Statement 1 
'The person.has got a lot of energy in that one. 
I mean, he can push it the whole way up to the 
top of the hill. But once the box is there it 
can't do anything, so the box definitely hasn't 
got any energy, whereas the person can walk 
back down.' 
'They (the two reacting chemicals) have energy 
in them. I mean they don't go around talking 
to things, but I mean they've got energy in 
them. So I suppose in their own sort of way 
they are living.' 
Is the statement believable? 
Does it make sense? 
Is it useful? 
peOPle] 
-Pushing a heavy box up a hill 
A chemical reaction 
Statement 2 
~-----~.-.... -.-~~ 
Some things are a source of energy. Other things need 
energy, which they can get from a source. 
don't need energy at all. 
Some things 
'Well, the battery has got energy, the bulb 
needs it. The wires well they're 
just ordinary wires, aren't they?' 
'The energy is in the person, he's using up 
energy, in his arms, legs, and muscles. 
The sledge doesn't have any energy. No, 
it's all in the person.' 
Is the statement believable? 
Does it make sense? 
Is it useful? 
, 
----
"I'~ 
A battery, bUlb and s~itch 
Sledging down a hill in the snow 
, 
Statement 3 
I Energy I effect is an ingredient in things. when something else happens 
'Well there's energy in things, but it needs another 
form of energy to make it come out. It's like a 
seed, it's got energy inside it to grow but it needs 
the sun to make it happen.' 
'One chemical needs another chemical to make it 
react and for it to have energy.' 
Is the statement believable? 
Does it make sense? 
Is it useful? 
A flower in a pot 
A chemical reaction 
, 
Statement 4 
I Energy is things happening I 
-----------------
'I think energy is a fire burning, a 
telephone ringing, chemicals frothing, 
people running, that sort of thing.' 
~----------------~-----
Two people colliding as they run 
'The bell would be doing energy as well, 
and the ticking of the clock, that would 
be energy.' 
Is the statement believable? 
Does it make sense? 
Is it useful? 
, , 
An alarm clock 
, 
S·~~~tement 5 
The energy that I :nergy is being made all the time. 
is made is then either used or given off. 
-------------- ----------- -- -------
'Sugar and glucose produce energy in the body. 
It's the body that makes the energy, it is 
things in the body that make it from the food. 
And then you use it up.' 
'Chemical reactions, they produce a lot of 
energy. If they are violent ones they give 
off a lot of energy too. Chemical energy is 
energy produced by chemicals.' 
Is the statement believable? 
Does it make sense? 
Is it useful? 
Eating a meal 
A chemical reaction 
• 
Statement 6 
Energy is to do 
machines turned 
'Energy has got to make something else work. -
If it was electrical energy then it would 
make something like a tape recorder work.' 
'Oh no, the sledge has no energy. I mean, 
it hasn't got a motor or an engine or 
anything so it hasn't got any energy.' 
Is the statement believable? 
Does it make sense? 
Is it useful? 
A power station 
Sledging in the snow 
Statement 7 
IEnerg-;i~something tha:~~:-flowU~~o~-~::~_e _--~_o ~lac_~. 1 
It can also move from one object to another. 
--------- ~- - -- -"---. 
'Energy comes out from both leads. It comes 
out of the negative end, flows round the 
circuit, encountering the light bulb on the 
way. There it can transfer some of the 
energy, and then goes back to the battery.' 
'Well, the energy goes through him into the 
box. As you push, yOU push the energy into 
the box to make it move.' 
Is the statement believable? 
Does it make sense? 
Is it useful? 
\! 
______ CJ"J~ 
A battery, bulb and switch 
Pushing a heavy box up a hill 
